University of Texas at El Paso

ScholarWorks@UTEP
Open Access Theses & Dissertations
2020-01-01

The Scramble for Texas: European Diplomacy and Imperial
Contest in the Republic of Texas, 1835-1846
Penelope Lea Jacobus
University of Texas at El Paso

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utep.edu/open_etd
Part of the History Commons, and the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Jacobus, Penelope Lea, "The Scramble for Texas: European Diplomacy and Imperial Contest in the
Republic of Texas, 1835-1846" (2020). Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 3071.
https://scholarworks.utep.edu/open_etd/3071

This is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open
Access Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UTEP. For more information,
please contact lweber@utep.edu.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR TEXAS: EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND IMPERIAL CONTEST IN
THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS, 1835-1846

PENELOPE LEA JACOBUS
Doctoral Program in Borderlands History

APPROVED:

Paul Edison, Ph.D., Chair

Brad J. Cartwright, Ph.D.

Samuel Brunk, Ph.D.

Brian Yothers, Ph.D.

Stephen L. Crites, Jr., Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

Copyright ©

by
Penelope L. Jacobus
2020

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Petra and Dirk Jacobus, who have been a source of
unwavering support. Through their encouragement, I have become the first person in my family
to earn a Ph.D.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR TEXAS: EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND IMPERIAL CONTEST IN
THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS, 1835-1846

by

PENELOPE LEA JACOBUS, B.A., M.A.

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO
May 2020

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my gratitude to my advisor and dissertation chair, Dr. Paul Edison,
for his support throughout my research. His commentary, suggestions, immense knowledge,
patience, and enthusiasm have vastly improved this project. I could not have wished for a better
mentor during my time as a Ph.D. student in the History Department of the University of Texas at
El Paso.
I also want to thank Dr. Brad J. Cartwright for serving on my committee. Ultimately, the
inspiration for this project was drawn from one of his courses that I had the pleasure of taking in
2015. His great enthusiasm for my idea served as a motivation to pursue European diplomacy with
the Republic of Texas as my dissertation topic.
My gratitude also goes to Drs. Samuel Brunk and Brian Yothers for serving on my
committee and contributing to this project with their invaluable knowledge on Mexican history
and the history of trans-Atlantic abolitionism, respectively. Through their commentary, I was able
to enrich my study with additional insights and details. I thank Dr. Samuel Brunk in particular for
providing me with a final round of comments before I submitted this dissertation.
I want to thank several others who have contributed to this project: Dr. Charles Martin,
who has given me valuable feedback in the early stages of writing, Dr. Jeffrey P. Shepherd, who
served as Program Director for most of my time as a Ph.D. student, and Gabriel Avila, whose
Spanish classes enabled me to utilise Spanish-language sources in this study.
Penultimately, I thank the staff of the various archives I have consulted, as well as librarian
Claudia Rivers from UTEP’s Special Collections.
Lastly, I want to extend my gratitude to my parents, to whom this dissertation is also
dedicated.

v

Table of Contents

Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... vi
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
The States and Their Interests in the Texian Borderlands ......................................................6
Historiography ......................................................................................................................13
Theoretical Frameworks .......................................................................................................27
Contributions.........................................................................................................................41
Chapter Overview .................................................................................................................44
Primary Source Base .............................................................................................................47
A Note on Terminology ........................................................................................................49
Chapter One – The Most Important State of Spanish America: European Commerce with
Mexico in the Early Nineteenth Century ..............................................................................51
Industry, States, and Markets in the Early Nineteenth Century ............................................53
European Relations with Spanish America...........................................................................59
European Diplomacy and Commerce with and in Mexico ...................................................65
Chapter Two – The Best Part of Mexico: The Agents of, Ambitions for, and Impact of
Informal Imperialism in Texas prior to the Anglo-French Mediation of 1844...................106
The Texas Revolution, Texas Independence, and European Reluctance ...........................107
Europe Moves Toward Recognition ...................................................................................126
Texas, Recognition, and Treaties of Amity and Commerce ...............................................135
Informal Imperialism through Emigration ..........................................................................151
Chapter Three – ‘Part and Parcel of the Law of the Land’: European Responses to the
Presence of Slavery in Texas and Informal Empire............................................................170
Slavery and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century ..........................................173
The British Slave-Trade Treaties As a Tool of British Power ............................................177
Slavery in Texas: A New Slave State .................................................................................187
Continental European Views on Slavery in Texas .............................................................202
vi

Chapter Four – Into the ‘Wilderness’: Native Americans in the Texas Borderlands and Their
Influence on trans-Atlantic Commerce, Finance, Migration, and Conceptualisations of
Race and Civilisation ..........................................................................................................218
European and North American Perceptions of and Interactions with the Comanche
Empire ........................................................................................................................225
Native Americans’ Influence on European Commercial Ambitions in North America .....230
Native Americans, European Colonisation Projects, and European Conceptions of Race 239
Native Americans As a Justification for Texian Independence ..........................................252
Chapter Five – “A Protective Arm to Watch Over Them”: The Development, Discussions,
and Impact of International Law, Free Trade, and Nationalism in North America ............268
German trans-Atlantic Trade and Its Role in Germany’s Growing Unification in the
1830s and 1840s .........................................................................................................271
Texas and the Development of trans-Atlantic Treaties of Commerce ................................293
Prussia’s Mediation Between the United States and Mexico in 1839: Texas and
European Conceptualisations of International Law ...................................................306
Mexico and International Law ............................................................................................319
Chapter Six – Under the Wing of the American Eagle or in the Jaws of the British Lion: An
Analysis of Anglophobia and Anti-British Sentiment on Both Sides of the Atlantic, and
Its Role in the Annexation of Texas to the United States ...................................................330
European Agents’ Awareness of Anglo-American Anglophobia and Jealousies Toward
Continental Europe ....................................................................................................343
France and U.S. Anglophobia .............................................................................................361
The Role of U.S. Anglophobia and French Perceptions of Britain’s Commercial
Prowess in the 1844 Franco-British Mediation Effort Between Mexico and Texas .364
Germany and Anglophobia .................................................................................................369
Chapter Seven – Lone Star Suicide: European Perceptions of Texian Nationalism and the
Search for a Texian Identity ................................................................................................376
“Barely Outgrown Its Diapers”: Texas As a Nation in a State of Infancy .........................379
Texian Nationalism and the Prospect of Annexation .........................................................383
Texian Diplomats’ Formulations of Texian Nationalism ...................................................393
The Republic of Texas and the Division of the U.S.-American Nationality ......................406

vii

Epilogue – Texas: A Vision of Empire ........................................................................................416
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................435
Vita 449

viii

Introduction

The early nineteenth century was marked by tremendous global change, both economic
and political. On the one hand, there were the revolutions for independence in the Americas:
After the American and French Revolutions of the eighteenth century, the faltering of the
Spanish Empire left behind a map of newly-formed states between the years of 1810 and 1825.
Far from being consolidated and stable, however, these new states were geographically and
politically fluid, as the case of Mexico demonstrates. The independence of Mexico was declared
in September of 1821 by the First Mexican Empire, a large state that included the Central
American provinces. Only two years later, the empire was dissolved and replaced with a republic
– this time without the Central American provinces, which formed the Federal Republic of
Central America only to splinter into its constituent member states less than two decades later.1
Border shifts also occurred around the United States, the first American colony to have broken
away from its mother country: Transactions such as the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and the
cession of Florida to the United States through the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819 enlarged the
young nation.
On the other hand, the early nineteenth century witnessed an enormous increase in
European industrial output after the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Europe, with Britain at
the forefront, grew continuously more efficient in its manufacturing and industry, which incited a
sharp competition: In order to withstand the economic pressure of other countries, European
states believed it necessary to seek steadily and diligently for more markets, more consumers,

See, for example: Jordana Dym, “Citizen of Which Republic? Foreigners and the Construction of National
Citizenship in Central America, 1823-1845”, The Americas, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Apr., 2008), pp. 477-510, or David
Chandler, “Peace Through Disunion: Father Juan José de Aycinena and the Fall of the Central American
Federation”, The Americas, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Oct., 1989), pp. 137-157.
1
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more raw materials. The political change of the Americas and the economic change of Europe
met with lasting and significant consequences beginning in the 1810s, when Europeans sought to
expand commercially into the former Spanish colonies, where trade had been regulated and
restricted by Spain. The emerging young Spanish American states were generally less stable and
established than their European counterparts and void of substantial industries of their own.
Spanish America became a place for negotiation, competition, and imperialism, where the
European need for raw materials and markets for their manufactured goods intertwined with the
Spanish American need for foreign recognition, stability, and consumption.
This politically and economically contested space continued to change throughout the
1830s and 1840s, when a new republic declared its independence in the northern part of former
Spanish America: Texas. After defeating Mexican troops under the leadership of General and
President Antonio López de Santa Anna at the Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836, the
Texian government was met with many of the same challenges that its Spanish American
counterparts had experienced only fifteen to twenty-five years prior: although the Texian
government sought to instill its state with more legitimacy through the Treaties of Velasco,
which had been signed by the captured Santa Anna though never ratified by the Mexican
government, its representatives soon realised that Texas needed foreign recognition as well as
economic and financial partners in order to survive in a global order increasingly defined by
trade and one’s commercial prowess – rather than mercantilist policies imposed upon one’s
colonial possessions, the new order began to focus increasingly on free trade.2 Internationally
stranded after the United States refused immediate annexation due to the powder keg of slavery,
which incited both Democrats and Whigs to refrain from incorporating the large area of Texas
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The Treaties of Velasco (May 14, 1836) in The US-Mexican War: A Binational Reader, ed. Christopher Conway
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2010), 24.
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into the Union, the young republic looked to Europe, where eyes had fallen on the new American
state as an economic, political, and imperial tool.
Rather than centring this story solely on that of the Republic of Texas as a sovereign
state, this dissertation desires to build on previous scholarship which has analysed the Texas
region as an imperial borderland, or as Andrew J. Torget calls it: “a central crossroads for
overlap, collusion, and conflict between various powers – not only Mexico and the United States,
but also Indian nations and European countries”.3 The independence of Texas was not
guaranteed; annexation to Mexico or the United States both seemed possible. In the 1830s and
1840s, territorial sovereignty was fluid in Texas: depending on the perspectives of the observers
of this region, it could be considered as its own republic, the North American Southwest, the
Mexican North, or la Comanchería. Boundary disputes plagued all three of North America’s
republics, and another actor, the Comanche Empire, did not recognise these nationally drawn
lines beyond their use toward Comanche benefit.4 The combined actions of Europeans,
Americans, and Native Americans shaped the territorial claims and possibilities of tribes such as
the Apaches, but also states themselves, such as Mexico or Texas, who could only lay a nominal
claim to those parts of their territories where Comanches resisted and overwhelmed Texian and
Mexican power. Imperial contestations centring around commerce, politics, and settlement
elicited a redefinition of the fluid concept of race: Diplomats attempted to categorise racially the
various groups present in Texas using terms such as “Anglo-American” and “Anglo-Saxon”,
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Andrew J. Torget, Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands, 1800-1850
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), xii.
4 “Nationally drawn” refers here to boundaries originated and accepted by European states, as well as those nations
recognised by Europeans as such, including Mexico and the United States. As chapter five on international law
showcases, Indian nations were not recognised by international law, developed predominantly by Europeans, as
nations possessing the same rights as others. As chapter four demonstrates, many diplomats from the United States,
Texas, Mexico, and European states viewed the Comanches as savage or uncivilised.
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“Mexican” and “Latin”, or “Indian”.5 The German desire for settlement in Texas also incited
racial debates on the resistance and persistence of the Germanic race vis-à-vis Native Americans
and Anglo-Americans. The extreme fluidity of the Texas region can also be noticed in legal
disputes, such as the Prussian effort to mediate between Mexico and the United States over U.S.American reclamations. The Prussian umpire struggled to define the national, political, and
economic circumstances of the region due to its changeability.
The story that this dissertation analyses is the attempted European penetration of the
North American borderlands during the independence of the Texas Republic. It will analyse how
the independence of Texas ties into new forms of imperialism exercised by Europeans and U.S.Americans during the first half of the nineteenth century, a time when shifting ideas about
freedom and coercion, international law and rights, civilisation, nationhood, and trade redefined
imperial possibilities. Imperialism in the nineteenth century had to be increasingly compatible
with ideas of freedom and justice, such as free trade, free labour and the use of fair legal tenets in
the conduct among nations and diplomacy to solve international conflicts. Emigration projects
and settler colonialism were also understood as more “humane” and acceptable forms of
imperialism.6 The imperial presence in Texas of European and North American states was
largely of an informal nature. Neither Britain nor France sought to incorporate Spanish American
states or Texas into their colonial possessions; informal imperialism was enacted through subtler
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For racial Anglo-Saxonism, see Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial
Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), in particular. Horsman lays out the emergence of a
racial ideology which placed some Europeans as superior to others, with American Anglo-Saxons at the very top of
the racial pyramid. The origins of Anglo-Saxons, the noblest stock of men in this construction, could be traced back
to the Germanic peoples, who travelled westward from the Asian steppes. The ancient German peoples’ pursuit of
self-governance was, in the eyes of American anthropologists, nativists, and pseudo-scientists, tied to their racial
identity, and it was believed that Anglo-Saxons inherited their own independence, initiative and intelligence from
these Germanic peoples.
6 Arguments about enlightened settler colonialism were also made by the French in their conquest of Algeria. See
Jennifer E. Sessions, By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2011).
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means. Using Texas’ dire economic state, its desperate need for foreign recognition, its fear of a
Mexican re-annexation, and its need for both settlers and financial support in the form of loans,
the various European states aspired to incorporate Texas into their realm of influence, making it
an entity that would favour their economic and political needs over those of other European
states without robbing it of its de facto sovereignty.
U.S.-American politicians acknowledged these motives with alarm, and exaggeratedly
viewed British designs in Texas as an effort to ruin the entire North American Union. European
imperialism was thus met with a growing imperialism on behalf of the United States, which
became increasingly vexed by European involvement in the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine,
first issued in 1823 by U.S. President James Monroe, was initially intended as a warning against
European imperialism.7 By the era of Texas Independence, however, the Monroe Doctrine had
also turned into a tool of U.S.-American imperialism. Interlaced in this conflict was the presence
of Mexico, subjected to European informal imperialism and the object of desire of U.S.
imperialist and expansionary schemes, but also an imperial power itself for it sought to
reintegrate Texas into its federation and crushed several other rebellions within its territory, such

7

The Monroe Doctrine forbade any direct European involvement in the Western Hemisphere, declaring that the
New World would no longer “be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” The
Doctrine was borne partially from the concern that France might possibly intervene in Spanish America through the
restoration of Ferdinand VII in the same year. The doctrine notes that although the United States would not interfere
with existing colonies, if any European power should try to challenge the independence of Latin American republics
that had already ousted Spain, the United States would view this as a violation of the doctrine, and take action to
counter this “manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.” George Canning, Prime Minister
of Great Britain in 1827 and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1822 to 1827, was a supporter of the
budding British policy of free trade as well as the exertion of influence using commerce, and he realised that
interference in former Spanish colonies by any continental European power would hamper British trade. In fact, this
realisation had pushed Canning to push for a bilateral Monroe Doctrine on behalf of both England and the United
States, a proposal that was rejected by the United States, still distrustful of entering into any alliances that might
entangle it too deeply in other nations’ affairs. See: “The Monroe Doctrine”, The Advocate of Peace, Vol. 58, No. 1,
(Jan. 1986), 8-10, Don Agustin Edward, “Speech at the Canning Statue, 1925” in British Documents on Foreign
Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part II: From the First to the Second World
War, Series D: Latin America, 1914-1939, Vol. 3: South America and Mexico, 1920-1924, ed. Philip, George,
(Lanham: Universal Publications of America, 1989), 132, and Elihu Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” The
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 3, (Jul. 1914), 427-442.
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as the independence movements of Yucatan and the Republic of the Rio Grande. Moreover,
Native Americans also constituted an imperial power: As Pekka Hämäläinen shows in his work
The Comanche Empire, Comanche Indians were an incredibly powerful entity with their own
imperial, economic, cultural, and political motives.8 The political landscape of the Texas region
was decidedly uncertain between 1836 and the early 1840s, but one thing was clear: each entity –
be it the United States, Mexico, Britain, France, the Comanches, or smaller states such as those
of the German Confederation – that sought to establish its influence over Texas had to challenge
and contest a varied assortment of other imperial contenders, including the Texians themselves,
for some of their statesmen hoped to build a Texian empire in its own right.
THE STATES AND THEIR INTERESTS IN THE TEXIAN BORDERLANDS
Although my focus is on European states, the North American republics were obviously
important actors. The United States had been home of the Anglo settlers that eventually rebelled
against Mexican rule and proclaimed an independent Texas; it was also the state within which
Texas was incorporated in 1846, and Texian officials maintained close contacts with their U.S.
counterparts. The linguistic, social, and cultural similarities between most Texian settlers and
U.S. Americans, particularly Southerners, are undeniable, and carried tremendous weight given
that the new regime of Texas was one that largely excluded Indians and Mexicans, even those
Tejanos that had supported the secession from Mexico. The United States, though initially eager
to remove or mitigate the Mexican threat of re-annexation of Texas by encouraging Texian
diplomatic ties to European states, became increasingly watchful of the same when it realised the
growing English interest in Texas and the potential of continued Texian independence. As a
burgeoning economic and imperial power, the United States, and especially its supporters of

8

Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
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westward expansion, looked with dismay upon the attempted English expansion of power in
what it regarded as the North American Southwest, of which Texas formed a crucial component.
As the anxiety over British influence in Texas grew, so did the willingness to engage in conflict
with Mexico over the issue of Texas.
Texas independence did not just set the United States on a collision course with Mexico,
but also encouraged Mexican hostilities toward the United States: After Texas seceded from
Mexico, the latter refused to acknowledge the independence of the former, maintaining that
Texas was merely a rebelling constituent territory. This attitude placed the Mexican government
on bad terms with several European representatives, who did not wish to damage their countries’
relations to Mexico yet also held interest in Texas and thus aspired to achieve a policy line that
benefitted their interests in both republics. The principal episode of this European course of
action was the joint Franco-English attempt to coax Mexico into formally recognising Texas so
as to eliminate one of the primary reasons why certain political factions in Texas continued to
seek annexation to the United States, fear of Mexican re-annexation. Yet other, less explored
incidents also show that Texas independence influenced European dealings with Mexico. This
includes, for instance, the Prussian mediation between the United States and Mexico in regard to
U.S.-American reclamations brought forth against Mexico in 1839, some of which were
complicated by the fact that damages and loss of U.S.-American property had occurred in Texas
during the Texas Revolution and could thus not readily be connected to the Mexican government
as the perpetrator of these damages. Another instance is the Hanseatic response to GeneralConsul Andreas Negrete’s protest regarding Hanseatic correspondence and commerce with
Texas. Overall, the guiding questions for the Mexican aspects of this research include how

7

Mexico was impacted by European diplomacy with Texas and how Mexican officials sought to
steer European action.
Great Britain is another state whose involvement with Texas is analysed in depth here. As
the nineteenth century’s hegemon and economic-industrial powerhouse, England held vested
interest in many parts of the globe. Britain and France were motivated by several political and
economic factors which were intrinsically tied to their imperialist goals and desire for influence
abroad. An independent Texas, with close to no industry of its own, could become a new
European market, like the former Spanish American colonies after 1820. The sooner one got
involved in Texian trade, the less likely it was that a rival economic power would garner more
advantageous conditions. Texas also seemed like an excellent location for the cultivation of
cotton. Cotton was crucial to European, particularly British, prosperity and power, for the British
economy was built heavily on the textile industry, whose lifeblood was a steady supply of cotton.
Purchasing cotton from Britain’s (and Europe’s) growing economic rival, the United States, was
not considered optimal by some European statesmen of the era, though it was inevitable given
the lack of other viable locations for cotton cultivation (and did indeed continue through the
U.S.-American Civil War). 9 An independent Texas, Britons hoped, might emerge as a
supplementary or even alternative source to U.S.-grown cotton. Nevertheless, as the key foreign
influence in Latin America after Spain had lost its dominions, British politicians strove to strike a
delicate balance between their interests in Texas on one hand, and in Mexico on the other.
Moreover, the issue of slavery loomed large in British debates on Texas. Though English
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In the British Empire of the early nineteenth century, neither India nor the West Indies were able to produce a
statistically significant amount of cotton. Only a few months after the independence of Texas, British politicians
highlighted that this economic dilemma could be solved if Texas could be established as a cotton grower. Texas’
industrial weakness was hereby not a problem, but rather an advantage: unlike the United States, Texas was a long
way away from becoming an economic rival to Britain. One of the best sources for cotton-related statistics, see
Stuart Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy: 1790-1860 (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1967).
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officials saw economic interests in Texas, they also condemned the presence of slavery therein,
and hoped that an independent Texas could be persuaded to abolish the practice.10 If Texas could
moreover be convinced that it did not need to be annexed to the United States to achieve political
stability and a measure of economic prosperity, it would also stand as a protective buffer
between the unstable Republic of Mexico and the United States, the emerging imperialist rival of
the French and British.
England’s ally in Texian affairs, at least as concerns the attempts to garner Mexican
recognition of Texas, was France, which harboured similar economic motives in conducting
diplomacy with Texas. The cultivation of cotton and the presence of other raw materials,
combined with the lack of industry and manufacturing in Texas made it a promising target for
European, including French, markets. Furthermore, the French policy line in Texas was
influenced profoundly by events in Mexico. The so-called ‘Pastry War’ of 1838-1839, fought
over reclamation claims, caused Franco-Mexican relations to slide to a nadir, and motivated
France to recognise Texas in 1839, two years before the British.11 Racial ideologies and the idea
of Pan-Latinism, a unification or solidarity among people who speak Romance languages such as
the French, Italians, Spaniards, and Spanish Americans, also shaped French discussions on
Texas, which was seen as a place where a war between two races – Anglo-Saxons and Latins –
was being fought out as a result of the growing imperialism and settler expansionism on behalf
of the Anglo-Saxons.12
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A Texian dependence on British manufactured items, so British diplomats believed, would keep Texas under
British influence, enabling Britain to impose its will on the American republic in many areas, a primary one being
slavery. A dependent Texas reliant on Britain could possibly be persuaded into the abolition of slavery, which might
inflame the debate over slavery in Texas’ sister republic, the United States.
11 For a brief summary of the Pastry War and its impact on Mexico’s politics, see Richard Bruce Winders, Crisis in
the Southwest: The United States, Mexico and the Struggle over Texas (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2002), 35.
12 For Pan-Latinism, see Maike Thier, “The View from Paris: ‘Latinity’, ‘Anglo-Saxonism’, and the Americas, as
discussed in the Revue des Races Latines, 1857-1864,” International Historical Review 33, 4 (2011): 627-644.
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Europe’s most dominant powers were not the only ones to recognise and engage in
relations with Texas: Belgium and the Netherlands, the Hanse Towns, and Prussia were all
involved in correspondence with or about Texas and found themselves on the latter’s radar for
achieving foreign recognition. Whereas England and France were Europe’s imperial powers,
both independent states with national identities, sizable economies and financial sectors, and
military and naval resources, the Hanse Towns were almost the opposite. Though the Hanseatic
League had dominated trade in Northern Europe between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, its
importance had greatly diminished by the nineteenth. In fact, of the League’s members, only
three remained by the time Texas became independent: the German city-states of Hamburg,
Bremen, and Lübeck. These city-states were independent entities, yet the aftermath of the
Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna threatened this independence. The Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nation was forced to erase and merge many of its over three-hundred
states in 1803 and was then replaced with the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806, which
represented Napoleon’s consolidation efforts in Germany. In the aftermath of the Congress of
Vienna, Germany was further consolidated into thirty-nine states of the German Bund by 1815.13
Caught within this consolidation effort and between the two great rivals in German affairs,
Austria and Prussia, the Hanseatic cities had reason for concern. In order to highlight the
necessity for their independence, the three towns looked overseas. Trans-Atlantic trade and the
pioneering of German markets in the newly-independent Latin American republics in the 1820s
and 1830s helped underline the significance of Hanseatic independence, for neither Prussia nor
Austria, because of their commitment to the legitimacy of status quo ante regimes, were willing

13

In 1815, the Ninth Act of the Congress of Vienna designated thirty-nine states for inclusion in the German
Federation (including the Hanse Towns), but the ascension to this Federation did not actually happen until states
joined it via the signing of a second treaty. This occurred between 1815 and 1820. Many of the independent cities
joined late, in 1820. Frankfurt, though not a Hanse Town, is also among them.
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or able to engage in large-scale negotiations or trade with the new states across the Atlantic.14
Both Texian and Mexican independence fall into this matter of legitimacy, for Hanseatic trade
with Mexico was unshackled by a necessity to uphold Spain’s authority in Spanish America.
Moreover, only the Hanse Towns engaged in official correspondence with Texas, which they
used to hold their ground in the German Confederation.
Though Prussia never engaged in diplomacy with Texas – Texian agent William Henry
Daingerfield only exchanged a few letters with Friedrich von Rönne, the Prussian chargé in
Washington until 1844 and leader of the Prussian Handelsamt, or Ministry of Commerce, in
early 1845 – it is nevertheless included in this study, perhaps especially for the reason that it, out
of all the European powers analysed here, did not recognise Texas or negotiate any treaties
therewith. That is because the Texian republic became a principal issue in Prussian relations with
Mexico and the Hanse Towns. Affairs within the German Confederation were influenced by the
independence of Texas in several ways. In its dealings with the Hanse Towns, Prussian
politicians acknowledged that Hanseatic connections to the trans-Atlantic world gave the citystates added weight as independent members of the German Bund. Although a stronger
Hanseatic presence in the Federation could be interpreted as a hindrance to Prussia’s
consolidation efforts, Prussian officials instead strove to draw their own advantage from

14

Between Austria and Prussia, Prussia emerged as the party more interested in overseas trade, and often worked in
connection with the Hanseates, for Prussia brought a certain measure of political power and the Hanse Towns
brought economic freedom to German trans-Atlantic trade. The other members of the German Federation were not
new states, but given the size of their economies, their political weakness, and heavy financial constraints, they also
encountered difficulties in forming ties across the Atlantic. Combined with the recent political tumult caused by
Napoleon, Europe’s partial restoration through the Congress of Vienna, and the economic threat in the form of the
juggernaut British economy, the German states were at risk of economic instability, and several of them, such as
Saxony and the Hanse Towns, feared for their continued independence. See, for example, Thomas D. Schoonover,
Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821-1929 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1999), chapter one, or Jürgen Prüser, “Die Handeslverträge der Hansestädte Lübeck, Bremen und Hamburg mit
überseeischen Staaten im 19. Jahrhundert,” veröffentl. a. d. Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Band 30,
(1962).

11

Hanseatic trans-Atlantic trade by using it as a way to escape the straitjacket of legitimacy. As
such, the Hanse Towns became a window for German trade into the Americas. Moreover, the
interest of the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas – a society founded in
Mainz in 1842, known as the Adelsverein because its founders were noblemen – also furthered
Prussian interest in the new republic, because the Society approached the Prussian government
for financial backing and official support in the 1840s.15 Lastly, Prussian views on Texas also
serve a useful purpose in this study because they represent at times the opinions of bystanders: as
a power without official ties to Texas, Prussia analysed the policy lines of the various other states
involved – such as Britain, France, the United States, Mexico, and the Hanse Towns – in regard
to a plethora of issues, including slavery and abolitionism, cotton and trade, and international
law.
As the discussion above shows, none of the above-mentioned European states viewed the
Republic of Texas in isolation. Diplomacy with Texas was deeply intertwined with these states’
diplomacy with Mexico, from which Texas had seceded, and the diplomats of one European state
were oftentimes aware of the actions, motives, and plans of the other European states and their
diplomats. Europeans were motivated in two ways by their competition and rivalry: on the one

15

For the smaller states of Europe who, much like Spanish America, suffered under Franco-British economic might,
emigration became a significant factor in establishing oneself on the international stage. Belgium, also a very young
nation having been recognised as independent from the Netherlands in 1831, harboured dreams of its own zones of
influence and potential empire, and regarded Texas as an opportunity to establish such a zone through emigration.
Large Belgian settlements in as well as a potential loan to Texas would strengthen Belgian influence in the
Americas. For more on Belgian-Texian relations, see Pierre Henri Laurent, “Belgium’s Relations with Texas and the
United States, 1839-1844,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Oct., 1964): 220-236. For some
Germans, emigration to Texas was also perceived as an excellent opportunity to augment German power by
establishing German influence in the Americas. Texas, many Germans believed, had too few inhabitants and was
generally too underdeveloped to be capable of assimilating the Germans as was occurring in the United States.
Many German noblemen hoped to turn Texas into a Germany outside of Germany by exporting not primarily goods,
but that which Germany had too much of: people. A German Texas would enable the German Federation to
establish what Britain and France had long had, a zone of influence in the Americas. This idea was most prevalent
among members of the so-called Adelsverein or Verein, the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in
Texas. One of the most recent and complete works on this subject is James C. Kearney’s Nassau Plantation: The
Evolution of a Texas German Slave Plantation (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2010).
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hand, they aspired to outdo, outsell, and outearn their European competitors; on the other, they
also sought collaboration if this secured their own position across the Atlantic or minimised their
risk. German diplomats also worked with other states; for example, Prussian officials received
most of their information on Texas from British, French, Texian, Mexican, or U.S.-American
sources. Though Prussians and Hanseates had a lively correspondence, it is interesting to note
that communication on Texas was sparse between these two German entities: Hanseates feared
conflict with the most potent German state if their negotiations with Texas were uncovered.
Taken together, the correspondence of European officials with their home governments, one
another, as well as with Mexican, U.S., and Texian representatives forms an intricate network
across the Atlantic. Many connections were uni- or bilateral, such as the correspondence of
Frenchman Saligny with his government or Prussian von Gerolt with Mexican politician
Bocanegra. Nevertheless, one can also pinpoint connections between statesmen of several
different states. This diplomatic web did not merely concern itself with the niche subject of the
independence of Texas, a state whose nine years of independence may seem fleetingly
insignificant in retrospect. Rather, this diplomatic web surrounding the young Republic of Texas
engaged directly with some of the era’s pivotal issues, such as slavery and abolition,
international law and ideas of nationhood and civilisation, economics and free trade, and the
nature of Native Americans.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
Given Texas’ secession from Mexico, one can begin to analyse the scholarship on the
Texas Republic with the Mexican perspectives. Andreas Reichstein observes that Mexican
historiography has traditionally analysed the loss of Texas as “the inevitable result of a clash

13

between two cultures – one which was very interested in land, and the other, which was not.”16
Indeed, as the correspondence of Mexican representatives shows, land was not deemed
uninteresting or expendable by Mexico, and formed instead a crucial component to Mexican
definitions of nationality, civilisation, and international law. While Miguel Ángel González
Quiroga has argued that Mexico was limited in its ability to respond to the Texas Revolt by the
material conditions of the federation’s member states, other recent perspectives challenge the
inevitability of antagonism between Anglo settlers and Mexico and the resulting inevitability of
revolution in Texas.17 Sarah Rodriguez argues that the first Anglo-American settlers in Mexican
Texas did not harbour anti-Mexican sentiments when they relocated there. According to her, one
must evaluate the 1820s as a time period when settlers’ nationalistic affiliations were flexible and
motivated by self-interest. Mexico’s political and economic conditions actually suited settlers
and hence attracted them, and Rodriguez writes that it was “Mexican political promise rather
than failure” that enticed immigrants.18 Josefina Zoraida Vázquez has shown how important the
Texas question was to Mexican politics of the time. The desire to regain Texas dominated

Andreas Reichstein, “¿Era realmente inevitable? ¿Por qué México perdió Texas en 1836?”, Historia Mexicana,
Vol. 42, No. 4, In Memoriam Nettie Lee Benson, 1905-1993 (Apr. - Jun., 1993): 867-887, 867.
17 González Quiroga argues that Nuevo Leon was difficult to mobilise in the fight against Texas, for it was a state
heavily dominated by agriculture and poorly developed otherwise; a state in which only a small group held wealth as
well as political power. He labels Nuevo León a “passive actor” in the Texas Revolution, suggesting that its
inhabitants had other concerns that seemed more dire than the distant and abstract threat of Texians revolting, such
as Indian attacks and hunger. This article also highlights how the attitude of one Mexican state could incite hostility
in another: Coahuila accused Nuevo León of not providing enough aid toward the Texas campaign, which furthered
the divide between the states of the Mexican Federation. Miguel Ángel González Quiroga, “Nuevo León durante la
independencia de Texas, 1835-1836”, Historia Mexicana, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Oct. - Dec., 2006): 427-470, see 462-465.
18 Much of the language used by such early Anglo-American-Mexican patriots closely resembles that which was
also used to discuss the United States: William Walker, for example, stated that “With these and a thousand other
advantages I repeat that Mexico cannot fail, under the influence of a wise and liberal government, to become the
greatest nation on earth”. Rodriguez notes that U.S. leaders of the 1810s and 1820s held a different opinion,
however, already thirsting for U.S.-American expansion across the entire continent and believing that the
immigrants into Mexico could be used as agents for this end. Her article changes the narrative of U.S. expansion as
an inevitability and furthermore provides a different perspective on González Quiroga’s claim that Mexico’s loss of
Texas was unpreventable. Sarah K. M. Rodriguez, “’The Greatest Nation on Earth’: The Politics and Patriotism of
the First Anglo American Immigrants to Mexican Texas, 1820–1824”, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 86, Number
1, (2017): 50–83.
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discussions regarding centralism versus federalism and could determine the success or failure of
a new president. As such, this question made the Mexican political landscape incredibly volatile
and unstable. Another significant contribution by Vázquez is her analysis of Texas’
expansionism at the expense of Mexico. Besides mentioning the Texian-Mexican boundary and
border dispute concerning the Nueces River, Vázquez details Texian proposals to Mexico for
sales of land, which amounted to downright Texian expansionism and its own ‘Manifest
Destiny.’19 Some scholarship on Mexican-Texian relations tends not to focus as heavily on
Mexican politics, but more so on Tejanos’ fate in Texas.20
Several works have also detailed contemporary U.S. perspectives on European
imperialism in the Republic of Texas. Justin H. Smith’s The Annexation of Texas was first
published in 1911 and later republished in 1941, and introduced Euro-Texian diplomacy to a
wider audience by incorporating this niche subject in a monograph on the broader history of the
Republic of Texas. It represents one of the first expansive works on the history of the annexation
of Texas and provides an analysis of European designs in Texas through a U.S. lens. In the
preface, he states that five nations - Mexico, Texas, the United States, Great Britain, and France were brought almost to the verge of war as a result of the existence of a new republic on the
continent between 1836 and 1845. Smith notes the potential influence an independent Texas
could have had on future events in the Americas: for Britain, it could have meant the
preservation of British power and Pax Britannica on the entire globe, including the Americas,
and for the United States, this rival republic could have posed a tremendous threat. Had Texas

Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, “The Texas Question in Mexican Politics, 1836-1845,” The Southwestern Historical
Quarterly, Vol 89, No. 3 (Jan. 1986): 309-344.
20 Lack and Negrete consider Texians who remained loyal to Mexico. Paul D. Lack and Sergio Negrete, “Los
tejanos leales a México del este de Texas, 1838-1839,” Historia Mexicana 42, No. 4 (April 1, 1993): 889-917.
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remained independent, the United States might not be the economic and imperial power it is
today.21
In 1985, John H. Schroeder published an influential work focussing predominantly on the
U.S. perspective on the Texas Question. Schroeder demonstrates how the annexation of Texas,
with its associated consequences for American politics and history – the ever-growing, looming
torment of slavery, the increasing and volatile sectionalism in American politics, the subsequent
war with Mexico, and the failure of too many compromises which ultimately almost tore the
nation apart in the 1860s – related to Texas’ diplomacy with Britain. Especially Southern
advocates for annexation argued that Britain was certain to influence Texas: U.S. government
officials spoke of England’s conquest of Texas, California, Mexico, or all three; of Britain’s
imminent plan to coerce Texas into abolishing slavery, which would hamper Southern slavery;
and of the danger Britain posed to the future of the United States. This hysteria over AngloTexian diplomacy has in part been analysed in regard to U.S. politics by Schroeder as well as
Sam W. Haynes, though the question remains whether this Anglophobia extended beyond U.S.
representatives to encompass other European, Mexican, or Texian officials as well. This query
also informed the research of this dissertation.22
Over the past decades, imperialism has emerged as a more central theme in the history of
the North American Southwest. Amy Kaplan highlights that the link between slavery, expansion,
and imperialism has often been denied by U.S.-American politicians, including James K. Polk

Smith wrote his book from a Progressive historian’s standpoint. Many historians of this strain, including
Frederick Jackson Turner, regarded westward expansion as one of the foundations and antecedents of American
democracy, and Smith is no different, viewing U.S. annexation of Texas as necessary and important for American
liberalism and democracy. Justin H Smith, The Annexation of Texas (New York: The Baker and Taylor Company,
1941).
22 John H. Schroeder, “Annexation or Independence: The Texas Issue in American Politics, 1836-1845”, The
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Oct. 1985): 137-164.
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who labelled slavery a domestic, yet not a foreign question. She moreover suggests that Perry
Miller likewise saw the United States as a nation wrapped up in domestic affairs.23 According to
Kaplan, Miller envisioned that “America – once cut off from Europe – can be understood as a
domestic question, left alone, unique, divorced from the international conflicts – whether the
slave trade or the Mexican War – in which that national identity takes shape”.24 Kaplan,
however, emphasises that the “political struggles for power with other cultures and nations” are
“struggles which make America’s conceptual and geographic borders fluid, contested, and
historically changing”.25 Kaplan further underlines the parallels Miller draws between the history
of the United States and the history of the Roman Empire as described by Edward Gibbon,
writing that Miller used the Roman Empire to differentiate “the American republic in its
illimitable capacity for self-renewal and expansion – to always be at the beginning – from the
inevitable decline of Old World empires”.26
Perry’s rejection of American empire, which alludes to European imperialism and
underlines, according to Kaplan, the imperialist nature of U.S. culture and foreign policy, can
also be witnessed in the historiography on the Republic of Texas. Though his work is entitled
Dream of Empire, John Edward Weems does not refer to the region occupied by the Republic of
Texas between the years of 1836 and 1845 as imperial. Weems had in 1971 considered the
secession of Texas from Mexico an “inevitability”, suggesting that Mexican observers in the
1830s and 1840s had held the same belief. In order to underline his point, Weems utilised a

Kaplan and others looked at “the multiple histories of continental and overseas expansion, conquest, conflict, and
resistance which have shaped the cultures of the United States and the cultures of those it has dominated within and
beyond its geopolitical boundaries”, including “European colonization, slavery, westward expansion, overseas
intervention, and cold war nuclear power”. Amy Kaplan, “’Left Alone with America’: The Absence of Empire in the
Study of American Culture” in Cultures of United States Imperialism, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 4.
24 Kaplan, 7.
25 Kaplan, 15.
26 Kaplan, 9.
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quote from Mexican Secretary of War José María Tornel y Mendívil, who had declared in 1837
that “the prevailing thought in the United States of America has been the acquisition of the
greater part of the territory that formerly belonged to Spain”. Despite Weems’ acknowledgement
of the U.S.-American desire for expansion, he does not in his book identify it as imperial in
nature. In fact, his use of Tornel’s quote seems to suggest that Weems did not regard U.S.
expansion as necessarily imperial, for he highlights that Tornel continued that the United States
“has been neither an Alexander nor a Napoleon, desirous of conquest in order to extend its
dominions or add to his glory, who has inspired the proud Anglo-Saxon race in its desire, its
frenzy to usurp and gain control of that which rightfully belongs to its neighbors; rather it has
been the nation itself which(…) has swept away whatever has stood in the way of its
aggrandizement”.27
Several authors have sought to increase the variety of imperial actors in Texas. Brian
DeLay and Pekka Hämäläinen both focus on the influence of Native Americans in the region,
highlighting how they shaped the imperial designs of European and American powers. DeLay
points out that the raids of Native Americans, particularly the Comanches, were instrumental in
causing the instability of the Mexican frontier, finances, political arena, and economy.
Hämäläinen targets the policies, geographic extent, and power of the Comanches, referring to
theirs as an ‘empire’ in its own right. The Comanche empire challenged several regimes,
including the Texian, Mexican, and U.S.-American ones, and formed a stumbling block for
European imperial schemes and diplomatic missions. What the Comanche empire brilliantly
showcases, given that it was an empire without set political boundaries, is that imperialism did
not merely rely on colonialism, but could instead also be elicited through other means. The

27

John Edward Weems, Dream of Empire: A Human History of the Republic of Texas, 1836-1846 (Fort Worth:
Texas Christian University Press, 1971 and 1986), 7-8.
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Comanches’ empire was largely one that held power through commerce and trade, military
action, and culture.28
More recent works have also sought to connect the North American imperialist landscape
to larger contemporary themes, such as slavery. Roger G. Kennedy’s 2013 monograph, Cotton
and Conquest: How the Plantation System Acquired Texas, focusses on the history of Texas
cotton and how cotton became central to Texas’ economy especially upon gaining independence.
Kennedy aims to make his narrative a transnational one, and incorporates European powers’
need for cotton and desire for the abolition of slavery during the time period of independent
Texas. The first third of this work, labelled “The Transnational System” in reference to the
legacy and impact of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, details Britain and France’s support for
Texian independence against the desires of both Mexico and the United States due to surmised
economic advantages to be plucked in Texas. Kennedy also showcases that Texian officials were
aware of England’s aim to prevent the annexation of their republic to the United States as well as
U.S. fears of British involvement in Texas, which the Texian government used to barter for
support from both states.29
Torget’s Seeds of Empire is another such work, in which he argues that the “powerful
economic and political forces swirling throughout the northern Atlantic world crashed into one
another during the first half of the nineteenth century, swept across North America, and

28

Raids served as both a retaliation against foes as well as an economic tool, for stolen goods were resold or
bartered with a variety of other groups, including Mexicans, U.S.-Americans, Texians, Europeans, or other tribes.
Moreover, this trade often occurred according to Comanche terms. As Spanish officials observed, Mexican villagers
sometimes dressed in Comanche attire in order to trade with Comanches, which demonstrates both the connection
between trade and culture as well as between culture and imperialism. Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire and Brian
DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexico War (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2008).
29 Kennedy’s interest in European-Texian relations during the independence period is mostly contextual in nature,
for he considers it through the lens of socio-economic and political consequences for Texas in the form of the
slavery-plantation system and the Civil War. See: Roger G. Kennedy, Cotton and Conquest: How the Plantation
System Acquired Texas (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2013).
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transformed Mexico’s northeastern frontier into the western edge of the southern United States.
That process would, in time, redistribute power on the continent”.30 Torget also highlights the
paradox of nineteenth-century abolitionism: just at a time when slave labour was more profitable
than ever due to the influence and lucrativeness of cotton, anti-slavery sentiments began to rise
throughout the Western world. The resulting polarization that occurred in the United States has,
as Torget suggests, often been evaluated domestically, i.e. with a focus on the internal
developments of the country rather than on global forces and themes. This the author seeks to
remedy by analysing slavery in Texas as being shaped by and shaping events impacting the
entire continent, including Mexico. Torget argues that there were three factors – slavery, cotton,
and empire – that motivated Anglo-Americans to settle in Mexican Texas, thereby embedding
the history of Texas and slavery in that state more firmly in the history of imperialism. Torget
also credits both European as well as Indian powers with playing defining roles in the imperial
landscape of the Texas region, and writes that “understanding the complex relationship of the
Texas borderlands to the rest of the world is central to understanding the evolution of this portion
of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands”.31
An important sub-field of scholarship on independent Texas is diplomacy, particularly
Euro-Texian diplomacy. The historiography on British-Texian diplomacy starts with J. L.
Worley’s 1905 article “The Diplomatic Relations of England and the Republic of Texas” and
Ephraim D. Adams’ book British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846, published in
1910. Worley’s article argues that Britain lost its dominance in the Southwest when it failed to
prevent Texas’ incorporation into the United States. This analysis questions the inevitability of
Texas annexation and U.S. supremacy on the North American continent, highlighting instead
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Torget, 3.
Torget, 6.
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that this region was one under contestation between powers.32 Building predominantly on British
Foreign Office records, Adams is able to consider the details of the Anglo-Texian relationship in
more depth. This work describes the plan to prevent annexation, the possibility of joint action
with France, and the importance of abolitionism and slavery. Moreover, Adams mentions
Mexico’s place in Anglo-Texian diplomacy, considers the role of English diplomats in Mexico,
and connects the ‘Texas Question’ to broader schemes of expansionism, imperialism, and
annexation. In his 1909 article, “English Interest in Annexation of California,” Adams connects
English diplomacy with the Republic of Texas to English interest in the North American
Southwest in general, and in California in particular.33 Adams published an edited volume of
letters from the National Archives of the United Kingdom in 1917.34
In 1999, Lelia M. Roeckell took a different stance on English-Texian relations in “Bonds
Over Bondage: British Opposition to the Annexation of Texas.” She argues that it is “difficult to
reconcile the grandiose designs attributed to British interest in Texas with realities of its
diplomatic policy,” because Britain’s main objective was the maintenance of peace, not the
prevention of U.S. expansion, the safeguarding of an alternative cotton supply, and the creation

Worley’s article is based predominantly on two manuscript collections found in the State Library at Austin, the
“Diplomatic, Consular, and Domestic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas” and publications of the Niles’
Register, a weekly newspaper of the early nineteenth century. See: J.L. Worley, “The Diplomatic Relations of
England and the Republic of Texas,” The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, Vol. 9, No. 1 (July
1905), 1-40.
33 Ephraim D. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1910),
and “English Interest in Annexation of California,” American Historical Review, Vol. 14 (July 1909): 744-763.
34 Correspondence from the British Archives concerning Texas, 1837-1846, ed. Ephraim D. Adams (Austin: Texas
State Historical Association, 1917). Following the literature by Worley and Adams were several dissertations,
theses, and seminar papers. Many of these add relatively little to the historiography on English-Texian diplomacy.
Nonetheless, Sherrill addresses the British hope that international law could be used to argue that a U.S. annexation
of Texas would be illegal. This showcases that the diplomacy of Texas could certainly be valuable in a discussion of
nineteenth-century international law and its impact on world history. Patricia Grace Sherrill, “British Attempts to
Prevent the Annexation of Texas,” Texas Western College: Seminar Papers, 1956. See also Robert Earl Nelson,
“Britain and the Annexation of Texas, with Particular Reference to the Slavery Question (1836-1845),” 1964,
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, and Professional Papers, 1710; and W.W. Jennings, “The Diplomatic
Mission of Ashbel Smith as Charge d’Affaires to England During the Years of the Texas Republic,” Texas Western
College: Seminar Papers, 1961.
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of a North American power balance. Although this negation of British interest in both a cotton
grower and a buffer state between the United States and Mexico is debatable given the wealth of
source materials that showcase that England did desire to accomplish these other goals (ideally in
accordance with a maintenance of peace, not instead of it), Roeckell rightly claims that AngloTexian relations must be viewed with Anglo-Mexican affairs and diplomacy in mind. Evaluating
Britain’s influence in Mexico, the author argues, also helps to explain Anglophobia in the United
States during this time. Overall, Roeckell argues that Britain recognised Texas not in spite of
British interest in Mexico, but because of it, in an attempt to stabilise Mexico.35
The first scholarship which focused on France’s diplomacy with Texas was Herbert Rook
Edwards’ “Diplomatic Relations between France and the Republic of Texas” from 1917.36
Edwards explores the European travels of James Pinckney Henderson, one of the predominant
Texian agents in charge of acquiring foreign recognition. Edwards is the first scholar of FrancoTexian diplomacy to mention Alphonse Dubois du Saligny, who went to Texas to assess the
nation’s resources, and returned to France with an overwhelmingly positive image of abundance
and fertility. In the late 1960s and early 70s, Nancy N. Barker published several articles on
French relations with Texas, with particular reference to Dubois de Saligny.37 Barker regards
Saligny’s efforts in Texas as a stepping stone which enabled Saligny to obtain more experience,
a factor that ultimately allowed him to occupy a primary advising role during the French

Lelia M. Roeckell, “Bonds Over Bondage: British Opposition to the Annexation of Texas,” Journal of the Early
Republic, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 1999): 257-278, 257.
36 Initially a Master’s Thesis which was subsequently published in The Southwestern Quarterly, this article relies
heavily on Garrison’s 1908 Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, a 1500-page, three volume
collection of letters on Texian diplomacy. Most of this correspondence targets diplomacy with the United States,
whilst some of it covers ties to Mexico.
37 These were “The Republic of Texas: A French View (1967)”, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 71,
No. 2 (Oct. 1967): 181-193, “Devious Diplomat: Dubois de Saligny and the Republic of Texas (1969)”, The
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Jan. 1969): 324-334, and “In Quest of the Golden Fleece: Dubois
de Saligny and French Intervention in the New World (1972)”, Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jul.
1972): 253-268.
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intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. She notes Saligny’s disdain for Mexico and its “Spanish
race” and his praise for the “Anglo-American race”. Saligny’s racial views later influenced his
attitude toward Mexicans during the French intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. Barker
describes Saligny as devious and lacking in integrity, and asserts that he betrayed his own
government by describing Texas as much more tempting for French interest than it actually was.
Another valuable contribution is Barker’s mention of Sam Houston’s proposal that Texas might
fight a war against Mexico with French support, and annex the already rebellious Yucatan
peninsula, or give won-over land to France.
Josefina Zoraida Vázquez’ valuable article, “Santa Anna y el reconocimiento de Texas”
(Santa Anna and the recognition of Texas) from 1987, incorporates Mexico into the discussion
on British imperial designs in Texas. It highlights Britain’s role as Mexico’s primary ally and the
pressures that the English desire for a Mexican recognition of Texas placed on the Mexican
president. The scepticism toward and dismay over Mexican re-annexation efforts on behalf of
British statesmen, combined with the void in the Mexican treasury’s coffers, made Santa Anna
receptive to the Franco-British offer of “protecting the border ‘from any intrusion’”.38 Santa
Anna’s fighting of wars that Mexico had no money for, his unpopular campaign against Paredes,
and the enduring British reclamations destabilised Santa Anna’s regime, inciting the President to
find a quick resolution of the Texas Question. In response, he viewed British mediation as an
increasingly attractive proposal. This article, which includes several pages of translated
correspondence of British representative Charles Bankhead, is significant for its discussion of the
British attempt to steer the Texian government away from U.S. annexation and toward continued
independence, as well as the Mexican responses thereto.

Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, “Santa Anna y el reconocimiento de Texas,” Historia Mexicana, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jan. Mar., 1987): 553-562, 554.
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Whereas Franco-Texian and Anglo-Texian diplomacy have been analysed in some depth
in English-language literature, the same is not the case for German-Texian relations. For this
subject matter, most relevant literature has been written in the German language. The only
thorough work on German-Texian diplomacy is Manfred Kossok’s “Preußen, Bremen, und die
‘Texas-Frage’ 1835-1845” from 1964.39 Kossok discusses some of the main episodes of
Hanseatic-Texian correspondence, such as initial exchanges between Texian envoy to Britain, J.
Hamilton, and Hamburg’s Syndic Karl Sieveking, as well as Hanseatic motives for pursuing
contact with Texas, including the inclusion of the German Confederation states within a
Hanseatic-Texian treaty. Kossok also targets Prussian correspondence on Texas and with the
Adelsverein and outlines how the Society sought to appeal to Prussian officials in an attempt to
garner official and financial Prussian support of the Society’s goal, German emigration to Texas.
Kossok has been one of the most productive and influential scholars on Hanseatic trans-Atlantic
trade, together with Hendrik Dane and Walther L. Bernecker, the latter of which is one of the
most prominent scholars of German-Mexican relations during the nineteenth century.40 The

Though an early (1892) work by Ernst Baasch, „Beiträge zur Geschichte der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen
Hamburg und Amerika,“ (Contributions to the history of the trading relations between Hamburg and America)
evaluates trade between Hamburg and the United States, Baasch’s consideration of Texas’ position in Hanseatic
commerce is very brief, and the political significance that the Hanse Towns attached to the treaty to be negotiated
with Texas remains unmentioned. The 1962 publication “Die Handelsverträge der Hansestädte Lübeck, Bremen
und Hamburg mit überseeischen Staaten im 19. Jahrhundert” (The treaties of commerce of the Hanse Towns
Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg with overseas states in the 19th century) by Jürgen Prüser likewise touches on
Hanseatic interest in Texas and vice versa only tangentially.
40 See Manfred Kossok, “Preußen, Bremen, und die ‚Texas-Frage‘ 1835-1845.“ Bremisches Jahrbuch, Band 49
(1964), 73-104, and Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz: Deutschland und Lateinamerika 1815-1830. Zur Politik der
deutschen Staaten gegenüber der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Mittel-und Südamerikas, (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1964). For Hendrik Dane’s work, see Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Mexiko und Mittelamerika
im 19. Jahrhundert (Köln: Böhlau, 1971). Of note is also Felix Becker’s Die Hansestädte und Mexiko:
Handelspolitik, Verträge, und Handel, 1821-1867 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1984). Walther L. Bernecker
has many works upon which this dissertation is built, including Die Handelskonquistadoren: Europäische Interessen
und mexikanischer Staat im 19. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: C.H. Beck, 1988), “El poder de los débiles: acerca del
debate sobre el desarrollo "dependiente" de México en el siglo XIX”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 51, No.
2, Visiones de México (Apr. - Jun.,1989): 377-411, and “Wirtschaftsimperialismus und Neokolonialismus. Zur
Diskussion über die 'abhängige' Entwicklung Mexikos im 19. Jahrhundert”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 14. Jahrg.,
H. 2, Lateinamerika zwischen altem und neuem Imperialismus (1988), 193-219. See also his chapter in Preußen und
39

24

Adelsverein and German migration to Texas have been the subject of more works than the
diplomacy of German states with Texas, and form a crucial component in European –
particularly German – interest in that region of North America. Works of note include those by
Rudolph Biesele, James C. Kearney, and Walter Struve.41 Joseph W. Schmitz offers a fine
synthesis of the most significant events in Texian diplomacy and in doing so also considers
German diplomacy with Texas.42

Lateinamerika: Im Spannungsfeld von Kommerz, Macht und Kultur, ed. Carreras, Sandra, and Günther Maihold,
(Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), which is a valuable work on Mexican-Prussian relations overall.
41 Rudolph L. Biesele, The History of the German Settlements in Texas, 1831-1861 (Fort Worth: Eakin Press,
Reprint 1987), considers German migration to Mexican Texas, such as a Prussian officer’s plan for German
settlements in Texas in the 1830s. The Mainzner Verein, including its founding near Biebrich on the Rhine and
Count Boos-Waldeck’s purchase of a plantation in Texas, is discussed by a number of historians. .One of the first
pieces of scholarship to assess the Verein in conjunction with the publication of primary sources is Chester William
Geue and Ethel Hander Geue’s work A New Land Beckoned: German Immigration to Texas, 1844-1847, first
published in 1966. In it, the Geues have translated and published Prince von Solms’ eleven reports on his
experiences in Texas. See also Harald Winkel‘s “Der Texasverein: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen
Auswanderung im 19. Jahrhundert,” (The Texas Society: A Contribution to the History of German Emigration in the
19th Century), published in 1968. Walter Struve’s Germans and Texians: Commerce, Migration, and Culture in the
Days of the Lone Star Republic (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), based on a prior 1983 German-language
publication, (Republik Texas, Bremen, und das Hildesheimische: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte von Auswanderung,
Handel und gesellschaftlichen Wandel im 19. Jahrhundert, mit Briefen eines deutschen Kaufmans und Landwirts in
Texas, 1844-1845) evaluates the presence of roughly 10,000 German emigrants in Texas, who became farmers as
well as merchants and businessmen. The latter two groups in particular are of interest to Struve, who argues that
their presence in the port city Galveston aided in making commerce thrive between Texas and European states.
Though Struve’s analysis of the German emigrants to Texas and the Adelsverein remains largely unrelated to
diplomacy, he does mention that the Mainzer Adelsverein, led by its director and vice-president Carl Count zu
Castell-Castell, Friedrich Prince of Prussia, and its founder Karl Emich Fürst zu Leiningen, hoped that colonisation
projects in Texas would enable the German Bund, and Prussia in particular, to participate in the imperial game
dominated by Britain and France. The most recent and most extensive account of the Verein’s history is James C.
Kearney’s Nassau Plantation: The Evolution of a Texas-German Slave Plantation (Denton: University of North
Texas Press, 2010), which draws on diplomatic ties and details the importance of slavery to the Verein’s affairs,
focussing on the plantation that gave his work its name. Most of the archival base Kearney uses is drawn from the
Solms-Braunfels Archives, which Kearney has analysed extensively and effectively in his monograph.
42 Schmitz lists many of the major diplomats and politicians associated with Texas’ European affairs, including
Texians James Pinckney Henderson, Mirabeau Lamar, Anson Jones, James Hamilton, Ashbel Smith, and William
Henry Daingerfield; Frenchmen Dubois Saligny and Molé; and Britons Lord Palmerston, Richard Pakenham, and
Charles Elliot; and even Hanseatic representative Vincent Rumpff. Schmitz lays out the main events in Texas
diplomacy, including Daingerfield’s negotiations with the Hanse Towns, particularly Bremen, its desire for loans, its
failure to conclude a treaty with Belgium and commence ties with Prussia and other European powers, and the
influence of Euro-Mexican relations on the hesitation of some European states to engage in correspondence or
official agreements with Texas. Furthermore, Schmitz denotes some of the major events in Mexican-Texian
relations, including the sending of Barnard E. Bee, James Treat, and James Webb to Mexico for negotiations with
that country. .Handbook of Texas Online, Joseph W. Schmitz, “DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF TEXAS”, accessed February 12, 2020, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mgd01.
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This dissertation also builds on recent work on European ambitions in the Americas in
the nineteenth century. A recent effort to analyse European interest in and impact on Latin
America is Rafe Blaufarb’s article “The Western Question”, which seeks to fill a historiographic
gap by connecting Spanish American independence to European diplomacy of the early
nineteenth century. Blaufarb writes that “the rivalry of the great powers, insurgent and royalist
attempts to draw them into their struggles, and Spain’s efforts to enlist them in its cause –
produced a vacuum” that ultimately led to a “geopolitical realignment in the post-Napoleonic
world”.43 The Napoleonic Wars left Spain subjected to French intervention and consequently
weak, whereas Britain achieved an unprecedented degree of maritime and commercial power.
These new conditions impacted heavily the political landscape of Latin America, for Spain was
too weak to repress its colonies. At the same time, Latin Americans initially believed it prudent
not to secede before the restoration of Ferdinand, who might enact reforms and reduce the desire
for independence (though this did not occur). Blaufarb’s conclusions regarding the power
vacuum following the collapse of Spanish rule that powers like the United States, France, and
Britain sought to fill are helpful when tied to the concept of informal empire. Afraid of British
hegemony, the United States looked toward expansionism, whereas France initially thought of
monarchical restoration in Spanish America. As a result, recognition of the newly-independent
Spanish American states fell predominantly to Britain, which was able to establish a new type of
empire dominated by ideas of free trade, free labour, and international law.
Another work that combines new forms of European imperialism in the Americas with
European diplomacy is Edward Shawcross’ France, Mexico and Informal Empire in Latin
America, 1820-1867: Equilibrium in the New World, published in 2018. This work, though it
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predominantly targets France’s imperial designs in Mexico, also includes a small section entitled
‘Texas: A Conflict of Races.’44 Shawcross argues that France’s relationship to Texas was not
solely shaped by trade and commerce, but also ideology, specifically Pan-Latinism. The
discussion on Pan-Latinism, or the idea that Latin America was France’s natural sphere of
influence due to both France’s and Latin America’s status as ‘Latin’ nations, aids in highlighting
the racial components of European diplomacy with Texas. The French believed that they should
protect Spanish America from invasion by the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and thus “save from irreparable
ruin not only Mexico, but also the whole Spanish branch of Latin civilisation in the New World”.
This sentiment was also used to justify the French intervention in Mexico in the 1860s.45
Moreover, Shawcross utilises the framework of informal imperialism within his work, which has
also influenced my research here.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Two frameworks in particular inform this research: Immanuel Wallerstein’s worldsystems analysis, which he began publishing in the 1970s, and informal imperialism, first
popularised by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson in their 1953 article “The Imperialism of
Free Trade.” Both are relevant for understanding European ambitions in and encounters over
Texas during its independence.46 They showcase why newly-independent Texas was so crucial to
the economic and political motives of a very diverse group of countries, from city-states to
empires.
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In “The Imperialism of Free Trade” Gallagher and Robinson argue that colonial
imperialism, i.e. the possession of territory, was not the only form of imperial influence. Instead,
imperialism could be elicited in a subtler way through diplomacy and trade.47 Since Gallagher’s
and Robinson’s article, historians have evaluated how European pressures might lead to the
revocation or reduction of tariffs within the western republics – sometimes for one European
power alone – leading to a flooding of Latin American markets by European goods; the presence
of European bankers and merchants as elites abroad; the use of coercion through gunboat
diplomacy and blockading of harbours (as France had done in the Pastry War); and the
establishment of Western European institutions and culture as global ideals. Latin America after
1820 is often listed as a prime example of informal imperialism because, though its republics
were not reclaimed as colonies by European powers, European imperial influence persisted
nonetheless. After Gallagher and Robinson, several more historians applied the concept to the
British in Latin America, though others, such as Thomas Schoonover, have also begun to look at
German and French forms of informal empire in Mexico and Central America.48 Moreover,
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scholars like Ricardo D. Salvatore have recently evaluated Latin America as a “U.S. informal
empire”.49
Informal empire has not been without its critics, however: Gallagher’s and Robinson’s
thesis was soon questioned by other historians, including D. C. M. Platt, who published several
articles and books on his rejection of free-trade imperialism in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
including “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations” (1968).50 Platt wrote that British
efforts to keep markets open
fell far short of the energetic promotion and intervention described by Gallagher and
Robinson, and it fell short in the following respects: the range of government action on
behalf of overseas trade permitted by the laissez-faire tradition of the time was
extraordinarily narrow; official demands on behalf of British interests overseas never
went beyond equal favour and open competition; non-intervention in the internal affairs
of foreign states was one of the most respected principles of British diplomacy; and force,
while often called for in the protection of British subjects injured by the government
action abroad, was rarely and only exceptionally employed for the promotion of British
trade and investments.51
According to Platt, many failures of early intervention in Spanish America encouraged British
politicians, beginning with Castlereagh, who refused Spain’s offer of trading benefits in Spanish
America in exchange for mediation between mother country and colonies, to Canning, and
finally to Edward Grey, to pursue a policy of non-intervention and equitable and fair trade.

Salvatore defines informal empire as a “collective enterprise (…) beyond the extraction of economic surplus
through commerce, direct investment, or the provision of services, the empire was a pharaonic accumulation of
representations”, including photographers, museum directors, or land surveyors. In his work Disciplinary Conquest,
he showcases the role of U.S.-American social scientists in linking South America to U.S. power and informal
empire. Salvatore demonstrates that science and knowledge were especially essential to the building of U.S.
influence in the region, for the U.S. did not desire a directly interventionist approach there. See: Ricardo D.
Salvatore, “The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire”, in Close Encounters, 72
and Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 23.
50 D. C. M. Platt, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations”, The Economic History Review, New Series,
Vol. 21, No. 2 (August 1968), 296-306, 296.
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Neither the Board of Trade nor British politicians, Platt argued, had any interest in Britain’s
meddling in the internal political affairs of Spanish and Portuguese America.52
Since then, the debate on informal empire and particularly the imperialism of free trade
has not yet found an end. Historians find themselves on both sides of the debate. Andrew
Thompson rejects the concept’s contemporary use, declaring that “’informal empire’ gradually
entered into every imperial historian’s phrasebook, so much so that many writers have felt able
to employ the concept without attempting to define let alone justify it. Informal imperialism has
been a very seductive notion for it has conveniently solved our problem of what to do with all
those ‘awkward’ nations which, whilst clearly not fitting into the narrower and more traditional
definition of empire, did seem, at least at first sight, to lie uncomfortable on its fringes”.53
Eugênio Vargas Garcia states that Spanish America constitutes a unique case in the history of
imperialism, which scholars have since tried to define or capture, sometimes by using informal
empire as a framework. Vargas Garcia advocates for a middle road between fervent support of
the concept of informal empire and the absolute rejection thereof, writing that “the question of
whether Latin America was an informal empire or not depends on the mode in which the concept
is understood […] there is no consensual definition of what exactly is an ‘informal empire.’”54 C.
A. Bayly, on the other hand, believes that British informal imperialism did not gain traction until
the 1830s and 1840s: Bayly argues that free trade imperialism was not a logical conclusion to
British hegemony after 1815 and asserts that the time frame between 1780 and 1830 was marked
by a stricter colonial rule as the “colonial state began seriously to discipline and control marginal
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groups and to create wider spheres for the exercise of state power.” Nevertheless, Bayly regards
Spanish America as an exception to this, where informal-imperial strategies were used as early
as the 1820s.55 The debatableness of informal imperialism’s existence, extent, and purposeful use
on behalf of various interest groups, no doubt due to its flexible and less visible boundaries when
compared with its formal cousin – an imperialism so easily identified by the existence of shaded
areas on a map – can also often be seen on first glance when evaluating the titles of works that
discuss it, whether it be Eugênio Vargas Garcia’s “¿Imperio Informal? La política británica hacia
América Latina en el siglo XIX”, Paul Garner’s “El ‘Imperio Informal’ Británico en América
Latina: ¿Realidad O Ficción?”, or Andrew Thompson’s “Informal Empire? An Exploration in
the History of Anglo-Argentine Relations, 1810-1914.”
Historians have also debated whether informal empire was a government strategy
instructed by the centres of power, such as London and Paris, or whether the real agents of
informal empire were the merchants and diplomats in the periphery. David MacLean denies that
the core employed informal empire by itself or that it even played the dominant role, rather, he
regards informal imperialism as a tool that arose in response to the communication between
politics and commerce, and regards it as a strategy that emerged as a result of a network of
decisions, interactions, and choices made by merchants and politicians.56 This point is also
discussed by John Mayo and Mario Zamudio Vega, who examine informal empire in Mexico
and suggest that, whereas British officials in London did indeed pursue a policy of nonintervention and fair trade, the merchants and diplomats located in Mexico, deeply intertwined in
their interests (and sometimes merchant and diplomat were one and the same person), had a

55

C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830, (London: Longman, 1989), 2-6.
David MacLean, War, Diplomacy, and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836-1853
(London: British Academic Press, 1995) and “Finance and ‘Informal Empire’ before the First World War”, The
Economic History Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1976): 291-305.
56

31

different strategy, using the threat of British imperial might to garner concessions from Mexican
officials who simply did not know the limits of British power and hence enabled the local British
to get away with their bravado and sabre rattling.57 Vargas Garcia moreover points out that,
whereas core officials in London, such as Viscount Palmerston, advocated for British neutrality
and non-intervention, instructing their diplomats in the periphery to abstain from exercising
undue influence, they also spoke dismissively of peripheral regions at other times: Palmerston
claimed in 1850 that “semi-civilised states” such as those in Asia or Spanish America, were
peopled by populations whose “opinions are of little utility”, and declared that the only argument
understood by such peripheral peoples was the “argumentum baculinum [argument of the club]”.
This showcases once more peripheral agents were empowered in their informal-imperial
ambitions by opinions circulating in the core, where government agents officially propagated
neutrality whilst maintaining biased views in which Europeans occupied an elite position vis-àvis peripheral states.58 A. G. Hopkins engages with peripheral actors’ importance to informal
empire in order to address one of the main criticisms brought forth against the concept of
informal imperialism: Hopkins rejects “a restrictive (and unrealistic) definition of informal

57 John Mayo and Mario Zamudio Vega, “Imperialismo de libre comercio e imperio informal en la costa oeste de
México durante la época de Santa Anna”, Historia Mexicana, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Apr. – Jun., 1991): 673-696. This
1991 article by John Mayo and Mario Zamudio Vega evaluates the importance of European statesmen in the
Americas for European imperialism there. In response to D. C. M. Platt, who argued that British informal
imperialism in Latin America did not exist because the British government in London desired fair and equal treaties
with those states, which it was capable of obtaining without the intervention in their governments, Mayo and Vega
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Mexico. Merchants who had already established themselves in Latin America prior to British recognition of the new
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America through local British officials.
58 Vargas Garcia, 371.

32

empire […] one that assumes that all causation was located in the metropolis, that events on the
periphery had no effect on the centre, and that informal influence was the result of directives that
were uncontaminated by negotiation or concession”.59 Hopkins’ argument thus illustrates not
merely the significance of European agents in the periphery to informal empire, but also that of
Spanish American agents, as well.
Thus, the primary difficulty with the framework of informal imperialism is that, given its
informality and larger degree of subtlety, it can be difficult to distinguish a mere interaction
between a stronger and weaker economy from an interaction within which the stronger state
actually imposes its economic and diplomatic dominance onto another, weaker state. According
to Walther Bernecker, only the latter should be considered an incident of informal imperialism.60
In his article on the imperialism of free trade, Bernecker suggests that British economic influence
in Spanish America during the early nineteenth century was fairly inconsequential and small, and
emphasises the large list of recent works that have criticised Gallagher’s and Robinson’s thesis.
At the same time, he also points out that the other Atlantic states have frequently been ignored in
the informal-imperialist debate.61 Bernecker argues that neither British nor German diplomats
were encouraged by their governments to intervene in the political affairs of Mexico, and that
they were to maintain a “neutral” attitude.62 Nevertheless, Bernecker also notes that local
diplomats and merchants, inspired by their governments’ reticent policy-lines, pursued more
interventionist strategies to protect their interests, which makes the concept of informal
imperialism incredibly vague. He writes:
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In the daily interaction between foreign diplomats and Mexican agencies there emerged
the development of a type of interaction situated in a ‘grey zone’ between political
neutrality and diplomatic intervention; a type of interaction that, because of its specific
vagueness, gives proponents of the various interpretations63 enough empirical data to
undermine the mutually exclusive interpretations.64
Elsewhere, Bernecker also asserts that Felix Becker challenged the thesis of free-trade
imperialism by highlighting that the treaties between Spanish American and European states
were “elements that built and structured a new order of states and commerce during the process
of the transformation of a mercantile into an increasingly free-trade-oriented system on one hand,
as well as that of the jus publicum europaeum into the modern international law, the
international law (non-translated original) according to Jeremy Bentham”.65 A reading of
Becker’s work on the Hanse Towns and their relations to Mexico suggest however that these two
developments – free-trade imperialism as well as the development of international law in
response to the trans-Atlantic treaties of the first half of the nineteenth century – were not
mutually exclusive. Becker writes that “already with the Methuen Treaty (1703), England had
proven that the domination of a market was not dependent upon a tedious, direct political
control. After the liberation of Spanish and Portuguese America, this knowledge was consistently
put into action”. Here, Becker quotes Gallagher and Robinson: “…the most frequently used
political method of English expansion was the treaty of amity and commerce with a weaker state,
which the latter signed or was forced to sign”. Instead of challenging this concept, Becker writes
that “this instrument of domination of markets was one which the Hanse Towns used, also”.
Here, he also quotes the commercial deputation of Hamburg, which acknowledged that the
outflow of Mexican silver into Europe as a result of international trade deprived Mexico of its
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strength and power, a condition not disfavoured by the deputation.66 Chapter five of this
dissertation, which analyses the impact of trans-Atlantic treaties briefly mentioned by Becker
and by Bernecker in detail, likewise focusses on the intersection of international law and
informal imperialism.
How can one determine then whether informal imperialism played a role in the
diplomacy and commerce between European states and American states such as Texas or
Mexico? This dissertation will focus on informal imperialism in a variety of ways: First, it will
analyse which policies European diplomats, both in North America and in Europe, pursued in
regard to Mexico and Texas. Did these policies differ? Were some more imperial than others –
were, as Mayo suggests, local diplomats more likely to engage in informal imperialist strategies
than their counterparts in Europe? Did key officials in Europe really push for fair and equal trade
under any circumstances, like Platt argues? Second, this dissertation will explore the boundaries
of informal empire and the imperialism of free trade. Bernecker suggests that the official British
trading policy in Mexico advocated for fairness to prevent strife between European powers that
might threaten the independence of Latin America. Yet, as Roger G. Kennedy highlights, British
merchants and commercial interest nevertheless had an advantage in trade with Mexico, even
vis-à-vis the French, who were “running alongside, panting,” as the juggernaut British economy
assumed the role as the world’s cloth-maker and banker.67 This suggests that the British were
less dependent on forcing a commercial advantage through coercion and manipulation. But with
Britain as economically powerful as it was and given its status as the hegemonic power of the
century, does the official policy-line of Canning – who himself claimed that Spanish America
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would be ‘English’ through British commerce – mean that its diplomatic and economic policies
in North America were not imperial?
Moreover, just as formal imperialist designs have failed – consider Italy’s effort to turn
Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate in 1895-1896, an event almost exclusively seen in the
context of the imperial Scramble for Africa despite Italy’s failure – and still been evaluated as
imperial in nature, informal imperialism should be analysed through the same light. Just because
informal imperialist designs failed, including all European designs in Texas, this does not mean
that the designs were not buttressed by strong imperial ambition of the actors standing behind
them. The Adelsverein’s scheme for a ‘German state outside of Germany’, strengthening
German, and particularly Prussian influence, globally, as well as British designs of an arrest of
slavery in Texas, are but two examples of this. Lastly, the analysis of Europeans’ perceptions of
each other’s policies as informally imperial is also an interesting aspect of informal empire,
which has shaped European states’ policy-lines in their overseas affairs. As Bernecker notes, it
was a prevalent thought among European statesmen and officials of the early nineteenth century
that the British were using their economic dominance to place Mexico firmly in a sphere of
British imperial influence: Frenchman Karl X. Samouels feared the British were turning Mexico
into a British protectorate; other French agents were under the impression that British agents
played the “decisive role” in influencing the Mexican government, and Prussian agent Friedrich
von Gerolt expressed frustrations with Britain’s alleged ability to influence tariffs and laws at the
expense of other European nations.68 Anglophobia, the subject of chapter five, is a primary
example of this aspect of informal imperialism, and is also exemplary of the scramble for
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empire: The United States in particular became increasingly eager to annex Texas as quickly as
possible in order to prevent British imperial influence.
Texas is a great example of the European desire to project informal empire. Gallagher
and Robinson briefly commented that British informal control also extended to Texas and
Mexico, but that “American political strength thwarted British attempts to establish Texas,
Mexico and Central America as informal dependencies”.69 Mexico was a central contestant in
British and French informal imperialist designs, as Edward Shawcross discusses in France,
Mexico, and Informal Empire in Latin America, 1820-1867. Other surrounding areas, such as the
Caribbean, Louisiana, and other Spanish American states were likewise exposed to British and
French imperial influence. Yet the existence of Texas raised new problems. In order to create an
informal imperialist presence, European empires had to assure that they did not fall behind their
imperial competitors commercially, culturally, and diplomatically. Texas’ independence proved
to be on the one hand an opportunity for establishing influence more penetratively in these
contested borderlands, but on the other, it was also a risk: In the event that Mexico regained this
province, having recognised Texas in the first place could sour relations with Mexico and create
a disadvantage for the imperial power in that way. Such considerations were debated at length by
British, French, and the German state officials who sought to solve this situation to their best
commercial advantage. Once Texas’ independence from Mexico seemed assured, many
European states recognised Texas within a short timeframe, including the Netherlands and
Belgium besides the above-mentioned parties of Britain and France. Nevertheless, informalimperial aspirations on behalf of European powers in Texas continued to stand on rickety legs
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even after recognition, for the possible annexation of Texas to the United States posed a bigger
risk than reconquest by Mexico.
Associated with the concept of informal empire through commerce is Wallerstein’s
world-systems analysis, which forms another foundation for my work. Wallerstein argues that
the current world-system is centred around capitalism, and he distinguishes between a worldempire and a world-system by explaining that the former is dominated decisively by one political
entity, whereas in the latter, no political party reigns supreme. Capitalism is defined by
Wallerstein as the endless accumulation of capital. This basic condition has maintained the
current world-system by centring it around the division of labour, which has prevented the
world-economy from transforming into a world-empire. The existence of multiple states is
necessary to preserve the world-system, for the dominance of one state would likewise lead to
the existence of a world-empire and the end of capitalism. The states together enact policies that
cement capitalism, a system that Wallerstein argues can only exist in a partially free market,
created by states that enact policies to control the market in some ways. Wallerstein notes that
nineteenth-century Britain actually achieved hegemony over this system, but it did not manage to
replace the world-system with a world-empire.70 The policies of mid-nineteenth-century Britain,
which focussed on informal imperial influence in Latin America as opposed to seeking an
(unlikely) annexation thereof, are representative of Wallerstein’s theory. It sought this influence
precisely through capitalist-commercial enterprises, i.e. the very concept on which the current
world-system is built.
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Wallerstein’s model is useful in analysing Texas in an imperial context because his
framework can be employed in answering the question as to why informal empire based on free
trade became a prevalent imperial strategy in the nineteenth century. Without the ability to create
a world-empire – even the British of the nineteenth century would have been unable to formally
colonise every state that was in some way involved in British imperialism – the core states, of
which Britain was perhaps the most dominant party during the 1800s, accumulated power within
the world-system based on capitalism by using commerce. Britain emerged as a chief core state
through industrialisation, the creation of a periphery through the colonisation of some territories,
and means to protect its industries (the quasi monopolies, especially in the case of the
cotton/textile industry). Wallerstein’s framework can thus be utilised to showcase and analyse
the use of informal imperialism as opposed to a brute show of force followed by colonialism:
unlike Robinson and Gallagher, who label informal imperialism a conscious policy line
dominated by the workings of the official mind, Wallerstein focusses on the inability of the
British to override capitalism by establishing a formal world-empire and the consequential use of
capitalism and commerce to acquire dominance and hegemony within the world-system.
Another component in this system are semi-peripheral states, which furthermore cement
this system for they are in constant competition against other semi-peripheral states. These states
wish to become core states, dread becoming peripheral, and hence legitimise oligopolies as well
as the division of labour by seeking to attract oligopolies once their products have started to
decline in profitability in the core. In the nineteenth century, states like the Hanseatic League or
Prussia could have been viewed as semi-peripheral in some ways. They aspired to use trade and
commerce to prevent becoming peripheral and provincialized by British economic might, and
reaffirmed the capitalist and unequal system by plotting colonisation schemes or consulting the
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British or French in the case of treaty violations by a Latin American party. Prussian and
Hanseatic officials often worked alongside British and French representatives in Mexico in order
to award their reclamation claims with more weight, and though Prussian politicians were not
fond of the Hanseatic resistance to the German Customs Union, they appreciated that the three
city-states were not limited by legitimacy and could hence more easily recognise new states in
the Americas in order to facilitate German trans-Atlantic trade. Prussian officials in particular
were incredibly concerned with French and especially English competition, and feared that the
German states could be left behind economically if they did not increase their trade with the
Americas. Moreover, the Hanseatic decision to engage in trade with Texas was motivated
precisely by the fear of economic repercussions that may arise in the event of Hanseatic inaction.
This would give Britain and France the opportunity to establish themselves as the most favoured
nations in Texian trade to the detriment of the Hanseates and German trade more broadly. This
fear of losing status and influence in a region or market also dominated French and British
discussions on Texas, such as when Britons decided to recognise Texas in part because France
had already done so, anxious that France may draw significant economic benefits and a stable
pre-eminence from a lack of British recognition of Texas.
This dissertation seeks to combine world-systems analysis and informal empire to offer
new perspectives on European imperialism in Texas. Gilbert M. Joseph highlights that views on
imperialism and economic development in Latin America have changed among historians, from
W. W. Rostow, who argued for modernisation theory and the idea that underdeveloped nations
needed to adopt the path of developed nations in order to progress, to dependency theorists, who
argued that Latin America had been kept in dependence on Western developed nations and had
hence not been able to achieve prosperity, to newer theorists who focussed on “the U.S. (or
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European) center’s penetration of the Latin American periphery”.71 Though Joseph denotes the
shortcomings of dependency theory, he also writes that “the contributors of the present volume
have all been deeply influenced by dependency theory and world-systems approaches; indeed, in
many cases the essays build on and refine these perspectives, rather than jettison them”, as is the
case for contributor Steve J. Stern.72 Stern argues that between 1750 and 1930, the imperial
powers in Latin America, including the British, Spanish, French, and Portuguese, sought to
“remake themselves anew” on several occasions, and that this process “implied a remaking of
the imperial presence”. Latin America’s external links changed continuously as a result of the
rivalry among European powers, the United States, and Latin American power contenders.73
CONTRIBUTIONS
The historiographies of the fields discussed above have largely remained separated from
one another. Literature on Texian-European diplomacy has been overwhelmingly national or
binational in focus and has frequently rejected the presence or questioned the intensity of
European imperial motives and ambitions. Although the Texas region was a fluid borderland in
which many states and non-state actors contested, resisted, or established power in the form of
commerce, diplomacy, or military action, much of the literature remains focussed solely on one
or two aspects of this borderland, such as the diplomatic relations of Europe with Texas.
Imperialism in Texas has also often been seen in isolation of European actors in Mexico. Only
recently have works emerged that seek to connect the various broader themes coexisting in the
era of the Republic of Texas, such as European relations, slavery, imperialism, emigration, and

Gilbert M. Joseph, “Close Encounters: Toward a New Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations”, in
Close Encounters, 11.
72 Joseph in Close Encounters, 15.
73 Steve J. Stern, “The Decentered Center and the Expansionist Periphery: The Paradoxes of Foreign-Local
Encounter”, in Close Encounters, 55-56.
71
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commerce. These works include Kearney’s Nassau Plantation, Shawcross’ work on the French
Informal Empire in the region as well as Torget’s work on the role of slavery and cotton in
shaping the imperialism extant in these borderlands. This project seeks to build on these efforts
in order to engage with the theoretical question of the changing nature of European empire: using
the Republic of Texas, I want to illustrate how European tools of empire changed during the first
half of the nineteenth century. Thus, I hope to offer new perspectives on the relevance of Texas’
independence to global affairs, especially the new types of informal empire.
I also link informal empire to world-systems analysis to extend the importance of the
former concept to semi-peripheral and peripheral states: German emigration to Texas, for
instance, was not merely the flippant idea of a handful of German noblemen. Behind this
organisation stood German schemes of nationalism and imperialism that were motivated by the
post-Napoleonic changes in Europe, including the establishment of the German Confederation,
heavily contested among its member states; the desire for commercial prowess in a world where
British trade threatened to overrun the German economies; and the longing for a German nation
capable of resisting foreign power, protecting its subjects abroad, and challenging the markets of
France and Britain. When it extended into Texas, this society joined a playing field occupied by
many other actors with whom it either sought to cooperate or resist, such as Prussia and England,
and the Comanche Empire, respectively. Tying the Adelsverein into other events surrounding
Europe’s interest in Texas is one of the ways in which I hope to showcase the interplay,
cooperation and conflict between several European nations in regard to Texas. I will also use
projects like the Adelsverein’s and the commercial rivalry of Europeans in Texas and Mexico to
underline that Europeans used imperial and colonising schemes to engage in nation-building.
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Chapter 5 in particular shows that German difficulties in Mexico were linked to the German
domestic concern of defining German nationalism and centralising the German Bund.
Another benefit of combining world-systems analysis and informal empire, the two
dominant theoretical frameworks utilised in this dissertation, is the creation of an imperial,
collaborative and competitive web. Because I am considering interests of states such as the
German states or Mexico, and because I do not look at core states’ interests in isolation
therefrom, my analysis of European imperialism in North America offers richer perspectives on
how European relationships functioned with other Europeans and Americans in North America.
This approach will also enable me to situate Mexico more firmly in both the European struggle
for influence in the region as well as broader global currents such as the development of nationstates and the law of nations. Reclamation efforts in Mexico, for instance, were often the subject
of European collaboration and based on international legal principles. Besides the obvious
economic vantage point, German support for the reclamations or intervention of the
economically and politically stronger France or Britain was also motivated by the German desire
to gain from this support an increase in their own international power and influence. Alone, the
German states were too insignificant economically and politically to pressure the Mexican
government into prioritising their commercial and legal concerns, yet in concert with Britain and
France, this was a much more likely endeavour. This reliance on other Europeans strengthened
the German longing for their own nation-state and informed intra-German debates regarding the
Customs Union. Conversely, European reclamations in Mexico also shaped the latter republic,
whose representatives utilised European action in Mexico and Texas, as well as U.S. and Texian
threats to their nation in order to redefine their nationality and situate it more firmly in an
international community of nations who abided by international law.
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Another contribution is the use of German sources that have frequently been left out of
the discussion on Texas. Most other scholars have neglected the Prussian Privy Archives and
Prussia’s role in Texian diplomacy entirely. Even the Hanseatic sources on Texas have often
been under-utilised, particularly in English-language scholarship.
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This dissertation is split into seven chapters. The first will lay out European desires for
informal empire in Spanish America after Spanish American independence. Though Mexico was
a country in which Europeans held informal-imperialist ambitions, it was not a state in which it
was easy for Europe to exert influence. This chapter shows which European agents were most
interested in informal-imperial designs and how they tried to impose them; how Mexico resisted
this attempted European interference and the means by which it sought to protect its budding
industry; how Mexico’s instability impacted European desires and capacities for informal
empire; and Mexican responses to manifest European pressure in the form of e.g. the Pastry War.
Chapter Two evaluates the impact of Texas independence on European informal empire in
Mexico, as well as European interests in informal empire in Texas. Though Europeans were
initially unfavourable toward Texian independence because of their commerce with Mexico,
Texas’ potential as a cotton grower and competitor to the U.S. was its salvation: Europeans were
quickly interested in the Republic of Texas, even if they did not immediately recognise it. This
chapter also details in which ways Europeans hoped to profit more from informal imperial
schemes in Texas than in Mexico.
Chapter Three deals with slavery and abolitionism. The presence of slavery in Texas
delayed the recognition of the new republic by Britain into the 1840s, for British officials
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pursued throughout the early nineteenth century a war on the slave trade.74 England’s
involvement in global abolitionism influenced how other states viewed their own and English
interests in Texas. This chapter will analyse how the policies of Germans, including the Hanse
Towns and the Adelsverein, as well as other states such as France, were shaped by English slave
trade treaties and abolitionist fervor. Chapter Four illustrates how the Native Americans of the
Texas borderlands were perceived by European, U.S.-American, Texian, and Mexican officials,
and how they shaped Texian diplomacy. Many state actors saw Native Americans as an obstacle
to a more stable Republic of Texas and a more stable Mexico because of plundering, rebellion,
the harassment of settlers, and destruction of property. As such, Native Americans at times
became a reason for Europeans to question the usefulness of Mexico or Texas to European
markets. Moreover, this chapter will analyse to what degree officials were aware of the diversity
of Native Americans. Whereas many European representatives situated in Europe were largely
unaware of the differences between Native American groups, state actors, including Europeans,
which were located in the Americas seemed to know a little more about the various tribes that
existed.
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The British Slave Trade Act of 1807 had outlawed the slave trade, and the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 ended
slavery itself within the British Empire. Britain desired more than the mere abolition of slavery and the slave trade
within its colonial boundaries and hence signed slave trade treaties with various European and American states, such
as the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Venezuela, and Mexico. More than just a mere humanitarian effort, these
treaties often involved a display of British power: Portugal and Spain for instance, weakened after the Napoleonic
Wars, received British payments in exchange for their banning of the slave trade, and opened their vessels to British
searches at a time when the Royal Navy ruled the seas. Many Spanish American republics, which had already
abolished slavery shortly after their revolutions, did not sign slave trade treaties with Britain until the 1840s. These
treaties were pushed and enforced by Britain, which possessed economic and diplomatic leverage over the Spanish
American states: Former Portuguese colony Brazil found its vessels seized by the British in the 1840s after these
vessels were proven to carry slaves. These slave trade treaties thus gave Britain additional rights over the vessels of
other states, enabling it to search and seize those vessels. The influence that this awarded to the British was noticed
and acknowledged by contemporary observers, who feared that the treaties would augment British power and
imperialism and threaten the sovereignty of other states. For more on British abolitionism, see, for example, William
Law Mathieson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade, 1839-1865 (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1967), David
Turley, The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780-1860 (London: Routledge, 1991), and Dale H. Porter, The
Abolition of the Slave Trade in England, 1784-1807 (Camden: Archon Books, 1970). For information on the
Brazilian slave trade, see Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave
Trade Question, 1807-1869 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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The fifth chapter focusses on international law and the movement toward free trade.
Texas was a state that inspired discussions and negotiations on international law and rights. The
independence of Texas resulted in reclamations by U.S.-Americans against Mexico, a legal
dispute that the Prussian government was meant to mediate. Such reclamation efforts are of
interest in this chapter beyond the legal scaffoldings at work, for they often induced
correspondence on ideas of nationhood, nationality, civilisation, and patriotism. Prussian
officials’ difficulties in their reclamation disputes with Mexico encouraged them to engage in
discussions on German nationalism and the benefits of a German nation, and the Hanseatic
diplomacy with Texas, partially motivated by a desire to strengthen the city-states’ weight in the
German Bund, resulted in a redefinition of Hanseatic identity, for they began seeing their role
increasingly as that of pioneering, liberal free traders. For Mexican officials, too, the debates on
reclamations provided a platform for a definition of the Mexican nation and Mexican
nationalism. Mexican representatives often rebutted reclamations using concepts of patriotism
and nationhood, as well as international legal principles.
Chapter Six targets Anglophobia and a general dislike for and criticism of English policy
during the independence of Texas. U.S.-American Anglophobia has been analysed in part by
previous scholars, however, European perceptions of U.S.-American Anglophobia have not.
Prussian and Hanseatic representatives were ambivalent about German influence in Texas and
the very existence of Texas because of U.S. Anglophobia, which could lead to Texas’
annexation. The French government, though Britain’s ally in some Texian affairs such as the
Mexican mediation attempt, also held its reservations toward England and “Anglo-Saxons” in
general, as the ideology of Pan-Latinism shows. The last chapter, Chapter Seven, will evaluate
how Europeans’ perceptions of Texians’ nationality influenced their diplomacy with Texas.
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European statesmen and diplomats frequently identified the parallels between U.S.-Americans’
national identity and that of the Texians, leading some to fear that Texas would choose
annexation over independence due to a lacking determination to create and maintain their own
nationality. This chapter thus also looks at Europeans’ changing definitions of concepts such as
the nation or a nationality, as well as the growing expectation among Europeans that they
encounter and engage in diplomacy with other nation-states abroad.
PRIMARY SOURCE BASE
For the purpose of this study, I visited ten archives in four different countries and used a
variety of published materials and online databases. In Germany, I gathered sources from the
City Archives of Bremen and Hamburg, as well as the Prussian Privy Archives and the Federal
Archives Division in Berlin-Lichterfelde, both in Berlin. Both City Archives had various actas
on Hanseatic-Texan and Hanseatic-Mexican diplomacy. The Federal Archives had relatively few
relevant folders, though they did hold materials on some European states’ early ties to Mexico.
By far more fruitful was my search in the Prussian Privy Archives, where I found an abundance
of Prussian correspondence with Mexico and the United States, correspondence of the Prussian
consulates in Mexico, and correspondence between Prussian officials in various European states
on the issue of Texas. Furthermore, the Prussian Privy Archives hold folders regarding the
diplomatic ties of other German states to Mexico. There are also two folders on German and
Swiss colonisation plans in Texas, respectively. In the United Kingdom, I consulted the National
Archives in Richmond, where I gathered the correspondence between British officials on the
matter of Texas and their correspondence with Texan politicians. Most of my English sources
stem from the Foreign Office 75 collection. In France, the National Archives held some materials
on French views on Texas and Mexico, but much richer was the source base available at the
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French Foreign Ministry Archives, which holds nine volumes of correspondence with and on
Texas.
Lastly, I also collected sources from three archives in Austin, Texas: the Dolph Briscoe
Center for American History held several folders and bound volumes on the Adelsverein, as well
as Texan officials’ correspondence among themselves, such as the Barnard E. Bee papers or the
Ashbel Smith papers. For a perspective on Mexican sources, I consulted several collections in
the Nettie L. Benson Library for Latin American Studies, including the papers of Santa Anna,
Benjamin Muse, Jr., Juan Pablo Anaya, Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, and, most extensive of all,
Valentín Gómez Farías. Some of these, such as collection 65 B of the Gómez Farías papers,
focus entirely on Mexican views on the Texas Question, whereas others, such as some of the
Muse, Jr., folders or other components of the Gómez Farías collection, also incorporate
documents on affairs such as the Pastry War and the French in Veracruz, the rebellion in
Yucatan, insurgencies across the republic, and relations with Europe. Finally, I gathered sources
from the Texas State Archives, where I found more documents on British-Texan and FrancoTexan diplomacy, as well as a small section on Texan correspondence with the Hanse Towns,
Netherlands, and Papal States. This archive also holds U.S.-Texan and Mexican-Texan
correspondence, as well as the papers of the Texan Legation to the United States.
In order to build up my source base on Mexican documents, I also consulted the online
database of the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley on La Guerra de Texas/The War of
Texas, which includes many scans of folders from the Mexican Foreign Ministry Archives.
Published sources utilised include Ephraim Douglass Adams’ Correspondence from the British
Archives concerning Texas, 1837-1846, Nancy N. Barker’s The French Legation in Texas,
George Garrison’s Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, Raúl F. Esquer’s
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Correspondencia diplomática de Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, ministro de España en México,
William Kennedy’s Texas: The Rise, Progress and Prospects of the Republic of Texas, and
Eugene Maissin’s Juan de Ulúa, ou relation de l’expédition française au Mexique, par P.
Blanchard et A. Dauzats : suivi de notes et documents, et d’un aperçu général sur l’état actuel
de Texas, par E. Maissin.
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
Given the abundance of North American nationalities discussed in this study, Americans
who are nationals of the United States will be consistently referred to as ‘U.S.-Americans,’ not
simply ‘Americans.’ In some places where it is appropriate given the contextual use of primary
sources, the word ‘North American’ might also be used to refer to a U.S.-American, for the
terminology ‘North America’ for the United States and ‘North American’ for a citizen of said
country was relatively common in the first half of the nineteenth century. Given that ‘Texian’
was the terminology used during a time when a Texian nationality began to emerge among some
of the republic’s citizens, and given that many readers do not immediately associate the term
with the current-day U.S. state, I tend to favour this term: I desire that the reader experience the
imperial contestation and resulting open-endedness of Texas’ fate as closely as possible, and the
use of ‘Texian’ helps me in linguistically showcasing that Texas’ annexation to the United States
was not an evident fait accompli as soon as Texas became independent from Mexico.
Moreover, German politicians will be defined by their state allegiance if possible,
because a united German state did not yet exist in the 1830s. This study will also refer to
Germans as Germans in the same way that the source materials do: when Prussian or Hanseatic
officials discussed issues impacting the entirety of the German Bund, they did refer to
themselves and the other states of the Bund as ‘German’ and ‘Germans,’ and the German Bund
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was at times labelled simply as ‘Germany.’ Additionally, German emigration to Texas
encompassed Germans from any of the German Bund’s member states, and hence, the term
‘German’ emigration will be used here, as the Adelsverein’s name also referred to their society as
the ‘Society for the Protection of German Emigrants to Texas.’ German institutions, such as the
Adelsverein, German Bund, or Zollverein will be labelled either by their German name or their
English equivalent, though when their German name is given, it will be italicised. The
Adelsverein went by many names, but will be referred to here as either the Verein, Adelsverein,
Mainzer Verein, or ‘the Society’.
Though I use ‘Britain’ and ‘British’ more often than ‘England’ or ‘English’ when
referring to the British, I am also influenced by the language used in archival documents from
the era. When ‘England’ and ‘English’ outweigh ‘British’ and ‘Britain’ heavily in
correspondence or newspapers, I tend to use the former two words, also. This project uses
British-English spellings throughout but will use additional characters for names, places, and
foreign words.
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Chapter One – The Most Important State of Spanish America: European Commerce with
Mexico in the Early Nineteenth Century

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were marked by tremendous change in
the Americas, with global consequences. The thirteen colonies of North America broke away
from the British Empire between 1776 and 1783, whereas France lost Saint Domingue and sold
Louisiana in 1803. Shortly thereafter, the Spanish-American colonies fought against Spanish
rule, gaining independence between 1810 and 1825. In 1836, they were joined by the Republic of
Texas, which had seceded from Mexico, itself only a little over a decade old. In former Spanish
America, where there were new markets, economic rivalry followed: European states and the
United States all sought to commercially gain the upper hand in regions that had previously been
restricted in their international trade by mother country Spain. Moreover, given that the young
Spanish American republics were all fairly debile politically, in need of establishing themselves
internationally through foreign recognition, and equipped with few economic means given the
relative absence of industry and manufacturing, Spanish America became something of a power
vacuum, one that many European states sought to step into. Generally, none of the European
governments under investigation sought a new colonisation of the formerly Spanish colonies, for
increasing industrialisation enabled European states to extend their influence abroad without the
need for political aegis in the form of colonialism.1 Rather, European governments aspired to
gain leverage in Spanish American markets, exporting products of their industry thereto and

1

With the exceptions of Spain, which did hope to regain its colonies after independence, and France, which briefly
considered monarchical restoration in the early 1820s, a reconquest of Spanish America was not desired by
European states. Moreover, John Darwin highlights that European regimes, including even Britain, would not have
been capable of re-colonising Spanish America: Darwin explains that in Latin America, “no British government
could have contemplated diverting the military force needed to occupy or annex a Latin American state”. See: John
Darwin, “Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion,” The English Historical Review,
Vol. 122, No. 447 (Jun. 1997), 617.
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importing therefrom raw materials needed for manufacturing as well as precious metals.
“Recognition in exchange for trade and trading advantages” became the mantra of European and
Spanish-American relations during the first half of the nineteenth century.
Economic rivalry in the decolonised Americas is one of the nineteenth century’s guiding
leitmotifs, and this chapter will focus on defining and analysing how this economic rivalry,
particularly among European governments, developed and manifested itself in Mexico. Mexico,
as a Spanish American republic, was one of the markets under European economic contestation,
yet from its independence through the 1840s, its international relations were rocky. When
analysed through the lenses of informal empire and world-systems analysis, one can regard
Mexico during this era as a peripheral state which resisted the informal-imperialist influence of
core states, such as Britain and France, exerted predominantly via commerce and diplomacy.
Mexico’s resistance centred, broadly speaking, on two categories of circumstances, the former of
which was voluntary: Firstly, Mexican regimes upheld many trading barriers and resisted
European reclamations in an effort to protect Mexico’s budding industries and prevent financial
ruin in an already financially devastated country. These measures made Mexico a less lucrative
market for Europeans and frustrated their attempts to permeate the entire country’s economic
networks. Secondly, the political landscape of Mexico was highly unstable, making trade
unpredictable and foreign reclamations or sanctions difficult.2 Regimes might deny responsibility
for a reclamation, be incapable of making payments because insurgencies drained the state
coffers, or enforce changes in policy, often commercially restrictive in a different manner than
previous efforts, after the overthrow of an old administration. After evaluating what European

2

Indeed, Mexico went from an empire (1822-1823), to a federal republic (1824-1835), to a central republic (18361846), and back to a federal republic (1846-1853) in the first half of the nineteenth century. See: Edward Shawcross,
France, Mexico, and Informal Empire in Latin America, 1820-1867 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 6.
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informal empire looked like in Mexico, this chapter will analyse how significantly these two
factors impacted European informal-imperialist designs.
INDUSTRY, STATES, AND MARKETS IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY
Much of the European correspondence of the era on Mexico, the United States, and Texas
targets the textile industry, including linen goods and most emphatically, cotton. Cotton and the
associated textile industry were of particular importance for Britain, a state that emerged as the
hegemonic power of the century in the aftermath of political and economic change.3 British
industrial output overall doubled between 1800 and the 1820s, and doubled once more between
the 1820s and 1840s.4 British imports of cotton in 1787 totalled roughly 22 million pounds; by
1800, that number had risen to 56 million. During the 1820s, cotton made up a gargantuan 80%
of total British imports.5 By 1840, Britain imported almost 600 million pounds of cotton, and in
1850, the number exceeded 660 million pounds per annum.6 Britain’s export industry was also
dominated by this staple: by 1843, half of all exports were manufactured cotton products. The

Britain’s economic output rose starkly, particularly after 1780. The Industrial Revolution, which was one of the
essential prerequisites of Britain’s commercial prowess and indeed Europe’s formidable economic growth during the
nineteenth century, has been given various time spans, with starting and ending points somewhere between 1750 and
1850. The cotton industry was one of the most heavily impacted industries. See: Seymour Shapiro, Capital and the
Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 4-5. For more literature on the
Industrial Revolution and the cotton industry, see James L. Watkins, King Cotton: A Historical and Statistical
Review 1790-1908 (New York: James L. Watkins & Sons, 1908), David L. Cohn, The Life and Times of King
Cotton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), Stephen Yafa, Big Cotton: How a Humble Fiber Created
Fortunes, Wrecked Civilizations, and Put America on the Map (New York: Viking, 2005), James A. Mann, The
Cotton Trade of Great Britain: Its Rise, Progress, and Present Extent (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers,
1970), M. B. Hammond, The Cotton Industry: An Essay in American Economic History (New York: Johnson
Reprint Company, reprint 1966), and especially Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York:
Vintage Books, 2014).
4 Shapiro, 231. This is based on Walther G. Hoffmann’s statistic regarding the average annual physical volume of
Industrial production, United Kingdom, 1700-1899, (excluding building). With base 1796-1800 = 100, the 1820s
received an index of 208.1, the 1840s, 420.0.
5 Roger G. Kennedy, Cotton and Conquest: How the Plantation System Acquired Texas (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2013), 32. Shapiro gives another statistic based on numbers gathered and accumulated by
Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697-1808, (Oxford: 1960). In the decade between
1780-1789, raw cotton imports averaged 15.15 million pounds. See: Shapiro, 255.
6 James A. Mann, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain: Its Rise, Progress, and Present Extent, (New York: Augustus
M. Kelley Publishers, 1970), 93, and Andrew J. Torget, Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation
of the Texas Borderlands, 1800-1850 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 3.
3
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British production of cotton yarn between 1800 and the 1840s increased more than 14-fold, and
that of piece goods more than 11-fold.7 Much of Britain’s wealth was thus drawn from the textile
industry: Sven Beckert writes that it “was estimated that the livelihood of between one-fifth and
one-fourth of all people was based upon the industry” and that “one-tenth of all British capital
was invested in it”.8
Developments in cotton production and manufacturing during the first half of the
nineteenth century were tied to a new form of capitalism: industrial capitalism. Sven Beckert
argues that the success of industrial capitalism was linked to the existence of a “peculiar and
novel form of state”, of which Britain is a prime example with its strong “trade networks and the
institutions in which they were embedded – from a strong navy creating and protecting market
access to bills of lading allowing for the transfer of capital over large distances. This state was
capable of forging and protecting global markets, policing its borders, regulating industry,
creating and then enforcing private property rights in land, enforcing contracts over large
geographical distances, forging fiscal tools to tax populations, and building a social, economic,
and legal environment that made the mobilization of labor through wage payments possible”.9
Statesmen’s realisation that trade networks, commerce, and industrial output had become crucial
to their state’s power and importance also increased economic competition among the states of
Europe, which became an essential component of European governments’ relations with one
another.

7

Shapiro, 253. This statistic is based on a statistic by Walther G. Hoffmann. When the base is 1796-1800 = 100,
production of cotton yarn in the 1840s amounted to 1422.4, and production of piece goods in the 1840s to 1142.4.
Stuart Bruchey has another statistic on cotton yarn exports, stating that they amounted to 5 million pounds in 1800,
63.7 million in 1830, and 135.2 in 1845. Cotton piece good exports went from 12 million pounds in 1800 to 144.3
million in 1840, and 199.3 million in 1845. See: Stuart Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy:
1790-1860 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), 10.
8 Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of
the American Civil War”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 5 (December 2004), 1405-1438, 1408.
9 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 76.
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The forging of an industrial capitalist state dovetailed with the aftermath of the
Napoleonic Wars, which left many Continental European economies in shambles as a result of
Napoleon’s Continental System and Britain’s blockade against France. States like Prussia,
defeated by Napoleon, had to participate in the Continental System, and France’s occupation of
the Hanseatic city-states prevented the German states from making use of their most significant
harbours.10 Prussia’s maritime trade decreased by 60%, and Silesian linens, Berlin’s silk, and
Brandeburg’s Tuche, making up roughly 50% of Prussian exports, lost their international
markets. After Napoleon’s defeat, the Continental System ceased to exist, and British goods
flooded European markets. German producers feared for their existence, and statesmen
desperately sought to prevent the ruin of their economies through British output. Spanish
American independence provided just the opportunity that European economies threatened by
Britain had needed: new markets which could be used to sell German products and reinvigorate
the German economy.11 A Prussian report from Mexico dated November 1836 evaluated the new
economic order of European states, commenting that “with the extraordinary development and
expansion of the industry of all European states, the necessity to secure the sales of domestic
products in the trans-Atlantic states, where the population and the needs grow daily and where
nature, for the satisfaction thereof, stores such immeasurable treasures of all metals, grows more
urgent daily”.12

Katherina Aaslestad and Karen Hagemann, “1806 and Its Aftermath: Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic
Wars in German Central European Historiography”, Central European History, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 2006),
547-579, 549.
11 Walther L. Bernecker, „Preußisch-mexikanische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19.
Jahrhunderts“ in Preußen und Lateinamerika: Im Spannungsfeld von Kommerz, Macht und Kultur, ed. Sandra
Carreras and Günther Maihold (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), 217-258, 218-219.
12 Trading Report of Friedrich von Gerolt, November 14, 1836, in Prussian Privy Archives/Geheimes Staatsarchiv
Preussischer Kulturbesitz (GSta PK): III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Acta des Ministeriums der auswärtigen
Angelegenheiten (MdaA) betreffend die Handelsverhältnisse mit Mexico und die Nachrichten über Handels- und
andere Gegenstände in Beziehung auf diesen Staats, Vol. VIII: December 1834-December 1836, l. 529-553, 531.
10
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German trade during the 1830s and 1840s was dominated by two entities, the German
Customs Union, also known as the Zollverein, and the three Hanse Towns of Bremen, Hamburg,
and Lübeck. The Zollverein had been born on January 1, 1834 after the conclusion of a treaty on
March 22, 1833 and was designed to lift several of the internal tariffs within the German Bund.
Such internal tariffs had been common practice among German states for centuries, and had been
criticised by German writers of the nineteenth century and Second German Empire era: The
Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Frankfurt (Main)’s journal from 1908 asserted that an
Englishman named Thomas Wiccius had already referred to “the wonderful insanity of the
Germans (miram germanorum insaniam) to kill their own traffic through tariffs” as early as the
fourteenth century, and in his 1848 history of the city of St. Goar, Alexander Grebel pointed to
the Rhine region of the thirteenth century as an example of this, claiming that ten such tariffs
existed between the cities of Koblenz and Mainz alone.13 The Customs Union of the 1830s was
described by the Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Frankfurt as a crucial effort to promote
and protect German commerce in an era when the fall of the Holy Roman Empire had led to a
power vacuum, enabling several of the former member states of this fallen empire to impose
internal duties due to the absence of a central entity forbidding or curbing such limitations on
trade. This heightened fervour for internal tariffs in early nineteenth-century Germany had arisen
after the breakage of Napoleon’s Continental System: this blockade had damaged German trade
and created a certain levelling of duties within the continent and hence left Germany exposed to
an English flooding of goods, particularly via the Hanse Towns upon whose independence
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England had in part insisted. In response, German states put in place several barriers to
commerce that, though designed to reduce the import of foreign goods, also crippled the German
economy and hence made the necessity for a more unified German economic system more dire.14
Historian W. O. Henderson had labelled the Customs Union “the first practical step towards the
forming of a united Germany”.15
Though the Zollverein was a customs union created to facilitate trade among the German
states and form a counterweight to British industrial might, it was also an outgrowth of Prussian
ambition.16 With Austria excluded from the Zollverein, Prussia was able to further its influence
among its German sister-states without any formidable rival. By 1844, twenty-eight of the thirtynine extant, post-Napoleonic German states were members of the Customs Union.17 Notably
absent from this list were the three Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, which
were, in fact, the union’s last addition. Though the unification of the German Empire occurred in
1871, the three city-states did not join the Zollverein for another seventeen years; only in 1888
did they take this step. Hamburg and Bremen also managed to secure the creation of Zollvereinexempt areas within their ports, which showcases the importance that the Hansa attached to their
ability to conduct trade independently.18
The three Hanseatic city-states were by the early nineteenth century the only remnants of
the Hanseatic League, which had been a powerful trading organisation throughout the Middle
Ages, having been referred to as “quite a singular product of medieval history”, “the most
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important trade organization in the Middle Ages”, “the most powerful and lasting of the many
medieval corporations of merchants designated by this term”, and “the most important political
formation in German history of the late Middle Ages”.19 Though the three Hanseatic city-states,
small, with little to no military power, may seem insignificant as political players in German or
indeed global affairs at first sight, their importance is not to be underestimated. The Second
German Empire of 1871, so proud of its maritime trade and so eager to trump the English Royal
Navy, was heavily dependent on its Hanse Towns, particularly Hamburg and Bremen. (Lübeck
became disadvantaged due to its location on the Baltic, not the North Sea as trade focussed
increasingly on trans-Atlantic states). In the early twentieth century, roughly two-thirds of
Germany’s foreign trade was maritime in nature, for which Hamburg and Bremen were the most
significant ports, claiming almost 70% of the total maritime trade of an empire whose economy
was second only to England. Germany’s merchant marine was likewise the second-largest, and
Bremen and Hamburg again constituted the most important destinations with a combined 86%.
Hamburg was the largest port of the European continent, and Bremen was Germany’s secondlargest.20 The Hanse Towns, so crucial to the German Empire after 1871 and the primary trading
league of medieval times, also held great significance to the German Bund in the early nineteenth
century, maugre the difficulties that it faced as a result of the Napoleonic occupation. As this
chapter shows, most German products destined for Spanish America sailed from Hamburg and
Bremen.

Frederick H. Gareau, “A Contemporary Analysis of the Hanseatic League”, Il Politico, Vol. 47, No. 1 (March
1982), 97-114, 97.
20 Heinrich Flügel, Die deutschen Welthäfen Hamburg und Bremen (Paderborn: Salzwasser Verlag, reprint of the
original 1914), 1.
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EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH SPANISH AMERICA
The independence of Spanish America did not result in immediate recognition from
European states, but strong European economic interests in the region guided post-Napoleonic
War politics on the issue even before Spain’s defeat became clear. In 1815, the SpanishAmerican revolt seemed to have been crushed and as a result, Spanish America was discussed
only marginally in relation to the slave trade at the Congress of Vienna.21 By 1817, the matter
already looked slightly different: After Spain consulted the Great Powers in response to a
Portuguese invasion of Banda Oriental del Uruguay, the four power of Britain, Austria, Prussia,
and Russia disagreed on the best course of action. Whereas Britain, whose interest in Spanish
American commerce had existed since the eighteenth century, pressured Spain to open its
colonies up to free trade and award the Spanish Americans equal rights to Spaniards, Russia
supported the Spanish government in its desire for dominance in its colonies, with the caveat that
political and economic concessions would have to be made by Spain to its colonies in order to
soothe the Spanish-American opposition to Spanish rule. Though England did not yet push for
Spanish American independence, for some statesmen feared that new states in the Americas
would fall under the sphere of U.S. influence, the overlap in interests between Britain and Russia
were negated by the former’s desire to maintain its diplomatic dominance in Spanish American
affairs.22 Austria and Prussia sided with the British in this matter, for they, much like the British

Ulrike Schmieder, “Spain and Spanish America in the System of the Holy Alliance: The Importance of
Interconnected Historical Events on the Congresses of the Holy Alliance”, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol.
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Independence”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3 (Jun., 2007): 742-763, 744.
22 Kossok emphasised the rivalry between the European powers, particularly Russia and England, at the Congress of
Vienna: for England, economic dominance in Spanish America, and indeed economic preeminence of the
continental European powers, was of the highest priority, which is why London pushed for a balance on the
European continent in order to prevent the rise of a commercial rival in extra-European trade. Spanish America had
also already assumed a political importance by 1815, because England had, through its mediation between Spain and
its colonies in 1811/1813, established a precedence for diplomatic dominance in the matter vis-à-vis other European
powers. Russia, on the other hand, sought to contest England’s desire to secure for itself the lion’s share of
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themselves, hoped to gain commercially from the loosening of Spain’s mercantile hold on
Spanish America and feared that the Russian stance, which also considered economic sanctions
toward the Spanish American revolutionaries should they decide to reject Spain’s concessions,
would hamper German trans-Atlantic commerce.23 In the aftermath of Spain’s Bourbon Reforms,
Spanish America had grown in importance for the German economies, and a more liberal
Spanish trading policy would only augment Spanish America’s position as a German market
further.24 Manfred Kossok sketched the German trade with the Spanish-American colonies prior
to their independence, stating that by 1766, German states imported Spanish-American cotton,
indigo, cochineal, tobacco, cacao, sugar, spices, woods, and animal hides and skins, whilst they
exported iron manufactures, glass, wax, hemp, flax, and nautical equipment, such as rigging and
lashing. The value of exported linens had grown from roughly 3.5 million Taler in 1748/49 to
around 8-10 million Taler in 1800, and before the Spanish-American revolutions, half of all
Silesian linens went to Spain, Portugal, and their colonies.25

American commerce. Tsar Alexander I did not acknowledge England’s claim to supremacy in American affairs, and
thus offered to mediate between the United States and England in a dispute in 1812 (for more, see chapter five).
Alexander I also tried to persuade the United States to join the Holy Alliance, an attempt to turn this European
entente into an international coalition with the potential of challenging English power. This policy of Alexander I
did elicit a measure of concern in London. See: Manfred Kossok, Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz: Deutschland
und Lateinamerika 1815-1830. Zur Politik der deutschen Staaten gegenüber der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Mittelund Südamerikas (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964), 49.
23 Russia’s influence in the matter quickly decreased: By 1818, it became clear that Russia’s warships, supplied to
Spain in order to enable Madrid to regain control over its American colonies, could not even cross the Atlantic. See:
Kossok, Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz, 57, and Schmieder, 150-151.
24 Bernecker, „Preußisch-mexikanische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts“, 218.
25 Most of Germany’s commerce with Spanish America occurred via Spain, particularly the port of Cádiz, which
gave Spanish merchants a not insignificant amount of control over German-Spanish American trade. However, the
high duties imposed on this trade by Spain combined with the latter’s other regulations regarding commerce with its
colonies encouraged German merchants to engage in direct trade with Spanish America illegally. The last third of
the eighteenth century, in which England, France, and Spain were heavily preoccupied with wars – including the
American Revolution – was witness to increased desires by Germans to profit from Spanish-American commerce.
Eager merchants argued that Prussia, as a neutral power in the American Revolution, could take advantage of the
hostilities between England, France, Spain, and the thirteen colonies in order to further its own trade. In response,
Berlin was confronted with plans that foresaw the establishment of a privileged and extended merchant marine.
Nevertheless, most German hopes for extensive direct trade with Spanish America – either by using Prussia as a
neutral power, by simply taking the risk of engaging in illegal direct trade, or by sailing to less-regulated Portuguese
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Nevertheless, the establishment of the Holy Alliance, a conservative coalition between
Russia, Prussia, and Austria aiming to restrain and curb liberalism in Europe, and defend the
status quo ante monarchies, reduced the ability of German regimes, particularly Prussia, to freely
advocate for the recognition of the Spanish American states that had by the early 1820s gained
their independence. Austria and Russia, with fewer overseas commercial interests than Prussia,
were concerned primarily with questions of legitimacy and rejected the recognition of Spanish
America.26 France, on the other hand, was in a similar position as Prussia: French commercial
interest in Spanish America had existed since the eighteenth century, and as Shawcross has
pointed out, “France (…) did not lack ambition when it came to Latin America” in the nineteenth
century, either.27 Nevertheless, the restoration of monarchy in France under a Bourbon King and
the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna also limited France’s abilities to recognise Spanish
America, despite the fact that leading French economists and policy makers acknowledged that
free trade with Spanish America– unrestricted by Spain – would benefit France. Thus, France’s
first course of action did not focus on recognising the new states; rather, it aimed for an
establishment of monarchies in Spanish America.28
In response to the policies of continental European states such as France and the Holy
Alliance, and with Spain still eager for reconquest, Spanish America’s need for foreign

America – did not bear tremendously rewarding fruit, though some illegal trade did take place. See: Kossok, Im
Schatten der Heiligen Allianz, 16-17.
26 Bernd Schröter, “Die Anfänge der preußischen Diplomatie in Südamerika“, in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 97.
Of course, Austrian overseas interest did exist. In fact, Austria hoped to regain the Netherlands in the aftermath of
the Congress of Vienna in order to strengthen its ability to conduct trans-Atlantic trade and even possibly establish
Austrian colonial ties to the Americas. This plan was ultimately surrendered in exchange for a better position in the
new German Confederation, which was deemed more important to Austria’s national interests than trans-Atlantic
trade. See Christian Cwik, „Revolutionen und Reaktion: Der Wiener Kongress, Österreich und die Amerikafrage“,
in Mächtepolitik und Friedenssicherung: Zur politischen Kultur Europas im Zeichen des Wiener Kongresses
(Münster: LIT, 2019), 107-121, 4-5.
27 Shawcross, 12.
28 Shawcross, 42-43 and 48.
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recognition became more dire, for its new states sought to prevent invasion efforts by Spain,
intervention by the Holy Alliance, as well as territorial disputes with their neighbouring states.29
Independent of the Holy Alliance and its restrictions, England was the first European state to
forge connections with the new states: particularly once under the leadership of new Prime
Minister George Canning, the British government pursued relations with Spanish America, with
one primary focus: recognition was to be awarded if advantageous commercial connections were
to be established. In 1822, Britain recognised the Spanish American rebels as a war party, and in
1823, it sent consuls to the new states of Spanish America. Official recognition often followed
quickly thereafter: London recognised Gran Colombia, Mexico, and Buenos Aires in
1824/1825.30
By 1824, the conquest of Spanish America was, under the new economic and political
order, no longer possible for any of the powers analysed in this chapter. The only power with
lasting interest in reconquest in the early nineteenth-century was Spain. At the Congress of
Verona in 1822, a clear breach took place between the continental powers and England over the
“Spanish Question”, or France’s proposal to intervene in Spain. France hoped to restore full
power to Ferdinand VII, crush the liberals who had seized power in 1820 and had ruled Spain for
three years known as Trienio Liberal, and possibly arrange for the establishment of Spanish
American monarchies disposed amiably to Spain and France, whereas England, represented at
the Congress by the Duke of Wellington, supported a policy of non-intervention. Since the great
powers decided to permit France’s invasion, which took place in 1823, England began to fully
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pursue its own course vis-à-vis the Continental leaders of the Holy Alliance.31 Ferdinand VII, on
the other hand, appealed to the Holy Alliance for support in France’s monarchical restoration
efforts by downplaying the strength of the independence movements in his former colonies,
arguing that his return to power in Spain would enable him to recapture Spanish America to the
commercial benefit of European states such as Prussia.32 Indeed, Austria’s, Prussia’s, and
Russia’s response to English concern regarding Spanish America’s fate after monarchical
restoration in Spain shows that these powers were not in complete disfavour of a reunion
between mother country and colonies, so long as commerce did not suffer. This stance motivated
English Prime Minister Canning to seek an understanding with the United States: a dual
statement of European non-intervention in the Americas was the goal, though it was famously
rejected by the United States, which, through James Monroe, issued its own proclamation of
non-interference on behalf of European powers in the Western hemisphere.
Though Kossok argued that an intervention in the New World on behalf of the Holy
Alliance was largely an exaggeration, based in part on a canard of the British press alluding to a
secret treaty between the Holy Alliance and France to restore monarchies not merely in Spanish
America, but also the United States, the idea led to such consternation in England and the United
States that the Monroe Doctrine was born. England’s sending of consuls to Spanish America and
the subsequent recognition of the new states led to a shift in the Holy Alliance’s policy in transAtlantic affairs.33 England’s weighty decision, combined with an awareness of the impracticality
of conquering the large territory lost by Spain, led to the downfall of desires to capture Spanish
America. Moreover, statesmen of the various commercial powers realised that economic rivalry
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among these powers would prevent lasting conquest should any one of these parties decide to
invade a former Spanish American colony.34 Edward Shawcross highlights that even France’s
interventions in Mexico in 1838-1839 and 1862-1867 should not be seen as aims for territorial
conquest, but rather signs of informal imperialism.35 In fact, in late 1823, Canning and the
French ambassador Polignac agreed that Spanish American independence was a fait accompli
and that neither party would attempt to conquer the former Spanish colonies.36
The imperial aim was one for pre-eminence in the formerly Spanish realm of influence,
to be achieved through economic dominance. The British, not bound by the policy of legitimacy,
were the first to engage in this strategy in Spanish America. As Canning noted, “Spanish
America is free and if we do not mismanage our affairs sadly, she is English.”37 Even before
Spanish-American independence, the Napoleonic Wars had given England an opportunity to
further cement its position as the commercial leader in Spain’s colonies, as E. M. Lahmeyer
Lobo argued: “The Spanish colonies grew dependent on England throughout the course of the
18th century…as the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian peninsula opened the possibility for
political liberation, the Hispano-American nations remained English commercial colonies”.38

As a British Parliamentary Paper highlights, “in 1825 there had been (…) on the part of the United States”, a
project “to obtain possession of the island of Cuba. There were at that time in Cuba three parties, severally wishing
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Early access and commercial connections to Spanish American states became imperative for
European governments, who did not want to lose out on the economic benefits of Spanish
American markets. As von Gerolt wrote in the case of Spain; by the time Spain had finally
engaged in economic relations with Mexico, other nations who had forged ties earlier had
“already won the upper hand”.39 The same concern also existed once Texas became independent.
EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND COMMERCE WITH AND IN MEXICO
Given the fear of missing out on trans-Atlantic trade, increasingly seen as so crucial to
the stability, prosperity, and power of the European states, the governments of Europe tried to
follow the English lead in Mexico by circumventing the political guideline set by the Holy
Alliance. By 1836, Britain, France, and Prussia had all completed treaties and agreements with
Mexico: After Britain’s recognition of Mexico in 1825, the first Anglo-Mexican treaty of amity
and commerce was signed in 1826, making this the first such treaty Mexico signed with a foreign
power.40 France, like other European continental powers, was limited by the straight jacket of
legitimacy and restauration dictated by the Holy Alliance, which reduced its ability to follow the
English lead. Legitimist principles and loyalty to Ferdinand VII notwithstanding, France’s
government was aware of Mexico’s importance to French trade, and thus sent a representative to
Mexico in 1822, largely to assess the situation and prevent England from gaining the upper hand
in a market that French policy makers regarded as the most important of former Spanish
America. The collapse of the Bourbon restoration and the rise of the July Monarchy finally gave
France the opportunity to recognise the new republics in Spanish America in 1830.41
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Bernecker’s discussion on the early Prussian-Mexican relationship showcases the
difficulties on behalf of both Mexico and European states like Prussia and France to settle and
establish the formalities and officialities of their relations. Bernecker notes that Prussia desired to
send a representative to Mexico in 1825, without the intention of creating diplomatic ties but
with the objective of facilitating German trade through the presence of a trading agent. This new
position, which lacked consular or diplomatic precedent in Prussia, was filled by Louis Sulzer,
who had previously been to Mexico as a representative of the Rheinisch-Westindischen
Kompagnie, a trading organisation that had represented the first Prussian effort to form
unofficial, non-state ties to independent Mexico without disrespecting legitimist principles. Upon
his return to Mexico, Sulzer, together with several other Prussian officials, including Christian
von Rother, the President of Prussia’s maritime department the Seehandlung, as well as German
merchants, encouraged the Prussian government to forge a proper treaty of commerce and amity
with Mexico and to establish a consulate there. The first General-Consul was Carl Wilhelm
Koppe, who arrived in Mexico in 1830. In 1831, the first Prussian-Mexican treaty of amity and
commerce was completed and awaited ratification.42
For the Hanse Towns, trans-Atlantic trade emerged as imperative after the independence
of Spanish America. The Napoleonic Wars had led to an occupation of their ports, preventing the
use of their merchant marines which stood at the foundation of Hanseatic prosperity, and
Britain’s economic might after 1815 resulted in a flooding of German markets and the
overwhelming traffic of British vessels in Hanseatic ports. This, combined with a hindrance of
European trade due to the increase in internal duties among German states as well as the
heightened protectionism of states like France, led to a reorientation of trade outward and
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overseas, where the newly independent republics provided the Hansa with an opportunity to
revive their maritime trade and hence their raison d’être.43 Though the Hanse Towns were not a
part of the Holy Alliance and therefore not bound to the policy of legitimacy and restauration,
they struggled in establishing commercial ties to Mexico nonetheless. The two dominant powers
of the German Confederation, Prussia and Austria, were both members of the Holy Alliance, and
combined with the influence of other major European powers also bound in part by the
conservative order, e.g. France, the Hansa could not afford to pursue a policy entirely to the
contrary of the maxim given by the two leaders of the German Bund.44 Political pressures
notwithstanding, the Hanseatic city-states, which did have a history of engaging in trade even
when clothed in the guise of illicitness, had been, as Hendrik Dane found, sympathetic towards
the Spanish American independence movements since the 1810s, and also followed their own
diplomatic path in trans-Atlantic affairs: Whereas Friedrich von Gerolt, Prussia’s interim
General-Consul beginning in 1833 and chargé d’affaires (Geschäftsträger) in Mexico between
1837 and 1844, supported European interference in Mexico in the 1830s, the Hanseatic citystates were largely against it.45 By the late 1820s and early 1830s, Hanseatic trade had resumed,
with a trans-Atlantic focus, a closer cooperation with Berlin, and the continued use of the other
German territories as suppliers of goods.46
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In the following pages, German trade will be evaluated predominantly as the trade of one
large economy as opposed to dissecting the economic importance of each of the German
Confederation’s member states. The reason for this is because the Zollverein, as well as the
political and economic landscape of Europe, incentivised the discussion of German trade as such,
though attention will also be paid to the Hanseatic correspondence, which differed at times from
Prussia’s. Nevertheless, even Bremian Mayor Smidt was informed by Hamburg’s consul Adolph
de Bary that the Hanseatic interests were so deeply intertwined with those of the other German
Bund member states that Hanseatic and Prussian policies in Mexico were most frequently the
same.47 In an 1836 letter to the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, von Gerolt analysed the
Customs Union’s benefit to German trading interests, particularly in Spanish America. “Your
Excellency is aware of the large interests and commercial connections which Prussia has with the
former Spanish colonies and the entirety of America, and primarily with Mexico since the
emancipation of these countries”, wrote von Gerolt, “especially since these connections expand
from year to year and increase in importance for our motherland”. As this importance grew, it
became “all the more necessary and urgent” that Prussian subjects benefit from “a larger measure
of protection and consequently larger advantages” given the “competition of the other nations”.
This need for greater Prussian power to secure Prussian trading interests and subjects in Mexico
and Spanish America at large was, according to von Gerolt, met partially by the Zollverein.
Through the “benedictory formation of the German Zollverein, the (…) material interests of the
member states of this large union had been closely connected and tremendously promoted”
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because the Union had aided in “freeing the German Gewerbsthätigkeit and industry of its
shackles”. With Prussia’s “providence”, the Union had enabled the German economy to “enter
the lists” with the larger commercial nations.48
European commerce with Mexico was dominated by a European desire to acquire raw
materials – in the case of Mexico, chiefly metals, predominantly in the form of silver – and to
sell their manufactured products. In the Spanish era, the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru
had been the most lucrative sources of metals, and the eighteenth century had seen an increase in
production and exportation thereof, making New Spain and Peru all the more attractive for
Europeans: the extraction of metals since 1700 rose five-fold compared to the rate prior to 1700,
and between 1750 and 1800, the exportation of metals, largely silver, was higher than the entire
yield between 1492 and 1700.49 Furthermore, as Seymour Shapiro has highlighted, E. A. Wrigley
argued that metals were a crucial raw material for the industrialised states of Europe, for “the
most important change in raw material provisions which took place was the substitution of
inorganic for organic sources of supply, of mineral for vegetable or animal raw materials. This
was the sine qua non of sustained industrial growth…” Cotton, Wrigley argued, was an
exception.50 Indeed, mining was one of independent Mexico’s largest export sectors, and both
mineral materials for European production as well as silver played a crucial role in European
interest in Mexico. Shawcross has detailed the importance of silver to the French economy:
Spanish American silver brought wealth and stability to France’s bimetallic currency system. 51
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An optimistic 1836 trading report highlighted the European focus on silver. It described
the German economies’ increased competitiveness in commerce with Mexico. Putting the value
of Prussian industrial products exported to Mexico at 7,342,870 pesos, it calculated that roughly
5 million of that sum should remain after the subtraction of import duties and other expenses.
Moreover, the report claimed that Mexico’s production and export of silver valued around 18 to
20 million pesos, which meant that Prussia would receive roughly a quarter of this sum. In other
words, Prussia would, according to these numbers, “have a share of one quarter in the entirety of
foreign trade with Mexico”. Combined with several other German states, including Silesia,
Saxony, Bavaria, Westphalia, or the Rhineland Provinces, Prussia held a share of roughly one
third of silver production, which put it on par with Britain, with also one third, or France and the
United States, who held combined another third.52 In a letter from Hanseatic merchants to the
Senate of Hamburg, the former asserted that “a third of the entire foreign trade of this country
(Mexico) goes through German hands, which in turn passes mostly through ours”.53
What must be remembered about these statistics, however, is that many of them are not
entirely accurate. Bernecker points out that von Gerolt’s estimation regarding silver exports was
50% too high, and he also questions whether German merchants could lay claim to a third of all
foreign trade in Mexico, as does Kossok, who estimates that share at a quarter.54 Even German
contemporaries questioned the accuracy of empirical data available. After being asked by
Prussian statesman Friedrich Eichhorn, von Rother cautioned in 1837 that “the messages
regarding the ships entering or leaving the ports of the Mexican state are very incomplete”, and
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commented that there were no documents for the year 1836 due to von Gerolt’s temporary
absence from Mexico during which he was in Europe. For 1835, only a few pieces of data from
the port of Tampico were available, and von Rother suggested that von Gerolt be encouraged to
provide closer documentation. For the German trade with Tampico in 1835, only a small list of
two Hamburgian vessels seemed available.55 Such reservations also challenge other shipping
records, such as a directory that von Gerolt had sent to the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in which he stated that, in the years 1831-1833, only three of his government’s ships had visited
Vera Cruz, namely the Mentor, Fredericke Sophie, and Elisabeth Luise. All of these vessels had
likewise sailed from Hamburg.56
Though European economies provided a broad variety of goods for Mexican
consumption, the dominant industry featured was the textile industry. Competition among
Europeans in Mexico did not focus primarily on France’s and Germany’s effort to catch up with
British cotton product sales, however. Rather, each economy had their own competitive textile
manufactures. Bernecker points out that the English were able to dominate the cotton market in
Mexico for decades, with the United States as its fiercest competitor in this field. The French and
German commerce in Mexico had emphases on other goods, leading to what Bernecker labels a
sort of “division of labour” among European economies in Mexico. Cotton, linen, and wool
textiles all constituted an important part of European commerce with Mexico. One of the
principal German products that German statesmen regarded as competitive in the realm of
international trade was linen. The linen industry was highlighted in newspapers, correspondence,
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reports, and official documents of many German states as one of the region’s flagships, capable
of outselling even their British and French competitors in some American states.57 In 1836, a
Prussian trading report stated that half of all Prussian exports to Mexico were linen products with
a value of almost 4 million pesos.58 In the early 1830s, Silesian linens constituted a sixth of all
Mexican imports and exceeded the export value of any other German good, though other textiles
and iron, steel, and glass manufactures also sold relatively well in Mexico.59
Various types of linen existed on the Mexican market, including platillas, listados,
bretañas, and creas. The German linen product that seemed to sell best in Mexico were the
platillas: a trade statistic from 1837 noted that the ship Emma, which had sailed from Hamburg,
had brought 2068 pieces of creas, 2850 pieces of bretañas, 1050 pieces of listados, but 12600
pieces of platillas. Ship Hansa from Bremen carried 1710 pieces of creas, but 4100 pieces of
platillas, and Neptunus, sailing from Hamburg, carried 956 pieces of creas but 11,000 platillas.
More German platillas were brought into Mexico via the ports of New Orleans (1400 pieces),
New York (2000 pieces) and Havana (1000 pieces). Other ships coming from Hamburg and
Bremen, such as the Hebrus sailing to Tampico, carried 6000 pieces of platillas, 1000 pieces of
creas, 200 pieces of estopillas, 350 pieces of listados, as well as Bielefelder Leinen (Bielefeld
linens), Hessian rolls, Drelle (twilled linen), and glass, and the Anna Johanna carried 3000
pieces of platillas, 600 pieces of creas, 600 pieces of estopillas, 350 pieces of listados, other
linen goods, Hessian rolls, glass, iron, and hosiery. Beyond linens, some woollen textiles were
also sold such as Casimir.60
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As a result of linen’s significance to the larger German economy, efforts were made to
facilitate and protect the trade with the American republics particularly in regard to linen
products. Other European nations, chiefly among them Britain, had their own versions of
platillas, creas, and the other types of linen sold on the Mexican market, and began to compete
increasingly with the German linen products. The Rheinisch-Westindische Kompagnie, a pioneer
of German trade in Mexico, had exported goods to Mexico in 1831 to the value of 7,939,379
Prussian Thaler, of which 3,287,919 Thaler’s worth had been linen goods. A few years later,
however, English trade introduced British and Irish linens, which were mixed with cotton and
hence had a shiny surface that Prussian Koppe identified as one of the reasons why English
linens became increasingly successful.61 German officials often hoped that changes in Mexican
laws or the market would decrease the competition from other foreign textiles. Von Gerolt hoped
that new Mexican regulations in 1837 would dampen the success of the mantas trade, a trade in
cheap cotton cloth consumed by the poorer classes, which was conducted heavily by U.S.Americans. Mantas, according to von Gerolt, flooded Mexico and thus threatened the German
markets for Silesian platillas.62 Moreover, Bahre hoped in 1840 that the recent cheap sales of
German linens would hinder English linens from establishing themselves more firmly on the
Mexican market.63
Besides the mere sales of goods, Europeans also began to establish merchant houses and
businesses in Mexico. Von Gerolt estimated that there were roughly 2000 Frenchmen, 1000
Germans – virtually all of which were either from the German Customs Union or the Hanse
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Towns – , and 1000 Englishmen in Mexico, and that the total number of foreigners did not
amount to more than 5000 individuals, mostly settled in port cities such as Campeche, Vera
Cruz, Tampico, Matamoros, Acapulco, San Blas, Mazatlán, and Guaymas, or inland towns like
Mexico City, Jalapa, Puebla, Oaxaca, Toluca, Valladolid, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato,
Queretaro, Zacatecas, Durango, Guadalajara, as well as in the mining districts, such as Real del
Monte. Indeed, historian Nikolaus Böttcher likewise asserts that Englishmen in Mexico never
numbered more than roughly 1000 individuals before 1850.64 Whereas British competition was
always seen as fierce, the Prussians evaluated the French as less threatening, for French trade,
according to the report, was dominated by retail in the form of fashion and millinery goods, as
well as shops owned by chefs, perfumers, tailors, carpenters, and wig makers. Moreover, the
French owned several distilleries, sugar refineries, bakeries, and a pharmacy. The German and
English merchants owned larger merchant houses; by the 1830s, the number of German houses
had reached thirty, and by 1836, English houses numbered 27. Many Germans were
watchmakers, lathe operators, and other types of artisans and tradespersons, such as tailors, shoe
makers, milliners, saddlers and leather workers, and tanners. The British owned jeweller and
watch shops, mechanical workshops, breweries, saddleries, and, as of 1836, a facility near
Acapulco for the cleaning of cotton.65
As the Prussian concern for German linens and their competitiveness shows, the same
competition that existed between European powers globally also existed in North America,
including Mexico. Von Gerolt argued that the flooding and saturation of Mexican markets was
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“unavoidable” because of the large degree of European competition thereof, and Prussian Consul
F. Schneider moreover highlighted that Mexican demand for European goods fluctuated strongly
with the seasons: the rainy season made travel and transportation and hence access to markets
difficult.66 Prussia’s interim consul in Tampico also spoke of limited demand in Mexico, for the
Mexican population’s poverty restricted the purchasing power of many. An 1836 report by von
Gerolt suggested that, as European merchants were becoming more aware of the amount of
consumption in Mexico, they had also become more discerning in their selection of goods to be
shipped overseas. European economies thus competed both based on quality and quantity, and
the Prussian report announced proudly that it was the quality of German products and the careful
selection thereof for the Spanish-American markets that had enabled them to challenge the
English and French competition (though the interim consul in Tampico wrote in 1844 that
German linens’ superior quality had not yet been properly appreciated by Mexico’s
consumers).67 This made Spanish America all the more attractive to German trade, for Prussia
had already lost out to English competition in Brazil and the United States, the report claimed:
The English had “in earlier times succeeded, in Brazil and North-America, in largely displacing
the German industrial products, and namely our most important article, linens, in introducing
their (English) cotton fabrics as the main necessity of the inhabitants of these countries”.68
Despite the fact that the report regarded Mexico as less suited for linen products, it noted
that the sales of linen articles in that country were probably larger than in Brazil and NorthAmerica combined. Bernecker describes the competition extant between Germany and Britain in
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Mexico regarding linen goods as “cutthroat”, emphasising that strategies such as “dumping
prices, unfair business methods, and speculative accommodations of credit” were already in
use.69 Prussian correspondence demonstrates repeatedly that German linens were in fiercest
competition with England, and officials such as von Roenne hoped for the dominance of German
textiles vis-à-vis their English counterparts on the Mexican market.70 Because of this
competition, von Gerolt wrote that it should be “one of the most essential duties of the agents,
residing in Mexico and accredited by the various governments, to use their personal and official
influence in order to promote their respective country’s interests within the changes that the
Congress seeks to make in the customs tariff”. This could happen either through the rejection of
and resistance to new restrictive laws or a reduction of the entrance duties for the agent’s
respective country.71
The interesting question is whether the European parties analysed in this chapter actually
pursued informal imperialist strategies in the Texas region and if so, with what success and on
what level. The trading report’s recommendation that European agents in Mexico use their
official influence in order to attain a better customs tariff, being willing to either resist restrictive
laws or accept an advantage for their country only, suggests that free-trade imperialism did play
a role in Mexico in the 1830s and 1840s. The following evaluation of European commerce and
diplomacy with Mexico and Texas will focus on various components of informal imperialism: In
order to determine how significant informal imperialist ambitions were, various zones of
contestation will be laid out, including Mexico’s efforts to protect its own industry, the European
resistance to tariffs and duties, reclamations, and an analysis of the contraband trade. These
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discussions will include an evaluation of the success of Europeans in swaying or influencing the
Mexican government’s policies.
The tendency of European states, as a response to their new-found economic-industrial
prowess, to export their manufactured goods to trans-Atlantic states at the expense of those
countries’ own industries was highlighted in the Prussian trading report, wherein was written that
Mexico had, since its independence, witnessed a revival of agriculture and mining, but had very
few other developed economic sectors, in response to which a “speedy flooding of the country
with foreign industrial products of all kinds” had taken place.72 Moreover, the report emphasised
that many Europeans who went to work in Mexico did not stay there permanently and instead
returned to their motherland after several years or decades. The report continued to observe that
“of all these foreigners there are only few, as experience has taught and continues daily to teach
(us), who, after a number of years with a proportionate fortune and as rich people, do not return
to their fatherland, where they put their capital to fruitful use. Most of them have their relatives
or friends replace them in their shops in Mexico and thus lay the basis for their own fortune”.73
Von Gerolt’s successor in Mexico, Ferdinand Seiffart, proudly made a similar observation in
1846, linking German wealth established in Mexico to German industriousness.74 These reports
show that much of the wealth that was established in Mexico by European immigrants also
remained in European hands. This led to the outflow of mineral wealth from Mexico: The report
claimed that the metals mined in Mexico each year circulated first among several Mexican
sectors, such as agriculture, mining, or industry, only to then end up in the hands of European
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merchants, who transmitted them to Europe. “The same would also occur”, the report declared,
“if this production were twice or thrice as high”. The Commerz-Deputation of Hamburg
acknowledged the importance of silver in a letter to Hamburg’s Senate in 1838, claiming that
silver was “all of Mexico’s power”, which flowed from that country to Europe and hence
deprived Mexico of not merely its mineral wealth, but its power, also.75
To a certain extent, Mexico was not capable of stopping the outflow of precious metals
and breaking its dependence on European commerce, largely because of its instability. The 1836
report addressed this, and asserted that European merchants took advantage of Mexico’s
financial crisis by re-buying orders, which were used as payment of import duties in coastal
regions, from the Mexican government, which was in such dire need of cash that it sold these
orders at a huge discount, enabling European merchants to circumvent, to a certain extent,
Mexico’s import duties. Restrictive laws and regulations were sometimes waived in part or even
entirely for merchants of European states whose local representatives had used their influence in
order to obtain such an advantage for their nationals. Moreover, European products were also
brought into Mexico via contraband trade and thus at “the expense of state revenue” – generally,
these were “the most lucrative commercial transactions” for merchants.76 Another letter from
Bahre emphasises that European trade was partially responsible for contraband trade, with
perilous consequences: Bahre argued that a revolution, which had commenced in Tampico in
October 1838, “had been entirely and completely fuelled and sustained due to the known
contraband commerce”, because merchants had, coaxed by significant discounts, paid import
tariffs to the revolutionaries in advance and been able to ship into Mexico even forbidden goods.
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The revolutionaries, on the other hand, thus possessed monetary resources which prolonged and
bolstered their fight. Despite this, Bahre noted, Mexico’s central government had conceded to
recognise these payments of foreign merchants, so long as they paid the additional 25% that the
insurgents had granted to them.77
Though many European merchants participated in the contraband trade, it was frequently
identified as a problem by European officials, because it made the market more unpredictable.
Contraband trade was made possible by the Mexican inability to stop this traffic, and the
frequency and volume of this trade only exacerbated this issue. Prussian officials reported on the
difficulties caused by “contraband trade, which has grown rampant in the last years in almost
every harbour of the republic”. The Mexican government, one report by von Gerolt claimed, was
only able to collect one-sixth of all entrance duties at best, for most goods found their way onto
the market by contraband trade. This satiation of the market could not be adequately controlled
by Mexican authorities and imperilled merchants, who were not able to make adequate
predictions due to the vast amount of ‘black’ articles. As a result, “the prices of goods are
continuously depressed, and the state of the real trade has generally, from year to year, been
made more precarious”. The Mexican border patrol (Douanenpolizey), the report lamented,
lacked the means of stopping or curbing contraband trade in all or even most of Mexico’s
harbours.78 Another Prussian report explained that many German merchants located in Mexico
City and Veracruz had complained about a “lack of sales and depressed prices of our goods”.
These complaints the report credited to “the northern parts of Mexico, where consumption has
risen significantly through the increase in silver production”, and where people met their needs
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“directly and by means of contraband trade, largely from New Orleans via the northern ports of
Tampico and Matamoros”. Later on, contraband trade is criticised again as a hindrance to
European commerce with Mexico. The officials behind the report believed that a French factory
producing mantas, a certain type of cotton fabric, would not be of permanence and unable to
make significant profit due to the heavy smuggling trade along the northern Mexican frontier,
where U.S.-Americans covered Mexican consumers’ desire for mantas.79
Insufficient profits in response to the heavy contraband trade plagued many European
merchants. In another letter to his government, the Prussian Consul-General analysed the market
for German products in Mexico, concluding that “an improvement of prices could not be
detected” and that “the German commerce has the highest hopes in an intentioned reorganisation
of the local customs system and the reduction of entrance duties for the control of the contraband
trade”, highlighting the Prussian beliefs that profits were not as high as desirable and that
commercial regulations were inefficient.80 Another letter from July 1837, with a price list created
by Prussian Vice-Consul in Veracruz, A. Stolz, analysed the linen market there, suggesting that
“all Silesian linens, with the exception of ordinary platillas, of which there were lately 1000
pieces distributed among the local merchants, would only find buyers with considerable loss,
(…) Saxon linens have, since the stocks were almost gone, been sold (…) with moderate profit,
all sales did not exceed 800 pieces, however”.81
The mantas trade, as well as trade in cotton in general, was a nuisance to Mexico, which
sought to build up its own cotton industry. Schneider wrote that textiles were, for patriotic
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Mexicans, a proof of love for their country: because foreign textile industries had tremendous
dominance in Mexico, Mexican patriots bought what Schneider referred to as “inferior native
products” rather than foreign textiles.82 Mexican protectionism thus led to bans on the
importation of cotton goods several times, including in 1838. This prohibition, which included
cotton textiles as well as cotton twist, vexed the English, and stands as another example of
Mexican protectionist measures to prevent European influence through European commerce.83
Prussian Vice-Consul in Matamoros J. Eschenburg reported that, in the aftermath of the
prohibition, several Mexicans had established spinning factories and weaving mills, with the goal
of satisfying the Mexican demand for cotton products. Nevertheless, though Mexico made efforts
to restrict the foreign cotton trade, Prussian correspondence highlights that contraband trade in
cotton as well as other products remained high. “All customs duties collected in Matamoros up to
the first of October 1837 amounted to no more than 200,000 pesos, to which one can add 50,000
pesos for embezzlement or savings”, Eschenburg wrote to Eichhorn. “In response to these
collected duties, one estimates that all imports amount to no more than 800,000 pesos, (…) the
entire trade in Matamoros was founded on secret importation”.84 Since much of contraband trade
was dominated by the U.S.-Americans, the 1838 prohibition of cotton-good importation
impacted England most heavily.
European attempts to sway Mexican governmental policies, visible in e.g. von Gerolt’s
recommendation that local European agents endeavour to coax the Mexican authorities into
passing laws more favourable towards foreign trade, did not go unnoticed by Mexican
representatives, who firmly rejected such European involvement in their country’s internal
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affairs. J. M. Ortiz Monasterio emphasised this in a letter to von Gerolt, arguing that European
consuls could make use of their right to make reclamations on behalf of their respective
country’s subjects – if they were “fair and just” – but that this was the extent of their power, for
they were “not authorised to engage the authorities in discussions nor issues of competencies on
political or other non-commercial matters”. Such policy-lines frustrated Europeans, who did not
believe that Mexico was doing enough to address their reclamations when the former relied
solely on the practices outlined by Ortiz Monasterio.85
Mexico was also unable to establish commercial ties to European countries on truly equal
footing, despite the rise of “free trade”. Though most treaties of amity and commerce signed
between European parties and Mexico spoke of both parties treating one another as being among
“the most favoured nations”, Mexican trade to Europe was disadvantaged when compared with
European trade to Mexico. A Prussian report highlighted this and stated that the restrictive
Mexican duties and laws which led to frequent European disgruntlement did not “amount to a
fourth of those duties which a Mexican (merchant) house of the same category would have to
pay in regular taxes in England, France, or Prussia”.86 Such examples notwithstanding, the
Mexican government did at times refer to European and U.S.-American laws to resist European
financial pressures. In the discussion on a reclamation that had been raised by European powers
in response to a fire that had destroyed the customs house, Mexican diplomat and minister
Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza had stated that Mexico would first contact its representatives
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abroad to receive notice of the respective laws in Europe and the United States before conceding
to any demands made by European merchants in Veracruz, where the fire had taken place.87
Though European informal imperialist ambitions existed, and though European powers
had commercial advantages in trading with Mexico, the Mexican government often resisted the
pervasive penetration of European commerce in its country. An early vexation for European
merchants was the Mexican government’s use of forced bonds in 1836. The rationale behind this
practice was that the monetary gain from such bonds would enable the financing of Mexico’s
army, which, throughout much of the 1830s, cost on average 10 million pesos to maintain per
annum. “Given the impossibility of enforcing direct taxes”, noted a Prussian report, “the
governments see themselves as forced to impose forced bonds on capitalists and the merchant
class”. There were huge disadvantages associated with this practice, however, for it was seen by
Mexican and European merchants alike as irregular in implementation and prone to abuse, which
elicited their resistance and outcries from foreign newspapers.88 Adolph de Bary, who had served
as the consul for the free city of Frankfurt, as interim consul of the Hanse Towns, and had
watched over the Prussian consulate in von Gerolt’s absence, described one such effort by the
Mexican government when he lamented that a new law passed on June 6, 1836,
disproportionately affected German merchants in Mexico. The law foresaw the establishment of
forced bonds, amounting to the value of two million pesos, for the purpose of covering in part
the deficit of the Mexican states. Certificates would be issued for these bonds, and at the end of
the fiscal year, those living in Mexico could turn in their bonds in order to cover a tax to be
established in connection to this law. De Bary saw an injustice in this law, for he argued that it
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disadvantaged smaller merchants, especially German ones who were almost exclusively taxed at
the maximum rate. When German merchants sought legal reprieve, they were treated
dishonourably and threatened with greater financial losses, motivating de Bary to contact the
French and English representatives, for their subjects were likewise treated inequitably.89 This
correspondence suggests that European diplomats and merchants were not always able to easily
sway the Mexican government to their favour.
Next to Mexico’s deliberate resistance to European free-trade imperialism, in the form of
e.g. the forced bonds of 1836, Mexico’s political instability was identified by European officials
as problematic to European interests early on, and thus formed a less intentional Mexican
resistance to European imperialism. Prussian Consul-General in Mexico, von Gerolt, labelled the
country as disorganised, and another official report from 1836 complained about the lack of
security foreigners enjoyed in the country.90 The report referred to the plundering of Mexico City
in 1828, where many French subjects had lost 400,000 pesos; a “gruesome murder” of six
Frenchmen in Puebla, August 1833, for which the perpetrators had not yet been punished; the
murder of Swiss consul Mairet; as well as the recent shooting of several foreigners in Tampico.
Such events, combined with Mexican laws regarding forceable bonds, incited Europeans to
pressure Mexico for compensation. The 1836 report, for instance, deemed it probable that France
would impose penal measures on Mexico in the likely event that the Mexican government did
not give in to French reclamation efforts, and urged the Prussian government to support France
in such an event, given that “all nations with connections to Mexico have the interest that an
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order of things be established in this country, through which the foreigners would enjoy a more
authentic protection and other guarantees than the ones granted to them by the treaties and the
Mexican laws”.91
In Mexico, resistance to European penetration and political-economic instability
combined, often stymying European diplomats and merchants who desired to take legal redress
for their losses, aware however that the Mexican government found itself unable to pay
reclamations or properly address grievances by stopping the contraband trade. Oftentimes,
Mexican measures to stabilise the country had a negative impact on merchants, who possessed
much of the wealth in the country and were predominantly foreigners. Von Gerolt noted that low
sales in Veracruz were exacerbated by the local lack of cash, which had only recently found
alleviation after half a million dollars transported from Mexico City and Puebla reached the port
city. Nevertheless, von Gerolt wrote, the sales of platillas and creas had even in Mexico City
been lower than normal. This depression in sales did not merely impact German linens, von
Gerolt claimed, but generally all industrial products of Britain, France, and Germany, a
development owed to the devaluation of copper money to half its nominal value. This measure
taken by the Mexican government was described by von Gerolt as “beneficent and necessary”,
though he did note that this had caused Mexico to face a loss of 4 million dollars, mostly carried
by the merchant class.92 Bahre also pointed out that because “the entirety of trade is in the hands
of foreigners and Altspanier (lit. old Spaniards)”, and because “the Mexicans know, as usual,
how to secure their interests”, Mexican officials preferred at times to address the concerns of
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merchants last, suggesting that the European merchants’ position in Mexico was nuanced: they
held tremendous significance to Mexican trade and the Mexican economy, and hence had
increased influence, which Mexican authorities at times tried to fight.93
Similar circumstances can be seen regarding Mexican efforts to stop the contraband
trade.94 Von Gerolt noted in a trading report that a new tariff had led to the closure of the port of
Mazatlán – certainly a restriction on Mexican trading possibilities.95 This same tariff had come
into effect in September 1837, and had limited foreign trade to the ports of Sisal, Campeche,
Tabasco, Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros, as well as Acapulco, San Blas, Monterey, and
Guaymas, partially in an effort to curb contraband trade by giving the underfunded harbour
patrol a smaller range of ports to control.96 Von Gerolt also reported on the insurance rates on
Mexican ships leaving New Orleans for Tampico, which had been incredibly high in the past and
had hence resulted in little direct trade between these ports, disadvantaging the German
Confederation’s trade, for German platillas and creas were still located in New Orleans.97
Fortunately, von Gerolt noted, this rate had, as of April 1836, been reduced to 3 percent,
enabling the transportation of the German goods to Mexico.98 Even developments that were on
the surface positive were at times criticised by European observers, because trading regulations
were too stringent. Von Gerolt commented on German merchants’ discontent with a new tariff,
which had been interpreted by them as “too strict” despite the fact that duties paid on German
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creas now amounted to 6.30 pesos as opposed to the more than 7 pesos to be paid under the old
tariff, whereas duties on platillas decreased from 4 pesos to 3.60. Von Gerolt showed himself
more optimistic, however, hoping that the new Mexican government’s “good will” and
“morality” would help alleviate the ills impacting its foreign trade.99
Nevertheless, discontent among Europeans, mostly due to reclamations, continued.
Though some reclamations were successful, such as Eduard Ferdinand Färber’s of the DeutscheWestindische Compagnie (also the Hanseatic consul in Veracruz), who received 11,095 pesos
after von Gerolt had engaged in lengthy discussions with the Mexican authorities, many
reclamations were rejected due to Mexico’s lack of money to pay for them.100 By 1838,
Europeans had realised that their reclamations often went nowhere, and that the Mexican
government was both incapable of and unwilling to pay what the Europeans demanded. The
Pastry War had begun in November of 1838 due to Mexico’s failure to repay French nationals
for the damages endured during unrest in Mexico City the previous months, and the failure of
Mexico to pay off her debts to France.101 When France, through Louis-Antoine Deffaudis, gave
Mexico an ultimatum to pay in August 1838, and Mexico refused, the French navy blockaded
Mexican ports and captured both the port city of Veracruz as well as almost the entire Mexican
navy.102 In order to prevent Mexican citizens from conducting trade illegally via Texan ports,
France also sent naval ships to the Republic of Texas, and the Texan navy patrolled its own ports
along the bay of Corpus Christi to prevent Mexican smugglers from transporting goods in and
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out of Mexico.103 The hostilities lasted several months, and Mexico continued to refuse to make
concessions so long as its ports were blockaded by another power.104 The conflict eventually
came to an end in March 1839, after a British-brokered agreement was made and Mexico repaid
600,000 pesos to the French baker situated in Mexico City who gave the Pastry War its name.105
Mexico also made the concession of eliminating the practice of forced bonds.
Though von Gerolt had expressed his support for intervention in letters preceding the
Pastry War, the overall European reaction thereto was not exactly positive. Färber spoke to
Syndic Karl Sieveking of the French blockade of Mexican ports as an unfortunate event for
Hanseatic commerce. Färber criticised the blockade as being ineffective because France did not
have a true hold on the ports. He reported of one U.S.-American vessel, the Anna Eliza, which
had sailed from New York to Vera Cruz and had been able to enter the port unnoticed. Despite
French efforts to deny the ship’s entry, their late realisation that a ship was entering the port
prevented them from doing so. In response, Bazoche granted the vessel permission to unload
cargo and leave. In addition to this mishap, Färber commented that most of Mexico’s ports had
not been actively and effectively blocked by the French, which caused him to doubt whether
“England and the other powers will recognise the blockade (…) in earlier instances, England
acknowledged a blockade only if it was executed effectively and no possibility existed to enter
such a blockaded port”. Even von Gerolt, favourable towards European intervention, had by
1838 changed his mind, arguing that a “hasty attack on behalf of France will have sad
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consequences for all foreign connections and interests in this country”.106 Färber also stated that
a Hanseatic protest in Vera Cruz had been reported to him, and that the Hanseatic Senates could,
if they deemed it best for Hanseatic interests, consider steps to resist this blockade.107 Eventually,
France did face various reclamations in response to its intervention in Mexico: The Diario del
Gobierno argued that Mexico should file reclamations against France because its vessels had
been captured by the latter party. In the event that these vessels were not to be returned, Mexico
should receive compensation for each ship.108 The Hanse Towns also desired a reclamation due
to the insultation of their flag on behalf of French soldiers in Mexico.109
The Pastry War constituted a very aggressive form of informal imperialism, likely
marking the most direct episode thereof in Mexico since its independence. It is thus a useful and
opportune point at which one can evaluate whether the relationship between Mexico and
European countries became more imperial and inequitable in subsequent years, and whether
Mexican authorities were more likely to make concessions to European diplomats and
merchants.
Shortly after the Pastry War, the Mexican government passed new laws strictly
regimenting foreign trade, an episode which put European influence after the show of military
force to the test. Bahre reported on the increase in Mexican customs in 1840, lamenting that the
existence of high duties on consumption of foreign goods damaged his business, and that he had
only sold “a few hundred pieces of platillas”.110 Land-borne customs on foreign goods had risen
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from 16 2/3 % to 50% of their maritime tariff, which had prevented Bahre from selling his goods
further within the country. Re-exportation of goods likewise came at a loss, for Mexican
harbours did not refund paid maritime tariffs. Bahre argued that both maritime as well as landborne customs had to be announced with at least six months’ notice, for a failure to do so was
akin to “placing Europeans into the largest disadvantages with frank deliberation”, and
highlighted that the new tariff itself made note of the six-month timeframe in article 70.
According to Bahre, other merchants had complained of the deliberations which Mexican
agencies applied regarding the new tariff. Several ships had sailed into Vera Cruz before the new
tariff took effect, yet two weeks of bad weather delayed their unloading, causing the Mexican
authorities to apply the new duties to the cargo despite the fact that arrival of the ship, not
unloading of cargo, determined the proper tariff.111
The Mexican government thus continued to actively resist the influence of foreign
powers through trade, perhaps even more harshly than before: Bahre wrote that the new landborne duties on foreign goods were so discriminatory and the Mexican chambers of commerce so
unyielding, that one could only speak of the Mexican governmental intention “to destroy foreign
trade and consequently its influence in the internal affairs of this country”. Bahre feared that this
aim could be realised, arguing that this law had already damaged foreign trade to the amount of
one million dollars within just four months. 300,000 pesos of damages had been imposed upon
German commerce alone, a number that Bahre believed would rise to 500,000 by autumn. In
order to cover these financial losses, sales in Mexico would have to amount to 20 million pesos,
Bahre argued, which, combined with the other risks that the German merchants faced in the
country, mitigated the successes that German trade had accomplished in Mexico in the past six
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years, particularly given that German commerce had already faced heavy losses through the
plundering in 1828 and in the Elberfelder Minen Compagnie. Bahre identified the new tariffs as
so problematic, empowering the Mexican government to easily manipulate foreign trade to their
advantage, that he recommended that the European governments either fight this new regulation
or end their relations with Mexico, encouraging their merchants to establish themselves
elsewhere. English minister Pakenham had, according to Bahre, taken the same stance in the
matter, and had encouraged his government to seek reclamation. The doing away with the new
tariff should also be seen as imperative by France, Bahre suggested, for France’s last war and the
resulting concession of the Mexican government in form of the elimination of forced bonds
would essentially be useless if Mexico now hampered foreign trade through means of this tariff,
which was “even worse”.112
Interestingly, the new law was so unpopular that even Mexican voices expressed their
disapproval for it. A Mexican newspaper had acknowledged that European reclamations in
response to the impediments caused by the law would indeed be legitimate, for the six months’
notice outlined in article 70 had not been given to European merchants, which had caused a great
disruption to trade and would lead, the author feared, to the complete halt of new European
imports. The newspaper likewise pointed out that if France, “only propped on weak arguments”,
had already blockaded Mexico’s harbours once before, forcing Mexico to pay 600,000 pesos in
damages, then “we fear now that, propped on the arancel (the new tariff law) and plain
reflections, that (the European powers) will demand everything which the Mexican authorities
collected through the 10 % increase, and possibly even the damages and disadvantages for the
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goods that were forced to rest in the ports”.113 Prussian observers pointed out that the Mexican
chambers had been subject to “incessant complaints, grievances, and appeals of their own
Mexican merchant class”, and that Mexican merchants themselves resisted the new law
fiercely.114
The discontent of even Mexican merchants, and the fact that their complaints fell on deaf
ears within the Mexican government was sometimes explained by European diplomats as
stemming from political corruption within a small Mexican political elite. A Prussian report
communicated to the Prussian Royal Government that the many revolutions and ‘destructive’
civil wars in Mexico were largely the work of party members. This small group “pursued
predominantly nothing but their own selfish purposes” whereas the “broad mass of the nation,
together with the rich, propertied classes engaged in agriculture, industry, and commerce, have
withdrawn as much as possible from all political affairs and into their private lives, leaving the
field to those who view these revolutions for the purpose of their speculations and the attainment
of military and civilian offices”.115 Disheartened, von Gerolt had already feared at the beginning
of the Pastry War that a European intervention would destabilise the country further because “the
largest part of those who will grab their weapons” to fight the French would “use such an
opportunity for the realisation of their selfish goals”, which would “lead to the establishment of a
general anarchy, in which the interests of foreigners will be the first victims”.116 The assessment
of this foreign intervention in Mexico’s internal affairs showcases that Europeans had, due to the
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political situation of the country, their doubts regarding military attacks, suggesting that the
Pastry War did not benefit European imperialism in Mexico.
The Mexican government’s handling of the customs law controversy emphasises this
conclusion. Despite protests, the customs law persisted in the coming months. Bahre contacted
von Gerolt, desiring that the Prussian diplomat assist him in a reclamation matter related to the
law. The inability of Bahre to move his goods into Mexico had forced him to buy them out of the
customs house to avoid their forceable sale by the authorities, which had resulted in a
considerable financial loss for him. Von Gerolt expressed his sympathies for Bahre, who had
also filed another reclamation regarding confiscated weaponry, and lamented that the Mexican
Minister of Finance had, as of late, rejected reclamations on behalf of all European merchants,
including the French and British, with a “ruthlessness”. The minister had not given in to any
demands until British diplomat Pakenham had made a show of force, claiming that he would take
his passport and leave in the event that Mexico continued to refuse the British reclamations. The
Mexican authorities relented, and made payments to the wronged subjects, though it appears that
this concession was limited to Britons. This pressure by a European diplomat, Pakenham, on the
Mexican government had been a unilateral decision: Pakenham had not had instructions from his
government to pursue the strategy of threatening his departure if no reclamations were addressed,
but he told von Gerolt that he was confident that the Britannic government would accept his
justification. Von Gerolt surmised thereafter that Pakenham’s exit from Mexico would have led
Britain to commence “a forceful intervention in the affairs of this country, which its commercial
interests and the political situation of this country have long made desirable”.117
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The Mexican government’s suspicion toward foreign trade are further highlighted in the
same letter. Von Gerolt argued that both the Mexican Congress and the government had “hostile
attitudes toward foreign trade and foreign connections”, which they had “displayed too
obviously” to receive the same consideration and patience that the European powers had thus far
applied towards Mexico. Moreover, though Pakenham’s threat of leaving the country had led to
the Mexican government’s acknowledgement and payment of several English reclamations, von
Gerolt surmised that this British show of force had probably only “increased the acrimony
toward the diplomatic relations of Mexico with foreign countries”, suggesting that European
agents’ efforts to use their countries’ political and economic dominance to arm-twist Mexican
authorities into concessions had a negative impact on Europe’s connections to Mexico in the
long run.118 In another letter from 1841, von Gerolt wrote in a trading report that “the main
object of my recent reports to your Excellency this past year” had been reclamations and
diplomatic discussions on behalf of European representatives with the Mexican governments on
“the subject on the interests and security of foreign trade”. These had been elicited by the
“ruinous influence of the local trading policies”, which von Gerolt described as “hostile” and as
“imposing all state expenses and duties on foreign trade”. So shortly after the Pastry War, von
Gerolt noted that “England seems, under the current circumstances, excellently appointed to take
the necessary steps to protect its local trade”, and argued that “the results, which England must
achieve for the security of its local trading interests, are in the interest of all nations”.119 The
Pastry War thus rewarded the European powers with only meagre results, for the Mexican
government’s attitude toward foreign trade had not changed, or potentially worsened, after this

118

Report of von Gerolt to PFM, October 25, 1840, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 293298.
119 Trading Report by von Gerolt, January 23, 1841, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 354355.

94

intervention in Mexico’s internal affairs. Even as late as November 1844, Hanseatic merchants
still reported to their government that there existed in Mexico “a distrust and a hostile
atmosphere toward everything which is foreign” which “necessarily led to difficulties and claims
of all kinds”.120 In 1844, just 5 years after the conclusion of the Pastry War, Deffaudis’
successor, Alleye de Cyprey, was so at odds with the Mexican government that he submitted to
the French foreign ministry a plan to install a monarchy in Mexico under a French prince.121
These anecdotes suggest that even overt informal-imperialist acts were largely unsuccessful in
Mexico, hence stymying the European agents, merchants, and states further.
The political, economic, and territorial instability extant in 1830s-40s Mexico caused
European diplomats and merchants to find themselves in a quandary. On one hand, they acted as
imperial agents in the periphery, largely without incentive or instruction from the centre, by
resisting and complaining about Mexican duties, tariffs, and laws impacting the systems of
finance and taxing, exposing Mexico to international pressures due to reclamations and other
legal and diplomatic furores. To a certain extent, Mexican authorities were receptive to such
European demands: the Mexican state had very little industry of its own and was thus dependent
upon manufactured goods from abroad. It also desired official recognition as a nation on equal
international footing with Britain, France, and the other European states. On the other hand,
European influence, up to the outright use of force such as during the Pastry War, bore only little
fruit. To a certain extent, this was due to Mexico’s instability: the country was in a continuous
and dire need of money, faced with political corruption, constantly preoccupied with quelling
rebellions and insurgencies, with no financial means to curb robberies and raids, and lacking
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both the manpower and the money to arrest contraband trade. Mexico was often simply not able
to recognise European reclamations, such as those related to the new customs in 1840, because
the money obtained through such regulations had already been spent by the time Europeans
sought legal redress. Mexico’s difficult situation and the resulting impotence of European
diplomatic and commercial pressures found note in a Prussian report, which encouraged
European merchants to recognise that the 1836 policy of forced bonds – this “extortion” – had
been implemented largely in order to enable Mexico to defend itself against threats and improve
the security of property, particularly in its capital city.122
Von Gerolt commented in December of 1840, more than a year after the custom law’s
passage, that Congress had considered a modification or erasure thereof, but had ultimately
decided to hold on to the law as it was. The reasons for this, von Gerolt noted, could all be
attributed to Mexico’s debility: the country faced “great financial difficulties”, its civilian and
military personnel was in “a sad state”, and the Mexican judicial system, also in charge of
handling European reclamations and legal concerns, was “badly administrated” because its
officials were not getting paid due to the lack of funds. All of these dire aspects had been brought
up by proponents of the law in Congressional debates, and this, combined with the lack of
initiative on behalf of Mexican politicians to draft up alternative laws based on e.g. an increase in
maritime tariffs, had caused Congress to reject changing the law. Von Gerolt acknowledged
Mexico’s dire financial situation, but also expressed his unwillingness to accept the damages that
the law was imposing on the Prussian subjects, particularly merchants, in the country.123
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Though European merchants and diplomats recognised that Mexico’s internal problems
prevented it from paying its European debts and reclamations, shrouding the country from the
full brunt of European commercial and diplomatic influence, the fact that Mexico’s instability
gave it protection from pervasive European imperialism was also deliberately used by Mexican
officials. Von Gerolt highlighted this in a letter to his government dated October 1840, where he
noted that he had approached Mexican official Ortiz Monasterio after Prussian reclamations had
stalled. Though von Gerolt threatened that the Mexican government’s delay on reclamations,
particularly after the spectacular incident of Pakenham’s promise to leave the country and
Mexico’s subsequent acquiescence to some English demands, suggested to European
governments that Mexico would only yield to those reclamations which were attained by force,
Ortiz Monasterio merely attributed the delay to the Minister of Finance and his huge workload,
which had prevented him from responding to von Gerolt’s reclamations. Von Gerolt further
lamented that the Mexican government had not even taken steps to seek out and punish the
murderers of several Germans named Tervooren, Otto, and Kraemer, and reported to his
government that he had reminded Ortiz Monasterio of this matter yet again because of Mexican
inaction.124 In January 1841, he approached the Mexican official again, impatient since the
matter had still not been addressed.125
The futility of reclamations was also emphasised by Bahre. A merchant himself and
hence deeply concerned with his best financial interest, he wrote a letter to the Prussian
government advising it that he and various consuls in Mexico had written and signed an initiative

124

The only somewhat positive note on the murder of Tervooren, a man whose local friends did not even wish to
pay for his funeral, was that a priest who had received some of his belongings had promised to say 15 prayers for the
soul of the murdered. Report of von Gerolt to PFM, October 25, 1840, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222:
Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 293-298.
125 Report by von Gerolt to PFM, January 24, 1841, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 356358.

97

concerning foreign policy in Mexico. Within it, the representatives stated that they preferred not
to seek legal recourse in the form of a reclamation in response to a trade embargo that had taken
place during an insurgency, because reclamations were costly, often impacted the relationship
between Mexico and foreign countries negatively, and were, frequently, ultimately fruitless. He
told the Prussian government that he could not understand why von Gerolt did not seek to pursue
the same policy-line as the other Prussian officials, particularly given that English representative
Pakenham had already approached the Mexican government and received a verbal guarantee that
the new government would strive to curb abuses such as those which occurred during the
embargo.126
Though von Gerolt had not joined the course proposed by other German consuls and
merchants like Bahre in this instance, there were other times when von Gerolt likewise
discouraged reclamations because he deemed them pointless. In 1840, von Gerolt received a
reclamation raised by the merchant house Knecht and Stamm of Iserlohn, which desired
compensation in response to the confiscation of its weapons five years prior. Von Gerolt
received notice of this reclamation effort from Bahre, but reported to his government that he had
told the merchant that he would regrettably not be able to assist in this matter, for the incident
had already occurred several years earlier, making it difficult for the Mexican government to find
and hold accountable those individuals responsible for this injustice.127 In another instance, von
Gerolt stated that he would pursue a reclamation regarding the personal injury that had been
inflicted upon Prussian subject and merchant Stahlknecht in Durango, but was overall
pessimistic about its outcome, for he noted that “all foreign reclamations to this government,
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which are not supported by vessels of war, are very difficult to push through”.128 A report of the
Prussian consulate in Mazatlan from 1844 outlined, much as similar reports from other Prussian
agents in Mexico from that year, that the Mexican market was not very profitable at that time,
and that all promises of European action to improve European merchants’ conditions and
opportunities in Mexico had had a disappointing, even the opposite, effect: Mexico continued to
enforce prohibitions and trading restrictions throughout the 1840s.129
What the case of Mexico shows is that informal imperialist strategies cannot work
adequately in a state that is too weak. Though the relationship between a weaker and stronger
state – one that is peripheral and one that is a centre-state – is required to perpetrate informal
imperialism, such as through free-trade imperialism, too much instability and weakness hinders
the establishment of this influence, for the weaker state is not as economically lucrative:
Merchants lose their investments; reclamations face dead ends because of frequent changes in
government or the presence of several governments, all vying for supremacy and capable of
attributing damages at the root of reclamation efforts to their opponents; murderers of merchants
and diplomats go unpunished for the government lacks the resources to pursue the perpetrators of
such crimes; and restrictive trading barriers raised by the government in a frantic attempt to
acquire money or curb debilitating and destabilising factors such as the contraband trade limit
merchants’ profits. In Mexico, all of these aspects of weakness existed. More stability in Mexico
was seen as a crucial element to furthering European influence and wealth by European agents.
In one report, Prussian officials hoped for a more stable Mexican government in the future not
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because this would make Mexico capable of augmenting its own industry, but because it would
enable it to produce more mineral wealth – of which this country, the report coveted, had an
“immeasurable” amount – which could be exported to Europe via its merchants.130 In another
incident, von Gerolt quoted to his government the thoughts of a Mexican gentleman, welleducated, with prior political experience in Mexico, and a member of one of the country’s richer
families, who had the idea that a foreign prince be installed in Mexico to bring stability to the
debile state:
If we continue like we have, then the moment won’t be far away in which the other
nations, tired of the scandal which we perform and our inability to rid ourselves of it, will
seek to eliminate these evils through an intervention in our affairs, in the interests of
humanity and civilisation. But how much more dignified and patriotic would it be if our
nation, in the event that she decide in favour of a monarchy, chose its own monarch, as
opposed to having him imposed by the foreign powers…
Von Gerolt was impressed by this statement, writing that he believed it to be of
the greatest importance that this production of a Mexican, whose patriotism, nobility, and
selflessness cannot be denied by all those who know him personally and know his
character as a statesman, be made popular and known in Europe in order to attract the
attentions of the cabinets toward the ever-growing necessity of a pacification of these
states who are of such an importance to the industrial states of Europe and so richly
blessed by nature…
This statement showcases that European diplomats did not believe that their countries could fully
reap the advantages of trans-Atlantic trade if Mexico were not stable. Economic interests, and
hence any free-trade imperialist motivations, were thus tied to a certain level of political
stability.131 This analysis adds another layer to the findings of Heath, who writes that “British
interests and capital sought to profit from (Mexico’s) financial crisis. But the consequences were
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fatal to Mexico’s political stability and its economic growth”.132 European commerce likewise
suffered under Mexico’s instability rather than solely taking advantage of it, and European
officials were not in favour of their respective merchants’ engagement in destabilising practices,
such as the contraband trade.
What also becomes evident about the European presence in Mexico is that, despite the
existence of ferocious economic competition among the French, British, and Germans, many of
the efforts to pressure Mexico into concessions were implemented in European unison. European
agents in Mexico were aware of the reclamations of the other foreign powers, and in their
resistance to the forced bonds of 1836 or the increased tariffs of 1839, European states often
acted in the capacity of an interest group, combining and linking their respective interests
together into one block of European commercial interests. Additionally, an analysis of the
German correspondence on Mexico showcases the status and ‘imperial rank’ of the various
European states involved in Mexico. Whereas Britain was the century’s hegemonic power and
pioneer in Spanish-American trade through its early recognition of Spanish-American countries
and its pursuit of its own individual political course rather than the Holy Alliance’s, the German
states were to a certain extent semi-peripheral states when compared with England or France.
Dreading their economic downfall under the onslaught of British commerce in continental
Europe, the German Bund looked overseas and engaged in trade with Spanish-America, though
political obligations, dominated by Prussia’s to the Holy Alliance and policy of legitimacy,
complicated the German policy in Mexico comparatively to the British. The political straitjacket
that Germany was in, combined with its desire not to slip into economic insignificance and
dependence on England, gave it less political power in its negotiations with Mexico, as well as
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fewer possibilities for legal redress or the establishment of any sort of imperial pressure. As a
result, the Prussian and Hanseatic policies in Mexico emphasised the support of English or
French imperialist strategies in the form of the Pastry War, threatened future interventions,
diplomatic ultimatums such as Pakenham’s proposed leave, et cetera, without engaging in any
overt or aggressive actions themselves.
This support on behalf of European powers for another European power’s imperialism,
which seems on first glance to be a paradox in an age of economic competition and free-trade
imperialism, has also been mentioned by David Todd in “A French Imperial Meridian”, where he
highlights that France was at times an agent of the British Empire in order to promote French
imperialism: Todd points out that that the French empire in the mid-nineteenth century was
dominated by cooperation with the British as opposed to measures against them. This included
informal yet coercive measures, such as the prevention of Argentina’s annexation of Uruguay in
1845-47 or the Second Opium War of 1856-60 that opened China further. In these joint missions,
France and Britain were able to showcase their influence and prestige not merely by naval or
military, or even commercial and economic means. Rather, they were also able to stress their role
as the world’s civilised, just, and orderly authorities.133 Though France was arguably the junior
partner in this alliance with Britain, it profited from this union because combined Franco-British
strength was able to maintain favourable trading connections and conditions around the globe for
both the French and British parties involved. Even when Britain drew the lion’s share of this
benefit, France still found herself in the advantageous position of asserting herself vis-vis nonEuropean power, and other European empires, such as Russia.134
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The example of German states’ actions in Mexico point to the same strategy: as opposed
to locking horns with both the politically, economically, and militarily stronger British as well as
Europe’s new-old order dictated by the Holy Alliance, the German states supported British or
French imperial action, in hopes that they would reap some benefits. If the British or French
were to force Mexico to revoke a law restricting commerce, this would also benefit the German
economy by achieving something that the German states themselves could not have done:
wrestling Mexico into concessions. Von Gerolt emphasised this in a report to his government,
arguing that intervention on behalf of larger imperial powers, such as England, “needed also the
participation of the other Great Powers with vested interest (in trade in Mexico), as a moral
support in order to carry out in an expedient fashion any sort of demonstration in favour of its
commercial interests”. Europeans, though commercial competitors, stood to profit from
presenting their economic interests as a united front and pursuing imperial interventions in the
same manner. The failure of the Pastry War von Gerolt attributed to the lack of unison, stating
that “France, which has exactly the same interest in the matter (of Mexico) has already made the
painful experience that the isolated position of a power in a conflict with this republic comes
with great difficulties”.135
These circumstances also existed on a national level in Germany. The Hanseates, though
resistant to the Customs Union, did often rely on Prussian diplomats in Mexico, most
noteworthily von Gerolt. One entire acta in the Hamburg State Archive is dedicated to
documents that acknowledge the merit of von Gerolt, who assisted Hanseatic trade through his
intermediation and representation of Hanseatic interests in Mexico during a time when
Hanseatic-Mexican diplomacy faced several difficulties: Between 1842 and 1845, the Hanseates
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did not have a consul in Mexico, and Consul Wilhelm Lobach appointed to Tabasco in 1839 did
not get the Exequatur and recognition of the Mexican government in 1840.136 As a result of their
lack of political power as individual entities, the Hanse Towns and other German states
increasingly presented themselves as a consolidated front in trans-Atlantic trade, which will be
the partial subject of chapter five.
As the above analysis of correspondence of European diplomats and merchants in
Mexico shows, Europeans did seek to establish an informal imperialist influence – the ambitions
and desires existed. For the most part, this occurred on the level of diplomats and merchants
located in Mexico as opposed to the power centres in London, Paris, or Berlin. European power
presented itself through the flooding of Mexican markets, the perpetration of contraband trade,
attempts to steer Mexican political decisions through the use of diplomatic influence, and the
accruing of wealth, particularly metal wealth, in the hands of European merchants and the
outflow of silver to Europe. Though the desire existed, establishing or cementing this influence
in Mexico was not easy – in fact, Europeans largely failed due to the instability of Mexico
economically, financially, and politically. Paradoxically, though a weaker state is needed in order
to create a free-trade imperialist relationship between the centre and the periphery, Mexico
during the 1830s and 1840s was too weak to enable Europeans to properly dominate it, for
mercantile risks remained large at a time when raids, plundering, murders, and insurgencies were
common and the Mexican government unable to stop them. Böttcher, citing Bernecker and
Ferns, writes that it was the periphery – in this case, Mexico – which determined how deep the
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impact of European informal empire was.137 Measures to force the country to concede to
European reclamations did not constitute stabilising factors, either: too dire was the need for
money on behalf of the Mexican government, and so consequently debilitating were payments
made to Europeans; payments that Mexican military, governmental, and civilian personnel were
waiting on; payments that were needed to muster up the resources to better guarantee the safety
of commerce in Mexico.
Though the Mexican government did not have much control over a lot of the factors that
debilitated European powers, it did at times use its weakness to its advantage by stalling
reclamations, advising Europeans to seek redress from one of the insurgent – and by that time,
often inexistent – regimes in the various regions where insurgencies occurred, or replacing one
restrictive measure with another. Even the Pastry War, an aggressive and overt imperial act, bore
far fewer fruit than France and the other European powers had hoped. Moreover, such direct
forms of imposing European political and economic influence onto Mexico often only aided in
rallying the divided and torn country together against the one common enemy that many
Mexicans could agree upon: foreign powers, and especially, foreign trade. Mexico, though
European states sought to establish an imperial influence there, could not be thoroughly
embedded in Europe’s commercial-imperial web, because the country’s weakness paradoxically
gave it the power to resist such European efforts. All the more interesting was thus the
independence of the Republic of Texas. The next chapter will analyse Texas’ deemed suitability
for European informal imperialism, particularly in comparison to the story this chapter has
established for Mexico – would Europeans have better luck in Texas?
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Chapter Two – The Best Part of Mexico: The Agents of, Ambitions for, and Impact of
Informal Imperialism in Texas prior to the Anglo-French Mediation of 1844

As the last chapter has shown, European informal imperialist designs were not very
successful in Mexico of the 1830s and 1840s. How then, did Europeans react to the revolution
and subsequent independence of Texas in 1835-1836? Though immediate recognition of the new
state did not occur, interest in Texas was palpable from the moment that news of this young
republic on the North American continent reached European observers. The following chapter
will seek to analyse the imperialist (i.e. the economic, political, and social) ambitions that
influenced European actors, from diplomats in both the periphery and the centre to non-state
actors such as the noblemen of the Adelsverein, from Britain, the political pioneer in postindependence Spanish-American affairs, to Holy Alliance member Prussia. The interests of
Europeans in Texas will also be evaluated in light of their interests in Mexico and the rising
influence and imperialism of the United States. Given that British and French interests in Texas
have already been subject to significant scholarship, this chapter will focus on the interests of
German states related to Texas.
This chapter will showcase that Texas was attractive to Europeans because it, much like
Spanish America before it, provided Europeans with a new, though initially small, market.
Whereas Mexico had restrictive trading policies, Europeans hoped that Texas, politically and
financially frail, would impose fewer limits on its foreign trade. A parallel can thus be drawn
between German, British, and French economic interest in the independence of Spanish America
from Spain and the same economic interest that existed in the independence of Texas from
Mexico. Moreover, Texas was cultivating a cotton-growing culture that suited European
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economies better in an independent Texas as opposed to a Texas under Mexican authority, for
Mexico’s protection of its cotton industry prevented the establishment of the exchange of
peripheral raw material and core manufactured goods between Europe and Mexico deemed
desirable by European states. This chapter will also analyse emigration to Texas through the lens
of informal imperialism. Overall, the chapter argues that European informal imperialist designs
seemed more promising in Texas than in Mexico because cotton constituted Texas’ primary
export, the country had fewer trading barriers, was – despite its political weakness – less
politically volatile and unstable than Mexico, and provided Europeans, due to its comparatively
small population, with an outlet for migrants who could potentially sway the country’s ethnic
and cultural affiliation towards their respective country or ethnicity and help build a market loyal
to European goods. These designs were moreover perpetrated predominantly by peripheral
agents, as they were in Mexico. This current of European political and commercial interest
dovetailed but also conflicted with the rise of another imperial power in North America, the
United States. Texas independence increased imperial conflicts between primarily Britain and
the United States, for an annexation of Texas to the latter country stood to drastically change the
fluid imperial landscape of the continent.
THE TEXAS REVOLUTION, TEXAS INDEPENDENCE, AND EUROPEAN RELUCTANCE
When Texas declared its independence in 1836, European states did not immediately
engage in foreign relations with the new republic, despite the fact that Santa Anna had signed the
Treaties of Velasco and the United States had rejected the young state’s annexation to the Union.
Europe’s reticence stemmed from several factors, including the possibility that Texas could
quickly be re-annexed by Mexico or fall to the United States, the treaties with Mexico and U.S.
Congress’ stance on the matter notwithstanding; as well as the political conservatism of the Holy
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Alliance, which had also delayed European recognition of Spanish America; and the fear that an
early recognition of Texas could damage one’s interests in and relations with Mexico, giving
other European states the opportunity to gain economic ground in a country where cutthroat
competition with the intent of not merely besting, but displacing one’s competitors, already
existed. Moreover, slavery posed a large problem, and given that many Texans were slave
owners, extending recognition to Texas was regarded by European politicians as risky if that
republic decided to reinvigorate the slave trade in the Gulf of Mexico.138
The fear of locking horns with Mexico in the Texas matter was one of the most dominant
reasons for not recognising Texas right away. If European states were to recognise Texas, this
would surely affront Mexico, and given both the intense competition among Europeans in that
country and the hostility towards the pervasiveness of foreign commerce on behalf of Mexican
statesmen, the European states had to be careful not to lose valuable commercial connections
there through a hasty recognition of a new republic.
The consideration of not acknowledging Texas in order to prevent insulting Mexico was
particularly predominant among the German states. The Hanse Towns were approached in 1841
by Texian representative J. Hamilton, who desired to forge a treaty of commerce and amity
between the Hansa and his country.139 Even at this late stage, the Senate of Hamburg protocolled
that “the independence of Texas is not yet totally assured, given that Mexico has not given up its
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2 (Summer 1999), 257-278.
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claims (to the territory)”, causing it to conclude that its representatives, though permitted to
receive and correspond with Texian official William Henry Daingerfield, ought not to hurry the
negotiations or completion of a treaty.140 The Senate also feared the possible annexation of Texas
to the United States, giving it another reason for its hesitation. Nevertheless, the matter was
forwarded to Hamburg’s Deputatis Commercii by Syndic Sieveking, who came to a similar
conclusion and viewed Texian independence as very meagrely secured. Moreover, Sieveking
emphasised that Hamburg’s trade to Texas would and did not stand in any comparison with that
to Mexico, which was deemed more important to Hamburgian interests. Though Hamburg’s
officials ultimately decided that their city state’s commercial interests in Mexico would not be
damaged by an accession to Bremian negotiations with Texas, the fact that Hamburgian officials
had these conversations shows that recognition of Texas hinged for Europeans on their interests
in Mexico.141
Additionally, a Hanseatic politician shared the concerns regarding Mexican commerce,
writing to Syndic Sieveking that the Senate had expressed apprehension on “whether the
commercial relations to Mexico would be impacted through negotiations with a state that has
been torn from this state (Mexico) and is viewed by it as a province in the state of insurgency.”
Mexico, so the official noted, “could possibly find” in such a negotiation with Texas “an
expression of a hostile disposition toward Mexico”.142 Hanseatic Ministerresident Vincent
Rumpff responded to the concerns primarily emanating from the governments of Hamburg and
Lübeck by stalling, to a certain degree, the completion of a treaty of amity and commerce with
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Texas by encouraging Daingerfield to visit the Hanse Towns personally, where the treaty would
be finished.143 The Hanse Towns were thus reluctant to award foreign recognition to Texas, and
the prospect of poor relations with Mexico in response to negotiations with Texas was one of the
primary reasons for this hesitation. Souring relations between one European state and Mexico
could have given other European merchants an advantage. Especially if Texas ended up being reannexed by Mexico, taking such a risk by recognising Texas as an independent entity would
have been in vain and awarded no benefit to the recognising entity – in fact, the only outcome of
this decision would have been a disadvantage in relations to Mexico, and in the case of Britain
and France, a further blow to the informal imperialist schemes employed in Mexico, already
incapable of prevailing over the politically volatile and hence somewhat impenetrable country.
The thought processes, fears, and consideration outlined above and prevalent for German
observers were similar to those of British and French statesmen. Adams pointed to this in his
edited volume of British correspondence on Texas, noting that J. T. Crawford’s letters to Richard
Pakenham on the subject of Texas were formulated very carefully, whereas Texian newspapers
of the time surmised that Crawford’s 1937 mission to Texas had the goal of investigating “the
civil and political condition of the country and [reporting] to the British government”. Crawford,
on the other hand, stressed to General Houston that his “visit was wholly one of a Consular
nature to collect satisfactory information respecting the Commerce of the ports to the Northward
of the District of Tampico”, highlighting a British reluctance to demonstrate overt interest in the
Republic of Texas.144 This emphasis had been a measure to prevent rumours regarding English
recognition, which, if they had reached Mexico, could have been disadvantageous to commercial
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and diplomatic relations between England and that country. The same dynamic can also be
identified in Saligny’s arrival in Texas in late 1838.145
As early as 1836, British Parliament had concerns about the developments in Texas.
Since Adams outlined the initial House of Commons meetings on the matter from June and
August 1836 in his in-depth study on British interests in Texas, they will only briefly be
discussed here. Concerns regarding the independence of Texas were brought forth in particular
by Barlow Hoy and Henry George Ward and can be summarised to fall into two broad fields:
slavery – indeed, the topic of the debate dated August 5, 1836, was that of slavery in Texas – and
British commercial interests.146 In both matters, discussions were marked by an emerging
British-U.S. rivalry.147 An independent Texas was not a possible outcome of the Texas Question,
the statesmen believed: either Texas would be incorporated into the United States or be
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reconquered by Mexico. 148 Given the belief that Texas was imperative to British interests, Ward
pushed Parliament to take action on behalf of Mexico, if need be through naval and monetary
support.149 Adams regarded the two 1836 House of Commons debates as a clear sign that some
Britons desired official British interference in Texas, though he also pointed out that Foreign
Secretary Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount and Lord Palmerston (1830-1834, 1835-1841) did
not consider it necessary to take such steps at that time, partially because he hoped Mexico could
be able to reconquer Texas.150 Palmerston also dismissed claims of undue U.S.-American
governmental support for the Texas rebels, though he did not reject Ward’s claim that U.S.American citizens had provided aid to the revolution to ultimately get ahold of the fertile Texian
lands.151 Overall, Ward emphasised that a U.S. acquisition of Texas would lastingly and
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rebellion in Texas. See: Armand Saillard to Henri Gauthier, Comte de Rigny, April 12, 1835, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1,
21-22. Nevertheless, European responses to the Texas Rebellion were initially mainly those of reluctance.
151 Ward noted that “Hon. Members might, perhaps, not be aware of the importance and value of such an
acquisition. That territory contained upwards of 120,000,000 of acres of the finest land: it was watered by several
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cripplingly hamper British trade in the Americas, a view that other parliamentary members
reiterated in 1837.152
British political discussions in 1836 emphasised aiding Mexico and protecting British
trade there. Despite shortcomings of British informal-imperialist designs in Mexico, the
country’s placement within greater commercial currents and imperial contestations in North
America, primarily between Britain and the United States and involving also other European
states, such as the German states of France, incentivised a British support for a Mexican Texas
rather than one that was independent. British bondholders’ interest in Mexican lands formed

navigable rivers, having their embouchures in the gulf of Mexico; and on its coast were to be found many harbours,
superior to all others in the adjoining territories, and the possession of which would give them a complete command
of that gulph”. Ward believed it essential to British interests that U.S. imperialist ambitions be curbed: “Ever since
the erection of Mexico into an independent republic, the United States had cast most covetous eyes upon the
province of Texas”, the parliamentary paper read, and had employed in their endeavour to gain ownership of this
territory the questionable means of encouraging “all the refuse of their population to overflow the boundary line
between the United States and the Texas, and to take possession of the lands of the latter”, after efforts to pay
Mexico for Texas had failed. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.
152 Ward questioned “whether it were advisable to allow the United States to pursue a system of aggrandisement
without any endeavour on our part to check them”, for such U.S. expansionism would “allow the extension of their
territory to the Rio Bravo and the Gulf of Mexico, in such a manner as to obtain for them the absolute command of
that Gulf; for certainly the acquisition of Texas would give them that command, and would enable them with half a
dozen privateers to shut us out entirely from our present trade with Mexico, leaving us no route whatsoever by
which to maintain a commercial intercourse with that country save that leading round Cape Horn to its western
coast. Upon the importance of that trade, not only in reference to its present actual amount, but in reference also to
the large probable increase which it would undergo, it was unnecessary for him [Ward] to dwell, it was growing
more extensive every day; nor could he see any definite limit to its increase in future years. Our connection with
Mexico was rendered, too, more intimate by this circumstance, that we possessed a large capital invested in mining
adventures in that country. It was impossible, then, to contemplate without anxiety, events having a tendency,
apparently, to sever from the Mexican State a most valuable portion of its territory, and to place our trade with that
state at the mercy of a commercial rival”. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5,
1836. This summary of Ward’s statement to Parliament reveals much about how Britons perceived commerce and
imperialism in the southern half of North America. Not only were France and the German states commercial rivals,
as the previous chapter has shown in the case for Mexico, but the United States emerged also as an increasingly
greater threat to British commerce and imperialism. In 1837, member of British Parliament William Molesworth
also feared that the entanglement of U.S. citizens, as had been the case in Texas, could hold implications for
Britain’s possession of Canada, highlighting emphatically the importance of Texas to relations of power and empire
in North America. See: “Affairs of Canada”, House of Commons Sitting of Monday, March 6, 1837, Collection: 19 th
Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 36, 1280-1364, cc. 1287-1362.
Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlipapers-proquestcom.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0036p0-0023?accountid=7121, and “Affairs of Canada –
Adjournment of the House”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, December 22, 1837, Collection: 19 th Century
House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 39, 1426-1508, cc. 1428-1507. Accessed using
ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0039p00026?accountid=7121.
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another crucial aspect of British policy in the Texas Question, and highlights that Britain was
initially most concerned with its mercantile interests in Mexico rather than any sort of
advantages to be gained from Texian independence. Ward stated that British merchants “had
embarked 70,000,000 dollars in the Mexican dominions” and saw their investments in Mexico
threatened through Texian independence.153 Adams and Kossok also pointed to the interests of
British bondholders: Kossok wrote that England held liens of 45,000,000 acres of land in Texas,
a security for the significant bonds of Britons in Mexico.154 Adams cited Mr. Robinson,
chairman of the British committee for Spanish-American bondholders, who “recited that by an
act of Mexico in 1837 it had been provided that security for that portion of the Mexican debt
called ‘deferred stock’ should be offered to the English bondholders in the shape of one hundred
million acres”, of which twenty-five million acres should be located, as desired by the
bondholders, in the territories of Texas. Previously, an individual named Gordon had voiced a
similar plan.155
Though Prussian subjects did not have significant bondholders with interest in Texian
lands, the broad British concerns regarding the Texian Question were shared by Prussian
observers, who likewise saw the United States as an emerging commercial rival in Mexico and as
a growing imperial power in the Americas. The early Prussian correspondence on the Texas
Question is interesting, because it showcases an early European perspective on Texas. Adams
asserted that “in the years 1837 and 1838 very little interest was attached by [British] diplomats
to the situation in Texas”, and that agents in Mexico were only sent one instruction referring to
Texas by Palmerston. Adams moreover noted that English statesmen were more concerned with
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French interference in Mexico during this timeframe as opposed to developments in Texas, and
didn’t connect British affairs in Mexico to Texas until 1838.156 What the Prussian
correspondence, dominated by agent Friedrich von Gerolt in Mexico, showcases, is that Prussian
diplomats viewed the Texian affair as intertwined with affairs in Mexico, and indeed, European
interference in the North American continent as a whole, before that date. U.S. imperialism was
a primary reason for Prussian antipathy toward Texas shortly after the latter’s independence. Von
Gerolt feared that, despite official U.S. neutrality in the Texas matter, the United States
government would, through the “irresistible pursuit of the majority, spurred by the rich prizes
which exist in Texas for the numerous North American land-speculators and thousands of
adventurers” seek to “bring itself into the irrefutable possession of this territory, without
consideration of the band of international law which tied Mexico and North America together,
and without sparing any means”.157
Consequentially, von Gerolt expressed his disapproval of Texian independence if this
would lead to the state’s annexation to the United States, because this would expose “the great
commercial interests which tie England, France and Prussia to Mexico to the greatest danger, and
there is no doubt that the North Americans, which, through any and all means at their disposal,
impede already Europe’s direct trade to Mexico through their contraband trade, would, when in
possession of all rivers and bays from New Orleans to Matamoros, cement, given the
impuissance of the Mexican government, their contraband trade, within which no nation can
compete with them”. Von Gerolt’s statement, combined with the problems that contraband trade
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posed for Europeans discussed in chapter one, highlights the growing commercial-imperial
influence of the United States. In order to resist this U.S. expansion of power and influence, von
Gerolt suggested that Prussia support an intervention by France and England on behalf of
Mexico. Von Gerolt emphasised that the editor of the French Journal des Débats, M. Chevalier,
deemed such an endeavour beneficial. “I think”, wrote von Gerolt, “that such an intervention
won’t merely curb the danger which our commerce in Mexico is threatened by, but that it will
also enable the local (Mexican) government to better organise its tariff-system and its finances
and fulfil its numerous obligations to foreigners of all nations, aspects which cannot be thought
of (realised) as long as Texas is the theatre of war”.158
As von Gerolt’s statement showcases, Texas’ revolution, independence, and the Mexican
efforts for its reconquest had negative impacts on European commerce in Mexico. In December
1835, the Prussian General Consulate’s report to its government stated that Ortiz Monasterio had
mentioned to the Prussian agents that forced bonds, which were eventually introduced through a
law passed in 1836, would have to be imposed in order to enable the Mexican government to
fund its failed campaign as well as future campaigns in Texas. These forced bonds had to be
imposed, Ortiz Monasterio had told von Gerolt, “after all other means in order to acquire the
necessary amount of money have been tried in vain”. Ortiz Monasterio also emphasised that such
bonds would impact predominantly “wealthy inhabitants and the merchant class of the capital
city”. Texas’ war of secession from Mexico thus stood behind one of the most hated and
contested practices of 1830s-Mexico, which helps explain Europeans’ antipathy towards Texas
in 1836.159
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In the same month, circulars issued by Mexican minister Vallejo reached foreign
merchants, stating that the mercantile class had to contribute to financing the war against Texas.
Several Prussian merchants, including Ebert and Schneider, Radiche de Bary and Bahre, and
Uhde and Eschenburg, wrote to von Gerolt, reporting that the circular demanded “1000 – 800 –
600 – and 500 pesos” respectively as forced loans in order to cover the costs of war against
Texas, a measure that they rejected based on the treaty of amity and commerce between Prussia
and Mexico.160 The French and English governments likewise resisted the “monetary extortions”
that had been imposed upon their merchants, and demanded reclamations from the Mexican
government in early 1836. Yet again, the Mexican government rejected the British and French
claims, emphasising that it denied the possibility that these claims were founded on any principal
of international law. If Mexico were to pay the reclamations, then it would only do so in order to
avoid British and French hostilities, suggesting that Mexico at times actively challenged
European informal imperialism. Prussian observers feared such developments, for the outlined
Mexican defiance towards reclamation efforts would disadvantage those European states who
did not possess the naval power to make such shows of force – Prussia being one of them – and
make them more dependent on British and French mediation, or simply make it less likely that
they would receive the desired reclamations.161
The campaign against Texas also led to an increase in contraband trade. In order to feed
his troops and satisfy the Mexican army’s need for weaponry, Santa Anna furnished a contract
with a “rich Spaniard” named Rubio and located in San Luis Potosi, who had “for many years
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now held a kind of monopoly on the contraband trade in Tampico and Matamoros”. Against an
advance of 200,000 pesos, this contract foresaw that, in order to provide the necessary goods to
the army, Rubio would be allowed to circumvent all entrance duties in both of those harbours.
European merchants responded to this contract with “great unsatisfaction”, for they predicted the
abuse of this agreement towards the “blackening” of foreign goods, i.e. their illegal importation
and transport within the country. This development dovetailed with an increase in sea-borne
duties, as well as the suspension of payments on loans, bonds, or contracts to facilitate Mexico’s
financing of the war.162 The transport and export of Mexican silver, so desired by Europeans,
was furthermore impacted by the Texan campaigns, as von Gerolt highlighted: In December of
1835, Santa Anna’s troops gathered in San Luis, for all “silver transports from the centre
travelled to Tampico via San Luis Potosi”, giving Santa Anna the opportunity to, “in case of
need, secure the necessary monetary means”.163
The situation did not improve after the Texian rebels had won their independence in May
1836. Von Gerolt, situated in Paris in September of 1836 and having left the General-Consulate
in the hands of Adolph de Bary, wrote to his government that he had received several promises
from Mexican statesmen that, as soon as the Texian campaign had ended, Mexico would fight
the contraband trade in more earnest. The proposed plan foresaw the concentration and
consolidation of foreign vessels in the port of Vera Cruz, where duties were to be paid. After this
initial step, ships would be able to approach other harbours, also, in order to unload their cargo.
This measure would be accompanied by lowered entrance duties and modified tariffs, which had
caused von Gerolt to leave Mexico in early 1836 with “the blithe hope” that the contraband
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trade, which according to von Gerolt, was by this point mostly in the hands of U.S.-Americans
and damaged German trade the most, would finally be curbed in its debilitating severity. “This
prospect regarding the elimination of the contraband trade (…) has sadly experienced yet another
indefinite delay due to the unfortunate result of the campaign of Santa Anna against Texas”.164 In
August of 1837, von Gerolt lamented that the commercial situation of Matamoros had “worsened
considerably since the campaign against Texas” had taken place.165
The instability of Mexico was also worsened as a result of the Texas Revolution, a
circumstance that European observers were aware of. In late 1835, the campaign in Texas
dovetailed with the return of Mexican General Mejia, who tried to capture Santa Anna but, after
realising that the latter had already left his hacienda for Mexico City, revised his plan and sought
to capture Tampico. This scheme brought Mexico into further conflict with European
governments, for two Frenchmen had been forced by Mejia to either pick up arms or be
executed. When they did so and were captured by Santa Anna’s troops, they were executed
anyway for having supported an insurgent general. These executions angered the French
government, which believed that its two subjects had been shot in vain and unjustly.166 Prussia
and the German Confederation shared this sentiment, for there had been seven Germans among
the other executed individuals.167
When Santa Anna was captured by Texian troops in May 1836, de Bary reported that the
conservative “party of aristocrats and priests” in Mexico tried to use the Mexican general’s
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absence to “provoke an intervention by France through their hidden intrigues”. This, as de Bary
had heard from “persons who are very au courant in this matter”, was a ploy to install a Spanish
prince and consequently a monarchy in Mexico. Though such a project was not likely to come to
pass for Mexicans’ hatred towards Spain had not yet dissipated, it nevertheless showcases that
the political instability Mexico faced was not lessened through the Texas revolt. Moreover, de
Bary feared that Santa Anna’s absence would lead to the liberal party’s rise, for “he was, through
his influence on the army, the only one, who could keep the liberal party in check”. De Bary
doubted that another proclamation of a federal system as preferred by the liberals would
contribute to the stability of Mexico.168
The economic and political troubles of Mexico were exacerbated by continued efforts to
recapture Texas after Santa Anna’s loss. The Mexican troops had lost and left behind many of
their weapons, horses, mules, and donkeys, and had, bereft of clothes as well as nourishment,
disbanded. Those troops that remained had been reorganised under various generals, who
gathered near the Rio Bravo Norte, where General Urrea planned a new attack on Texas. For this
purpose, von Gerolt wrote, “the government supported him as much as possible by sending all
disponible troops from within the country to Texas”. The downside to this effort was another
imposition of forced bonds to the value of 2 million pesos, which caused von Gerolt to view
Urrea’s campaign and Texian independence as “affairs so significant to Prussian trade with
Mexico”.169 This policy of forced bonds was protested against on behalf of the Prussians, who
addressed their concern to the consulate in Mexico, still under the temporary leadership of de
Bary. The merchants argued that the forced bonds, amounting to a total of 2 million pesos to be
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distributed among merchants in such a manner that the highest levy should not exceed 1000
pesos, disproportionately impacted and exposed to discriminating treatment the German
merchants. “Of each of the local German merchants who have signed below, the highest levy has
been demanded (by the Mexican government)”, the protest stated. The German merchants
labelled the “extortions” of the local government as already nearly ruinous to German trade and
nearly “unbearable”, but complained that the distribution of these forced bonds should elicit
action on behalf of the Prussian government, for none of the rich Mexicans, some of which were
“known to be millionaires” had been asked to pay the highest levy.170 Though Prussian statesmen
and merchants felt like their countrymen faced the largest disadvantages regarding the measure
of forced bonds, the English and French governments likewise confronted the Mexican
government with reclamations based thereon. Though the Mexican government relented in
response to English, French, and Prussian protests, lowering the levies imposed on many foreign
merchants from the highest sum to amounts between 500 and 100 pesos, the policy itself
remained, causing U.S.-American and French protests. In response, the Mexican government
sought judicial legitimation of its policy and commenced the forceable taking of the levies,
which Prussian agents predicted would lead to a direct confrontation with France.171 Texian
independence thus elicited a chain reaction that reached pervasively into the commercial and
diplomatic relationship between Mexico and foreign powers, destabilising Mexico and
heightening hostilities between the country and Europe.
Texian independence hurt Mexico in other ways, also. Many European observers agreed
that by losing Texas, Mexico had lost one of its best territorial possessions. British members of
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Parliament Ward and Hoy were not the only ones to point towards Texas’ fertile land, important
geographic and geo-political location, and luscious rivers. French ecclesiastic Jean-Henri
Baradère wrote a lengthy summary on the conditions of Texas in late 1835, raving that “there are
only few countries with such a fortunate location as regards commerce and agriculture, as Texas.
The large number of navigable rivers, which traverse this province in all directions, facilitate the
transport of its products, the extraordinary fertility of its soil, the splendid and perpetually
temperate climate and its superb locations, make this country one of the most interesting on
earth”.172
Von Gerolt called Texas “indisputably the best part of Mexico”, a province “whose daily
growing population could, through its strong example of industriousness, industry, and
enterprising spirit, when united with Mexico, exert a decisive influence on the welfare and
political stabilisation, as well as the adoption of a tolerant legislation in this country”.173 He
lamented that Mexico “would, according to the (Treaty of Velasco) lose the most valuable part of
its territory, a piece of land which is almost half the size of France and which unites, due to its
many navigable rivers through the most exquisite bays and due to its fertile climate, the most
fortunate location and all elements for industry and trade”.174 In view of Texas’ importance to
commerce and agriculture in North America, von Gerolt sent a map of the territory to his
government which highlighted the province’s great fertility, long sea coast, numerous rivers,
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valuable soil, and ability to grow superb cotton, sugar, tobacco, rice, and generally “productions
of tropical climates”, as well as the existence of great countries for raising cattle and other
livestock.175 In an 1835 letter, Armand Saillard, French consul at New Orleans, emphasised the
suitability of Texas to growing one of the most significant agricultural resources desired by
Europeans: cotton. Within just one year – between 1833 and 1834 – cotton production and
transportation to New Orleans rose from roughly 2,000 to 8,000 bales.176
Texian representatives, in their approach of European governments, highlighted their
country’s natural and agricultural assets. A letter from several Texians, including W. H.
Wharton, to the French stated that “Texas possesses a territory which suffices for an annual
exportation of over 200 million dollars’ worth of cotton and sugar”. The Texians were confident
that their country’s agriculture would develop rapidly, and that, through cultivation of its
excellent soil, Texas would be able to produce many of the raw materials relevant to the
European markets.177 General Hamilton, in his letter to Syndic Sieveking of Hamburg, wrote that
“as the relations of commerce between the Free City of Hambourg and the Republic of Texas
must from the peculiar nature of the Trade and productions of each become highly profitable and
interesting to both, if placed on a reciprocally sound basis by a judicious convention – I am
curious of knowing whether the Honorable the (sic) Senate of Hambourg is prepared to form and
conclude a Treaty of amity and commerce with her”.178 In his request, Hamilton emphasised the
potential importance Texian commerce could have for Hamburg due to the “peculiar nature of
the Trade and productions of each” – i.e., in Texas’ case, these were predominantly raw

“New Map of Texas with the Contiguous American & Mexican States”, by J. H. Young: Philadelphia, Published
by S. Augustus Mitchell, 1836, and sold by Mitchell & Hinman, No. 6 North Fifth Street, in GSta PK: III. HA
MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII.
176 Armand Saillard to Comte de Rigny, April 12, 1835, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 21-22.
177 W. H. Wharton et al to M. Pageot, February 8, 1837, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 53.
178 J. Hamilton to Karl Sieveking, June 28, 1941, Sta HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol I., Texas, 2.
175

123

materials. Daingerfield, in a letter to Rumpff, emphasised the advantages of a treaty of amity and
commerce in light of the “rapidly increasing Commerce between the two governments”.179
British merchant Charles Power wrote to Saligny that Texas could be “an exporting as well as
consuming Country of the Manufactures of both France and England”, showcasing that early
European representatives in Texas often shared such views.180
Beyond this mere advertisement of raw materials, Texians were aware of the significance
their republic held to the commercial, political, and imperial dynamics of North America. As
early as 1836, when the question of annexation to the United States was more open than in the
subsequent years, Stephen F. Austin instructed William H. Wharton, Minister Plenipotentiary to
the United States, to highlight Texas’ importance to and ability to influence the power relations
on the North American continent. “You will use every possible exertion to bring the question of
recognition and annexation, to an issue during the present session of the United States
Congress”, wrote Austin. Wharton should emphasise that, “should our affairs assume a more
favorable aspect by a termination of the war, and a treaty with Mexico, and by the manifestation
of a friendly disposition towards us by England and France, it will have a powerful influence on
public opinion, and in all probability decide it in favor of remaining independent”. If Texas were
to be met by U.S. indifference or illiberality in admitting Texas to the Union, Austin noted, why
should Texians choose annexation? England, he argued, would recognise Texas due to its
commercial interests: “In the event therefore of discovering any such disposition in the
Government or Congress of the United States you will have full and free conversations with the
British, French and other foreign Ministers, on the Texas question, explaining to them the great
commercial advantages that will result to their nations from our Cotton &c. and finding a market
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here for their merchandise, and an outlet for their surplus population, on the basis of a system of
low duties and liberal encouragement”.181 With this one statement, Austin summarised most of
the major European commercial and imperial motives that incentivised the recognition of Texas.
Because Europeans recognised Texas’ assets, interest in Texas existed quickly after its
independence, resulting in a slow shift in European policy. The interests of Britain and France in
Texas have been detailed quite thoroughly by previous scholars, most predominantly by Adams,
Pletcher, Kennedy, and Torget for the British and Barker for the French. As a result, the interests
of these two states will only be discussed subsequently for context, to refer to little-discussed
correspondence, or to offer a new analysis. The first step taken by the British to assess the
situation in Texas was the sending of British Vice-Consul in Tampico, Joseph T. Crawford to
Texas in February of 1837.182 Though Adams asserts that little interest in Texas was expressed
by British diplomats prior to 1838, Crawford’s mission is an exception: Crawford analysed
Texian trade arguing that Anglo-Texian trade could be beneficial because Texas, with no
noteworthy manufacturing sites of its own, was dependent on imports. Crawford believed that
a modification of the Tariff will be carried by the present Congress, to the effect of
authorizing the President to exempt from duty for one year all articles for Agricultural
use, provisions of all kinds, seeds and plants, Saddlery and Harness, Artificiers Tools,
Lumber and framed houses…should Texas maintain its Independence of Mexico an
advantageous Barter trade can be established with other Countries who will supply
manufactures and take Cotton and other produce in return. Almost any quantity of the
finest and most durable timber for the purposes of Naval architecture can be furnished
from the forests for little more than the expence of felling and taking away.183
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Crawford’s assessment showcases several of the principal components upon which the hegemon
Britain built its supremacy: the cheap supply of raw materials, drawn from states who would not
rival British industrial potential, free trade policies in particular with such states, and a strong
navy. Though Britain and other Continental European powers had not yet recognised Texas and
European political and economic currents had in 1836 been in disfavour of Texian independence,
this attitude changed by 1837, largely due to one resounding conclusion: Mexico would not be
able to regain its lost territory.
EUROPE MOVES TOWARD RECOGNITION
De Bary reported to his government in August of 1836 that the Mexican campaign
against Texas, led by Urréa, had been delayed due to a pluvial period. His army, de Bary noted,
was “supposed to be in a completely shattered state” according to observers, largely because of
the government’s dire lack of financial means. “One is generally of the opinion”, de Bary wrote,
“that this campaign will not take place, and that Mexico will lose Texas”. The independence of
Texas dovetailed with rebellions elsewhere, such as in Oaxaca, making it incredibly difficult for
the Mexican government to muster up any money for the Texas campaign when it had to prevent
other parts of its territory from revolting.184 In December 1836, de Bary mentioned another
delay, and pointed out that U.S.-American General Gaines had occupied Nacogdoches, in
response to which Mexican minister Gorostiza requested his passport in Washington D.C.185 In a
letter from May 1837, de Bary summarised that U.S.-Mexican relations had not improved;
Gorostiza had left the United States and severed ties to that republic. This rupture further
disillusioned Europeans about Mexico’s chances of reincorporating Texas. De Bary reported also
of a new campaign against Texas planned under General Bravo, but wrote a month later that the
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recognition of Texas on behalf of the United States had led some members of the Mexican
government to believe that they should abandon their efforts to recapture the new republic.186
“For Mexico, this would certainly be for the best”, argued de Bary, “since it could never
maintain its possession of Texas without a large army, in case the reconquest succeeded”.187 Von
Gerolt shared his colleague’s views on the Texas matter: In June of 1837, von Gerolt noted that
Mexican politician Luis Cuevas, who had spent time in Europe and returned to Mexico in
response to his appointment as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, found his country “in the sad
political situation into which it had been brought through the failed campaign as well as
administration of the prior President, General Santa Anna”. Von Gerolt commented that he
regarded the government’s efforts for a new campaign as hopeless due to the “shattered state of
finances” that made it impossible for the Mexican army to move beyond the port of Matamoros,
“bare of any means” to make war. Texas, though blockaded by the Mexican navy, gained more
stability as the planned Mexican invasion stalled, and re-annexation seemed increasingly less
likely.188
The Mexican blockade on Texas, one of the only penalties Mexico was able to impose on
Texas, suffered also from U.S. intervention, further discrediting the Mexican claim to the young
republic. Based on excerpts from U.S. newspapers, von Gerolt reported that the United States
responded to the Mexican blockade by despatching a man of war, the Boston, to the coast of
Texas, where the vessel protected any ship with authorisation to enter Texian ports. When
Mexico reacted to this by sending brig Urrea to capture several Texian vessels as well as a U.S.American vessel, which were all brought to Matamoros after the Urrea had completed its
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mission, the United States man of war Natches demanded the immediate release of the U.S.American ship. When Mexico refused, the captain of the Natches fired onto the Urrea, forced its
captain to exchange the Mexican flag for a U.S.-American one, and took it as a prize. Though the
U.S. government apologised to its Mexican counterpart for this incident, releasing the Urrea and
disposing of the captain of the Natches, the U.S. policy of protecting Texian vessels nevertheless
demonstrates that U.S. intervention debilitated Mexican penal measures against Texas, and
discredited further Mexico’s efforts to recapture the lost territory.189
Mexico feared U.S. influence in the former and present Mexican North, suspecting
hectically and nervously that the United States could destabilise its other provinces in the region.
In 1837, Mexican President Anastasio Bustamante described his country’s situation to von
Gerolt, highlighting that Mexico’s northern regions were and had been subject to “invasions of
the North American population”, and expressed his desire for a sizable increase in European
immigration to northern Mexico in order to enable his country to withstand this U.S.-American
pressure threatening the integrity of the Mexican state.190 In a speech to Congress in January of
1837, Bustamante spoke of California and New Mexico as home to subjects who “desired to
subject themselves to foreign domination”, and connected this struggle to the previous Texian
rebellion. He moreover accused the United States of honouring neither the conduct of
neighbourliness nor its treaties with Mexico. Mexico could not, though it desired to, improve
U.S.-Mexico relations, until the United States treated Mexico more fairly.191 Shortly before this
speech, upper California had revolted against Mexican rule, forcing the Mexican government to
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send troops there to quell the rebellion. In October of the same year, unrest broke out in New
Mexico, with the result that the governor as well as several officials were murdered by rebellious
townsfolk. Official documents and correspondence of the Mexican authorities blamed this
uprising on the intention of New Mexican residents to rip their state from the Mexican
Federation and join the United States. Von Gerolt doubted this theory, emphasising that most
New Mexicans had probably been more upset about the stringency with which the tax laws had
of late been enforced in their province. The likelihood of von Gerolt’s explanation
notwithstanding, this incident showcases that the independence of Texas and U.S. support for it
had alerted Mexico to growing U.S. imperialism in the former and present Mexican North.192
Among the British, the belief that Mexico would not be able to reannex what it deemed
nothing but a rebellious province likewise grew continuously stronger. As early as 1837,
Crawford argued that Texas had a potent militia which “would be very effective, in a Country
where there are so many Brakes and so much Timber, where every man is a Marksman and
carries his Rifle…Should the Mexicans undertake another Campaign into Texas, they will
probably never reach beyond the Colorado. They would be met with the full quota of the
Militia.” Moreover, he stated his belief that Texas would not fall into American hands, either, for
Texians, after the failed annexation effort to the United States, had realised that independence
suited their interests better.193 Though Adams noted that the statesmen in London did not
actively involve themselves in the Texas Question before in the 1830s, one can nevertheless
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identify the resignation regarding Mexico’s chance for reconquest as early as 1837 through
Crawford’s letter, and subsequently through Ashburnham’s letter in 1838.194
Beginning in 1837 and 1838, European powers generally evaluated the independence of
Texas from Mexico as fairly secure; at least secure enough to pursue diplomatic or commercial
ties with the new republic. Imperative to these relations was trade. The system of economic
competition that England, France, and the German states, and increasingly, the United States,
engaged in did not exclude the young Republic of Texas. Rather, as the European views on
Texas outlined above underline, Texas was seen as a crucial component of this competitive
system. As in, though even more strongly than in, Mexico, the economic competition extant
between the various European states and the United States in Texas dovetailed with imperialist
schemes, designs, and motives. The rising industrial power, the United States, held interest in its
own expansion, whereas Britain and France sought to secure their trade in the Gulf of Mexico
and saw in Texas a suitable cotton supplier. The German states, without noteworthy maritime
and military strength for overseas imperialism as practiced by the greater powers, were home to a
more pronounced imperial focus on emigration as a source of German influence upon Texas.
British interest in Texas was motivated by Britain’s costly imports of cotton from the
United States, as well as by the belief that it was necessary to recognise Texas in order to protect
vital British commercial interests in the Americas.195 The importance of cotton to British
interests will not be expounded here, for it has been discussed in depth by scholars like Worley,
Adams, Torget, and Kennedy.196 The most crucial aspect to point out here is Britain’s desire to
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have a supplementary, or ideally, alternative cotton supply to that produced in the U.S. South.
Statements by Britons like Francis C. Sheridan, Colonial Secretary under Governor MacGregor
in Barbados, and Commander Joseph Hamilton of the British navy, showcase the British desire
for cotton from a country that was not Britain’s imperial and commercial rival.197
European interest was prompted further by Texas’ efforts to reach out to European
governments. In 1837, James Pinckney Henderson was appointed as Texian minister to England
and France, and in response thereto, a French memorandum on Texas stated that “the time has
come, therefore, to submit a review of the present situation of that country and its revolution
against Mexico for the consideration of the Minister (Molé)”. The memorandum emphasised that
Mexico had more than likely lost Texas for good, because “the anarchy prevalent in Mexico, its
financial difficulties, and the natural indolence of the Mexican people have frustrated all efforts”
to recapture the province. Moreover, the exquisite fertility of Texas was highlighted on several
occasions, as well as the “rich possibilities” extant within the country: its cotton and location on
the Gulf of Mexico “places it [Texas] naturally in communication with all maritime and
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commercial powers”.198 A note from October emphasised once more that “the separation of
Texas from Mexico was a fait consommé and irrevocable”, and that, given that the United States
had refused annexation, Texas was an independent state with a growing population and “a
culture which flourishes rapidly (…) the country is advancing and organising itself”.199
In 1838, France was spurred into taking more decisive action in the Texas matter due to
the fear of losing commercial advantages to Britain. As memorandums of the same year
showcase, English economic rivalry played a crucial role in French policy. “The (…) increase in
agricultural production and exploitation of (Texas’) immense natural resources will open new
and valuable outlets for foreign trade”, a document from September 5, 1838, noted. “France
cannot afford to let herself be forestalled in this area”. The memorandum continued to illuminate
the fine line between commercial benefit and political disappointment in matters of awarding
foreign recognition to new states: “Although in this question of the recognition of Texas hasty
action is likely to entail disappointments and complications should be avoided”, the
memorandum stated, summarising the reasons for European hesitation regarding Euro-Texian
diplomacy, “it should be recognised, at the same time, that in excessive delay lies the risk of
losing the advantages that will naturally accrue to the first European power to treat with the new
republic”. In the case of France – as indeed for any power of the era – the main competitor who
could steal from France such advantages of early recognition was Britain. England had, in 1837,
sent an envoy to investigate Texas (Crawford), and Count Édouard de Pontois, minister
plenipotentiary from France to the United States, recommended that France do the same. The
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choice fell on Alphonse Dubois Saligny, who would go to Texas because the French, “above all,
(…) do not want to be outstripped by the English and the Americans”.200
France’s eventual decision to recognise and sign a treaty with Texas in 1839 was in part
motivated by the growing French disdain for and negative relationship with Mexico. In 1838, a
French memorandum asserted Texas would have remained “a wasteland in the hands of
Mexico”, and that the former’s independence had effected a transformation that could not “be
other than advantageous to our commerce”. As such, French observers emphasised that Texian
independence could be beneficial in light of Mexico’s economic incapabilities.201 Moreover,
another memorandum pointed out that the obstacles that had prevented France from recognising
Spanish-American independence straight away did not exist in the Texian case, for the
government of the Restoration had had reasons to defer to Spain that did not exist in the case of
Mexico. Though Mexico may desire that France reject the presence of any French agents in
Texas and vice versa, the memorandum argued that Mexico’s reasoning was not compelling
enough for France to take such a step, largely because of the way the latter had been treated by
the former: “The French government has many times demonstrated its friendliness and
generosity toward Mexico only to be rewarded by injuries and insults so that indeed we were
forced to despatch a squadron to Mexico to put an end to these outrages”. The memorandum
referred here to the looming Pastry War, a French response to the belief that French interests in
Mexico had been ignored and French patience abused.202
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Several Frenchmen highlighted that France’s negative relationship with Mexico
dovetailed with its recognition of Texas. In a note from Hersaut to Molé, the former pointed out
that Texas was “now our national ally as a result of our dispute with Mexico”, which
demonstrates that France’s diplomacy with Texas commenced partially in the light of France’s
sour relationship with Mexico.203 Saligny, shortly after his arrival in Texas, said the same,
writing that “the fact is that our differences with the Mexican government is a stroke of luck for
Texas, and our (naval) diversion against Mexico will contribute not a little to the increase in our
popularity in this new republic”.204 With Saligny, France had moreover chosen an agent with
relatively little regard for Mexico and its ability to recapture Texas. In March 1839, Saligny
described Texas independence as a “fait accompli”, and already suggested that AngloAmericans, such as the Texians and U.S.-Americans, would eventually conquer more of Mexico,
the latter being peopled by the “degenerate descendants of Pizarro and Hernando Cortés”.205 The
potential benefit of the Pastry War to Texian interest was also seen by Texian observers, who
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hoped in 1838 that Henderson’s mission would be more fruitful as a result and that he would be
able to acquire a French extension of the blockade of Mexico to the Texian ports, where Mexican
contraband trade ran rampant.206
TEXAS, RECOGNITION, AND TREATIES OF AMITY AND COMMERCE
In 1839, France became the second nation to recognise Texas as an independent country,
the United States having been the first in 1837.207 The Netherlands followed shortly after in
1840, though Britain, despite its interest, remained hesitant.208 French recognition of Texas in
1839 played a large role in Britain’s eventual decision to furnish a treaty with Texas, for the
commercial consideration that Britain could not leave the opportunities an independent Texas
offered to French hands became more prevalent after France had taken such a significant
diplomatic step.209 Just as England’s sending of an envoy had spurred French action for fear of
losing out economically in 1838, by 1839, French recognition of Texas pressured British
representatives to take the next step, also. Joseph Hamilton expressed his awareness of the
importance of France’s earlier recognition of Texas, noting that, though he was optimistic that a
commercial treaty between England and Texas would be “placed upon the most favourable
footing by that Country; Notwithstanding France might by her Treaty, consider herself entitled to
a prior claim as the most favoured Nation.”210 Hamilton’s statement highlights that France had in
Texas done what Britain had used to her advantage in Spanish America in the 1820s: through
early recognition, Britain had obtained a head start in Hispano-Anglo commerce. This same
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advantage it now stood to lose to France in Texas, a significant threat given the high hopes some
British observers had for the country, particularly in regard to its cotton culture. In response,
British negotiations for a treaty with Texas were put under way.
The Hanseates summarised the Texian treaties in correspondence regarding their own
potential treaty with Texas, writing that the treaty with France has been completed on September
25, 1839, and subsequently ratified on February 14, 1840, followed by the treaty with the
Netherlands, completed September 16, 1840 and ratified on June 15, 1841. Lastly, Great Britain
also completed a treaty with Texas on November 13, 1840, though ratification did not take place
until June 28, 1842. All of these were treaties of amity and commerce, „resting entirely on the
basis of equality (of foreign vessels) with national vessels, and on the reciprocal treatment as the
most favoured nations”, wrote Hamburg’s Commerce Deputation.211 These treaties encouraged
the Hanseatic city-states to spur into more vigorous action on the subject of Texas in 1844, and
under the direction of Rumpff and Daingerfield, a treaty began to take shape.
Whereas French and British interest in Texas was present very shortly after the latter’s
independence, the German states’ policies were a bit different. Given the Prussian concerns of
legitimacy, the only official correspondence between Texas and Germany was that between
Texas and the Hanse Towns, predominantly Bremen and Hamburg. Just as for Britain and
France, trade was a dominant motive for the Hanseatic city-states. Bremian Consul to Galveston,
Diedrich Hermann Klaener encouraged the Bremian Senate to award more importance to Texas
as an economic partner, for Bremen, as a Handelsstaat, i.e. state whose existence was, like
Bremen’s, founded on commerce, needed to defend its mercantile interests in all major locations
of trade. “The Bremian trade with Texas, so insignificant just a short while ago, has, since the
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independence of this young republic, increased so tremendously, that it can be expected that,
given such progress, Texas would soon become one of the main markets for German products”,
wrote Klaener. Granted that Klaener pursued not merely Bremian, but also individual interests in
this instance – after all, he desired to become consul, and highlighted several times that “the
appointment of a Bremian Consul for the protection of Bremian property” or the “recognition of
mercantile interests” was “an inevitable necessity” and a “palpable need” – the Senate’s decision
to establish a consulate in Texas demonstrates that it shared many of Klaener’s views on TexianHanseatic trade.212 In August of 1843, Bremian Mayor Smidt sent a declaration on the
reciprocity between Texian and Bremian vessels to the Texian government, stating that “in
consideration of the commercial connections between Bremen and the Republic of Texas, which
have existed now for several years, and in order to extend these on the basis of a just and
complete reciprocity, the Senate of the free Hanseatic city and Republic of Bremen” deemed it
desirable to take such a step.213
Hanseatic correspondence and negotiations with Texas are at the crossroads of the
political, commercial, and imperial currents of the era, which make them a very valuable subject
for analysis. Hanseates were limited in Texas by the larger political guidelines established by the
Holy Alliance and Prussia. In March 1844, the Commerce Deputation of Hamburg argued that
negotiations with Texas should not be engaged in if these would “have a negative impact on the
commercial relations to Mexico, so tremendously crucial to several interests”. What followed,
however, was a caveat to that statement: given that ties to Texas had already been created by
England and France, “whose friendly relations to Mexico have not been disturbed in the slightest
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through this action”, the Deputation believed it recommendable that Hamburg join Bremen in its
official negotiations of a treaty with Texas.214 This excerpt thus highlights the consideration
European agents paid to their countries’ commercial interests in Mexico, the growing belief that
diplomacy with Texas did not damage the former, and the economic and political layers of
imperialism and power in the nineteenth century. Just as Prussian statesmen in Mexico often
supported the British and French policies in Mexico because they lacked the maritime and
political strength to act alone, the Hanseatic policy toward Texas also sought legitimation and
political acceptability by following the English and French examples.
In other instances, Rumpff showcased his awareness of the importance that the
independent Republic of Texas held to the imperial landscape of North America: “In the event
that war break out between England and the United States”, wrote Rumpff, “the Texian flag
would make great gains in its importance”. Texas, Rumpff argued, would in such an event
change the commercial relations extant in this part of the globe, and hold geopolitical
significance to foreign states, including the Hanse Towns.215 Moreover, he linked the U.S.American policy on Texas to the U.S. policy regarding the Oregon Territory, shared by both
England and the United States. Rumpff noted that the U.S. Senate had, with a vote of 28:18,
decided that its convention with England regarding the “joint occupation of the Oregon
(Columbia) should not be discontinued”, a decision that facilitated negotiations between the
United States and Britain. The attitude that the U.S. Senate had expressed through said vote was,
according to Rumpff, a signal to the “war party” of the country, which also sought to provoke the
incorporation of Texas into the Union.216 Rumpff regarded both, the Oregon as well as the Texas
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Question, as tied to imperial contestation between England and the United States, and thus
situated Texas within a broader, global struggle.
Though Europeans had the initial concern that their commerce with Mexico could be
negatively impacted through recognition of Texas, the Hanseatic example of 1844 has already
hinted that this position changed throughout Texian independence. In fact, British and French
representatives began to believe that an independent Texas could be beneficial to Mexico.
Sheridan showcased this in a report, where he stated that he was optimistic that much could be
gained from trade with Texas, even as far as British interest in Mexico was concerned. He
estimated that Texas, in exchange for Mexican recognition mediated by the British, would pay
Mexico 3 to 5 million dollars, which would fill Mexico’s coffers on one hand and serve British
commercial interest on the other, for Texans would “also assume a portion of the Debt due by
Mexico to British Merchants.”217 Moreover, as merchant Power emphasised, a strong Texas
“may be made a barrier to the encroachments of the United States”, whose citizens were already
teeming towards the south of North America.218 The Franco-British ambition of establishing
Texas as a ‘buffer state’ between an expansionist United States and a vulnerable Mexico has
been acknowledged by several historians, including Kossok, Adams, and Worley.219 German
historian and traveller G. A. Scherpf wrote in 1841 that the independent Republic of Texas
would stop U.S. expansion into the Southwest, because Texas would be “the ‘until here and no
further’” for the United States, and protect Mexico from U.S. annexation.220
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Because of such factors, Britain’s new policy was the reconciliation of Mexico and Texas
to protect British interests in both countries. Britons like British Commander Evan Nepan did not
believe in Mexico’s chance for reconquest, and thus emphasised mediation with Mexico.221
William Kennedy, who had travelled to Texas in 1839, published a two-volume book on the
country, and became British consul at Galveston beginning in 1842, moreover believed that
mediation with Mexico would increase the likelihood of continued Texian independence.222
After the initial reluctance to engage in relations with Texas in 1836-1837, British interest rose
starkly in the 1840s, and hence advocated for the laying aside of the dispute between the two
republics of Mexico and Texas. British interest in neither one of those two countries stood to
benefit from this strife, for it worsened Mexican instability and financial difficulty and made
Texas more prone to U.S. annexation. Adams outlined the policy of the British in Texas, and
described the years between 1839 and 1841 as a timeframe where London continued to express
fairly little interest in Texas – most of the people who urged British involvement in Texas,
particularly on what can be labelled an informal-imperialist level, were agents situated in the
periphery: In 1841, William Kennedy announced to Foreign Secretary George Hamilton Gordon,
4th Earl and Lord Aberdeen (1841-1846) that he believed that “unless English influence be
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employed in raising up a stable independent power on the South-Western and North-Western
frontiers of the (U.S.) Union, a very few years will suffice to place the whole territory they covet
under the Sovereignty of the United States. There lies the danger to the Maritime and
Commercial supremacy of Great Britain”.223 Aberdeen did not respond in any official capacity to
Kennedy. British chargé d’affaires and Consul-General in Texas, Charles Elliot, was also not
sent to Texas until 1842, though Elliot was also a very enthusiastic supporter of British
interference in Texas.224
James Hook’s report from 1841 is a good example of how British agents and merchants
believed Britain could profit commercially from Texas’ geographic and geopolitical location.225
Hook outlined quite starkly what can be referred to as informal imperialist designs intersecting
with a relationship between Texas and Britain that is akin to that between a peripheral and core
state in Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis. Hook observed:
It is true that Texas is capable of producing almost every thing which we import in a raw
state from foreign Countries,…the first, and decidedly, to Great Britain, the most
important is her Cotton. Her soil, climate, and position for producing this most valuable
Article has no equal, and though in England more than one Million and a half of people
are employed in this trade, Texas can produce more Cotton, and at a cheaper rate than we
at present consume. I would here beg leave to observe, that we, in payment for this and
other raw Materials, give our manufactured goods of Manchester, Glasgow, Sheffield and
Birmingham. I need not stop to point out the great advantage which must arise to our
merchants and manufacturers from such a Commerce…(Texas) is, and will be for more
than a hundred years to come, destitute of all kinds of manufacturies, whilst her daily
encreasing population and wealth will require a supply of almost every thing made in this
Country, for the payment of which, as before stated, she will give us bullion and raw
Materials.226
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For Hook, Texas was an ideal candidate as a raw material supplier, for he did not see the
possibility of her becoming an economic rival such as the United States was becoming during the
1830s and 1840s.227
Though several Britons underlined the commercial-imperial advantages of Texas, the
instructions from Aberdeen to Charles Elliot encouraged – consistent with official British policy
outlined in the centre, London, for the entirety of the Americas – that the latter remain neutral.228
This would suggest, much as in the case of Mexico, that informal-imperial actions or schemes
were not the official policy of the centre and often emanated from local agents. As his
correspondence on the Texian blockade against Mexico proclaimed in March 1842 highlights,
however, Aberdeen was conflicted on Britain’s neutrality. Adams outlined this in regard to
Britain’s maritime policy: Because British commercial interests in Mexico were threatened by
this blockade, Aberdeen addressed a letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,
requesting that the British navy send vessels to the Gulf of Mexico in order to protect British
interests.229 Aberdeen’s stance was criticised in Texas, as Adams pointed out, because it
suggested that “British neutrality was more nominal than actual”, not least because of the
confusion that had arisen in response to the Montezuma and Guadaloupe affair. This affair was,
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according to Adams, evidence that Aberdeen “lacked perfect confidence in his own protestation”
that England observed perfect neutrality in the contest between Mexico and Texas.230
Adams does not consider however that Aberdeen also used arguments of antiquity in his
protest of the Texian blockade to suggest Texas’ weakness vis-à-vis European powers: Despite
instructing Elliot that “all representations which you […] make to the Texian Authorities […]
should be conveyed in such a tone and language as it becomes one independent Govt. to use
towards another independent Govt., without reference to the greater strength and more ancient
reputation of the one or the lesser power and antiquity of the other”, Aberdeen also argued that
“a Govt. so recently established, and as yet so scantily recognized, as that of Texas” ought to
always avoid such an act as a blockade, for it was “always attended with great danger and odium
to the Blockading Power, and liable to excite feelings of disgust and hostility in all other Powers;
- the great Commercial Powers especially”.231 Aberdeen continued to instruct Elliot that he
should “use (his) best endeavours to induce that Govt. (of Texas) to raise the Blockade without
loss of time; representing to them the ill will which a continuance of it will excite in foreign
Nations, and especially amongst the Merchants of the higher Commercial Powers, whose
friendship it must be so greatly the interest of the Texian Govt. to conciliate in the infancy of
their Country’s independence”. Within such statement, one can identify that British imperialism
and commerce functioned symbiotically in North America, and that informal-imperial measures
were not always limited to peripheral agents.232
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The above nevertheless demonstrates that British statesmen in London were less
enthusiastic toward the Republic of Texas and possible British interference therein than
peripheral agents were, and were overall more inclined toward stabilising relations with Mexico.
Adams pointed to this in his work on British interests in Texas, arguing that Kennedy and Elliot,
the two primary British diplomats in Texas, expressed great confidence in Texas as a place
where Britain could impose its influence, whereas correspondence from Aberdeen to the English
representatives in Texas was considerably more subdued. Roeckell also focusses on the aspect of
British foreign policy that existed most predominantly in London and favoured good relations
with Mexico as opposed to actual and substantial interest in Texas.233 Yet Adams and Roeckell
do not consider the potential strength that peripheral agents could exert upon their country’s
policy in another country: Mayo and Zamudio Vega, for instance, demonstrate that British agents
and merchants in Mexico were key drivers behind British informal-imperialist ambitions.234 It is
important to consider thus that Kennedy and Elliot, although their ideas were to a large extent
not shared by Aberdeen, had the potential of exuding an influence beyond the policy dictated by
the core. As Torget points out, reports from British merchants, diplomats, and travellers in the
periphery, such as Power, Hook, and Sheridan, as well as Elliot and Kennedy, did influence
British decision makers in London, including Palmerston and his successor Aberdeen.235 Lastly,
British interference in Texian affairs did exist at times even among statesmen in London, as the
above discussion of Aberdeen’s policy toward the Texian blockade shows. Adams did underline
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that some of Aberdeen’s motives in sending Kennedy to Texas as part of a mission in 1841, and
the latter’s influence on the Texian government, are part of private correspondence whose
content is unknown, which makes it difficult to fully determine Aberdeen’s motives in this
matter. Chapter three will also highlight British interference in the matter of slavery, within
which Adams also concedes that Aberdeen sought to influence Texian policy on at least one
occasion.236
To a certain extent, Texas seemed more suitable for European informal imperialism than
Mexico. Analyses in this regard will be made first in regard to trading restrictions and barriers, as
well as reclamations. The second section will consider informal imperialism through emigration.
The latter strategy was employed in particular by the Adelsverein, founded in Mainz, though
European states also considered this informal-imperialist tool. As a result of both imperial as
well as commercial and financial considerations, connections can be seen between the Society
for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas, Prussia, the Hanse Towns, and England.
As the previous chapter showed, Mexico was not a country that European imperialism
and commerce could easily permeate and penetrate. Next to its resistance to reclamations and its
restrictive laws such as forced bonds or raised duties, Mexico maintained differential duties
amounting to 25% for imports occurring under foreign flags and imposed increased tonnage on
foreign vessels.237 As such, Mexico’s discrimination of foreign vessels was more severe than that
of other countries: in Brazil, foreign flags paid 8% more on entrance duties, and in the United
States, goods transported thereto indirectly from the harbour of a country with which the United
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States had a reciprocity agreement had to pay a special tax of 10%.238 The clause of treaties, such
as that in articles VI and VII of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty or article III in the U.S.-Mexican
treaty, or agreements of most favourable nation merely gave foreign flags the concession of
equality among other foreign flags whose countries had such agreements with Mexico, not the
equality with Mexican ships themselves.239 Mexico moreover strictly regulated its coastal trade:
As article X of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty highlights, foreign powers were not allowed to
participate in this trade, which was reserved for Mexican vessels.240 Mexico moreover waited a
long time to ratify treaties: the treaty with the Hanseates of 1827 was never ratified, and, after
over a decade, the two parties finally signed a changed draft in London on November 8, 1841.241
Von Bülow noted that this delay was caused in part by Mexico’s desires for changes: because
Mexico feared being the disadvantaged party in treaties based on complete reciprocity, it deemed
it important to protect its industry and economy by maintaining differential duties.242
Matters were different with Texas, which pleased Europeans. The treaty between the
Netherlands and Texas made no mention of the coastal trade exception, and the Hanseatic
representatives actively pushed for an additional clause in their treaty with Texas that would
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explicitly permit such trade, including the possibility for partial unloading in several harbours.243
Moreover, the Hanseatic draft had a second clause that foresaw that the vessels of the contracting
parties should be considered equal, in regard to tonnage and other duties, to “the national vessels
or those of the most favoured nations”.244 This showcases that the Hanseates regarded Texas as
an opportunity to negotiate more liberal and favourable treaties. Moreover, in sending a note by
Daingerfield to the Senate, Hanseatic diplomat Rumpff in Paris argued that a treaty with Texas
would be advantageous given that he hoped it could be negotiated on a “liberal basis”.245
Though Hamburg’s involvement between 1842 and 1843 had been relatively minor, it
nonetheless sought to participate in negotiations led by Bremen because a treaty between Texas
and the Hansa was viewed in Hamburg as potentially beneficial even in the event that the former
be annexed by the U.S, partially because it was hoped that the treaty would be, “at least as
concerns that part of the united landmass of the North American free states, equally binding.”246
The potential for a very liberal trade treaty was one of the Hansa’s main motivators in
maintaining their correspondence with Texan diplomats, predominantly Daingerfield, throughout
1844 and 1845. Given both Texas’ desire to “step into the footsteps of the United States” as
regards its treaties, as well as Daingerfield’s limited time in Paris, Rumpff suggested that
previous treaties between Texas and European states as well as the Hanseatic treaty with the U.S.
could be used brevi manu, mutatis mutandis as a guide in furbishing the Hansa’s treaty with
Texas.247 The treaty between the Netherlands and Texas provided the main skeleton upon which
Eventually, the final version of the treaty (never ratified) also had a coastal trade exception, though the Hansa’s
push for a treaty without this caveat is nevertheless interesting because it explains Hanseatic ambitions in
commercial ties with Texas.
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VI, no 16m, Vol. 2, 12.
247 Note extracted from the letter of Min. Res. Rumpff, No. 27, d.d. Paris, February 16, 1844, in StA HH: Cl. VI no
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the draft for a treaty between the Hansa and Texas was built, partially because the Netherlands,
by this point in time a smaller, less imperial commercial state than other European powers such
as England or France, was viewed as a better reference point than the other aforementioned
European parties.248 When evaluating the treaties on which the modifications to this base draft
were modelled, two feature particularly prominently: the treaty of the Hansa with the U.S., and,
what is perhaps more noteworthy, the treaty between the Hansa and Venezuela.249
The treaty between the Hansa and Venezuela was labelled by Prüser as the most
progressive trade agreement of its time, more so than those of Venezuela and Britain or
Venezuela and France.250 Within the Hanseatic-Venezuelan treaty, the Hansa’s products were
given treatment entirely equal to that of Venezuelan goods, a status quo that England and France
were able to obtain as well. Unlike the latter two European powers however, the Hanse Towns
were able to get a concession of equal treatment with Venezuelan vessels and goods concerning
tariffs and duties for any products imported into Venezuela in Hanseatic ships, regardless of
origin. This was an achievement shared with the United States and its treaty with Venezuela, and
according to Walter Kresse, this was an important milestone in the elimination of mercantilist
structures and the dawn of free trade.251 What the Hanseatic city-states and other European states
had not been able to accomplish in Mexico, they tried to accomplish in Texas: trade agreements
that were overall more favourable to European economic interests.
In their negotiations, the Hanseatic cities also insisted on one condition deemed crucial to
both Hanseatic and greater German interests: the inclusion of products from the states of the
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German Bund in several of the treaty’s stipulations.252 The significance Hanseatic representatives
attached to the extension of some of the treaty benefits to the entirety of the German Bund was
an innovative component of this treaty which made Texas more attractive as a negotiating
partner than Mexico. Though this preference for incorporating the German Confederation’s
member states was initially ill-received by Daingerfield, because he feared that this would both
reduce the interest of other German states to engage in their own treaty negotiations with his
state and trouble the young republic’s Senate, which might lead the ratification of the treaty ad
calendas graecas, Rumpff indicated to Daingerfield that this was a sine qua non on behalf of the
Hansa, and that an exclusion of the German states would lead to the termination of negotiations,
which caused the latter to acquiesce to his counterpart’s demand so long as the other German
states were not listed by name and merely addressed by the blanket term “states of the German
Bund.”253 This underlines that Hanseatic representatives, despite the fact that their republics were
not large political weights, possessed, to a certain degree, more power than they did in Mexico.
The Hanseates were not the only ones who found the Texians overall more amenable to
their wishes and Texas more attractive to European commercial interests. Given that Texas
possessed only very few vessels, – nearly no navy at all – differential duties did not make much
sense for the country: As Daingerfield himself noted, Texas could not agree to too many
limitations as regards flags and their privileges, e.g. the limitation of maritime tax-related
benefits to only those vessels sailing from or to Texas from a treaty partner’s port that were
under either the Texian or treaty partner’s flag, because Texas was heavily dependent upon U.S.
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vessels.254 In 1842, a German newspaper estimated that the value of goods legally imported into
Texas (contraband trade was, like in Mexico, a large factor) amounted to roughly 1.6 million
dollars, and that almost 80% of goods were imported from the United States, followed by
Britain, France, and Bremen.255 Texian commercial maritime traffic was rather negligible.
Nevertheless, this opened opportunities for Europeans, who hoped for lower duties and more
advantageous terms of trade with Texas than with other, Spanish American, republics. Saligny
wrote to his government in April 1839, recommending that it respond to Texas’ pleas for a
treaty, for France “could easily have obtained from Texas valuable concessions to our commerce
and navigation, in exchange for subsidies” in the form of loans, predominantly.256
The fact that Texas was viewed as a more favourable location for European imperial and
commercial designs is also reflected in European agents’ occasional efforts to garner advantages
for their state over others. Saligny, for instance, highlighted that he had spoken to Texian
Congressmen and asked them “to adopt a law at the beginning of the next session placing a duty
of 25 to 30 percent on the export of timber, but stipulating an exemption in our favour for
twenty-five or thirty years”. Since the President did not like England, according to Saligny, he
had been optimistic that such a law might be encouraged and passed. This desire to secure
Texian timber for the French market was motivated not merely by fear of English, but also
Russian competition, for Saligny reported of a Russian engineer, Pepin, who had heard of the
excellent quality of the good.257 In June of the same year, Saligny reiterated that France would be
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able to get more deeply involved in Texas than in other parts of North America. When the
negotiation of a treaty between France and Texas was still in the air, Saligny pressed that
finalising steps be taken:
Shall we once again reject the opportunity open to us to establish our influence over a
portion of this continent and to open important outlets to our industry and navigation?
Shall we again let ourselves be outstripped by England? In my preceding despatches I
explained to your Excellency how we might obtain special advantages in Texas. My
conviction and hopes in this regard have not changed. But even in the event that the
Government of the (French) King might not want or were unable to obtain special
concessions owing to the current theories on free trade, we would still derive very
valuable benefits from the sympathies of the Texian population and from their marked
preference for our ideas, tastes, and products. Our wines, silks, muslins, et cetera et cetera
would find a huge market there; we would receive, in exchange, the products of its fertile
soil, cottons reported to be of superior quality…258
What Saligny’s statement demonstrates once more is that Europeans, often agents in the
periphery, did foster ideas of informal imperialism in the Americas. What is more, Saligny noted
that, even in the event that the French government abide by ideas of free trade, a beneficial
exchange of peripheral raw materials and core industrial products could still occur, and that the
popularity of French culture would assist and promote French trade. Free trade was also
something that Europeans had been unable to establish in Mexico, which protected its young
industries, and thus set it negatively apart from Texas.
INFORMAL IMPERIALISM THROUGH EMIGRATION
Next to these financial, tax- and treaty-related advantages that Texas offered to European
commerce and imperialism, there existed also the benefit of emigration to Texas. This moreover
set Texas apart from Mexico, where few emigration projects in the 1830s and 1840s succeeded
and where, as this chapter and chapter one have shown, many Europeans got killed or otherwise
feared for their safety and security of property. Though concerns regarding migrants’ safety
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existed also in Texas, where the Comanches held significant power and conducted raids, many
Europeans had a much more positive and optimistic outlook on emigrants’ future in Texas given
that it had a manageable, not too sizable population, and possessed great agricultural resources
and fertile soil. Texas thus became subject to European emigration schemes, which were deeply
related to and intertwined with the commercial and imperial motives European states held in
Texas.
European emigration projects into Mexico were generally not very successful, as a
Prussian report from 1836 observed: “of the various colonisation efforts which the foreigners
have attempted in the form of land speculations (Landbauspekulationen) in the various parts of
Mexico (Texas excluded) none have flourished, with the exception of the German effort in the
state of Veracruz, not far from Huatusca and Arizaba [Orizaba]”. This settlement did not amount
to more than one hundred souls, however. The independence of Texas also hampered the
Mexican dream and European schemes for colonisation efforts. One Baron of Racknitz of the
German Würtenberg sought to settle a border region between Tamaulipas and Texas along the
Nueces River, and had thus made arrangements with the Mexican government, which granted his
request for settlement as long as he introduced at least 250 German colonists into Mexico. This
plan fell flat in response to the Texan Revolution and the resulting boundary disputes and
hostility along the frontier. The 1836 Prussian trading report also emphasised that Texas had
been one of Mexico’s most attractive lands for settlement due to its many rivers and
consequential fertility, which had already been acknowledged over a decade earlier by AngloAmerican colonists.259 Indeed, noteworthy European efforts to settle colonists in Mexico
focussed on northern Mexico, where Irish empresarios Power and Hewitson received grants for
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colonisation in California and McMullen and McGloin brought Irish and Mexican settlers to the
area of modern-day Corpus Christi.260 Financial resources were often a limiting factor for such
efforts: German merchant in Mexico City, Joseph Vehlein, tried thrice to settle families in Texas,
with very little success – the first two efforts remained entirely fruitless.261 German historian
Kossok summarised that Mexico “did not possess the socio-economic prerequisites” for
colonisation projects on its northern frontier.262
In response to this assessment and the shift in European diplomacy toward Texas after
1837 and particularly after 1839, emigration to Texas became a chief subject, especially to
German observers, whose loose confederation of states lacked the political and economic
influence of its English and French competitors. Germans believed that Germany had one thing
to offer in abundance above all: people. Germans were already emigrating in large numbers in
the nineteenth century, partially due to unsatisfactory conditions within their home states such as
lack of political freedoms, heavy taxation, as well as widespread poverty.263 Many migrants
made the United States their new home, but emigration societies and efforts existed in several
German states, advocating for one certain location, such as Australia, Brazil, or Hungary. The
Verein zum Schutze deutscher Einwanderer in Texas, also known as the Mainzer Verein,
Adelsverein, or simply the Verein, made it its mission to settle Germans in Texas.264 Founded in
Spring of 1842, in the aftermath of a meeting of the Rate deutscher Fürsten und adeliger Herren,
i.e. the council of German princes and noblemen, in Biebrich on the Rhine, this “Society for the
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Protection of German Immigrants in Texas” desired to better organise German overseas
migrations in order to alleviate the difficulties migrants faced on their voyages.265 When the idea
for a settlement project in Texas became popular, the Society, made up of 20 noblemen and one
noblewoman, Countess von Isenburg, sent two members to Texas to evaluate the situation and
buy land: Viktor Count von Leiningen and Count Joseph von Boos-Waldeck.266
Christian Count von Neu-Leiningen-Westerburg had already spoken positively of Texas
to his eventual society members in March of 1842. He highlighted that Texas was a country
“destined by nature to, because of its location, climate, fertility, and its many navigable rivers,
become the cradle of important future events”. No other part of the Americas, von Leiningen
believed, was as well suited to German settlement as Texas. Von Leiningen emphasised that
Texas had already been praised by Alexander von Humboldt – an important judgement for
Germans of this time – and that the state had developed very quickly both politically as well as
economically. Von Leiningen also used travel literature by Scherpf and Kennedy in order to
justify why he promoted Texas as a destination. Other positive German pieces of literature also
influenced the society according to Louis E. Brister, namely Charles Sealsfield's Das
Kajütenbuch, oder Schilderungen aus dem Leben in Texas (1841) and Detlef Dunt's Reise nach

265

April 20, 1842, is often given as the date of founding, but sources suggest that a meeting was held in March of
that year, though not yet in terms of a society for Texas specifically. The society also changed into a joint-stock
company in 1843. See: Kearney, 12.
266 The names of the society members can be confusing, for many were each other’s relatives. Christian Count of
Neu Leiningen-Westerburg, called hereafter Count von Leiningen, had a cousin, Carl Count of Castell, who held the
power of attorney in the society, and another relative, Karl Emich Prince von Leiningen, was the president of the
society. The latter Leiningen was also a Fürst, not a Graf, i.e. a prince, not a count, and the patriarch of the
Leiningen lineage. Another Leiningen involved in the society was Viktor Count von Alt-Leiningen-Westerburg – a
slightly different lineage, for unlike Christian, who was of the Neu-Leiningen lineage (New Leiningen), Viktor was
part of the Alt-Leiningen (Old Leiningen) lineage. Another important individual to mention here is Carl Prince von
Solms-Braunfels, who travelled to Texas after initial efforts on behalf of the society stalled. Two other SolmsBraunfels relatives, Princes Ferdinand and Alexander, were also part of the society. Letters of the Leiningen family
can be difficult to identify sometimes, for some of the Leiningens referred in their letters solely to their ‘cousins’ or
‘uncles’ et cetera. For more on the names of the German nobility involved, see Kearney, 16-17, and Moritz P. G.
Tiling, History of the German Element in Texas (Houston: Moritz Tiling, 1913).

154

Texas nebst Nachrichten von diesem Lande (1834). Margarete Erika Thompson has also
illustrated that German travel narratives portrayed Texas in an overwhelmingly positive manner,
as a “Garden of Eden” where opportunities, democracy, open lands, and freedom could be
found.267 Such travel literature had also influenced von Leiningen, who argued that Texas was an
ideal location for emigration because it had a tremendous amount of land but very few settlers.
This was, according to von Leiningen, an advantage to the Germans who emigrated, for they
would be received with open arms in a state that sought to bolster its population. The Count also
asserted that Germans were well-liked in North America and that their industriousness and work
ethic had contributed to Anglo-American wealth in “no insignificant measure”. He proceeded to
ask:
Would the German not be more trusting in joining/fastening on/affiliating with a wellknown name, not (be more likely to) hope for a guarantee in those, which he has for
centuries been accustomed to regard as his home and shield?-- Should the best elements
towards the unpredictable wealth/prosperity of the future remain unused, torn from the
motherland, useful only for foreign entrepreneurial spirit?-- Does there not lie, in the
gradually increasing necessities of such a colony, the potential for extensive economic
projects? …The overpopulation of Germany, the circumstance that America is, almost
throughout, the destination of emigrants, the percentage with which the merchant marine
of our fatherland participates in global commerce; the colonisation projects, popping up
sporadically in the newspapers, must, after thoughtful consideration, lead to the
conviction that centralisation cannot be far away; subsequently, decades will surpass
centuries in productivity, and the names of those who constituted the first effort of
unification, will go down in history!
Von Leiningen’s statement showcases several beliefs. First, German productivity was benefiting
foreign powers, primarily the United States, which received many industrious Germans who
made the country prosper. Second, German emigrants would prefer maintaining their own
culture and remaining in affiliation with German leadership. Third, if the first two points could
be combined – if emigrants could settle in a country where they could maintain their German
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identity and not enrich a foreign power – this would be tremendously beneficial to Germany.
Lastly, such colonisation efforts might even aid in the process of German unification and
centralisation.268
Von Leiningen’s speech highlights that Texas stood at imperial, commercial, and social
crossroads that the Society sought to use and tip in its and Germany’s favour. The Adelsverein
did not merely endeavour to rid Germany of its superfluous population; it wanted to use the
emigrants in order to increase Germany’s overall global prosperity, influence, and strength.
Rather than passively watching as the United States reaped the benefits of Germans’ hardworking and skilful nature, the Society attempted to actively concentrate German emigration in
Texas. Conditions for affordable and impactful German settlement in that country, where the
population was small and the government thankful for migrants, were deemed excellent by von
Leiningen.269 Scherpf also commented that Texas had had, in 1830, only a population of 16,000
souls, and that as many as 15 million Europeans could settle in the large country.270 In 1842, the
Texian Congress granted the President the authority to offer land tracts to European societies and
entrepreneurs who would settle migrants in Texas, underlining further von Leiningen’s belief
that Texas would gladly receive German settlers.271
This German ambition for Texas was not new by the time the Society formed its plans in
the 1840s. In 1821, a retired Prussian army officer published a book on Texas and its mercantile
opportunities for Germany. German emigration to Texas, he believed, could enable Germans to
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dominate the trade with Indians down into South America, and Galveston, if home to German
merchants, would provide Prussia with a harbour from which it could ship German goods into
Mexico or the United States. Prussia would be able to better sell its manufactures and receive
raw materials that could potentially be grown in abundance in Texas, such as cotton or sugar.272
Nevertheless, as the previous analysis on European efforts to colonise land during the Mexican
era shows, such ambitions were either not put into practice, suffered from poor execution, or
failed. The Society sought to remedy this: according to a report, it was “true that many Germans
have failed in this blessed land. But what was the cause? Could the lone family, without
protection, advice, and knowledge of the country, without a home, exposed to the influence of
the weather and climate (…) expect a different fate?” The Society, the report stated, would make
sure that such difficulties facing migrants would not ruin the Germans moving to Texas.273
The Adelsverein’s sending of von Leiningen and von Boos-Waldeck resulted in the
latter’s purchase of a league of land in modern-day Lafayette County, which was named after the
patron of the society, Duke Adolf von Nassau.274 The first objective was to establish a plantation
there, for von Leiningen and von Boos-Waldeck, though the former desired ultimately to settle
Germans in Texas, realised upon arrival that buying land grants for German colonisation,
organising the voyages of families, and affording their protection, would be too impractical,
costly, and time-consuming given that the Society was new and had not done any preparations
yet.275
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Earnest German colonisation projects would not start until Carl Prince von SolmsBraunfels became more involved in the society in 1844. The contract for a land grant purchased
by the Society in 1842, though not settled with German families, had expired in December of
1843. Despite the assurances of Bourgeois d’Orvanne, who had helped the Society in acquiring
the contract, that the contract could be renewed, von Solms found upon his arrival in 1844 that
this was not the case.276 This notwithstanding, von Solms promoted the idea of German
emigration to Texas. He in particular shared the idea that Texas could become a state in which
Germans could live as Germans, connected to their motherland and hence beneficial to Germany,
merely a Federation of states and hence lacking in the commercial and political power enjoyed
by nations such as France and England.277
Von Solms issued eleven reports during his time in Texas. Within them, one can see that
his desire that the Society facilitate the maintenance of connection between emigrated Germans
and their home country. Shortly upon his arrival, von Solms wrote that he was approached by a
German living in Texas by the name of Ernst, who expressed to him a toast “to the health of the
noble and generous German princes who think of the well being of their subjects on the other
side of the ocean”. Von Solms commented on this interaction by stating that “many are happy
that through community interests they will be able to have closer ties with the Fatherland”,
highlighting that the Germans already in Texas supported the idea of maintaining their German
identity and connections despite the geographic distance between Texas and Germany. In order
to support his fellow countrymen, von Solms wanted to obtain from the Texian Congress trade
advantages for the German farmers of Texas, as well as to “give German industries a new
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market, and expand the German maritime industry”.278 Much like von Leiningen had wished for
in his first address in March of 1842, von Solms also conflated German commercial interest with
a colonial presence in Texas. The Germans settling in Texas were not to assimilate as had
occurred in the United States – they were supposed to maintain their German identity. As von
Solms wrote in his second report, in response to d’Orvanne’s remark that “nationality (was) only
a word”, “Yes, for you perhaps, but not for me and the Verein”.279
The commercial power that the Society hoped to gain through its colonisation efforts was
moreover underlined in von Solms’ reports. On August 20, 1844, von Solms emphasised that he
desired a new grant for German settlement located on the Medina River. This tract of land would
facilitate commerce with Mexico, he argued, due to the proximity of the Rio Grande and the
mule caravans. “In order to make this trade advantageous to our German merchants”, said Solms,
“I shall endeavour to secure from Congress a reduced import duty on all shipping under the
auspices of the Verein.” The conflation of commerce, emigration, and power becomes more
evident in his subsequent statement: “The Verein is entitled to some evidence of appreciation
from the Republic for bringing in resources such as man power”. Von Solms actively argued that
German states, through the proxy of the Society, were entitled to commercial advantages vis-àvis other nations because they provided Texas with immigrants. In order to successfully
accomplish these goals, he also requested that the Society send German men to Texas to aid the
families who would settle there, for he did not trust Mexicans or Americans to do so. Neither did
he trust Frenchmen d’Orvanne, whom he described as having the “typical French arrogance but
not the quality to gain for themselves respect”. In order to make this project, so crucial to
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Germany’s greater commercial, political, and imperial future, viable, von Solms believed that
those with the largest interest in its success should lead the German emigrants: fellow
Germans.280
In order to solidify these objectives, von Solms recommended that the Verein seek out
support from the German governments.281 Prussia was an obvious first choice: Prince Friedrich
Wilhelm Ludwig of Prussia, was a member of the society, and his uncle, King Friedrich Wilhelm
III of Prussia, was not unfavourable towards the Verein.282 In late 1843, Count von Castell
approached the Prussian government through a letter in which he highlighted the benefits that
Prussian support of this project would have for Prussia. Von Castell estimated that roughly
35,000 Germans emigrated each year, cutting all ties to their fatherland, and taking both money
and valuable labour with them. In the last twenty years, von Castell believed, Germany had thus
lost 1,200,000 labourers and 600 – 800 million Gulden, a loss that had spurred the creation of the
Adelsverein. The Society, said von Castell, wanted to funnel German emigration into one
direction and one location, to assure that the German “labourers would not be exploited by
foreign states, and benefit instead the motherland”. The goal was for a German colony that
would, despite Germany’s lack of a nation-state, noteworthy navy, and colonial experience,
elevate Germany on the international playing field. The fact that Germany could not compete
with England, France, and the United States on an imperial level could be used to its advantage,
von Castell asserted, because Texas, “fearing the dependence upon North America, England, and
France, desires a connection to Germany”. Germany ought instead to impose its influence
through its people, because Texas had, according to his estimate, only roughly 160,000 white
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settlers, among them some Germans. If the 35,000 emigrants leaving Germany each year could
be guided toward Texas, the German element in Texas would grow immensely.283
The Verein had started this project on its own, von Castell noted, but it now desired
official protection and support from the German regimes. Prussia, described in this letter as the
“shield of Germany”, had already acknowledged the importance of an overseas colony for the
prosperity of Germany in the 17th century, and would thus, von Castell was sure, recognise the
importance of the Society’s involvement in Texas. Prussia’s mission was the promotion and
protection of German industry and independence from foreign influence, which it had already
defended in various wars, the letter stated. In a second letter, von Castell moreover stated that
Daingerfield was eager about this project, for Texas needed migrants. Like von Solms, von
Castell believed that it was important that no foreigners guide German emigrants to Texas,
because this would not benefit the German fatherland. Rather, Germans should be in charge of
establishing a colony in Texas that would essentially create a German state outside of Germany,
which would provide the German merchant marines with a trading post akin to those possessed
by Europe’s maritime powers. Germany could draw from Texas raw materials, whilst its industry
would be able to best its European rivals because of Texas’ German affiliation created through
German migrants, and as a result, Germany’s economy would grow and enable more Germans to
stay in their homeland.284 Such considerations showcase deeply how closely linked imperial and
commercial ambitions were, even for a non-imperial power like the not-yet-existent Germany.
The Prussian government considered von Castell’s plea, but felt like it did not possess
enough information on Texas to make an immediate judgement. In response, it contacted
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Alexander von Humboldt as well as the Bremian government.285 Von Humboldt, though von
Leiningen had stated earlier in an address to the Society that the former had praised Texas, was
sceptical towards the project, because he feared that Prussian support would create the
impression that the state actively encouraged emigration. Moreover, the famous Prussian rejected
the idea that German settlers could somehow maintain a significant enough tie with their
fatherland, precisely because Germany was not a maritime power like England or France. Those
countries, he argued, could support emigration of their subjects, because they possessed navies
and marines. He also pointed out that von Castell, who had approached von Humboldt about
official support for the Society, had really asked the wrong person because his name, being that
of a well-known and influential traveller, had been used and abused by other emigration
societies, causing him to shy away from involvement in any colonisation schemes. Based on his
discussions with a Texian representative in France and Frenchmen, von Humboldt emphasised to
the Prussian government that England had significant imperial interest in Texas – as a buffer
state which could protect Mexico from the United States and a state in which slavery could be
contested due to the state’s political weakness – which increased U.S.-American anxieties to
annex Texas sooner rather than later to prevent the republic from becoming an English
stronghold. Prussia, von Humboldt believed, was not fit to enter this debate. He also doubted that
the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, guided by von Bülow, who had helped complete the
treaty of commerce and amity with Mexico, would be inclined to provide the Society with
assistance for its colonial project.286
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Minister Christian von Rother also gave his opinion on the matter. As chief of the
Seehandlung, the Prussian maritime department, he agreed with von Humboldt’s concerns,
emphasising that he questioned strongly the practicality and practicability of the Verein’s plan.
Much like von Humboldt, he was in disfavour of emigration, and actually asserted that
emigration of Germans had gotten so bad, laws would have to be put into place to stop it. Prussia
in particular did not suffer from overpopulation, so supporting an emigration society was
contrary to its interests, von Rother wrote. The strong imperialist conflict between Mexico,
England, and the United States was not one that the German element would be able to compete
against, for the three powers would nip any German influence exerted through emigrants in the
bud. England, von Rother feared, would use an informal imperialist presence – through the
manipulation of tariffs, duties, and taxes – in Texas to make German exports thereto profitless
and “impossible”. Since Prussia found itself with politically “bound hands”, preventing it from
taking an initiative on the Society’s project, von Rother furthermore recommended that von
Castell approach other German Zollverein states and ask them for financial support, especially
since the huge sum needed for such an undertaking could not be singularly paid by Prussia,
anyway. Lastly, given that he was sceptical regarding Germany’s commercial interests in Texas,
von Rother contacted Bremen, which had already established commercial connections to
Texas.287
The Bremian who responded was merchant Fred. Delius, who considered Bremian, and
more broadly, German, trade with Texas as fairly insignificant. Settlers who had gone to Texas
with Bremian vessels delivering goods had been small in number, unaffiliated with the Verein,
and Bremen had not been able to export anything of significant value due to the strong economic
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presence of the United States in Texas. The rivalling power there commercially was England.
Generally, Delius regarded the civilisation of Texas as backward and consumption as
insignificant, and feared that the republic would not maintain its independence for long given its
financial and political lability. Texian fears of Mexico contributed to this instability. Just as how
commercial competition and the economic advantages of being ‘the first’ in a new market had
spurred English and French agents and diplomats on in the process of recognising Texas, the
same factor discouraged Delius’ view of Texas. England and France, he argued, had already
established a significant presence in Texas, and this, combined with the low consumption there,
might prevent German trade from establishing a significant foothold. Delius did not know
whether the creation of a “German protectorate” in Texas, fuelled by German emigrants, and the
subsequent benefits to German trade, would be achievable.288 Prussian Consul in London, F. W.
Schmidt, who also had mercantile connections to Mexico, was also consulted by Rother, and
responded to the latter that he strongly rejected the idea of Prussian support of Texas or aid for
the Verein. In response, the Prussian government declined the Society’s request for protection
and support.289
The Hanseates, though they did not officially support the Adelsverein or engage in
significant correspondence with it, had an interest in German emigration to Texas and the
society’s project nonetheless. This interest went beyond that which was held by Bremian consul
Klaener, who was also involved in the Society during his time in Texas.290 In his negotiations
with Daingerfield, Rumpff sought to use the emigration of Germans to Bremen’s advantage.
Bremerhaven was, together with Hamburg, Germany’s largest port for emigrants, and the vessels
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sailing to Texas sailed almost exclusively from Bremen.291 Rumpff wrote to the Senate of the
Hanse Towns that his impression of Texas as a destination for German emigrants – based on
Daingerfield’s information – was positive, and suggested a separate convention or treaty with
Texas on the subject of emigration.292 In another letter to the Senates, Rumpff reiterated that “the
German emigrations to Texas seem indeed to carry a certain measure of weight”, for
Daingerfield had emphasised his desire for such a convention on emigration, which might spur
the Texian Congress’ desire to sign and ratify the treaty of amity and commerce between the
Hanse and Texas. Rumpff pointed here to a society under the leadership of German noblemen,
including the Duke von Nassau, the Prince von Leiningen, and Count von Boos-Waldeck – the
Adelsverein.293 The Commerce Deputation of Hamburg hoped that such German colonisation
efforts would, if they increased, consolidate the political situation of Texas and thus secure
German trade with Texas.294 In yet another letter, Daingerfield pronounced once more the Texian
desire for “respectable immigrants, not entirely without means”, highlighting that Texians hoped
to increase the prosperity of their state through European migrants.295 This motivated Rumpff to
write to his governments with the plan of tying emigration to Hanseatic maritime advantages:
duties to be paid by Hanseatic vessels could possibly be reduced, he argued, if the ships also
carried migrants and their belongings. The capital brought by migrants could result in a
proportionate subtraction of the tariff imposed on cargo. Particularly the negative experience
Daingerfield had had in Brussels, Belgium, might persuade him to make such a concession to the
Hanse, Rumpff noted. The Adelsverein’s goal of bringing 4,000 to 8,000 German emigrants to
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Texas in the near future were thus seen as positive by Rumpff. In a subsequent letter, Rumpff
announced to his governments that he would press the matter of a convention on this subject with
Daingerfield, for he wanted Hanseatic trade to take advantage of German emigration as quickly
as possible.296 In the Hanseatic case, emigration was used as a means by which to increase
Hanseatic negotiation power and influence in order to further Hanseatic commerce.
Given Prussia’s rejection to the Adelsverein, von Solms, with familial connections to the
English royal lineage, sought to acquire a good standing for his society in Britain. He contacted
British consul in Texas, Kennedy, in late 1844. The latter was favourable of von Solms, referring
to him as an “able and active representative”. Kennedy supported the idea of European
emigration to Texas, and wrote to Henry U. Addington that it would be a “pity” if the German
endeavour would not succeed.297 In another letter, he told Aberdeen that von Solms was “an
acute observer” who would recognise “fitness for the arduous enterprise of planting European
Settlements in the wastes of Texas”, highlighting that he thought of the Society as more than just
a group of dreaming, illusioned, German nobles. Kennedy stated: “I bore favourable testimony to
the character of the German emigration to this Country. Still greater success may be anticipated
for that emigration when conducted under the auspices of so respectable and enlightened a body
as the German association represented by the Prince of Solms”. He moreover pronounced that
“no sensible friend of independent Texas” would object to this introduction of German colonists,
tying the Society’s ambition to a goal that suited English interests: the prevention of U.S.
annexation of Texas.298

296

Rumpff to Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24.
Kennedy to Addington, October 24, 1844, CBA, 371.
298 Kennedy to Aberdeen, December 6, 1844, CBA, 385.
297

166

Given that other European powers also had an interest in European migration to Texas, in
hopes that this would encourage Texians to have a stronger affiliation to Europe and a lesser to
the United States, von Solms wrote a letter to Kennedy outlining that he hoped for some British
support in his project. Instead of underlining solely the interests that Germany had in Texas and
the benefits it could hope to gain commercially, politically, and militarily, von Solms emphasised
the importance of an independent Texas to all of Europe, for a Texas annexed to the United
States would lead to the latter’s domination of the entire Gulf of Mexico and the continent. In
order to prevent this scenario, von Solms suggested that “there is a very obvious step to be taken,
- and that is to fill this Country, and especially the Western part of it, as soon as possible, with a
large number of Europeans. Probably aware of the concerns Prussia had had regarding its
maritime possibilities, von Solms highlighted to Kennedy that British vessels could aid the
German association with the transport of migrants and help equip them. “English arms”, he
wrote, referring to previous wars in Europe, “were effective weapons in the hands of the German
soldiers of the Legion”. Whereas the Adelsverein’s letters to the Prussian government had
portrayed England as a rival, von Solms wrote of a deep Anglo-German friend- and kinship: his
intention, he said, “is to serve my native country, as well as Great Britain – that noble Empire,
always so nearly and faithfully allied with Germany, and, to show my zeal and solicitude for the
service of your Most Gracious Queen, on whom may God bestow his richest blessings!”299 What
this statement showcases is that agents, even those not necessarily affiliated with a particular
government, were well aware of the imperial ambitions and contestations that existed for and in
Texas. People like Klaener, von Solms, Schmidt, or Saligny, the first a consul for Bremen as
well as an agent of the Society, the second likewise an Adelsverein member, the third a Prussian
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consul with mercantile interests in Mexico, and the fourth a Frenchman trying to bolster his
career, all showcase that state motives and actions dovetailed with personal interests in the
commercial, diplomatic, and imperial landscape of 1830s and 1840s North America, which
added to the unpredictability, contestability, and fluidity of power relations in the contested
Texian borderlands.
The Republic of Texas emerged in North America at a time when the continent was
highly contested between several powers, including mother country Mexico, England, France,
the United States, the Comanche Empire, and, situated on a lesser imperial tier, the German
states, led politically and economically by Prussia and the Hanse Towns. Initially ill-received by
Europeans because of its destabilising effect on Mexico and threat to European interests there, as
well as its likely annexation to the United States, an imperial and commercial rival who
contested European intervention and influence in the Americas through the Monroe Doctrine,
Texas became interesting to European commerce by the late 1830s due to its raw materials and
lack of industry. Europeans hoped that Texas, described frequently as the best part of Mexico,
now lost to that country, would provide Europe with cotton, sugar, timber, and other raw
materials, and become at the same time a market for European manufactures. Quickly,
Europeans did not believe in the reconquest of Texas by Mexico, and feared that such efforts by
Mexico would only lead to the former’s annexation to the United States. As a result, and in
response to feeling imperilled due to growing U.S.-American imperialism and expansion,
European states tried to persuade Mexico to recognise Texas as independent, seeing the latter as
a buffer state that could secure European commercial interests in the former.
Texas was also seen by several European actors as a state within which their respective
countries could establish their influence. Unlike Mexico, which had been and continued to be
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difficult for Europeans to dominate in any way, even through direct intervention in the form of
the Pastry War, Texas seemed an easier target for European informal imperialism.
Commercially, Europeans hoped for and received better trade agreements, and the country was
stable enough to afford the quick ratification of treaties (unlike in Mexico, where the HanseaticMexican treaty had even once been lost in the aftermath of chaos caused by insurgencies and
rebellions). Texas, predominantly a plantation and farm-based society and economy, would
factor well into European commercial networks that emphasised the exportation of manufactured
goods from the European core to American peripheral states and the importation of peripheral
raw materials into core states. Cotton was of particular importance to the British. Several
European agents used diplomatic pressure to try and obtain concessions from the Texian
government regarding the commerce of their respective country. Given Texas’ need for people,
Europeans, chiefly among them the Germans through the Adelsverein, also sought to use
emigration to establish a dominant influence in that state vis-à-vis commercial, political, and
imperial rivals.
Though Europeans were in favour of Texian independence by the late 1830s and early
1840s, one large issue remained: Slavery. In the next chapter, the effectiveness and methods of
European informal imperialism in Texas will be analysed in regard to slavery, which many
Texians defended furiously whereas Europeans sought desperately to eradicate it.
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Chapter Three – ‘Part and Parcel of the Law of the Land’: European Responses to the
Presence of Slavery in Texas and Informal Empire

Though European interest in Texas was strong, and European agents believed that the
young state could be placed in their respective country’s zone of influence, the agents of each
European state hoped that Texas, given its strategic geographic location between the United
States and Mexico, would tip the commercial, political, and imperial balance in their
government’s favour; and Texian cotton in particular became an economic consideration for
Europe’s industrialised powers. But Texas’ cotton wealth and potential, praised so frequently in
European correspondence, was both the republic’s blessing and its curse.1 Behind the bales of
cotton that were being exported to Europe in steadily growing numbers stood a practice that the
European states, under British lead, increasingly condemned: slavery. Texian farmers, like their
counterparts in the U.S.-American South, relied heavily on slave labour to grow their cotton.
This had already set them up for confrontation with the Mexican government, which sought to
rid its territories of the moral ill. Having seceded from Mexico, the Texians had already
succeeded once in defending their use of forced African labour, which was, in fact, a main
motivation for the Texas Revolution of 1835. How could European agents, interested in their
respective state’s commercial gain, respond to a republic whose existence could be credited to its
inhabitants’ belief in slavery?
Though it had been responsible for much of the trans-Atlantic slave trade operations for
roughly 300 years, Europe, with Britain in the forefront, spent much effort on ending slavery
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Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson emphasise in Globalization: A Short History that the nineteenth century
was marked by a “double revolution” which had occurred in the late eighteenth century, one political, in the
aftermath of the French Revolution, and one industrial. See: Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels. P. Petersson,
Globalisation: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 59.
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throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century. From the banning of the international,
trans-Atlantic slave trade to the abolition of slavery within their empires, Europeans were
moving toward the eradication of the heinous practice. Britain, claiming for itself the driver’s
seat in this endeavour, negotiated a large number of treaties with other European and American
governments with the objective of guaranteeing that no slaves be transported on vessels under
their respective flags. Abolitionist societies gained prominence on both sides of the Atlantic, and
occupied successfully and effectively the moral high ground on this subject, particularly in
Britain. The global, predominantly trans-Atlantic triangular, network of slavery, found itself
under attack in response to political pressures brought forth by the aftermath of the French
Revolution and the Enlightenment era. Slavery no longer seemed just or justifiable, ultimately
leading to the war on slavery during the nineteenth century. This political current clashed,
however, with a commercial one: Though the moral inaptitude of slavery was widely
acknowledged and accepted in Europe by the first half of the nineteenth century, the commercial
benefits to be reaped from it had grown in response to the Industrial Revolution. The textile
industry, and especially the British one, relied heavily on cotton. As chapter one has showcased,
this crop stood at the foundation of Britain’s economic wealth and power.2 Unfortunately, most
of this cotton, so imperative to Britain’s commercial interests and consequently its imperial,
military, and maritime strength, was grown in the United States, more specifically in the U.S.-
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Beckert points out that Europe was able to dominate and build an empire of cotton which gave it wealth, power,
and prestige because Europeans began “combining imperial expansion and slave labor with new machines and wage
workers.” See: Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), xi. He
moreover describes England prior to the revolution as “an imperial nation characterized by enormous military
expenditures, a nearly constant state of war, a powerful and interventionist bureaucracy, high taxes, skyrocketing
government debt, and protectionist tariffs,” which was able to combine the powers of the state and capital to create a
global production complex – tied to the Americas via plantations, Africa via slaves, and England for processing –
wherein the British “used the capital, skills, networks, and institutions of cotton to embark upon the upswing in
technology and wealth that defines the modern world.” See: Beckert, Empire of Cotton., xv.
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American South – by slave labourers.3 Britain needed cotton, of that fact there was no question,
but it also wanted to pursue an abolitionist policy at a time when slavery was increasingly less
accepted socially and morally. How could it combine its two opposing interests, when U.S. use
of slaves was made so tremendously more lucrative because of England’s cotton-hungry
factories? This question loomed over the British government, unable to find a way of uniting its
political, moral, philanthropic, and social interests on the one hand, and its commercial and
economic on the other.
The independence of Texas brought this question to a head more urgently than before, for
independent Texas actively and overtly portrayed itself as a slave state. Slavery stood at the
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foundation of its existence and secession from Mexico. Like many new Spanish-American
countries, Mexico quickly worked on restricting slavery and finally abolished it in 1829. The
Texian secession thus symbolised an overt expansion of slavery and forced the British
government to take a stance and make a fateful decision: Should it, in the interest of morality and
commerce, assist Mexico in fighting Texian independence, or should it follow its growing
commercial interests in Texas and afford it recognition despite the presence of slavery? Or was
Texas perhaps an opportunity – an opportunity to cement British influence in North America by
using informal-imperialist measures to establish Texas as a rival of the United States, the latter of
which would be damaged economically, halted in its expansion, and threatened in its practice of
slavery, if the former could be turned into a cotton-producing, slave-free republic? This chapter
will analyse European responses to the slavery question in Texas and will argue that slavery was
one of, and, more than likely, the largest point of contestation between European powers and
Texas. Slavery prevented deeper commercial, social, and political ties between Europe and
Texas, and ultimately became the one subject which put informal imperialism in Texas to the
test: could European governments pressure Texas into ridding itself of slavery? In the 1830s and
1840s, Texas became the dominant North American battleground between European imperialism
and its U.S.-American counterpart, with slavery being the catalyst.
SLAVERY AND EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The morality of slavery, questioned emphatically in the late eighteenth century and
ultimately rejected, had lasting consequences on European imperialism. Slavery led to a major
political revolution in French Saint Domingue, a territory built on slave labour which
successfully revolted against French rule; it spurred U.S. imperialism and expansion, and almost
tore the nation apart in its bloodiest war; and the continued presence of slavery in Africa was one
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of the contributing factors to European justifications of their colonisation of ‘uncivilised’ Africa
toward the end of the nineteenth century. Many of the political, moral, philanthropic, and social
arguments that guided Western policy on slavery throughout the century were founded on French
Revolutionary and Enlightenment Era thought. Jeremy D. Popkins highlights how France’s
colonial empire shaped the French Revolution and its theoretical bearings, pointing out that
slavery was one of the gravest offences to the French cries for Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité and
that the slave insurrection in Saint Domingue pushed revolutionaries in Paris to embrace
emancipation.4 In front of the Convention of February 4, 1794, Louis-Pierre Dufay tied France’s
revolution and its ideals directly to French pride, honour, and dignity, by expressing his beliefs
that France needed to abolish slavery in order to fully fulfil the promises of liberty, and to allow
France to reassume her position amongst Europe’s Great Powers.5 This underlines that the issue
of slavery became a two-headed prong for Europeans after the French Revolution: on the one
hand, a rejection of slavery enabled European governments to occupy the moral high ground and
improved their political standing; on the other, the significance of the textile industry in the
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After the fall of the monarchy on August 10, 1792, the French revolutionaries were less certain about the stance
that France should take in regard to that dreaded institution. Should France not advocate for the end of slavery, led
under the banner of liberty and equality, and by doing so pose as an example for the rest of the world? The
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condemned the slave trade. See: Jeremy D Popkin, You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of
Slavery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 329-340
5 It is noticeable that the revolutionary leaders were unsure of how to proceed in the colonies, and that their
insecurity stemmed mainly from their need to define ideals of liberty and equality, and who they encompassed.
Dufay made his case for emancipation of slaves on a mostly political and rhetorical, not an economic, basis. He
couched his argument in enunciations of liberty and equality – the fairly standard considerations of the French
government at the time. But he also included another element, that of French national interest. See: Popkin, 358.
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aftermath of the Industrial Revolution made slavery economically more propitious and
rewarding.6
Napoleon reinstated slavery in France’s colonies in 1802. Nevertheless, the French
Revolutionary Wars and especially the subsequent Napoleonic Wars helped spread French
Revolutionary ideas to other European states, where Enlightenment thought had already
established itself.7 Wallerstein evaluates the importance of these ideological underbearings
cemented in Europe during the era of the French Revolution in regard to World-Systems
Analysis, arguing that ideology bound this world-system together in form of what he labels a
‘geoculture’: developed during the time frame of the French Revolution, this ideology revolves
around the belief in sovereignty of the people. The beliefs in equality, liberty, and fraternity did
not lead to the immediate abolition of slavery, as the final abolition of slavery in French colonies
did not occur until 1848 (1833 for English colonies). Moreover, Europe pursued a policy of
political restoration through the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 and thus reintroduced some
conservative principles. Nevertheless, French revolutionary and enlightenment thought
contributed to the arguments used by the opponents of slavery.8

6

Dufay had argued in the late 18th century that slavery was not economically efficient, suggesting that there no
economic factor to be considered in the matter. By the early 19 th century, cotton’s importance to European
commerce and prosperity really cemented itself, which augmented the prevalence of the above-mentioned paradox:
Europeans wanted to get rid of slavery at a time when it was becoming most economically advantageous.
7 Napoleon, despite the fact that he proclaimed himself emperor, brought back some of the customs of the ancien
regime, and reintroduced slavery in 1802 after emancipation had been decreed by the National Convention in
February 1794, enforced many revolutionary changes in French law, education, and society. Where Napoleon’s
empire spread, those revolutionary changes followed. The Code Civil gave renewed affirmation to the inviolability
of private property, the abolition of feudalism, as well as civil equality. Scholarships, technical schools and
improved secondary schools were made available to Frenchmen, and through his conquests of Spain, Germany, Italy
and other European regions, the French legacy from 1789 spread across the European continent. See: Rafe Blaufarb,
Napoleon: Symbol for an Age. A Brief History with Documents (New York: Bedford, 2008), 11-16.
8 Slavery in the British colonies was impacted by the French Revolution in several ways, and not all of them were of
a purely ideological nature. Michael Duffy in “War, Revolution, and the Crisis of the British Empire” points out that
British officials were initially eager to acquire France’s lucrative Caribbean and West Indy islands, believing that
they would afford Britain “a degree of commercial prosperity beyond all calculation”. Yet the presence of slavery
there posed a logistic problem concerning British designs of annexation, for the emancipation of slaves in February
1794 by the National Convention raised fears among British statesmen that the French Caribbean Empire would no
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The French Revolution had not been the spark for British abolitionism. As John
Dinwiddy has argued, British evangelicalism had its own compunctions as regards slavery and
formed another element of abolitionist sentiment in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Dinwiddy does assert, however, that English religiosity and the Church of England
rose in importance during the French Revolutionary age.9 Moreover, Michael Duffy argues that
the French Revolutionary War and the impact of French ideals of abolitionism and emancipation
resulted in a disruption of the elements of British imperialism: “military strength, mutual
economic benefit and an opportunist game of divide and rule.”10 Duffy notes that Britain was
heavily confronted with French revolutionary ideals and their potential for eliciting insurrection
and disquietude in the Caribbean and West Indies.11 By the onset of the nineteenth century,
Britain was confronted with religious, strategic, ideological and ethical arguments against
slavery.
British compunction over slavery resulted in significant political and legal change within
the British Empire, impacting its global commerce, imperialism, and hegemonic understanding

longer be maintainable and manageable. Unrest among the slaves on these islands would strain the British navy, and
might not have been quellable in light of Britain’s engagement in a war with France beyond the American coastal
lines. Britons fretted the possibility that French revolutionary sentiment could spill from French-owned colonies to
theirs, and by 1795, British aspirations of taking over France’s predominantly slave-built empire had given way to
British desperations to hold on to their own. Slavery became thus a factor of severe unpredictability and potential
destructiveness in British colonies. See: Michael Duffy, “War, Revolution and the Crisis of the British Empire,” in
The French Revolution and British Popular Politics, ed. Mark Philip (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 118-120.
9 John Dinwiddy, “Interpretations of Anti-Jacobinism,” in ed. Philip, 38-49.
10 Duffy, 120.
11 One such example is Grenada, where Catholic French planters and francophone mulattoes protested British
restrictions of their rights (a decision that had been made in anticipation of unrest among slaves yet led to discontent
among the more elitist planters and mulattoes), using revolutionary ideals to do so. See: Duffy, 130. This
confrontation with the French Revolution, which concerned itself domestically with British imperialism in the West
and East Indies, but also Ireland, and England itself, led British officials and intellectuals to define themselves
largely in contrast to the French. French liberty, portrayed by the British as tyrannical for it was marred by the
bloody struggles of the 1790s when thousand were guillotined, was contrasted starkly with British liberty built on
British institutions. Duffy, 11-116. Philip also addresses the debates between intellectuals in Britain, some of whom
were Francophile reformers who regarded the French Revolution as a bearer of universal liberty, and others who
were loyalists who rejected the excesses of the French and referred instead to British liberty. See: Philip, “The
Fragmented Ideology of Reform,” in ed. Philip, 52.
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of itself. In the early 19th century, the British public founded anti-slavery societies, and
newspapers condemning slavery, such as the Anti-Slavery Reporter. The abolitionist movement
in Great Britain gained such momentum that it resulted in multiple pieces of legislation being
passed that limited the expansion of slavery in the British Empire, beginning with the Slave
Trade Act of 1807, which banned the international slave trade, and culminating in the Slavery
Abolition Act of 1833.12 With slavery banned in the British Empire, most British abolitionists redirected their focus, and, strengthened by their success, decided to encompass in their movement
an international facet with the goal of ending slavery world-wide.13 One of the first steps taken
was to target slave trafficking, which encompassed British excursions into African coastal
regions. The Ashanti Empire, a dominant force in the African Gold Coast region, had defended
some of their territorial claims against the British in 1824 and signed a boundary treaty with the
British Empire in 1831. In order to impel the Ashanti to quit partaking in the slave trade and
slavery, the British offered to educate the son and nephew of the Ashanti King in London in
1836, which the Morning Post hoped would lead to the spread of enlightened and humanitarian
thought to the Ashanti Empire.14 The British Empire’s efforts against slavery during this time
frame did not concentrate primarily on Africa, however: rather, they focussed on other European
powers.
THE BRITISH SLAVE-TRADE TREATIES AS A TOOL OF BRITISH POWER
One way by which the British hoped to curb slavery’s expansion and in fact exact its
retreat was by use of anti-slavery treaties with several nations around the globe, beginning with

Bartholomew Close, “State of Law and Manners in Jamaica Illustrated” in The Anti-Slavery Reporter, No. 81,
Volume iv, No. 9 (June 1, 1831), 2, and “Texas – The Prospect of Annexation”, The Anti-Slavery Reporter, No. 34,
Volume ix, No. 6. (London: April, 1845) 7-8.
13 Close, 2-5.
14 Journal des Débats, Politiques et Littéraires, September 5, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico,
Vol. VIII, l. 491-492.
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other European states. In 1818, the British government ratified a treaty with the Spanish which
foresaw the abolition of the slave trade within the entirety of the Spanish Empire. For this, the
British government even paid 400,000 pound sterling (over forty million U.S. dollars in 2019
currency) to the Spanish Crown so that it may compensate those Spanish subjects who had been
engaged in the trade slave and either had incurred losses due to British capturing of vessels prior
to the ratification of the treaty, or were expected to incur them in the future as a result of the
cessation of the slave trade.15 The British also initiated treaties with other states, such as Portugal
and the Netherlands. The treaty with Portugal looked very similar to that with Spain: Britain
demanded an end to the international slave trade within a very short period of time, stating that
those engaged in the trade would be given “six months after the date of (ratification) for the
completion of enterprises already commenced.” Portugal received 300,000 pound sterling
(around thirty million U.S. dollars in 2019) for losses suffered at the hands of British vessels that
had seized Portuguese ships transporting slaves during the Napoleonic Wars, and in exchange for
the ratification of the treaty, Portugal also received a British loan over 600,000 pound sterling.16
The British government also established six Mixed Commission Courts with Portuguese,
Spanish, and Dutch representation (those nations which had been heavily engaged in the slave
trade and with which Britain had signed treaties) in Brazil, Cuba, Suriname, and three courts in
Sierra Leone.17
Britain’s remarkable ability to impel other European empires to cease their engagement
in the international slave trade in such an astonishingly short period of time was coupled to
Britain’s newly acquired status as the world’s hegemonic power after the defeat of Napoleonic
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France in 1815, which rang in the onset of a century of relative peace in Europe (although not
necessarily overseas) under the banner of Pax Britannica. The fact that many of these treaties,
which enabled the British to search and seize foreign vessels, gave the British significant power
did not go unnoticed by European states: the Prussian government, for instance, rejected an
Anglo-Prussian treaty for the abolition of the slave trade, and refused to sign or accede to the
Franco-British treaty on the same subject matter. As Prussian representative Ancillon noted,
Prussia feared that Britain would use such a treaty as an excuse to unjustly seize and search
Prussian ships. This fear, said Ancillon, existed within the Prussian government mostly because
Prussia engaged but little in trade with those involved in the slave trade, and with the Maritime
Company and the Company of Eberfeldt, the two predominant maritime endeavours of Prussia,
under government control, there should have existed little reason for the British to desire a slave
trade treaty with Prussia – unless, of course, the British merely held the ulterior motive of
gaining the right to search Prussian commercial vessels for British commercial benefit.18 Hans
Count von Königsmarck, Prussian agent in the Hague, underlined in an 1849 letter to his
government that the British government’s behest had motivated the Dutch King to incorporate
the earlier agreements between the two countries regarding the slave trade within the Dutch
statute book, a move that the English had desired in order to pressure France on the slave trade
matter and its unwillingness to engage in further agreements with Britain. “Dutch compliance”,
according to von Königsmarck, could pose as a “recommendable example for France”.19
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The might that Britain could achieve through the slave-trade treaties was indeed utilised
in full by the British, to the extent that the Portuguese government sent a circular note to the
European courts with the object of complaining against British policies that had arisen in
response to Anglo-Portuguese slave agreements in 1839.20 These policies Portugal described as
“unprovoked, oppressive, and unjust”; an attack upon that independent nation. This showcases
how interlaced slavery, slavery-related agreements and treaties, power, and imperialism were
during the first half of the nineteenth century. In response to the Portuguese note, British
Viscount and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Henry Palmerston, likewise wrote letters to
the European courts, justifying British action by attaching the negotiations and agreements
concluded between Portugal and England. Palmerston asked the European representatives,
including Prussian Baron Werther, chargé d’affaires of the King of Prussia in London, “to refer
to those negotiations for proofs, showing how entirely groundless and false are all the assertions
made by the Government of Portugal”. Britain used the Portuguese note to portray itself in a
favourable light and enhance its political prestige. Palmerston spoke of British “forbearance” and
goodwill towards a Portugal guilty of “bad faith” and “breach of engagement”.21 What made the
elimination of slavery such a compelling foreign policy issue was that, due to political and
philanthropic currents extant in the entire Western world at the time, Britain was able to occupy
both the moral high ground and intervene in other states’ affairs at the same time.
In a copy of papers relating to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty from the Regency era, this
potent combination is clearly identifiable in the language used by Palmerston in addressing
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Portuguese Baron de Moncorvo, chargé d’affaires in London: given that the slave trade “has long
been denounced as criminal by all the Nations of Europe”, Britain thought that it was “entitled to
claim the co-operation of Portugal” on the matter, and, given the horrors of the trade and the
British belief in Portugal’s morality, ethics, and humanity, it did not “permit (itself) the doubt,
that such co-operation will be obtained”. A stance against such agreements with Britain could
easily give the rejecting nation a negative image; an image of a state in favour of trafficking
humans and perpetrating slavery, which could sway public opinion in several European countries
against that party which had opted against this treaty. Because of its moral superiority and
sagacity, Britain also reserved the right to steer Portuguese slave trafficking even if Portugal
were to turn down the British effort for a treaty: “in case the Sovereign of Portugal ‘should
persist in allowing his subjects to prosecute the traffic, (…) His (British) Majesty had an
undoubted right to require, that their commercial operations should be confined to their usual
haunts, and should not be extended to the tracts of coast, which His Majesty had determined to
abandon and to leave to the undisturbed possession of its native inhabitants.’”22 British
politicians expected that other European powers follow their country’s lead and leave alone those
regions Britain had declared as abandoned by Europeans and as being in the possession of the
natives. Such examples emphasise the interplay of political-imperial influence and moral
rectitude regarding slavery. Abolitionism played a role in cementing British hegemony.
The prestige that Britain was afforded through its abolitionist activism was identified as
somewhat unique to that country by British politicians, who took pride in the fact that their
country was ‘the first’ to initiate many of the milestones that would eventually lead to the end of
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slavery. Britons regarded it as important that their country maintain this status as the trailblazer
and vanguard of abolitionist policy, for it gave Britain moral credence, clout, and influence. In a
Parliamentary paper from July 6, 1837, Colonel Thompson noted that he had had, in January of
1820, the “honour of negotiating, under the orders of Sir William Keir Grant in the Persian Gulf,
the first treaty or public act in which the slave-trade was written down by its proper name of
piracy”. He pointed out that North America had likewise made such a treaty in the same year, but
was quick to emphasise that, despite frequent perception to the contrary, this treaty had followed
England’s treaty rather than vice versa. The U.S. treaty, spoke Thompson, had taken place in
May, which meant that “the British was actually the prior” – it was only for “the difference in the
modes of communication” that “the American act was known in England first”. Thompson
highlighted that he wanted to make British politicians aware of this fact, which would remind the
British government of its significance in the struggle against slavery, and might motivate the
government to take more urgent steps in substantial affairs related to slavery: “above all things”,
Thompson stated, his remark was supposed to aid the government so as “not to expose
themselves to the charge of stopping the small flies in their net, and letting the great ones
through”.23
Britain continued to assume its position as the world’s dominant abolitionist force even
after the demise of the Portuguese and Spanish empires in the Americas and entered treaties with
Latin America’s new nations. Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela are just three Latin American
nations that signed treaties with Britain with the objective of banning the slave trade.24

“Treaties for the Abolition of Slavery”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, July 6, 1837, Collection: 19 th
Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 38, 1822-1835, cc. 1822-1831.
Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlipapers-proquestcom.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0038p0-0053?accountid=7121.
24 Most Latin American nations had already banned slavery prior to that during or after their revolutions against
Spanish rule.
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Sometimes, the British even used coercion to accomplish their goal, such as in Brazil in the
1840s.25 In a Parliamentary session in 1838, Harry C. W. Verney supported the idea that Britain
ought apply “nothing short of the punishment of piracy for those engaged in the horrid traffic in
slaves,” emphasising a British willingness to intervene against slavery on an international scale.
Verney highlighted the Brazilian slave trade as contemptible, declaring that “there were no fewer
than seventeen slave-ships, fully laden, entered for clearing in the port of Rio Janeiro in the last
month of 1837”. “These things”, said Verney, “should not be allowed to pass unnoticed, neither
should the present opportunity be suffered to elapse without a further effort to suppress the
diabolical traffic”. The potency that such British intervention in the affairs of other countries was
able to establish due to its foundation on arguments against slavery was also underlined by the
parliamentary paper’s summary of Verney’s views: “Whatever might be the issue, he trusted,
that the Government would not shrink from enforcing the treaties entered into on the subject,
even by war if necessary; and he was quite sure, that however strong the course they might take,
they would have the cordial concurrence of the public”.26 Abolitionism was a moral as well as an
imperial tool that strengthened the British Empire by unifying its political and public opinions on
this matter. As Verney remarked: “It was a singular fact, and one which he hoped the
Government would be able to explain, that those States over which England exercised most
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There, slavery was still incredibly prevalent, and the relatively bloodless revolution of the 1820s which had left a
king in charge and an empire in place had done little to change the social structure. Brazil’s elites continued to rely
heavily on slave labour, but when foreign recognition was sought, Britain refused to open diplomatic relations with
Brazil until the latter agreed to signing an anti-slave trade treaty in 1826. When Brazilian elites continued to resist
the treaty and ignored its provisions, in the 1840s, the British navy seized Brazilian vessels that carried slaves. See:
L. M. Bethell, “Britain, Portugal and the Suppression of the Brazilian Slave Trade: The Origins of Lord Palmerston's
Act of 1839,” The English Historical Review, 80, No. 317 (1965), 761-84.
26 “Foreign Slave Trade”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, May 10, 1838, Collection: 19 th Century House of
Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 42, 1080-1154, cc. 1122-1154. Accessed using ProQuest
BPP: https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0042p00021?accountid=7121.
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influence were those which were most active in the traffic”.27 In another meeting, Colonel
Thompson voiced something similar, asking “for what were we strong-why did we keep up a
large army, and why such a noble navy, if not for the purpose of upholding our own rights, and
causing the rights of others to be respected?”28 Informal imperialism could be justified so long as
the ground for intervention was the curbing of slavery; this justification stood to satisfy both
British politicians and the British public, and it occurred under a banner of selflessness, for
Britons liberated Africans whose rights Britain had gloriously taken it upon herself to defend.
Correspondence and negotiations with Mexico, which had abolished slavery years earlier,
were also opened in regard to a slave-trade treaty; this effort came to fruition in 1843. This treaty
emphasised that it was Britain’s desire to effect “the total extinction of the barbarous traffic in
slaves”, which other states – in this instance, Mexico – had the “sincere desire to co-operate”
with.29 Much like Portugal, Prussia, or Brazil, Mexican authorities feared the potential influence
the British navy could garner over Mexican vessels due to the article on the mutual right to
search and seizure in the event that slave trafficking be suspected. As a result, Mexico pushed for
the exclusion of its immediate coastal area in order to protect its coastal trade from possible
British intervention, a move in accordance with Mexico’s insistence on the inclusion of an article
in its treaties of amity and commerce with other states that specified that its coastal trade be
reserved for its own national vessels. The concern was that British vessels might circumvent this
article by use of the slave-trafficking treaty, which would give it an advantage vis-à-vis Mexico
and other commercial and imperial powers. Thus, the treaty specified that determined coastal

“Foreign Slave Trade”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, May 10, 1838.
“Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, March 9, 1837, Collection: 19 th Century House of Commons
Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 37, 159-207, cc. 191-202. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0037p0-0003?accountid=7121.
29 “Tratado para la abolición del tráfico de esclavos, celebrado entre la república mexicana y S. M. Británica”, June
13, 1843, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA, II, Nr. 5324: Slave Trade, 1.
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regions would be exempted, “with a view to avoid even the possibility of annoyance to the
coasting trade of Mexico from the exercise of the mutual right of search stipulated in the present
article”.30
Moreover, Mexican doubts led to the incorporation of another stipulation which Mexican
authorities hoped would protect their country from too much British influence: Article IX of the
treaty outlined items and scenarios that qualified as “reasonable” cause for the belief that a
certain vessel was engaged in slave trafficking. These included the presence of spare planks (to
build a second or slave deck), shackles, bolts, or handcuffs; a quantity of water much larger than
that which would commonly be found on a merchant vessel; a large quantity of mess tubs; and
an extraordinary quantity of certain foodstuff such as rice, flour, manioc, maize, or cassava.31
Mexico, subject to so much internal strife and desperate to quell the insurgencies extant in so
many places – rebellions had occurred in Zacatecas, Tampico, Yucatan, Tamaulipas, and several
other states between 1835 and 1845 – worried that this treaty with the British would hamper its
ability to transport troops or convicts by sea, thus impacting deeply the governmental ability to
regain and maintain order in the country. Because of this, the treaty included a clause stating
that, “to avoid even the possibility of prejudice resulting from the Ninth Article of the Treaty of
this date to the merchants vessels which the Mexican Government may have occasion to employ
in certain cases for the conveyance of troops by sea, or of convicts from one point of the
Republic to another, it is agreed to except from the operation of the said IX Article the merchants
vessels employed by the Mexican Government in such service”.32 Britain’s crusade for

“Tratado para la abolición del tráfico de esclavos, celebrado entre la república mexicana y S. M. Británica”, June
13, 1843, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA, II, Nr. 5324: Slave Trade, 2-3.
31 “Tratado para la abolición del tráfico de esclavos, celebrado entre la república mexicana y S. M. Británica”, June
13, 1843, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA, II, Nr. 5324: Slave Trade, 6-7.
32 “Tratado para la abolición del tráfico de esclavos, celebrado entre la república mexicana y S. M. Británica”, June
13, 1843, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA, II, Nr. 5324: Slave Trade, 8-9.
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abolitionism was thus identified by Mexico, already cautious regarding European intervention,
influence, and imperialism exercised through informal means, as another tool that the British
might use to pervade it more deeply.
The United States in particular became a thorn in the eyes of British slavery opponents,
who believed that their Anglo-Saxon cousins should follow their doctrine and banish the taking
of humans as property from their Southern plantations.33 British parliamentary member John
Bowring argued that, whereas Britain had made great strides toward the abolition of slavery, this
marking the one subject that Britons of “all parties and all sides of the House” could agree on,
progress on the matter could be facilitated if British abolitionism “spread to another great
nation”, the United States. Bowring referred to U.S. conduct as “distressing to her best friends”,
particularly because the United States was a nation founded under “republican auspices” that
were betrayed by the existence of slavery there. Especially the perpetration of the slave trade to
Texas was criticised by Bowring as problematic. Though Bowring acknowledged that English
pressure on the United States could only be limited, he hoped that the British government would
go as far as it could “with propriety” to communicate its feelings regarding slavery to the U.S.
government.34 The fact that such a large portion of British imports of cotton came from the
United States thus agitated British abolitionists, as well as the general British public, which,
constituting the main recipients of British textiles, pressured both the government as well as
British manufacturers to consider alternatives to U.S. cotton.
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William Kennedy, Texas: The Rise, Progress and Prospects of the Republic of Texas (London: R. Hastings,
1841), republished excerpt in The Athenaeum, May 22, 1841, No. 708, 23.
Bowring furthermore lamented that “not only did (the United States) make no difficulty in admitting to her union
new states in which slavery had long existed, but by her instrumentality slavery was forced into countries where it
had been wholly extirpated”. “Treaties for the Abolition of Slavery”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, July
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With the overwhelming majority of cotton coming from the U.S.-American South, where
the economy was built on the backs of African slaves, many Brits who opposed slavery argued
that the British Empire was essentially still a nation in favour of the heinous practice. Beckert
identifies the paradoxical relationship between British commercial interest in cotton and British
antipathy towards slavery, noting that emancipation in the British West Indies had contributed to
their decline as a cotton source for the British mainland.35 Nevertheless, he also showcases that
slavery became a commercial liability due to its volatile nature and unpredictability, which led
most Britons to ultimately favour the abolition of slavery in the United States. Slave rebellions
could cause unrest in the U.S. South and break supply chains, continental Europeans were
increasingly competing with Britain for U.S. cotton, and a dependence on U.S. cotton decreased
the effectiveness of the core-periphery relationship between British manufacturers and U.S.
cotton growers. Therefore, Britons increasingly saw an abolition of slavery in the United States
and the seeking of alternative cotton sources as compatible with British commercial interests.36
SLAVERY IN TEXAS: A NEW SLAVE STATE
As soon as British Parliament discussed Texas, slavery became a primary issue. In the
1836 parliamentary sessions discussed last chapter, members Barlow Hoy, Henry George Ward,
and Fowell Buxton all expressed their disfavour for the independence of Texas on the grounds
that this would lead to a promotion of the slave trade and slavery that would not occur with
Texas under Mexican rule.37 Hoy expressed this reservation even though the United States had
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Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 96.
Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 121-123.
37 Hoy observed that Mexico, if it could keep Texas, would be very likely to arrest the slave trade in that territory,
given that Mexican laws prohibited it, whereas the prevailing of the Texians would lead to the state’s annexation to
the United States and hence the spread of slavery. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday,
August 5, 1836, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 35,
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also banned the international slave trade in 1808. He, together with other parliamentary
members, believed that the Texian Revolution had only been a fight for slavery, not for liberty.38
Subsequent debates continued to regard the Republic of Texas and its likely annexation to the
United States in the event that Mexico did not reconquer it as a huge setback for British plans of
abolitionism.39 Henry George Ward also raised the House’s awareness concerning the delicate
balance of slave and free states within the United States, which would be thrown off balance if

prohibition, Mexican troops were sent to Texas in 1830. The main objective of this action was the suspension of
contraband trade, including that in slaves. The small number of troops did not make a large impact on the Texians
coming from Southern U.S. states. The Constitution of 1824 forbade the continuation of slavery by birth, i.e. no
person born in Mexico after 1824 should be born a slave or introduced into Mexico as a slave, and slavery was
officially abolished in Mexico. State Coahuila y Tejas had an additional article in its 1827 constitution which
reaffirmed the federal constitutional tenets. In 1829, President Guerrero issued a decree abolishing slavery in all of
Mexico, effective immediately. When Texians sought to circumvent such legal restrictions by labelling their slaves
as ‘apprentices’ officially and by keeping them as indentures servants for ninety-nine-year contracts, the Mexican
State Legislature passed a law forbidding contracts for periods over ten years. This was a direct response to the
Texian resistance to Mexico’s abolitionist stance on slavery. Children of ‘apprentices’ should moreover be freed
from this state (de facto, slavery) by the age of fourteen. See: Benjamin Lundy, The War in Texas: a review of facts
and circumstances, showing that this contest is a crusade against Mexico, set on foot and supported by slaveholders,
land-speculators, &c. in order to re-establish, extend, and perpetuate the system of slavery and the slave trade in the
republic of Mexico (Philadelphia: Merrihew and Gunn, 1837), 10.
38 The step of annexation, if it occurred, would surely be taken by Texians and U.S.-Americans to “establish
slavery, and the slave-trade, permanently, in that province”. The war fought by the Texians, Hoy asserted, was “not
for independence, not for liberty, but positively for slavery”. He was joined in this belief by Buxton, who asserted
that the Texian-Mexican war’s main purpose was, on the Anglo-American side, the expansion of slavery. “If the
British Government did not interfere to prevent the Texian territory from falling into the hands of American slaveholders”, he warned, “in all probability a greater traffic in slaves would be carried on during the next fifty years than
had ever before existed”.
39 The issue of slavery dominated the Parliamentary debate so enormously that one Colonel Thompson felt it
necessary to remark that “the political importance of the subject (of Texas) had been a good deal lost sight of in the
stress which was laid upon the question of the slave trade”, demonstrating that the presence of slavery in Texas
overshadowed all other British considerations. Indeed, Hoy had already raised concerns regarding the presence of
slavery in a meeting on June 30, 1836, and in subsequent discussions in Parliament, slavery continued being a
primary issue. On March 9, 1837, slavery in Texas was considered at length. In 1838, the Texas Question arose
again in relation to slavery, when Verney addressed Parliament, claiming that “the annexation of Texas to the United
States of North America would be a death-blow to the abolition of slavery, if some strong measures were not taken
to neutralize the evil consequences certain to accrue from it to the hapless negroes”. See: “Foreign Slave Trade”,
House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, May 10, 1838. Though slavery was a major topic for debate, other points
were brought up, like British financial and commercial interest in Mexico. A Parliamentary member named
Molesworth also connected the Texas Question to the Canada Question in several meetings, interrogating whether
parallels could be drawn between both territories that could impact British policy-line in Canada. See, ex: “Affairs
of Canada”, House of Commons Sitting of Monday, March 6, 1837, Collection: 19 th Century House of Commons
Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 36, 1280-1364, cc. 1287-1362. Accessed using ProQuest BPP:
https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0036p0-0023?accountid=7121.
Many of these excerpts dovetailed and ultimately led back to the discussion of the slavery question, however.
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Texas were annexed and possibly result in an even more expansionist imperial rival to Britain;
one that would spread slavery across the continent.40
Hoy also pointed toward Britain’s right to interfere in the Texian struggle in support of
Mexico, for Britain had already spent a lot of monetary resources on crushing the slave trade:
“after the enormous sums expended in abolishing and putting down slavery”, he stated, “it would
render the whole of that expenditure useless, and allow slavery to take deep root in situations
with respect to which this country, had both the power and right to interfere in suppressing it”.
The costs of the described endeavour were listed by Hoy:
The expense of the establishment at Sierra Leone was annually 40,795l..-the support of
captured slaves 25,000l.-the expense of the Commissioners, 16,000l.-the expenses of
twelve vessels stationed off the coast of Africa, 60,000l. and for eight or ten vessels in
South America and the West Indies, 25,000l. more. These expenses were annual, and still
continuing charges upon the country. The several items amounted to 166,000l. If to these
payments was added the interest upon the 20,000,000l. given to the West-Indies, with the
grants to Spain and Portugal, and the head-money formerly paid to the navy, to the
amount of 484,000l. per annum, the whole annual expenditure of this country for the
suppression of the slave trade was about 1,100,000l., calculating the interest at about 3½
per cent.41
This highlights that slavery was deeply intertwined with the imperial and commercial currents of
the era. Britain had invested a lot of money into its humanitarian effort of suppressing slavery,
but this humanitarianism dovetailed with the continued strengthening of the British navy, one of
the main cornerstones of British imperialism and commerce, as well as the slave-trade treaties
completed between Britain and other countries, which were used to establish Britain as a
hegemon through moral, not just military and economic, superiority.

“The result of the annexation of the province of Texas would be the creation of nine additional slaveholding
States,” Ward argued, “with eighteen Representatives in the Congress at Washington; and that circumstance would
put an end to all hopes of doing away with a system which formed the most degrading feature in the whole frame of
the United States”.
41 “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.
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U.S.-American abolitionists shared Hoy’s and Buxton’s view that the war in Texas had
been one solely for slavery. The title of one of Benjamin Lundy’s works aptly summarises his
stance on the issue: The war in Texas : a review of facts and circumstances, showing that this
contest is the result of a long premeditated crusade against the government, set on foot by
slaveholders, land speculators, &c. : with the view of re-establishing, extending, and
perpetuating the system of slavery and the slave trade in the republic of Mexico, first published
in 1836, addressed many of the concerns that had been raised in British Parliament. Much like
Ward, Lundy pointed out that the U.S. government found itself in a state of being torn between
pro- and anti-slavery constituents. 42 With Texas added to the Union, the entire United States
would find itself “completely under the influence of the slave-holding interest”.43 U.S. interests
in Texas had from early on been intertwined with Southern slavery, which shaped the U.S.American response to the Texian revolt: Lundy lamented that U.S. citizens, much like some
Britons also suspected, were engaged in aiding the rebellious Texians, through arms and
manpower.
Interestingly, he also regarded the Texian revolt as an imperial, not merely a
philanthropic affair: in speaking of the newly-independent Texian state, established by
slaveholders who had resisted Mexican authority primarily due to the slavery question, Lundy
referred to a ‘Texian Empire’, underlining the connection between imperialism and slavery in the

Lundy, 3. The Executive, he argued, had already chosen a side of the debate: “The Slaveholding Interest is now
paramount in the Executive branch of our national government; and its influence operates, indirectly, yet
powerfully, through that medium, in favour of this Grand Scheme of Oppression and Tyrannical Usurpation”, he
wrote. It remained to be seen whether the Legislature would join the Executive or choose a different path, one that
Lundy associated with the true and fundamental characteristics of U.S.-American government and described as
being built upon universal liberty and free republican institutions.
43 Lundy, 24-25. Southerners had vied for Texas for over a decade by 1836, hoping to gain a commercial as well as
a political advantage from its addition to the Union: slave states, a writer calling himself Americanus noted, would
gain the majority in Congress, and Judge Upshur of Virginia asserted that prices for slaves would rise as much as
fifty percent, benefitting the slaveholders of his state.
42
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first half of the nineteenth century. This empire of slavery would seek to expand farther into
Mexico, entirely contrary to the ideals of humanity and liberty.44 Indeed, Lundy shared several
newspaper excerpts written by other abolitionist authors, all of which emphasised that Texas, an
immense territory, would lead to a significant spread of slavery on the North American
continent. If annexed to the Union, Texas might, due to its size and continued territorial claims
against Mexico, be annexed in the form of several slave states. Some authors feared that this
number would be as high as five, six, or even nine additional slave states, turning the United
States into one of the most powerful nations in support of such a heinous and morally corrupt
practice.45
Reference was also made to Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri, whom Lundy
viewed as morally wicked due to his open and limitless support of and advocacy for slavery.
Benton’s arguments as laid out by Lundy showcase a deep and pervasive link between empire
and slavery in North America: Benton asserted that the “United States once had a rightful claim
to the province of Texas, by virtue of the Louisiana purchase; but that (…) it was lost through
the influence of the non-slaveholding interest in Congress.” “This being his view”, stated Lundy,
“he now calculates that the SLAVEITE PARTY is strong enough to reverse the existing state of
things, and open a new world, as it were, for the employment of slave-labor, like the colonial
projectors have generally done before him, since the discovery of the American continent by the
Europeans”. This commentary underlines that the expansion of slavery was seen by U.S.
politicians, both advocates and opponents of the practice, as an inherently imperial and even
overtly colonial act, comparable to the imperialism of the first European trans-Atlantic empires.
Benton promoted the idea of a change to this U.S.-American version of imperialism: rather than
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relying on trans-Atlantic connections like Europeans had done and were still doing in the
nineteenth century, when they continued to draw their raw materials from peripheral American
(and also other, such as Asian) states, Benton suggested that the United States “convert the
whole extent of the country, where slave labor is unprofitable, and where provisions are cheap,
into an immense nursery for slaves, and by this means people those more southern region with a
race of serviles (…) at least twice as fast as it could be done by the foreign importation alone.”46
Lundy also republished in his treatise the entirety of John Quincy Adams’ speech on
Texian independence to the U.S. Congress. This speech, given in May of 1836 was referenced in
the correspondence of the English, Prussians, and French, as well as in several newspapers,
showcasing its influence and political weight.47 Adams urged Congress to consider the injustice
of the Texian rebellion against Mexico, recommending that the United States not support the
revolution which he viewed as a Mexican civil war. The war fought by the Texians, stated
Adams, was undeniably one for slavery, in which the United States was urged to intervene by
slaveholders. Adams tied the colonial push of Anglo-Americans into Mexican Texas to slavery,
referring to it as an “overture, offensive in itself”, with the purpose of re-establishing “slavery
where it was abolished”. This was a war of conquest, a war of a nation which possessed “already
over-distended dominions”, much like an empire. As a result, Adams noted, the United States
would face imperial resistance: “Neither Great Britain nor France will suffer you to make such a
conquest from Mexico”, he declared to Congress. Britain, having spent “one hundred millions

46 Lundy, 28. This Bentonian idea is remarkably similar to British concerns for a cotton supply in that both Benton
and British officials sought to break their dependence on one particular source for a good needed – in Britain’s case,
this was cotton, which it desired to obtain from somewhere outside of the United States so as to prevent its feeding
into a system continuously more dominated by the latter country. In Benton’s case, these were slaves, which he
hoped to breed in a territorially large United States that would no longer need to rely on slaves from Africa, a traffic
dominated by the British hegemon desirous of arresting and eliminating the trade. Slavery was a central component
of the imperial showdown and economic competition in North America during the 1830s and 1840s.
47 It’s also been considered in secondary literature, as well. See, for example: James Oakes, The Scorpion’s Sting:
Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), footnote 67.
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dollars” on the abolition of slavery, would not accept such an extension of U.S. imperialism; it
would defend the tenets of Pax Britannica, and the United States would face war with the
hegemon of the era.48
Adams continued: A long coastline on the Gulf of Mexico would break the Union’s back
in its interaction with Europe. Great Britain, France, even Russia would seek to contest U.S.American claims and establish colonial projects that the United States lacked the means to
prevent. Such a coastline, though Southerners and war-hawks may think that U.S. power would
rise with it, would place the United States into an imperial position that she could not maintain,
and the imperial conflict with Britain that it would elicit would be one that it would be no match
for: “She, by her naval power, and by her American colonies, holds the keys to the gulf of
Mexico”, Adams announced of Britain. Even reasons for earlier territorial boundary settlements
could be found in imperialism: because the United States had not been able to defend its claims
against British might, U.S. politicians compromised to the extent that their country’s political
and military strength allowed. Moreover, since the imperial incentive of slavery had not existed
in the same measure, U.S. justifications and ambitions for a claim to more territory in the Southeastern and South-western part of the continent had been thinner during President Monroe’s
times. Slavery had, however, fired such imperialist and expansionist motivations that an
annexation of Texas was likely, for geopolitical and -strategic reasons moreover, to be followed
by the conquest of Cuba. This would be ruinous for the United States, Adams asserted: Spain,
too weak after having lost her continental colonies, would need to entrust Cuba’s naval
protection in someone else’s hands. “Suppose that naval power should be Britain”, Adams
surmised. “There is Cuba at your very door; and if you spread yourself along a naked coast, from
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the Sabine to the Rio Bravo, what will be your relative position towards Great Britain, with not
only Jamaica, but Cuba, and Porto Rico in her hands, and abolition for the motto to her union
cross of St. George and St. Andrew?” From the very onset of Texian independence, slavery was
the powder keg that threatened to set the imperial landscape of North America alight.49
Indeed, slavery became one of the largest points of contestation between the United
States and Britain. Many of the negative comments on their U.S.-American rival were voiced by
Britons in connection to slavery, namely Britain’s rejection and North America’s lowly, ignoble
perpetration and cultivation thereof.50 In the instance of O’Connell’s discussion of slavery in
front of Parliament in 1837 and his comparison between a noble, just Britain and a morally
impoverished, treacherous United States, some parliamentary representatives even made talk of
war. Though this idea was dismissed in favour of more diplomatic means, it nevertheless
showcases that slavery and morality became tied to the struggle between the two most significant
imperial rivals in the region, the United States and Britain. Parliamentary member Lushington
voiced his resignation that the United States would not be an ally to Britain in the strive for the
abolition of slavery. Rather, Lushington did not hold the United States in high regard in that
aspect: The President of the republic, he claimed, held views on the matter “characterised by the
most cold, calculating, and unfeeling spirit, which declared that neither he nor the people of the
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In 1837, parliamentary member O’Connell asserted that behind the Texian revolt stood the interest of U.S.
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such a crime except the high-spirited North American republic”. He contrasted the ideals upon which the United
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United States would be moved by any considerations of moral right or human happiness”. U.S.
motivations were, according to Lushington, economic.51 This showcases once more that British
and U.S.-American interests clashed on several fronts in Texas: commercial competition and
cotton production played a deep role in how officials and diplomats viewed slavery from both
sides of the Atlantic.
Neither France nor the German states remained unaffected by this contestation over
slavery. As the discussions on French Revolutionary thought and the English treaties and
negotiations with France and Prussia have shown, abolitionism was a fundamental subject for
European powers throughout the nineteenth century. This shaped Continental European views on
Texian independence, also. In 1836, Prussian representative Friedrich von Gerolt criticised the
rebellion of Texas, identifying it as a Southern U.S.-American move to strengthen their influence
in the Union and pursue the expansion of slavery. Von Gerolt wrote to his government that U.S.American speculator interest in Texas combined with that of the slave-states, who “regarded the
annexation or independence of Texas and the introduction of slave trafficking, already
introduced by the colonists, as the safest means by which to, in unison with this new state, put up
heavy resistance to the great opposition which exists in the northern states of North America
against the maintenance of slavery”.52 Similar views were also expressed by the French Journal
des Debats and the New York Advertiser.53 Like many of his contemporaries, von Gerolt’s report
was heavily influenced by John Quincy Adams’ speech. Another source consulted by von Gerolt
were English newspapers, who had likewise republished Adam’s speech. Von Gerolt, like many
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of his European contemporaries, regarded the “protection and expansion of slavery” as an
offence to humanity and argued that “the principles, acknowledged by all civilised nations, are
threatened and hurt” through the independence of Texas as a slave-state.54 The Journal des
Débats shared this stance, asserting that the Texians “violate the principles most sacred to
humanity; because they propagate slavery in vast regions where no necessity calls for its
existence”.55
This humanitarian and philanthropic sentiment was, much as in the case of Britain, joined
by commercial interests. The Journal des Débats lamented that European states were too caught
up in affairs on the European continent to turn their full attention to the events in North America
– a mistake, the newspaper judged, because North America was, particularly due to the United
States, a continent where the progress in the means of transport and industry approached more
and more those of Europe. The advancement of the United States, and its cultivation of the
landscape under its possession – Texas would be no different – included the transformation of
forests into cotton fields, but this admirable progress occurred under the most despicable
circumstances: not only had U.S.-American colonists disobeyed Mexican laws, they had done so
regarding the most odious practice of slavery.56 An 1838 French governmental report argued that
the southern U.S. states had a vested interest in the annexation of Texas because, beyond
improving their chances of resisting northern U.S.-American abolitionism, this annexation would
also eliminate an economic rival in the raw material trade.57 Another Prussian politician situated
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in Berlin informed his government in 1838 of the possible colonisation of Germans in northern
Mexico, which would benefit the German settlers, located in one of Mexico’s best agricultural
regions, as well as Mexico, which would have a bulwark of Germans to resist U.S.-American
encroachment into its territory. These Anglo settlers the Prussian observer did not hold in high
regard, for he saw them as Southern U.S.-Americans who had disrespected Mexico’s
humanitarian abolition of slavery and already broken off part of the country’s territory in the
form of Texas. Rather than having Germans settle in the United States, which promoted the
economic strengthening of that country and further enabled its southern states to pursue
expansionist policies into Mexico and spread slavery there, Prussia should promote settlement in
Mexico, which would provide larger commercial and economic benefits to the German settlers,
the German Confederation, and Mexico.58
Though Europeans nearly universally condemned the existence of slavery in Texas,
leading them to deplore the independence of said state, seen as an extension of the interest of the
U.S. South, the resignation that Mexico would not be able to reconquer Texas changed Europe’s
policy toward Texas. Part of this policy change has already been discussed in chapter two
focussing on commerce. Europeans came to the conclusion that an independent Texas did not
pose a significant problem to their commercial interests in Mexico; this had been the largest
economic concern and objection to the recognition of Texas prior to the late 1830s and early
1840s. But how then, and why, did European policy shift in regard to slavery, which Europe
condemned and Texas seemed unwilling to rid itself of? Overall, slavery remained a large
obstacle to better relations with Texas for European states throughout the former’s independence.
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However, given that Texas was not a strong and established country like the United States,
which had resisted European and particularly British military and economic might in instances
such as the War of 1812, Europeans, above all the British, theorised that Texas could be
persuaded to get rid of slavery through informal-imperialist means: economic, political, military,
and social pressure all seemed viable options in the battle against slavery. In fact, some Britons
believed that Texas provided Britain with an excellent opportunity: if Britain succeeded in
obtaining the Texian acquiescence to the abolition of slavery, it would establish that country
more firmly as an influential imperial power on the North American continent, especially vis-àvis the United States, whose cotton-slavery empire might stumble and falter underneath the
increased international and intranational moral and economic pressures.
Whereas the last chapter has shown that scholars like Adams and Roeckell have
expressed doubt regarding the influence of peripheral agents in Texas on statesmen in London,
the discussions on slavery in Texas suggest otherwise. Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston,
though more willing to adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude on Texian independence, did acknowledge
in front of the House of Commons that slavery was a great evil and that particularly the slave
trade ought not to be extended to Texas. In discussing slavery and the British stance thereto,
Palmerston emphasised the importance of Britain’s diplomatic and imperial network: in order to
gage the current state of slavery, the “correspondence between the Government at home and its
agents abroad” was evaluated by British Parliament “with regard to the progress or diminution of
the trade in slaves”. British statesmen in the periphery were crucial for the operation of the
government in the core, a relationship that encompassed the British policy on slavery, also.59
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These peripheral agents – British merchants, travellers, consuls, and diplomats –
frequently expressed optimism regarding Britain’s ability to interfere in Texas with the goal of
abolishing slavery. Crawford seemed confident that Texian representatives would be willing to
curb slavery in their country, writing to Pakenham that General Houston had called upon Great
Britain to aid Texas’ navy in controlling slave trafficking with the goal of ending the trade.60
Crawford argued that this sign of goodwill signified that the people of Texas would be open and
willing to exterminate slavery in its entirety within the Texian republic, so long as Britain acted
fast, before more slaves from the United States were introduced.61 Joseph Hamilton also sought
to alleviate British reservations concerning slavery by suggesting in 1840 that informal influence
on behalf of Britain ought to be capable of eradicating slavery from Texas within a few years:
Joseph Hamilton argued that Texians were “well aware” of the advantages of direct trade with
Europe, and that they would be willing to “make a sacrifice to obtain commercial Intercourse
with the rest of the World.” Moreover, he believed that slavery in Texas was “a Condition, which
might be remedied by Treaty with some influential Nation,” showcasing that the British tied
trade, slavery, and influence together in a net of connections centring around informal imperialist
strategies.62 Briton Francis Sheridan viewed this situation similarly, arguing that Britain could
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employ several informal imperial measures in order to promote the abolition of slavery in Texas:
One, once Texas was recognised and more Britons emigrated there, the presence of free labour
would make slavery, currently in use in Texas because of a labour shortage, redundant. Two,
Texas’ need for British recognition, which Sheridan surmised elicited a sheer desperation within
the Texan government, would allow “England almost, to make her own terms upon every, even
the Slave question”. Britain would be able to “insist upon the severest restrictions and penalties
being imposed at once on the introduction of Slaves” and would possibly even be able to
“appoint their own Agent to superintend and see that these penalties were inflicted”.63
James Hook’s report to Palmerston in April 1841 reinforced these ideas, and also
suggested that the eradication of slavery in Texas through British influence could facilitate the
attack on slavery in the United States. “I firmly believe,” Hook wrote, “that Slavery may be
forthwith abolished in Texas, which…would prove a powerful engine in the hands of
Abolitionists towards extinguishing that moral pest in the United States.”64 Hook argued that he
believed that the abolition of slavery would bring the “death blow” to slavery in the Americas,
because “by example and sympathy,” abolition in Texas would make severe waves in the
Slavery question within the United States.65 In 1841, Hook considered the conditions for the
abolition of slavery in Texas to be “peculiarly favourable”, and actively suggested that British
pressure in Texas could damage slavery in the entirety of North America, highlighting that “Her
Majesty’s Ministers have now an opportunity of inflicting a Mortal wound on the giant slavery
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existing in the United States, by simply forming a Commercial treaty with the Independent
Republic of Texas”, so long as the sine qua non of this treaty be the abolition of slavery. Hook
actively advocated for British interference.66
Nevertheless, not all peripheral agents shared this optimism. In September 1840, English
barrister Nicholas D. Maillard lamented that the Texans were importing more slaves from the
United States and noted that he found it unjust that Mexico had been held to a higher standard in
diplomatic negotiations in the 1820s than Texas was in the 1830s and 1840s: Mexican abolition
of slavery, or at least an end to the slave trade, was viewed as important by British officials, and
Maillard praised Mexico for having been the “first civilized Nation that abolished Slavery”.67
Given his dismay at Texas’ blatant expansion of slavery within its territory, Maillard highlighted
that England should exert power and apply pressure on Texas, and as his book showcases, he
was not in favour of official British recognition of the new republic: if Texas did not put an end
to the slave trade, he argued, it should be viewed as nothing more but Mexico’s rebellious
province, and Britain ought to seize all Texian vessels under the justification that a slave trade
treaty existed with Mexico, a nation within which slavery and the slave trade had been abolished.
In fact, in his letter, Maillard’s critique of slavery focussed intensely on its effect on Britain’s
economic network: he feared that “we shall see Slavery revived and perpetuated, and other
Institutions still more injurious to our Interests,” demonstrating that commerce and British
interests were the main issue at stake for British officials overall.68 Maillard’s commentary thus
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echoes earlier Parliamentary debates, in which it was also suggested that Britain apply Mexican
laws to Texas in order to suppress slavery there.
CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN VIEWS ON SLAVERY IN TEXAS
Hamilton’s conduct in official treaty negotiations with Britain also suggests that Texians
were less inclined to get rid of slavery than several peripheral British agents had hoped, which
delayed Britain’s ratification of the three treaties until 1842.69 Britain’s diplomacy with and
recognition of Texas were not the only ones that experienced a delay due to the slavery question.
The Hanseatic Towns found themselves in much a similar position when Hamburgian Syndic
Karl Sieveking was first contacted by Texan diplomat James Hamilton on June 28, 1841, when
the latter announced Texas’ interest in a treaty of commerce with Hamburg.70 As a Syndic,
Sieveking had to elevate Hamilton’s note on the subject matter to the Senate of Hamburg, having

There are several Parliamentary meetings that discuss this delay. See, for example: “Texas”, House of Commons
Sitting of Thursday, February 18, 1841, Collection: 19 th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers,
Third Series, Volume 56, 704-729, cc. 705. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlipapers-proquestcom.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0056p0-0015?accountid=7121, and “Texas”, House of
Commons Sitting of Friday, March 5, 1841, Collection: 19 th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers,
Third Series, Volume 56, 1346-1410, cc. 1346. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlipapers-proquestcom.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0056p0-0025?accountid=7121, and “Texas”, House of
Commons Sitting of Tuesday, April 26, 1842, Collection: 19 th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional
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Britain and Texas, including a treaty of amity and commerce, a treaty providing British mediation between Mexico
and Texas, and lastly, a slave-trade treaty akin to previous examples involving the mutual right for search of vessels
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unfavourable position regarding negotiations with Texas, Britain simply refused to ratify all three treaties until the
Texian Congress had also approved the third, which – as Congress had already adjourned by the time the last treaty
reached Texas – did not occur until 1842. See: Adams, British Interests, 54 ff.
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limited influence and decision-making power on the issue himself. Nevertheless, in order to learn
more about Texas, formulate his opinion on the issue, and possibly advise Hanseatic officials,
Sieveking read several documents on Texas and sent some of the materials he had gathered – as
it seems, the treaties between England and Texas and the Netherlands and Texas – to historian
and writer Christian Friedrich Wurm, from whom he hoped to receive an informed and
knowledgeable opinion: Wurm was one of Hamburg’s chief authorities on Anglican history and
literature, and his works often combined international law, economics, and philosophy (in which
he obtained a Ph.D. in 1825).71 Wurm responded to Sieveking on July 5, 1841.72
Within this letter, Wurm questioned the suitability of Texas as an ally and destination for
German emigrants. One of the dominant reasons Wurm cited for this was the presence of slavery
in that young republic, writing “even though the humanity of the young state possesses all of my
respect […] I cannot suppress my grave doubts in regard to German emigration to Texas […] in
Texas, slavery is ‘part and parcel of the law of the land [non-translated original].’ In John
Scoble’s pamphlet, p. 13, I find the words of the law, and on the back page a law which will
make obtaining the rights of citizens impossible for Africans, their descendants, and Indians.”
The prolongation of slavery in Texas and the fact that children born to slaves would continue to
the slaves – a condition that, as an earlier discussion in this chapter has shown, Mexico’s laws
had explicitly rejected – vexed Wurm. Though Wurm stated that slavery did not prevent
European states – whether it be the Hanse Towns, England, or France – from negotiating a treaty
with Texas per se, it did cause him to ponder whether “under these circumstances, Hamburg

Originally from Württemberg, Wurm relocated to Hamburg in 1827 due to the city’s desire for an Englishlanguage newspaper focussing on American and English politics.
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71

203

ought to, directly and by state means, participate in the encouragement of German emigration to
Texas.” Next to the moral compunction Wurm associated with slavery, he also considered the
negative consequences for the Hanseatic international image, especially because English papers
were, according to Wurm, keeping a keen eye on the ports of Hamburg and Bremen.73 Though
Wurm unfortunately does not elaborate on the matter, this reference to England is interesting
because it underlines British influence in the policies of other states, including those focussing
on abolitionism. The Hanse Towns, politically weak on their own and without a noteworthy
military, could not afford to pursue policies that might prompt British intervention in Hanseatic
maritime trade. Wurm considered the recognition of Texas and the encouragement of German
settlement there as such a policy.
Wurm’s evaluation of the slavery question in Texas and his opinions regarding the
possible impact that an engagement with Texas could have for the Hanse Towns impacted
Sieveking. No noteworthy Hamburgian correspondence on Texas exists after Sieveking’s
exchange with Wurm until 1844, when Texian-Hanseatic negotiations centred on Bremen as a
diplomatic partner. Though Sieveking’s involvement in the Texas question following Bremen’s
initiative did not indicate his disapproval of Hanseatic-Texan negotiations of a treaty, he could
not be described as overly enthusiastic on the matter, either – in 1844, when Daingerfield and
Rumpff met in Paris, he permitted, so long as the Senate’s instructions were not to the contrary,
Rumpff’s proceeding in the matter, albeit with several caveats: “although the independence of
Texas is not fully secured, given that Mexico has not yet relinquished its claims to the territory,
and given that the entry [of Texas] into the North American Union is not less than likely,” he
writes, “concl. [conclude] that [Rumpff] can generally consider the matter, without rushing the
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conclusion [of a treaty] all too much.”74 Slavery became a key issue for Hamburg, and is one of
the reasons why Hamburg took the back seat in the Texas Question, watching rather passively as
Bremen dominated Hanseatic action.
The German association for the protection of German settlers in Texas, the Adelsverein,
had a different viewpoint on slavery in Texas, or rather, given that over twenty nobles took part
in it, it was home to a variety of opinions on the matter. As has been discussed in chapter two,
the initial ideal of fostering German emigration to Texas as early as 1842 turned out to be
unrealistic after Ludwig Joseph Count von Boos-Waldeck and Viktor August Count von
Leiningen visited the country, realising that their society did not possess the financial resources,
manpower, and organisational planning necessary for such a project. As a result, von BoosWaldeck bought a plantation in modern-day Fayette County on January 9, 1843. This plantation,
named after Vereins member Adolphe Duke of Nassau, is remarkable, because it constitutes the
only example considered in this dissertation which showcases a German stance not in disfavour
of slavery. Neither Prussian nor Hanseatic diplomats raised their voices for slavery, and both
Prussian and Hanseatic correspondence are interlaced with anti-slavery views. In 1830, even
Stephen F. Austin remarked that he would like to settle Germans and Swiss in Texas, for they
were not prone to the speculatory character of the U.S.-Americans and would not, like the latter,
introduce slavery.75 Count von Boos-Waldeck, however, purchased slaves from markets in
Houston, Galveston, and New Orleans, planning to run the plantation with the use of slave
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labour. Count von Boos-Waldeck’s views on slavery have been considered in considerable detail
by scholar Kearney.76
This decision elicited discussions among the society members. Count von Walderdorf
withdrew his participation in the society in February of 1843 after finding out that von BoosWaldeck had purchased land for a plantation on which slave labour was going to be used. Von
Walderdorf had been sceptical about the society’s endeavour in the “distant Texas” from the
beginning, but emphasised that the plantation’s “cultivation through/by Negroes” was not one
that he agreed with. He also doubted that this project would be profitable, and hence determined
that he did not wish to take part in (or be a stockholder in) the society.77 Christian Count von
Leiningen, however, seemed less concerned about slavery: In his initial speech to the nobles
before their meeting at Biebrich on the Rhine, Count von Leiningen highlighted that slave
plantations were profitable. With this statement, the Count probably wanted to underline that
those who emigrated to Texas could become prosperous, particularly on an agricultural basis, but
this main objective notwithstanding, von Leiningen’s implicit acceptance of the existence of
slavery in Texas can be assumed.78 In another letter, a relative of von Leiningen actively
supported the idea of a plantation as a fruitful endeavour, arguing that it would be profitable. He
suggested that the plantation be established in a more elevated region, claiming that this would
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be safer for the “human capital, the slaves”, and more financially lucrative.79 Ferdinand Prince
von Solms was likewise passive, and if anything, encouraging about the use of slave labour:
Negroes, accustomed to the humid, hot climate of Texas, would be better able to grow crops and
do hard labour on the plantation than whites, increasing the plantations’ earnings and benefitting
the society.80 A report of the Society regarding the preparations taking place in Texas also
expressed dislike for liberal German newspapers and pamphlets, arguing that they sought to
besmear the German emigration projects in Texas. The arguments used by the German papers
were so “pathetic”, the report asserted, that its author(s) did not deem them worthy of the
Verein’s commentary or response.81 Overall, it appears that the Adelsverein was dominated by
more conservative currents, which could explain the society’s apathy regarding slavery in Texas.
Though the society justified the use of slavery on the plantation by citing that practice as
profitable, von Boos-Waldeck’s experience told a different story. Building the plantation was
much harder and took much longer than expected, and prime crop-planting seasons came and
went. Fencing the property turned out to be a nearly insurmountable task for von Boos-Waldeck,
unfamiliar with organising the enclosing of the immense acreage he had purchased. In a letter,
the Count lamented that a lot more livestock – sheep, cattle, pigs, horses – was needed for the
proper and successful operation of the plantation. The fields had to be planted in a more complex
way than imagined, and von Boos-Waldeck considered growing corn, cotton, and sugar cane in
order to finally induce the plantation to make profits. He had exhausted his credit in New
Orleans, and the austere and primitive lifestyle of the frontier weighed on him, as he imagined it
would on other Europeans, as well. He criticised both his overseer Bryan as well as the fertility
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of the soil, questioning whether the plantation could grow to be profitable. Ultimately, he
determined that he desired to return to Germany as soon as a replacement for his position in
Texas had been found among society members. Von Boos-Waldeck’s problems on the plantation
also concerned the slaves to a not insignificant degree: due to the slow building process, the
slaves spent a lot of time living in tents or huts; the eventual slave quarters were described by an
observer as “dreadful barracks”. The Count also questioned the slaves’ quality, noting that most
of them were not as hard-working as he liked – only one woman, Emily, was praised by von
Boos-Waldeck. It is likely that she had eventually become his mistress during his time on the
plantation.82
After von Boos-Waldeck left, disillusioned about the profitability of the Nassau
Plantation, Prince von Solms came to Texas in 1844. One of his first recommendations regarding
the plantation was that the society get rid of it. His reasons were two-fold: first, he doubted its
economic viability and productivity. Second, he did not believe it wise that the Society associate
itself with slavery. In his first report, von Solms noted that many of the slaves had been
overworked, with at least one who had gotten sick because of it. Two slaves had been killed after
an attempted robbery, which von Solms labelled a lost investment. Though he respected von
Boos-Waldeck, von Solms listed a number of bad choices that the Count had made, including the
appointment of Bryan as an overseer. Von Boos-Waldeck, not knowledgeable enough on
agricultural endeavours himself, had charged Bryan with a lot of work around the plantation,
which the latter had not fulfilled adequately according to von Solms, who pointed out that the
cotton had not been planted correctly, leading to the loss of a lucrative harvest. Moreover, Bryan
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was described as a drunkard in von Solms’ report.83 In his fourth report, von Solms explained
that one more slave had died, and another had run away, though she was later recaptured. The
crop looked “pitiful”, and von Solms estimated that the plantation would yield no more than five
or six bales of cotton. Though von Solms suggested that acquiring more slaves might alleviate
the situation, he did not like this idea, favouring instead the sale of parcels of the land to
Europeans.84 By his sixth report, von Solms distanced himself completely from the operation of a
slave-based plantation: “In no case am I in favour of buying slaves but, on the contrary, I stand
by my previously established views: the sale of the entire league […] From the bottom of my
heart, I can only say that this slave mess is an unworthy affair for the Verein. It is truly a stain on
human society; and this thing in particular, as well as the whole farm, has caused me more anger,
worry, and unpleasantness than all the dangers, privations, and hardships, that I have suffered in
the interests of the Verein up to now”.85 Though Nassau Plantation was not sold immediately
after von Solms’ report of December 1844 – the sale to Otto von Roeder occurred in 1848 – von
Solms’ evaluation of the property was the death knell for the plantation’s future as the safe haven
that German immigrants could first turn to upon arrival in Texas.
The French stance on slavery was likewise more nuanced than its British counterpart. As
early as 1835, pro-Texian views existed among Frenchmen, and these typically downplayed or
reinterpreted the relevance of slavery in that region. French abbé Jean-Henri Baradère alleged in
his exposé on Texas that the colonists had loyally and faithfully abided by Mexican law “for as
long as [Mexico] spoke the language of the law with them”, but that the Mexican failure to
uphold this policy had induced the colonists to rebel – as Baradère suggests, justifiable so.
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Though he sympathised with Mexico on the grounds that that country did not possess the
necessary resources for an adequate administration of its immense territory, making abuses of
power on behalf of local officials in far-off states such as Texas likely, Baradère nevertheless
supported Anglo rebellion, explaining that the colonists possessed an energy “of men belonging
to a free country”, emphasising the idea that Anglo-Americans’ settlement in new territories was
partially justified by their vigour. Mexico was instead characterised as subservient by Baradère,
who made an interesting, actually counterintuitive, observation in relation to slavery: Mexico,
the Abbé suggested, was a country whose people suffered from compliance/submissiveness, a
circumstance characteristic for those countries “which have made themselves contemptible
through the long existence of slavery”. This, wrote Baradère, was also the reason why Mexicans
accepted the abuses of officials, whereas the Anglo settlers did not. This observation on behalf of
the French abbé is so noteworthy because it turns the slavery question on its head: rather than
pillorying the Anglo settlers for bringing slaves with them, thus disrespecting Mexican laws and
the Mexican state, which had taken early steps toward the abolition of the slave trade and
slavery, he described the Anglo colonists as free, liberal men, ignoring entirely the fact that they
illegally brought slaves with them, and critiqued the Mexican authorities for molesting the lawabiding Anglos, a condition that existed in Mexico because of the long former presence of
slavery in that state.86
Saligny, the French diplomat in Texas after 1839, did not see slavery in Texas as highly
problematic. In March 1839, he noted that many U.S.-American planters were moving to Texas
with their slaves, a circumstance that the country ought to thank Mirabeau Lamar for.87 Saligny
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emphasised that this immigration would improve conditions in Texas because the planters were
rich, thus bringing to Texas people and capital all at once.88 A month later, Saligny reiterated his
impression, tying Texas’ economic success and importance to France (via cotton) to the presence
of planters with slaves, suggesting that he viewed slavery as perhaps akin to a ‘necessary evil’
that was needed to advance the country.89 Another letter from June of that year seems to
underline this: Saligny, though he labelled slavery an “odious institution”, acknowledged that
slavery was “the foundation stone of Texian society”, and argued that slavery could either be
seen “as a question that interests humanity as a whole” or “in terms of national interest”, which
suggests that he did regard slavery as profitable and its preservation as a matter of national
interest for Texians and U.S. Southerners, who grew such large quantities of cotton using slave
labour.90 In instructions that Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult, the Duc de Dalmatie and French
Foreign Minister (1839-1840) sent to Saligny in October of 1839, the former also remarked that
England’s policy in Texas was an interesting one, in part because of the conflict the slavery
question had elicited. De Dalmatie labelled Texian slavery a “social necessity”, and referred to
the British government as one in “deference to pro-Negro opinion”, suggesting that slavery was
not one of de Dalmatie’s dominant foreign policy goals as it was in the case of most Britons.
Moreover, he stated that England’s hesitation in the Texas matter – which England would not be
able to maintain for the sake of her economic and national interests – had benefitted France in
forming ties to Texas, possibly a sign that some French officials saw within British abolitionist
fervour an advantage for French commerce and diplomacy.91
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Given that abolitionism was not as significant to French policy, and given that the
German states were second-tier powers in this early-19th-century world-system, lacking political
as well as maritime might, the main conflict regarding slavery in Texas existed with Britain.
After the slave-trade treaty of 1842 was successfully ratified, British officials continued to hope
that their country would be able to exert more influence in Texas in order to effect the abolition,
even if gradual, of slavery. The two British agents that were employed in Texas in 1842/43,
William Kennedy as Consul at Galveston and Charles Elliot as chargé d’affaires, showed
significant interest in the abolition of slavery. Elliot remarked in late 1842 that Britain, now that
it had established a slave-trade treaty with Texas, should aim for the abolition of slavery in that
country next. In the interests of humanity, slavery should be abolished, and all political
restrictions on people of colour lifted. He combined this endeavour with one for “perfectly free
trade”, showcasing that commerce, philanthropy, and international law intertwined in his vision
of the Republic of Texas, and indeed, the Texian borderlands: Elliot hoped that such policies
would either spread to Mexico, or cause northern Mexican states, already in a state of rebellion,
to join a liberal and humanitarian Texas. Elliot also suggested that England could support
abolitionism in Texas by financing it via a loan; this would enable the Texian government to
compensate its slaveholders.92 Though the ratification of the slave-trade treaty had been delayed,
Elliot wrote that he had spoken to another Englishman in the country, who had told him that
“there is a much more general and strengthening feeling in favour of” the abolition of slavery
“than he had conceived possible”, indicating Elliot’s hopefulness that abolition in Texas was
attainable.93 Adams laid out that much of Elliot’s correspondence in which he expressed his

Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, CBA, 125. For the Texian response to Elliot’s idea regarding a loan for
the abolition of slavery, see: Ashbel Smith to Isaac Van Zandt, January 25, 1843, DCTx, 1103-1108.
93 Elliot to Addington, March 26, 1843, CBA, 165-169.
92

212

support for official British intervention in Texas was addressed not to Aberdeen, but to Henry
Unwin Addington, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Though they
were “nominally personal letters […] they were regarded in the light of official
correspondence”.94
Despite such hopefulness on behalf of many British diplomats, agents, and merchants,
Aberdeen requested a detailed report from Kennedy on May 30, 1843. This report was supposed
to detail a variety of aspects of slavery in Texas, including the political and legal possibilities and
opportunities of African-Texians, the population of slaves and ratio of slaves to whites, the
slaves’ origins, and the sentiment of abolitionism in Texas.95 On August 22, 1843, Kennedy told
Aberdeen that he could not yet comment on the strength of the abolitionist movement and the
likelihood of the abolition of slavery in Texas, though his response to Aberdeen’s request for a
report was sent in September. Kennedy emphasised that no trans-Atlantic slave trade had
occurred between the African continent and Texas, as it was in accordance with the BritishTexian treaty and Texian laws. Nevertheless, slaves had little to no legal possibilities; as criminal
law did not extend to slaves or even to free blacks, and evidence brought forth by slaves was not
considered in court. Moreover, the Texian Constitution’s expressed prohibition of a legal statute
that could forbid the importation of slaves via the United States virtually guaranteed that the
number of slaves would increase annually as more U.S. settlers moved to Texas with their
slaves.96 In a follow-up letter, Kennedy also stated, more sober than other Britons, that “there is,
in Texas, no recognized party favourable to the Abolition of Slavery”, and that efforts to abolish
slavery or promote the emancipation of slaves had been small, not numerous, and curbed by the
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fear of popular mobs unwilling to expunge slavery.97 Kennedy’s resignation notwithstanding,
Elliot continued to hold on to the idea that Britain could use her international influence and
power to persuade Texas to rid itself of slavery.98
Though Roeckell and Adams questioned the influence of peripheral agents Elliot and
Kennedy on statesmen in London, Adams did concede that Aberdeen’s stance regarding the
slavery question changed in mid-1843. This could also explain Aberdeen’s interest in Kennedy’s
report on slavery in Texas. Adams argued that Aberdeen’s interest in this matter was raised
probably in response to several factors, including Pakenham’s communications, Elliot’s letters,
and an abolitionist meeting held by Texians and U.S.-Americans in London. As Adams had
shown, this is also where Aberdeen met a Texian lawyer, S. P. Andrews, who likewise suggested
that Britain should advance a loan to Texas for the abolition of slavery. Aberdeen’s interest in
the abolition of slavery in Texas was quickly instrumentalised by proponents of Texas’
incorporation into the United States, such as General Duff Green, who exaggerated Aberdeen’s
interest in British interference in Texas. Nevertheless, though British statesman Everett denied to
U.S. official Upshur that Aberdeen had ever taken any partiality to the slavery question, Adams
concluded that Aberdeen’s responses to Ashbel Smith do showcase a personal interest on behalf
of Aberdeen to see slavery in Texas abolished.99
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Mexican officials had a different opinion on the slavery question in Texas altogether.
John Paul Tymitz has shown that many Mexican politicians and newspapers believed that
England was only out for its self-interest, and rejected arguments of English philanthropy either
regarding the issue of slavery or the establishment of a buffer state to halt U.S. expansionism and
thus protect Mexico. One Mexican newspaper in particular, El Precursor, decried that Britain
cared only for its commerce and was thus willing to betray its ethical and moral principles.
Signing a treaty with Texas was not enough, newspapers argued, for the Texians would never
give up their slavery. Pakenham reiterated over and over again to his government as well as in
communications with the Mexican authorities that the allegations of newspapers regarding
British selfishness and intrigue were simply not true, yet Mexican antipathy toward Britain’s
decision to engage in relations with Texas remained.100 Interestingly, several Mexican officials
and newspapers tied slavery and British power together to rouse Mexican sentiments of
nationalism vis-à-vis the British: The Precursor, for example, wrote that foreign influence in
Mexico’s internal affairs, including those of Texas, threatened “to convert the Mexican [sic] into
imbecile slaves of a foreign domination”.101
The presence of slavery in Texas quickly caused abolitionism to become one of the key
factors in both European diplomacy with that state and the broader imperial struggle within the
region. Initially, many European powers were indisposed to recognising Texas because they did
not want to associate themselves with slavery. This was partially a result of political change in
the aftermath of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which gave rise to a more
humanitarian and philanthropic current in European governments, newspapers, and institutions.
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But it was also a representation of British hegemonic might during the nineteenth century. The
political, maritime, commercial, and imperial strength of Britain, the primary abolitionist force of
the century, motivated politicians of more peripheral states to take caution in their interactions
with trans-Atlantic states, as was the case for Hamburg’s Syndic Sieveking and historian Wurm.
Von Solms likewise believed that the Verein should distance itself from slavery. The fact that
British slave-trade treaties and agreements were potent and had the potential of giving Britain a
commercial and strategic advantage was not lost on other nations, either: Portugal complained
about unjust British treatment, Prussia resisted such a treaty with Britain, and Mexico pushed for
the inclusion of several caveats to protect its coastal trade and military/naval freedom.
Nevertheless, economic interest eventually motivated Britain to commence negotiations
with Texas, anyway, largely because of Texas’ prime ability to grow cotton. U.S.-grown cotton
was heavily associated with slavery and U.S. imperialism, and even though acquiring cotton
from Texas did not create an immediate solution for Great Britain’s ethical dilemma, British
agents believed that their chances for an abolition of slavery were higher in Texas than in the
United States. Maillard’s suggestion that Texan vessels be seized, and Elliot’s, Crawford’s,
Sheridan’s, and Joseph Hamilton’s projections of British influence in slavery on Texas showcase
that some British officials – the ones most engaged in Texian affairs – were convinced that it
would be much easier to exhort the smaller, weaker and younger Texas into abolishing the
heinous practice than it would be with the United States. Thus, British statesmen viewed the
Texas Republic as an opportunity to curb slavery further, paradoxically through the republic’s
recognition. Several British statesmen hoped that Texas, fearful of a potential Mexican invasion,
in a state of shattered finance, and economically dependent on manufactured items, would be
more willing to make concessions to British abolitionist plans, and that Texas, once it had
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become enveloped in British informal-imperialist influence, would fall even more susceptible to
Britain’s desire for abolition. Using her commercial might, Britain also sought to coax Texas into
abolishing slavery by offering to finance this endeavour and compensate slave owners making
temporary losses after abolition. British pressures on Texas on the matter of slavery led to the
ratification of an African slave-trade treaty between the two parties in 1842, which gave Great
Britain, much as in most other cases, the permission to investigate and search any Texan naval
vessels suspected of carrying slaves. Several Texan officials were not happy with such treatment
at the hands of their European partner, but saw it as a necessary evil to maintain good relations
with the British, whose trade and recognition they were already becoming reliant upon.102
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Chapter Four – Into the ‘Wilderness’: Native Americans in the Texas Borderlands and
Their Influence on trans-Atlantic Commerce, Finance, Migration, and Conceptualisations
of Race and Civilisation

Another issue that shaped diplomatic relations and informal-imperialist possibilities in
North America was the presence of Indian tribes in Texas and Mexico. Many statesmen of
Europe and Texas feared that Indian attacks could destabilise the Texian government and make
Texas susceptible to either a reinvasion by Mexico or an annexation to the United States.
Moreover, agents hoping to use emigration projects to exert influence over Texas identified
Native Americans as one of the key obstacles to successful colonisation. Not only did Europeans
dread Native American raids in Texas, but they also did so in Mexico, because the power of
Indian tribes and their pursuance of their own commercial and ethnic interests jeopardised those
of the Europeans who were in need of stable and reliable trading routes and safety for their
nationals abroad. As such, Native Americans formed a key consideration for European
diplomacy and imperialism in North America. Texian officials also used their contempt for
Native Americans in order to justify their independence from Mexico, by asserting that Mexico
had not adequately addressed the ‘Indian Problem’ in the region and had even employed Indian
tribes in an undignified and unjust war on Texas. Native Americans were frequently perceived as
brutal and diplomacy with them considered a fruitless endeavour, for state officials did not
believe that they could be integrated into the established international commercial and legal
order. Particularly the Comanche pursued their own imperial policies in the Texas borderlands,
to the dismay of European, Texian, and Mexican agents. The discussions on Native Americans in
the region were often of a racial nature, no matter where the diplomats hailed from: Mexican,
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Texian, U.S.-American, German, French, and British actors often spoke of the various Indian
tribes as ‘savages’ and deemed them generally uncivilised and barbarous. This perception
influenced how Europeans and Anglo-Americans shaped their own racial identities and those of
others, such as Mexicans: The character traits attributed to the various groups in the region and
the level of detail that went into distinguishing between them tell revealing stories of an
emerging racial hierarchy in North America.1
Oftentimes, the diplomats of the states under investigation did not distinguish between
the various Native American groups, instead referring to them as ‘Indian tribes’, ‘Indians’, or
‘savages’ (as well as their equivalents in other languages, such as sauvage in French or Wilde in
German).2 Additionally, Indians were almost always depicted as hostile or uncivilised. Attorney
George Whitfield Terrell, in detailing the relations between Native American tribes and the
Texian republic, wrote that there were “numerous hostile Indian tribes which live on our
Northern frontier to plunder our establishments and to commit the most inhumane massacres
without sparing neither women nor children”, a condition which he titled a “war of savages”.3
Prince Karl von Solms-Braunfels, one of the principal individuals behind the Society for the
Protection of German Immigrants in Texas, the Adelsverein, described the area surrounding the
Nassau Plantation as “frequented by Indians and marauders”, surmising that this, combined with
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the great distance from other inhabited regions of Texas, made trips coming from the west
impossible. Though the Prince boasted that he expected to “have good relations” with the
Indians, he nevertheless requested that the directors “send [him] firearms so that [he] may be in a
position to impress the Indians”, suggesting that he perceived the Native American tribes of the
region as formidable and potentially dangerous. 4 He also noted that some settlers had enlisted in
“the mounted company to serve as a guard against the Indians”, whom he described as being
“always mounted”.5 Joseph Baron von Hormayr-Hortenburg, the royal Bavarian chamberlain and
privy Ministerresident to the free Hanseatic Cities of Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, labelled
the Indians as “immensely wanton”, particularly for alcohol and weaponry.6 British ConsulGeneral to Texas Charles Elliot likened Indians to “disorderly and dangerous persons” who
engaged in plunder, and in The Comanche Empire, Pekka Hämäläinen also states that Texians
branded Indians as “red niggers” or “wild cannibals of the woods”.7
Regions settled by Native American tribes and few or no peoples of European origin
were also labelled a ‘wilderness’, ‘savage’, or “uninhabited’. French consul Alphonse Dubois de
Saligny called any North American land not yet or seldom visited by foreigners “encore tout
sauvage [still entirely savage]” and asserted that some of the landscape was “impenetrable to
humans and occupied solely by savage animals”; he quoted General Sam Houston as having
referred to Austin as “that squalid spot, thirty-five miles beyond the pale of civilization”.8 British
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representative William Kennedy underlined the advantages that Texas held for the European
emigrant, yet also noted that, “if [the colonist] be unable to endure what, in older communities,
would be deemed privations – if he be wanting in moral courage – if he cannot look hopefully to
the future under temporary discouragement – he ought not to enter upon the life of a settler in the
wilderness, however fair and fruitful that wilderness may be”.9 Moreover, Kennedy noted that
several parts of Mexico that had been claimed by Texas were inhabited by Indians and Mexicans,
yet that the “greater portion of this territory [was] waste”.10 U.S.-American statesman John
Quincy Adams likewise labelled Texas a “wilderness inhabited only by Indians” prior to the
Mexico’s independence, showing that the Indian tribes were not judged as capable of cultivating
or somehow changing the land they lived on.11
Especially the Prince von Solms-Braunfels branded Indian lands as uncivilised and wild,
which gave him yet another way of justifying and emphasising the advantages of a German
colony in Texas. He considered many regions far from towns and settlements unsafe, because
even if it was “admitted that 50 to 100 families living in a group are safe from Indian attacks,
there would still be no assurance that their crops in the fields or their herds would be safe”. The
only way of properly securing settlements, said von Solms, was the establishment of towns
between already inhabited – i.e., by ‘whites’ – spaces and places far removed from other villages
and towns, which he referred to as “the forward push of civilization”, suggesting that Indian
settlements were not civilised.12 In another report, he highlighted this, documenting that though
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Texas was full of Indian camps, these camps tended to disappear “as soon as civilization comes
near, they withdraw because the sound of the ax in the woods is annoying to them”.13 In fact, von
Solms called the regions inhabited by Indian tribes as “uninhabited”. In one report, the Prince
wrote, quite ironically, that “the Indians are everywhere, but only in large numbers in the
uninhabited regions”. His disregard for the Native Americans of Texas becomes clear in other
reports, also, where he stated that several of these supposedly uninhabited tracts of lands
potentially suitable for European settlement were “land from which the Indians must first be
driven”.14
It is worth mentioning that not all Europeans shared these views regarding Native
Americans in North America. Particularly German travellers and writers of the nineteenth
century romanticised Indians, as H. Glenn Penny has shown. Penny demonstrates that the
German fascination with Native Americans can be traced back to three figures: Cornelius
Tacitus, Roman senator; Alexander von Humboldt, Prussian traveller; and James Fenimore
Cooper, U.S. author.15 Penny concludes that Germans’ identification with a tribal heritage,
combined with the ideal for self-edification and the partiality for freedom and nature encouraged

Prince von Solms’ Tenth Report dated March 27, 1845, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
Prince von Solms’ Third Report dated August 26, 1844, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
15 Tacitus wrote Germania in the first century C.E., a work that described the Germanic tribes as ‘noble savages’ in
much the same way in which romantic portrayals of Native Americans were written by Europeans and their
descendants in the nineteenth century. Since the fifteenth century, when Tacitus’ Germania was rediscovered,
Germans established and defined themselves, their identity, and their role in Europe using the heritage of the
Germanic tribal societies, and the defeat of the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest became one of the pivotal points in
such debates. The interest in Germanic tribes was further roused by the German cultural drive for Bildung, a general
sense of education and self-edification, in the nineteenth century. Von Humboldt exemplified this ideal, and his
travels to the Americas became staples for Germans desirous for Bildung. Von Humboldt spoke out against the
excesses of empire and for Native Americans in many of his works, and German scholars, guided by the ideal of
Bildung, questioned negative accounts of Indians due to Anglo-Americans’ and Europeans’ lack of understanding
for – and lack of Bildung regarding – Native Americans and their customs. Lastly, Penny argues that Cooper
supplied Germans with more realistic narratives of North America’s indigenous inhabitants. These were less
romantic than predecessors but nevertheless emphasised values like freedom in natural landscapes.
13
14

222

Germans to view Native Americans more positively.16 Harry Liebersohn points to a similar
sympathy for Indians among French travellers, including Alexis de Tocqueville, who cast Native
Americans as aristocrats who had been defeated by the Anglo-American conquerors. Given
Native Americans’ aristocratic role, de Tocqueville challenged the expansionary and conquering
component of Anglo-American ideology. Other Frenchmen, like Blosseville, shared de
Tocqueville’s views. In fact, Blosseville’s line of reasoning resembles that of German
sympathisers for Indians: The indigenous of North America closely resembled the earlier Franks
and Gauls living on the borders of the Roman Empire, and had a culture similar to that of the
Germanic tribes discussed by Tacitus.17 This makes the negative perceptions of Indians on behalf
of Adelsverein members, such as von Solms, others involved in emigration projects, and
diplomats like Saligny perhaps even more noteworthy.
Sometimes, the blanket term “Indian” was used because of a lack of knowledge on behalf
of Texian, Mexican, U.S.-American, or European observers. A report of the Battle of Walker’s
Creek fought by Captain J. C. Hays in June of 1844 noted that a Texian troop of fifteen men was
sent out “to ascertain what tribe of Indians were committing so many depredations”, but when
Hays found a party of Indians, he seemed incapable of determining which tribe they belonged to,
for he continued to label them as “Indians”.18 The blanket term “Indian” can lead to confusions
in evaluating the correspondence, for it can often be unclear what tribe the author is referring to.
In one lengthy report by Prussian Consul-General to Mexico, Ferdinand von Seiffart, for
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instance, the author analysed the population of Mexico and guessed that it numbered roughly
eight million. Of these, he estimated that roughly seven million were Indians. These, he asserted,
had “nothing in common with the European population, save for religion”. This is, of course, a
broad generalisation of Native Americans living in Mexico, and also oversimplifies the complex
racial nuances and mestizaje existant in Mexico.19 Seiffart continued by labelling all Indians in
Mexico as “gente sin razon, (unreasonable people) as they were for the Spaniards 300 years
prior”, without acknowledging that this definition likewise has a much more complex meaning
than merely distinguishing between the Spaniards and all Indians.
Letters such as this one by Seiffart illustrate that European diplomats’ use of the term
“Indian” does not adequately portray the large variety and diversity among Native American
groups in the Mexican North and Texas borderlands, though they do showcase how diplomats
perceived Native Americans. In the same letter, Seiffart also highlighted that Indians were not
just seen by Europeans, such as the Spaniards of centuries prior, as gente sin razon, but also by
Mexicans of the 1830s and 1840s: Though the indigenous of Mexico were “equally free and in
all political rights equal to the other inhabitants of the republic”, within the “ego of the Mexican,
there is an insurmountable chasm between himself and the native/indigenous”.20 As such,
diplomatic correspondence, precisely because it often offered very generic views of the
indigenous actors of the Texas borderlands, reveals a lot about how the Native Americans of
Texas were perceived in the early-to-mid-nineteenth century on both sides of the Atlantic.

More on Seiffart’s racial views regarding the Mexican population follows later in the chapter. It is unclear how he
classified the ‘white population’ vis-à-vis the ‘indigenous population’, i.e., it is not evident in which group he
included mestizos. In this report, he speaks of ‘whites/Europeans’ and ‘Indians’ only.
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General-Consulate in Mexico No. 3, by Ferdinand Seiffart, May 20, 1846, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA,
Handelsamt, Nr. 127: Acta betreffend der Handels- und Schiffahrts-Verhältnisse in Mexico, October 18, 1844-1847.
This report spans roughly a hundred pages. For references to Native Americans, see pages 60 ff. in particular.
19

224

EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF AND INTERACTIONS WITH THE
COMANCHE EMPIRE
Nevertheless, some tribes found frequent mention by Europeans. The Comanches were
described in correspondence and newspapers as dangerous and threatening. U.S.-American
statesman Daniel Webster wrote to Powhatan Ellis in Washington D.C. of the accompaniment of
a certain Franklin Coombs on the Texan expedition to Santa Fe, and justified the presence of
weaponry on this expedition by highlighting the need for defence against Indian tribes,
particularly the Comanches, rejecting any hostile motives towards Mexico on behalf of Texas as
possible reasons for the expedition’s armament.21 James Hamilton called the Comanches
‘hordes’ from which protection was needed, and A. J. Donelson referred to the Comanches as a
“fierce and warlike” tribe.22 The Civilian and Galveston Gazette detailed a battle between a small
troop of Texians and a larger force of Comanches, who had been stealing horses in Corpus
Christi. The account labelled the Comanches as ‘savages’ with such a pivotal warrior cult that
Colonel Kinney’s brave conduct in the battle allegedly earned him praise from the Comanches,
who had “since said that he acted more like one of their own warriors than a pale face – the
highest compliment they could pay him, however it may sound to the ears [of] civilized men”.23
Such reports, though they imply a certain respect for Comanches in their capacity as warriors,
showcase that Comanches were regarded almost solely as warriors whose behaviour did not fall
within the bounds of civilisation. In another issue of the Civilian and Galveston Gazette, an
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encounter between Texian and Comanche forces was laid out, specifying the events of a battle
between 150 Comanches and 75 Texians, the latter of which lost four men and more than sixty
horses and mules.24 According to Hämäläinen, Mexican inhabitants of the northern states cast the
Comanches as “alien others, animalistic barbarians who had to be erased in the name of
civilization, religion, and national honor”.25 One Mexican observer explained that the “numerous
Indian tribes living in the border regions, particularly the Comanches, have always been so
formidable and destructive for the citizens of Mexico”, and that “the Comanches inspire more
terror in (the Mexicans) than any other tribe”.26
Many European statesmen drew their knowledge of the Comanches and other tribes from
Texian newspapers, which detailed accounts of raids orchestrated by and conflict with Native
Americans. Beyond this, they had nary a source base, as is evidenced by how seldomly the
Comanche tribe was discussed: Prussian officials make hardly any noteworthy mention of the
Comanches in their correspondence on Texas, whereas the Hanseates and British do so
incredibly sparingly. Bremian merchant Delius cited that roughly 70,000 – 80,000 Comanche
Indians lived in Texas, who were viewed as the ultimate “mortal enemies of the whites, by whom
they were thus killed and eradicated at any given opportunity”.27 Prince von Solms likewise
referred to the Comanches and in fact generalised that the Indians of Texas were “namely the
Comanches”, suggesting that he believed that most Native Americans – or those of note, anyway
– were Comanche Indians. He described them as “great in number, and brave”, and though he
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knew only little of and had never interacted personally with them, he was, based on how the
Comanches were portrayed by contemporaries, ready for hostilities. He wrote, rather naively,
that he planned on “politely pay[ing] them the first visit. They will either make peace terms and
keep them or [he] shall immediately strike them such a blow that they will be rendered harmless
for a long time to come, if not forever”.28 This statement illustrates the prejudices toward and
fear of the Comanches, even on behalf of German newcomers to Texas who knew relatively little
about the Indian affairs of the young republic.29
By far the most extensive account of the Comanche presence in Texas is given by
Alphonse Dubois de Saligny. The French diplomat made fairly frequent mention of the
Comanches, whom he saw as the enemies of the Texians.30 In one letter, he wrote that the
Comanches were the “most bellicose and powerful of the Indian tribes of Texas”, who were
constantly at war with Texas as well as Mexico, and that many people of Texas believed any
peace negotiations with said tribe to be “a trap on behalf of the Comanches”.31 Military
confrontations between Comanches and Texians were not uncommon, and Saligny commented
upon them in the Texian’s favour. When an encounter between a Texian and a significantly
larger Comanche group led to the latter’s defeat, Saligny underlined that “this extreme
disproportion of forces did not scare the Texians, who bravely arrested the Comanche passage”,
showcasing his perception of the Texians as noble warriors whereas he labelled the Comanches
as “savages” later in the letter.32 Much of Saligny’s correspondence casts the Comanches as

Prince von Solms’ Third Report dated August 26, 1844, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
In general, the members of the Adelsverein knew very little about Texas, as von Solms even acknowledges
himself in a report where he laments that Fisher had taken advantage of the Verein’s lack of knowledge. Prince von
Solms’ Eighth Report dated February 8, 1845, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
30 Saligny to Thiers, July 26, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 235-241.
31 Saligny to Dalmatie, January 19, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 85-90.
32 Saligny to Thiers, October 30, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 273-298, 274.
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unbridled, impulsive and threatening, such as when he discussed the Comanche “hatred towards
the Lipans” and underlined that he perceived the Comanches as the “most dreadful” Indian
tribe.33
The French consul’s views were influenced by reports of kidnappings of whites and the
raiding of villages by Comanche Indians. In one instance, Saligny described the encounter of
Texian Colonel W. C. Cooke with twelve Comanche chiefs. After a “violent discussion”, Cooke
told the Indian chiefs that they were taken prisoner and would not be released until the “whites
held by them [were to] be released sound and safe”. “At these words”, wrote Saligny, “one of the
Comanche chiefs moved towards the door to leave, but the guard guarding them crossed the
bayonet in front of him, the Indian pulled out his dagger and struck him. In the same moment,
the other chiefs moved quickly toward the door also and hurt several Texians. A terrible
scramble/fight broke out, and the twelve Indians were massacred within a few minutes”. Even
though the chiefs were killed, Saligny expressed fairly little sympathy for them, stating that “it
seem[ed] like the savages fight with a fury and despair one cannot imagine”.34 In another
instance, the consul bemoaned the minacious atmosphere in the Texian borderlands, where
people “waited for another attack on behalf of the Comanches”, and lamented that “mules and
horses had been kidnapped by the savages”.35 Another report details the joint Comanche and
Cherokee attack of the town of Victoria, where the majority of the population was killed by the
Indian party and the village plundered and then set ablaze. Afterwards, as Mayfield informed
Saligny, the party moved toward Linnville to do the same.36 The events of Victoria and Linnville
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inspired wrath within the Texian government, which despatched an expedition into Indian
territory. Though this force consisting of 1800 men did not accomplish much – Saligny surmised
that the reason for this was the Texians’ complacency in times of peace, forgetting the prior
Indian raids and “falling back in their security” – the “[intended] success of this company,
stopped [prevented] by General Huston, seemed unmistakable: […] the extinction of the entire
tribe”.37
The trans-Atlantic governmental dislike for the Comanches also extended to other Indian
tribes, not least because of the frequent use of the blanket term ‘Indian’ for any tribe.
Nevertheless, even when other tribes’ names were given in newspapers and correspondence, they
hardly fared much better than the Comanches. In the case of the Karankawa, German newspapers
and officials of the Adelsverein fell prey to the misconception that this group of Native
Americans engaged in cannibalism.38 When their name occurred in newspapers, it was often in
relation to violence. One issue of the Civilian and Galveston Gazette spoke of a “party of
Caronkewa Indians, who had shown marks of hostility to” Texas. Due to the suspicion of
“mischievous designs”, Texian troops disarmed the party.39 The Morning Star labelled the
‘Cronkewas’, i.e. Karankawa, as “troublesome to the settlers in the vicinity of Aransas Bay”
because of robbery and a generally “threatening and hostile attitude towards the settlers.”40 In his
correspondence, Saligny also referred to another article from the Civilian and Galveston Gazette
in which a battle between a Texian company under Captain Hays and a band of Karankawa and
Comanche Indians was described. According to the article, wrote Saligny, both sides fought
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“with a lot of cold blood and intrepidity”, and Saligny continued to label both Indian tribes as
‘savages’ for the remainder of the letter.41
Besides the appearance of the Karankawa in Saligny’s letters, one can see that he also
juxtaposed the Tonkaways and Lipans with the Comanches, their ‘mortal enemies’. He noted
that the former, though allied with the Texian government, had the potential to be just as
troublesome to the Texians as the Comanches because any peace negotiations with the
Comanches would lead the Tonkaways and Lipans to terminate their alliance with Texas.42
Furthermore, he alleged that the surroundings of Austin were “infested with Lipans and
Tonkaways. Scattered through the country in small bands, they raid settlements and massacre the
travellers”. The quote exposed his wariness towards the two tribes.43 In another instance, Saligny
recounted that Texian troops had to be despatched to keep both tribes at a distance from Texian
settlements.44 In one report, Prussian chargé d’affaires to Mexico von Gerolt lamented the
destruction caused by “savage Indians (Apaches)” in the Mexican state of Chihuahua, the
government of which found itself forced to take out loans in order to acquire the means to arrest
Indian incursions.45
NATIVE AMERICANS’ INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL AMBITIONS IN NORTH
AMERICA
The above-mentioned incident discussed by von Gerolt demonstrates one of the two
primary concerns that dominated European discussions on Native Americans in the Mexican
North and Texian borderlands: that of finance and commerce. The presence of Indian tribes in
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Texas and Mexico threatened trading networks, because plundering en route could lead to loss of
goods as well as life. Moreover, as the case of Chihuahua exemplifies, Mexican governments
were destabilised by Native American intervention, leading to a vicious cycle of debility: Indian
attacks hampered the economy of Mexican regions, yet without economic success, these same
areas were unable to properly defend themselves against raids, plundering, and the destruction of
property. European officials were keenly aware of this and, combined with the already less-thanideal commercial conditions in Mexico as discussed in Chapter One, Native American action
made Mexico less attractive for European trade. Prussian consul to Mexico, Franz Schneider,
evaluated trading routes in New Mexico, concluding that they brought less commercial profit
than the Texian harbours because the route via Santa Fe necessitated lengthy bypasses around
Indian territories and the armament of caravans for defence against Indian tribes.46 In a letter to
Texian Minister Plenipotentiary to France and Britain Ashbel Smith, Anson Jones identified the
same problem for Mexico, claiming that the country did not possess the resources to invade
Texas because of “numerous and belligerent Apache and Comanche tribes” which organised
“destructive incursions into [Mexico’s] territory” from San Luis Potosi to Matamoros, placing
Mexico in such shambles that “all of its resources of credit have been exhausted” and that it was
indebted heavily to European governments, who sought to recover their financial losses.47
Hämäläinen also comments that some contemporary observers spoke of Mexico as a Comanche
colonial possession, which was only saved from complete destruction because Mexicans fulfilled
the Comanches’ need for horses.48 Moreover, he argues that contraband trade and commerce
with the Comanches damaged the economic and political stability of Mexican state Chihuahua,
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and that northern Mexican communities lived on or under the “subsistence level”, demonstrating
how crippled Mexico’s international trade was as a result of the commercial interests of the
Comanches.49 The French Journal des Débats, though it did not specifically mention Native
Americans as responsible, likewise lamented that “the Mexicans lack money for the interior
services of the country. They do not have one cent to open routes or to repair those of the
Spaniards, to maintain their ports or to subdue the thieves with whom the country is infested”,
revealing a French awareness of the difficulties of trading in Mexico, particularly those related to
plundering and unsafe travelling.50
Next to monetary issues, diplomats also identified a lack of manpower as a reason for
Mexico’s struggle in quelling raids, robberies, and plundering. Hämäläinen writes that many
villages of northern Mexico were so undermanned and isolated that they stood no chance against
Comanche raiders, and governmental support in the form of troops was often insufficient and
militia units in “pitiable condition”, inciting contemporary Josiah Gregg to note that Mexican
troops and settlers were, because they were so outnumbered by the Comanches, often of the
opinion that their resistance was futile, resulting in empty pursuits of Comanche bands that
ended with the Mexican soldiers sleeping in a cornfield to avoid face-to-face confrontation.51
Teodoro Bahre, German merchant in Mexico, pointed out that political insurgencies led the
federal troops to congregate in and around the cities, leaving trading routes exposed to robbers
and thieves. As a result, Bahre lamented, one German merchant house had lost over 3,000
dollars.52 In another letter, Schneider surmised that it would be difficult to make the frontier
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more impervious to attacks by tribes because the population of Mexico’s northern states was
incredibly sparse and scattered. In those states, wrote Schneider, “the organisation of the few
armed forces is lacking, and the local authorities futilely plead for help from the highest
government. One has now transferred to these departments a large portion of the general state
revenue, namely duties from internal tariffs and direct taxes”. This provided significant aid to the
states, though it did occur at the expense of the federal government. Schneider hoped that this
effort would prove successful, because it would enable the states to manage their own police
departments whereas the Mexican army would have to be used less for the defence against
Indian tribes in the form of escorts, securing of trading routes and the pacification of towns.
Nevertheless, he regretted that this re-organisation would more than likely take time to
transpire.53
The idea that Mexico’s inability to properly defend itself against Indian attacks stemmed
in part from an insufficiently large population was shared by Schneider’s contemporaries,
including several French officials. A French memorandum feared that Mexico was “incapable of
defending itself against relentless hostilities of the Indian tribes” and linked this condition to
Mexico’s being “depeopled” and “prey to misery”.54 Saligny also reported on the meeting
between the Texian government and Mexican general Mariano Arista, who aspired to bring
about a peace agreement between Texas and Mexico that would facilitate the protection of the
shared frontier from Comanche raids.55 At the same time as diplomats recognised that a low
population made Mexican towns more susceptible to raids, they also acknowledged that Indian
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attacks caused people to abandon their villages. This is a condition that Mexican General José
Urréa highlighted in a letter to frequent Vice-President and President of Mexico, Valentín
Gómez Farías, where he bemoaned that the “barbaric tribes” responsible for “death, plunder, and
desolation” had commercial connections to both the Texians and U.S.-Americans, from whom
they acquired arms and munitions in exchange for saddleries and other goods robbed from
Northern-Mexican settlers in states such as New Mexico, Chihuahua, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo
Leon, and Tamaulipas. This trade, warned Urréa, was akin to a “war on the nation”, for it
destabilised the Mexican frontier.56 Prussian von Gerolt suggested that the establishment of
military colonies in the northern states of Mexico would help stabilise the country and save it
from excursions by hostile forces, yet also commented that this was an idea that had existed for
quite a while – it could not be executed because the Mexican population was too sparse.57
Mexico’s supposedly numerically insufficient population also impacted European
perceptions in other ways, as Seiffart’s summary of Mexican history reveals. Seiffart’s report
focussed on the Native American population of Mexico that lived largely sedentary lifestyles in
or around Mexico’s cities as opposed to the Comanches and other “warlike” tribes of the
Mexican North. Next to stating that Mexico’s population numbered only roughly eight million
people, of which seven million were Indians, Seiffart surmised that six million of the indigenous
inhabitants were not a part of the international trading network and hence made Mexico less
attractive for German trade because of a lack of consumers. Seiffart explained this condition as
such:
The Indian exists to serve the Mexican, and nothing occurs so that he may forget this
destiny/designation. Thus it is explainable why the Indian has, after three-hundred years
56
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of community with a civilised people [Volk], only forgotten the oppressed culture of his
ancestors without appropriating any of that of his conqueror. If one estimates the Indian
population living in the immediate proximity of the larger towns at one entire million at
most, then there remain at most six million inhabitants to whom the necessities of
civilisation are entirely foreign and who are not drawn to an acquaintance with such by
anything. These six million must, as regards the question concerning the currently
possible extent of sale volumes of foreign industrial products in this country, be excluded
entirely. They are consumers for not one of these products.
Seiffart maintained that only the million Indians living close to the cities and in service of the
Mexicans were possible indigenous consumers of German products, chiefly linen goods.
Nevertheless, linens were “as much a necessity as a luxury” for this class of Mexico’s
population, and beyond the desire for linens, Seiffart did not believe that they formed a
noteworthy component of the consumer base in Mexico. “All other imported goods thus exist
solely for the consumption of the white population, which one cannot peg at more than one
million, and to which one can certainly add no more than ten to twelve-thousand foreigners”.58
Although Seiffart asserted that this portion of the population had a high level of consumption
bordering on extravagance and prodigality (Verschwendung), the fact that he believed that
roughly seventy-five percent of Mexico’s population did not qualify as consumers or/and
participants in international trade at all demonstrates how little European diplomats valued
Native Americans and how significantly their presence altered how Europeans perceived Mexico
commercially.
Prussian official Seiffart also regarded the governmental structure in charge of handling
Indian affairs as insufficient, though for different, slightly more sympathetic, though no less
condescending reasons. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Seiffart described the “Indian as
docile/good-natured, teachable, and skilful himself in some aspects”, and declared that the
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Mexican government had not done anything for his development. It is again likely that Seiffart is
referring not to the more mobile tribes engaged in raiding and plundering, such as the
Comanches, but to those Mexican Indians that lived within Mexican towns and villages, for he
referred to them generally as the “people [Volk] of the peasantry [/serfdom]” in a later passage.
There, he criticised that public education in Mexico at the time was firmly in the grasp of the
clergy, because it was “certainly not the aim or according to the wishes of the clergy that the
people of the peasantry be delivered from the indign idolism with which one blasphemes the
name of Christianity here”. In the same letter, Seiffart identified the Mexican government as
overly idle in the matter of public education, for most schools not led by clergy had been
established by foreigners, predominantly Englishmen and U.S.-Americans. Without the
development of its human capital, including that of its indigenous peoples, Seiffart asserted,
Mexico would not be able to progress its economy and industry, sustaining its dependency upon
European manufactured goods.59 In reference to the cultivation of silk, for instance, Seiffart
believed that the “Indian possessed care and industriousness enough” in order to acquire all of
the skills of a good cultivator of silk.60
The ‘Indian Problem’ also dominated Mexican political debates at the expense of
international trade. Von Gerolt addressed this in one of his reports to the Prussian government
and stated that the Mexican government had not yet evaluated its treaty of commerce and amity
with the Hanse Towns because the responsible “chamber of deputies had not dealt with anything
but the acquisition of monetary means for the combat against the Indians on the northern borders
and the campaign against Texas, which is also why the Hanseatic treaty has not yet been placed
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in front of the respective commission”. Von Gerolt looked upon this situation with unease,
pointing towards unrest among the south-eastern states of Mexico which were at the moment
insurgent. Despite this, von Gerolt wrote, the Mexican central government worried primarily
about its northern frontier, where Indian tribes had renewed their incursions to a level that von
Gerolt described as “devastating”.61 The presence of Native Americans in northern Mexico and
the central government’s inability to defend its states in that region also caused discontent among
these states, where insurgencies were already common. Gómez Farías summarised that the
Mexican Congress had spent a lot on the protection of the Mexican frontier from Indian raids
with little success, that his country faced commercial losses that could only be curbed through
emigration to the frontier regions, and that the actions of northern settlers did not always follow
the guideline of the government.62 Texian officials seemed to be partially aware of this, for H.
McLeod suggested that, because of the “opposition to Santa Anna in northern provinces” of
Mexico, “a counter revolution there, would immediately follow his success into the interior. And
that in that case, the country west of the Rio Grande would gladly avail themselves of our aid in
resisting Santa Anna”. In order to encourage Mexico’s northern provinces to side with Texas,
McLeod proposed enticing them with the promise of protection from Indians: “as a means of
giving protection, as well to the Mexican frontier in case they took part with us, [Gen. Green]
proposed arrangements for conciliating the Indian tribes”.63
The same concern for commerce and nationals’ safety also applied to Texas. A Bremian
official observed that the “civilisation of the country must be incredibly backward, because, with
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the exception of an over-abundance of game, the only foodstuff consumed by the population is
that which has been imported, e.g. salted meat, flour, bacon and butter from North America –
and imported coffee sugar et cetera, even though the country is capable of producing the former
article in large excess and possibly also the latter”. As a cause for the underdeveloped Texian
economy, the Bremian listed the existence of Indian tribes, particularly the Comanches.64 British
officials identified Native American influence in Texas as a possible incentive for Texians to
seek annexation to the U.S. in order to garner more protection from raids and plundering, a
measure that would have had significant repercussions for British commercial interests. Kennedy
reported that an English trader named Redmond, resident of Corpus Christi, had informed him
that “in consequence of the unusually formidable character of the late Indian inroads, the
residents of Corpus Christi had made urgent application for protection to the Government. […] it
was further intimated, by President Houston” that “arrangements should be made for calling in a
protective force from the United States”, particularly if Mexico proved to be behind the Indian
attacks.65 In a report to the Texian Senate, David S. Kaufman lamented that Texas was unable to
prevent Indian hostilities due to its weakness, claiming that Texian families were “made desolate
by the scalping-knife of the savage” and that Texas was falling prey to the “murderous savage or
the predatory Mexican”. Protection, he asserted, could only be provided by the stronger, more
stable United States, because its East lived in “comparative security” and could “come to the aid
of their suffering brethren of the West”. England was rendered in this report as “incapable […] to
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secure our Independence”, with which statement the author rejected European support as an
option of defence against Indian attacks.66
NATIVE AMERICANS, EUROPEAN COLONISATION PROJECTS, AND EUROPEAN CONCEPTIONS OF
RACE
For several European agents, Indian raids formed a key consideration for settlement in
Texas. Saligny regarded the choice of Austin as the republic’s capital as a wise move, because he
believed that this would be “the only way to afford protection from the Indians and to encourage
settlers to venture in this rich land where, with ax [sic] and plough, they will develop the
inexhaustible resources of this rich country”.67 This mention of settlers’ hesitation to explore the
entire Texian state due to the presence of Native American tribes reveals that diplomats did fear
how Indian tribes could impact commerce and nationals’ safety not just in Mexico, but also in
Texas. In fact, Saligny’s erstwhile successor, Viscount Jules de Cramayel, judged many of the
uninhabited parts of Texas as unworthy for planned European settlement, because they were
either places “unsuitable for culture and neglected for this reason” or “frontiers still unoccupied
and exposed to the depredations of Indian hordes”.68 The Texian and Brazos Farmer also
identified Indian raids as a reason for a lack of European settlement, reporting that peace with the
Native American tribes was needed before Texas could “teem with nature’s richest products
under the hand of the peaceful and industrious emigrant who is now afraid to settle on our most
fertile and prolific lands”.69 Whereas this newspaper viewed Indian peace as a prerequisite to
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European migration, the Texas National Register linked migration and Indian affairs in the
opposite manner, suggesting that migrants were needed to defend Texas against attacks by tribes
(mirroring the idea that Mexico needed a larger population in order to fend off Indian raids). The
newspaper esteemed that a “population of steady, industrious Germans, is raising in the west,
that best bulwark against the red-man – actual and permanent occupation of the soil”,
showcasing the belief that Indian tribes did not make proper use of the land and that, due to a
lack of permanent settlement on behalf of some Native American groups, they were not
genuinely entitled to ownership of Texian lands.70 Prussian official von Bülow discouraged his
government from supporting German emigration to Texas due to the additional dangers colonists
would deal with there, including the presence of “savage tribes”.71 Another Prussian statesman
questioned the value of German colonisation in Texas, surmising that the presence of the
“fearsome Comanche Indians” made the most fertile and suitable tracts inhospitable.72 Briton
Kennedy, who viewed von Solms’ project favourably, feared that “a single Indian inroad might
break up the first establishments, and affect disastrously the entire plan of the Association”,
demonstrating how pivotal Indians were to plans of European migrations to Texas.73
Europeans also feared that emigrants might become savage through association with
Indian tribes, which deterred some officials from supporting emigration. Elliot feared that one
might find the British Emigrant who “comes into contact with the American or frontier Stations
[…] squalid, poor and a Wreck”.74 Kennedy shared this belief, and argued that certain Europeans
were better suited for living in the wilderness than others. The Germans he regarded as “the most
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successful”, a reputation that preceded them, and considered that the Irish fared well, also. The
French, however, he deemed as unsuited for Texas, evincing “the least aptitude for the situation
in which they are placed”. “A Frenchman left to himself in an insulated Settlement”, maintained
Kennedy, “will soon become barbarized”.75 The possible ‘barbarisation’ of Europeans through
contact with Indian tribes, particularly the Comanches, is also addressed by Hämäläinen, who
writes that many Spanish and Mexican officials had the “fear of being culturally consumed by
the bárbaros”, whose dress and habits some northern Mexican villagers had already adopted in
order to engage in trade and more fruitful relations with the Comanches.76 The German
Adelsverein pressed for closely placed German settlements to prevent the dissolution of the
civilised German nationality into that of the American “yankees”, who were described as
backwood individuals and squatters against whom no “foreign, more civilised element” would
stand a chance, highlighting the idea that life in the wilderness had made U.S.-Americans less
civilised than a German.77
Germans in particular discussed how Texas’ Native American tribes would impact
emigration thereto. As the Texas National Register’s article showcases, German settlers formed a
significant portion of migration to Texas.78 A German pamphlet on Adelsverein addressed the
ambilateral issue of immigration and Indian affairs in the young republic, stating that Texian
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independence could only be guaranteed through internal consolidation and strength, something
that could only be achieved through a “quick expansion of the population (through
immigration)”. At the same time, the pamphlet also noted that German emigrants had to take
precautions in Texas, not for reasons of climate or other environmental challenges, but the threat
of Indian attacks. The Adelsverein only had limited resources available to provide for the
necessary protection of their emigrants, which would cap the number of families moving to
Texas at two-hundred for the first year.79 German Captain Colloredo Mansfeld expressed
scepticism regarding the planned settlement of German emigrants in Texas, citing that reports
highlighted that the available tracts of land were in Indian territory. Given that German settlers
were thus susceptible to Indian raids, Mansfeld inquired who would be there to protect the
‘peaceful’ Germans.80 Subsequently, in a memorandum of the Society, the Adelsverein
concluded that the German colonists needed land grants adjoined to one another to facilitate
“security against the Savages”.81 Another report of the Society also urged that measures against
the Indian tribes had to be taken in order to guarantee the safety for their settlers.82
Given the large number of Germans who sought to emigrate, many societies and
enterprises advertised various locations around the globe as best-suited for German settlement,
including Hungary, Texas, the United States, or Australia. The presence, number, and
characteristics of the native populations of these various places formed a chief consideration for
emigrants and were thus portrayed by advocates of emigration in a certain manner depending on
which location they favoured and supported. A pamphlet on the Third Expedition to Port
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Adelaide in Southern Australia endeavoured to extol Southern Australia and in doing so
provided arguments against German settlement in Texas and the United States. Next to economic
factors, such as travelling costs and distances as well as the suitability and fertility of the land,
the pamphlet also considered the native population of Southern Australia as incredibly docile and
peaceful. “The number of natives”, claimed the pamphlet, “coulored persons with plain hair,
beard and well-developed extremities, is very low and seems to decrease continuously […] The
enmity between the tribes, infanticide and an itinerant lifestyle seems to be the causes for this
decrease. The British government seeks to civilise the savages, it only succeeds seldom in getting
them to work and tying them to education […] there is an attorney employed in Adelaide to
protect the rights of the natives and to spare them from slavery and maltreatment”. One settler,
Christian Bothe, was cited as having written to his brothers that “the tribes who live here are very
good/friendly, some of them are also working, although they do not want to know anything about
the word of God”. In general, the pamphlet described Southern Australia as incredibly safe and
stable, highlighting that the German “colony enjoyed complete tranquillity and security of
property”, something that could not be said for Texas or the U.S.83
Another society supported the emigration of Germans to Brazil, suggesting that this
region was extremely well-suited for settlement because of its low population density.84 Wilhelm
Friedrich Karl Stricker, a German historian, doctor, and journalist, stated that German “settlers
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[…] enjoyed greater rights than the natives”, and that settlers in Brazil lived relatively peacefully
among one another, be they German, French, English, Brazilian, or North American. Settlements
were surrounded by “negroes, Indians of all tribes, and several mixed races”, but Stricker does
not point to any hostilities toward European emigrants.85 The Fränkische Merkur, a newspaper,
asserted that Brazil might be a better destination for German emigrants because they were less
likely to mix with the “Portuguese tribe” living there as opposed to the North American in the
U.S., where Germans assimilated within a few generations.86 Although the pamphlet itself exists
only in a very incomplete form in the Texas-related Bremian archival materials, the fact that the
society behind this enterprise touted Brazil by underlining its vast regions suitable for settlement
and void of people does reveal that the presence of indigenous populations played a factor for
migrants.
As the reference to the “Portuguese tribe” exemplifies, German opinions on the
inhabitants of the destinations for emigrants were not just limited to Native Americans. Hungary
constituted one of the most-discussed regions for German settlement, and for supporters of
Texas, also one of the most hated. Captain Mansfeld emphasised that, though Indian attacks in
Texas may harass the German settlers, the latter would be able to defend themselves if living in a
properly built plantation complex, which would make life no more dangerous than that in
Hungary during the presence of the “swarming Turks” from which the villagers of Hungary had
to seek protection.87 The Würzburg pamphlet on German emigration to Texas stated that “the
colonisation in Texas is judged in very varied manners, partially because the circumstances in
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Texas are very little known, partially because we have party interests of entrepreneurs to combat,
who tout other places for immigration in their own interest, (even the Hungarian feverish airs
[Fieberlüfte] and the Flugsandsteppen of the banat, for the increase of the legally thusly called
misera contribuens plebs, and in an epoch where ultra-Magyarism has witnessed an increase in
the Germanic principle of the Todfeind)”.88 The writer of the pamphlet much preferred Texas to
Hungary for the above-stated reasons of viewing Hungary – and south-eastern Europe – as
unhealthy and infertile, home to insalubrious air and sand dunes.89
Der Bayerische Landbote had similarly negative views of Hungary and Magyarism, i.e.
Hungarian nationalism. After listing many reasons for the future success of colonisation efforts
in Texas, the writer noted that “it must thus have caused the highest indignation, when one had to
hear vociferated the worst vilifications and denigrations of the noble intentions of the Society for
the Protection of German Immigrants to Texas in a recently published leaflet entitled: ‘The
Emigration of Germans to Texas, North America and Hungary, a w a r n i n g t o t h e n a t i o
n, Munich by Georg Franz 1844’”. This publication, authored by an Austrian named Mathias
Koch, aspired to denigrate any trans-Atlantic or generally overseas migration of Germans,
praising Hungary as a destination instead. Like the Würzburg pamphlet, the Bayerische Landbote
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emphasised the presence of Magyarism and fevers in Hungary. In addition, the newspaper also
criticised manorialism and feudalism, which restricted the freedoms of Germans who migrated
there, unlike in Texas, where the constitution, inspired by U.S.-American example, guaranteed
that the settler should have “all advantages and freedoms which one can wish for”. In Hungary, a
lord of the manor could even, according to the author of Der Bayerische Landbote, restrict the
amount of acorns that a German settler used to feed his pigs. Such insolence and hubris
combined with the outgrowths of Magyarism, argued the newspaper, had led to the formation of
a “contrepoid in a great many patient [/meek] Germans”.90
The Bavarian representative in communication with the Adelsverein, von HormayrHortenburg, referred to the same pamphlet authored by M. Koch, labelling it a brochure
conceived by the “most brusque ignorance regarding all trans-Atlantic conditions”, which sought
to demote any settlement in North America and eschewed the colonisation of Texas. The “sole
beatific solution” to German overpopulation was, according to Koch, Hungary and the Banat.
Von Hormayr-Hortenburg, however, argued that the “current crisis showcases […] urgently the
necessity of strengthening the German principle vis-à-vis Magyarism and Slavism” due to the
“highest irritability and the distrustful [/suspicious] repugnancy of the Stockungarn”.91 Von

90

A contrepoid is a counterweight. Der Bayerische Landbote, July 20, 1844, No. 202, in StA HB: C. 26.
Stockungarn is a word that was only used seldom, and usage seems to be restricted to the 19 th century. An 1847
book by Joseph Baron OW on the ancestry of the Greeks defines Stockungarn as “those who speak only their own
language”, whilst an 1811 volume on the geographic, historical, and statistical conditions of Europe refers to
“Stockungarn or Magyars”, suggesting that the two are synonymous. See: Joseph Baron OW., Die Abstammung der
Griechen und die Irrthümer und Täuschungen des Dr. Ph. Fallmerayer. Mit einem Anhange ueber Sprache, Volk,
und Fremdenherrschaft in Griechenland (München: Verlag von Georg Franz, 1847), 20-21, and Carl Ritter,
Europa: Ein geographisch-historisch-statistisches Gemählde für Freunde und Lehrer der Geographie, für Jünglinge
die ihren Cursus vollendeten, den jedem Lehrbuche zu gebrauchen, Zweyter Theil (Frankfurt a.M.: J. C. H.
Buchhandlung, 1811), 43. The Wiener Allgemeine Musik-Zeitung calls the Stockungarn the “Magyars that build the
core of Hungary”, and Hesperus: Ein Nationalblatt für gebildete Leser calls the Stockungarn the Ur-Ungaren, i.e.
the ancestral stock of Hungary. See: Wiener Allgemeine Musik-Zeitung, August 17, 1847, No. 98, Year 7, and
Hesperus: Ein Nationalblatt für gebildete Leser, April 1814, No. 17. The issues from 1814 have been collected in a
volume entitled Hesperus: Encyclopaedische Zeitschrift für gebildete Leser (J. G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung,
1814), see page 133. As such, the Stockungarn referred to by von Hormayr-Hortenburg are ethnic Hungarians.
German media often described them as rather nationalistic, particularly during the rise of Hungarian nationalism or
91

246

Hormayr-Hortenburg criticised the Hungarian climate, “the pressure of the obligarchy [sic], the
lack of freedom and security of property, which crushes even all large commercial and
transactional traffic […] in the wonderful Hungary”, promoting Texas as a destination instead.92
Pro-Texian German newspapers, such as Der Bayerische Landbote, also sought to portray the
Indian situation in Texas as well taken care of in order to promote German emigration to Texas.
The Bavarian newspaper asserted that “Texas had treaties with all Indian tribes save for the
Comanches, who wanted to appear at the peace convention in April of this year” and that “the
Texian government has had, for about a year now, a company on horseback on the Indian
frontier, and since then, one does not hear of Indians, who do no more than stealing horses,
which has been spoiled for them”.93
Next to German emigration societies and pro-Texian newspapers, who had obvious
incentives to tout Texas as an ideal place for German settlement and downplay the frequency and
severity of Indian attacks, there were also some diplomats who saw the new Texas republic as
more capable of handling the Indian situation than Mexico. British representative J. T. Crawford
commented in 1837 that the Texian government had, next to the regular army, established
“several Companies of Rangers on the various Frontiers to check the Indian Tribes. – These last
however have but little occupation, as the Policy of General Houston has been conciliatory and
he has very lately entered into Treaties with the most influential Chiefs”. Nevertheless, should
there be need for defence, Crawford surmised that Texas had a fairly positive outlook because it
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was a country where “every man is a Marksman and carries his Rifle”, showcasing that Crawford
believed that Texas had the sufficient manpower to repel attacks, and as of late had such a large
number of soldiers for this purpose that many of them remained underutilised.94 Saligny pointed
out in March of 1840 that “the government has recently determined on more vigorous measures
which will soon put an end to their [Indian] plundering”, and he commented several times on
Texian troops’ efforts to pursue raiding bands. Only a short while later, Saligny recorded on
March 17, 1840, that “the energetic measures of the government against the Indians have
produced good results. Travel is now much easier and safer”. Though the presence of Native
Americans surrounding Texian towns continued to force travellers to take lengthier detour
routes, Saligny noted that he “travelled with an escort of fifty Texian volunteers, and this was
sufficient to keep the Lipans and Tonkaways at a respectful distance”, suggesting that he valued
the Texian government’s efforts to guard against Indian tribes.95 By 1843, a year in which Texas
established more treaties with many Indian tribes, opinions on how threatening the Native
Americans of Texas were did change on both sides of the Atlantic, because a pacification of the
Indians seemed possible.
Although diplomatic perceptions of Native Americans were rather negative – especially
as regards the tribes of Texas, who were seen as violent and destructive – officials did recognise
that a more peaceful coexistence with them had to be sought. Thus, newspapers and
correspondence do offer some more positive accounts of Indian tribes when discussing peace
settlements with them. Elliot praised Houston’s policy of seeking peace with the various tribes,
judging it as “particularly honorable” and “wise”. He furthermore criticised that “the most
tremendous crime of these modern times is the treatment of the Indians on this Continent.
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Robbers and Murderers pronounce that the civilized man cannot live in peace with the Indian,
and the whole Christian world accepts the precious falsehood”.96 Saligny commented on the
Texian willingness to make concessions to Native American tribes, stating that the Texian
government had promised the Comanche tribe that they could, should they sign a peace treaty
with Texas and “remain abident to the laws of the country, count on, like all the inhabitants of
Texas, the protection of the government”.97 The Texian and Brazos Farmer reported in 1843 that
several Indian treaties were being negotiated, and that a successful treaty had been concluded
with the “Delawares, Shawnees, Ironise, Caddoes, Wacoes, Tahuachonaies, Keachies,
Wichetaws, Anadakahs, and Quapaws”, which had been “anxious to make” such a treaty and
were eager to also “preserve peace with the wild tribes”.98 The newspapers hoped that a “final
treaty can be made in October, which will include all the tribes in Texas and effect a lasting and
permanent peace”. Whereas Native Americans were often described as ‘savage’ in many
newspapers, this account of peace settlements spoke instead of “Indian eloquence” and printed
several statements made by Indian chiefs, such as the speech of Qahquash [sic], the Waco
chief.99 Although more sympathetic towards the Native Americans of Texas, Thos. Johnson, the
editor, maintained a condescension nonetheless, stating that the writers of the Texian and Brazos
Farmer “cannot believe in the doctrine of making friends with oue [sic] or two tribes of Indians,
in order that they may make war on the other tribes, and thereby lead to the final extermination
of all the sons of the forest – it is a policy at once inhuman, barbarous, unchristian and
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unstatesmanlike”. This reveals that many Texian diplomats endeavoured to use Indian tribes for
their own benefit.
Texian officials desired to employ Native Americans for their own advantage, by playing
tribes against one another and using them to distinguish themselves from Mexicans and
portraying Mexico as the national enemy or to take a stance in the matter of the annexation or
independence of their republic. Even editor Johnson, who claimed he did not deem the policy of
using a friendship with one tribe to incite a war against another desirable nor honourable, held
such ulterior motives, as he revealed by writing that he believed that the Texian “frontier will be
protected better than by a standing army” once peace with the Indian tribes had been made,
demonstrating his desire to use Native American tribes for his nation’s gain.100 Saligny reported
that Texian statesmen sought to use the animosity between the Comanches on the one hand and
the Tonkaways and Lepans on the other by using forces from the latter two tribes to march
against the former.101 British statesman Charles Elliot pointed out that President Houston had
advised him in a meeting that, whereas he had “the sincerest disposition to adjust the difficulties”
with Mexico and sought to “cultivate most friendly relations” between that and his republic, he
regarded the incessant raids by Mexico upon the Texian frontier as so problematic that he may
have to incite “measures of a similar nature, but of far more extensive effect”. In order to do so,
Houston hoped to use Indian warriors, for “the relations of this Government with certain Indian
tribes always left it in his power to carry on a warfare of the most formidable description along
the whole Eastern frontier of Mexico”.102 This demonstrates that the coexistence of Texians with
Indian tribes occurred not merely under the banner of peace, but frequently to further Texian
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motives. Saligny also commented on Texas’ desire to pacify the Indians so that “considerable
and lucrative trade” could be established between the tribes and Texians, showcasing Texian
commercial motives for peace with Native Americans.103
Another individual, Thaddeus di Lusignan, had self-reportedly “lived among the
Indians”, feeling “as they do”, and approached the British government for aid to prevent the U.S.
annexation of Texas. The Indians, he claimed “could they but receive powder and flints from the
Canadian Military Posts, would soon Master the Country West of the Mississipi [sic]. They can
appreciate to its real value the boasted power of the United States. They have Witnessed the
Black Hawk expedition (1832) and also the Florida War […] they are now aware of their own
strength”. Di Lusignan had dislike for the U.S.-Americans, and desired that annexation not take
place, but wrote that he begged “from the Foreign Office; in the event of the Annexation I have
mentioned, the office will know it a long time before the fact is made public. – Could I hope to
receive hint, as early as possible, so that I could hasten home and begin operations
immediately”.104 Though di Lusignan asserted that he had a kinship with several Indian tribes, he
also labelled them as “savage” and did not identify himself as being part of any tribe, simply
having lived among them.105 It is also apparent that di Lusignan appealed strongly to Britain’s
own interests, suggesting that an armament of Indians would possibly repel the U.S.-Americans
from succeeding in the annexation of Texas.
Teodoro Bahre was one of the few individuals in the correspondence evaluated who
explained the hostility among certain Indian tribes. In one of his reports, Bahre summarised a
story circulating in Mexico that Santa Anna had been pursued by a group of Native Americans,
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from whom he had fled in disguise and the accompaniment of no more than six men. The
Indians, Bahre stated, had been robbed of their land, and were so irate that they had continued to
pursue Santa Anna, whom they had eventually imprisoned. In order to buy his freedom, Santa
Anna had offered them money under the provision that they leave the country, yet Bahre had no
information as of March 1845 whether the President had been released or not. What this event
illustrates is that Native American hostilities in the Texian borderlands, and in fact the remainder
of North America, were often tied to land disputes, and that Europeans had an awareness of this
circumstance.106 In a speech, U.S.-American politician John Quincy Adams likewise pointed to
the fact that the “Indian savage” had been “the original possessor of the land from which you are
scourging him already back to the foot of the Rocky Mountains”, and denounced those who
sought to distinguish themselves from and condescend to other racial groups because of their
Anglo-Saxon background. “Oh! yes, sir!”, spoke Adams, “far be it from me to depreciate the
glories of the Anglo-Saxon race; although there have been times when they bowed their necks
and submitted to the law of conquest, beneath the ascendency of the Norman race”. Adams used
his speech to showcase that Native Americans in North-America had not been treated kindly by
the Anglo-Saxon settlers of the area, and labelled the Anglo-Saxon as the “exterminator of the
Indians” – quite an apt explanation for the hostility on behalf of some Indian tribes.107
NATIVE AMERICANS AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR TEXIAN INDEPENDENCE
The presence of Native American tribes in the Texas region also played another role, this
one more intrinsically for the Texian diplomats rather than their European counterparts. Texian
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statesmen used Mexico’s conduct regarding Indians as a justification for Texian independence by
alleging that the Mexican government had not adequately addressed the ‘Indian Problem’ of
northern Mexico and Texas. Hämäläinen points toward this, writing that the Texian
representatives cited the inability of Mexican governmental agencies to defend Texas against
Comanche raids as one of the reasons for the petitioned separation of Texas from Mexico. The
settlers lamented that certain communities “have disappeared entirely; in some of them the
residents dying to the last man […] Many early settlers and their descendants have been
sacrificed to the barbarians […] Every last one of us is probably threatened with total
extermination by the new Comanche uprising”.108 In a letter from Texian James Hamilton to
Mexican president Santa Anna, the former desired to vindicate the Texian revolutionaries by
listing several factors of injustice on behalf of Mexico. One such aspect laid out by Hamilton
was the claim that the Mexican government had less claim to the state of Texas as a result of its
fear of Indian tribes, in response to which it invited Anglo-American settlers to the northern
territory – Hamilton wrote that “these colonies of the Anglo-American race were introduced to
protect your own colonies from the hordes of the Comanche Indians, from which your troops had
fled so shamefully despite their sumptuous bravery”, indicating that the Mexican government
had no right to interfere with the Anglo-American presence in Texas now because it had been
sought out by a cowardly Mexico incapable of defending its settlements against Indian raids.109
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In another letter, Gómez Farías reiterated this Texian viewpoint and addressed that the
Texians did not perceive themselves as “usurping intruders, they were invited to take up
residence in Mexico primarily by the Spanish and later the Mexican authorities, […] they were
called upon to colonise, not for their own interests but for those of Spain and Mexico in order to
protect a debile province without the help of the nomadic Indian tribes”.110 Texian Anson Jones
echoed Hamilton’s argument in one of his letters, writing that Mexico had provoked the North
American immigration in order to safeguard its territory from the attacks of Indian ‘savages’.111
Hämäläinen provides several more examples of Texians who believed they deserved to secede
from Mexico because of their bravery in the face of Comanche attacks, something that Mexicans
had not demonstrated. William H. Wharton, for instance, argued that Anglo-Americans had
“conquered an underused wilderness from the Indians” whereas Mexicans “could not be induced
to venture into the wilderness of Texas”.112 Indeed, the Anglo belief that they had the ability to
tame the Texian wilderness occupied by “savage tribes” whereas Mexico did not, continued after
the U.S.-Mexico War: As Brian DeLay has illustrated, article 11 of the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, which ended the war and ceded much of Mexico’s northern territory to the United
States, established that the United States assumed the responsibility of forcibly restraining Indian
incursions into Mexico and rescuing Mexicans held captive by Native American tribes. This
showcases that U.S.-Americans remained optimistic that they could subjugate tribes such as the
Comanches.113 The United States had underestimated the power of the Native Americans in its
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new Southwest, however: years later, the United States, knowing that it had not been able to
bring Indian tribes under its control, insisted that the Gadsden Treaty had released it from all
liability when the Mexican government asked for restitution for Indian raids.114
The way in which the Mexican government handled the presence of Native Americans in
the region was interpreted by Texian officials in a second fashion, likewise to help build Texas’
case for continued independence from Mexico and to cast Mexico as the Texian enemy. Texian
officials often accused Mexico of inciting hostile Native American action in Texas, such as
raiding and plundering. The Morning Star reported that it was believed that a band of Karankawa
Indians had been instigated by Mexico to rob a merchant in Lamar, and the Civilian and
Galveston Gazette commented that Bexar was “an extreme frontier town, insulated from the rest
of Texas, eminently exposed to attack from Indians, or Mexican banditti”.115 A report of the
acting Secretary of War and Marine from November 1844, printed in the Texas National
Register, summarised that Texian “relations with Mexico” had “assumed a more threatening
aspect”, and linked “depredations in the neighborhood of San Antonio” to a party “composed of
Camanches, Wacoes and Mexicans, who fought desperately”; moreover, the report noted that a
“small settlement at Corpus Christi ha[d] experienced considerable annoyance by both Indians
and marauding Mexicans”.116 British statesman Kennedy recorded similar occurrences, noting
that there had “been a petty Indian inroad, attended with some loss of life, at Corpus Christi,
which is also threatened by Mexican Marauders”.117 In a letter to Joseph Count von BoosWaldeck, an unknown member of the Adelsverein likewise emphasised that raids and plundering
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were not merely executed by Indians, but also Mexicans, which is why the author of the letter
recommended that the Verein not take a land grant close to the Mexican border.118 Saligny
complained that Indian raids were possibly made worse because they were planned and executed
“with the Mexicans who do not cease to incite [the Indian tribes] against Texas”.119
Texian officials also instrumentalised such collusions – be they fact or fiction – between
Mexicans and Indians in order to demote Mexicans racially as barbarous and savage. Another
issue of the Civilian, in criticising the conduct of a U.S. dragoon that had run into conflict with a
Texian troop, wrote that the behaviour of the U.S.-American captain had been so shameful,
“Armijo himself could scarcely have acted more barbarously towards our citizens, had he have
captured them, than to disarm and turn them adrift in the wilderness, without provisions or the
means to procure them, in the neighborhood of bodies of hostile Mexicans, and surrounded by
savages”. This statement is representative of Texians’ perception of Mexican officials as
barbarous and Mexican peoples as dangerous, listed together with Indian ‘savages’.120 From the
War Quarter spoke of those Mexicans living peacefully among the Texian settlers of the Corpus
Christi area as “domesticated”, a word typically reserved for animals in service of humans.121 In
President Jones’ message from December 1844, Mexico was execrated for its supposedly
“barbarous policy toward Texas”, which entailed declaring against Texas “a war of savage
extermination”, thus linking the Mexican government’s conduct to those of savages, i.e.
uncivilised persons.122 Ebenezer Allen shared this view, referring to Mexico’s “intention to
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prosecute the war upon Texas” as “barbarous”.123 Mexican observers were aware of this AngloAmerican impugnation on their nationality, criticising that Anglo-Americans had not merely
taken part of their territory and taken their property but also “called us barbarians and thieves”.124
Mexico, so said one author, did not seek to fight a cruel war against Texas and instead sought to
resolve the issue as peacefully as possible, “observing the rules that humanity dictates and that
civilisation recommends”.125 A statement that had been written by the Texian Secretary of War
in which Mexicans are labelled as “semi-barbaric” and characterised as equally treacherous to
the “inhumane savages”, the Indian tribes, circulated in a translated version among Mexican
statesmen, demonstrating further that they were aware of the Texians’ racial hatred.126
One individual who was deeply involved in inciting hostility toward Mexico using
comparisons to or actions of Native Americans was General Duff Green. A newspaper excerpt
spoke of the news shared by General Green from Mexico pertaining to a Mexican order “to
exterminate the present inhabitants of Texas, without regard to age, sex, or condition”, which the
newspaper entitled as “savage orders”.127 This announcement by Green was met with scepticism
by various contemporaries, including Kennedy, as well as the Prince von Solms, who doubted
that “such a thing could be done in our days”, labelling such an act “hors de saison” and so
unimaginable that he had to keep himself from telling Green that he thought “nothing” of the act
for he could not believe it to be accurate despite Green’s assurances.128 Charles Elliot generally
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accused Green of fabricating, in several ways, “nothing short of a conspiracy against Mexico”,
and suggested that Green’s motives were “a subject of curiosity and interest” due to their
ambiguity.129 Another one of Green’s ideas had been the removal of Indians from Texas, and due
to a lack of clarity in his statement on the matter, several observers feared he desired to deport
tribes into Mexico where they might wreak havoc. Though Elliot highlighted that Green had not
in fact disclosed such motive, he did conclude that “it is not so plain that the driving back of the
Comanchee and Apache tribes upon Mexico would be equally advantageous to that Republic”,
exhibiting the potential risks the Texian Indian project could have for Mexico.130
Yet again, John Quincy Adams identified this trend among Anglo-Saxons in the United
States and Texas, when he asked in a speech what “the feelings of all this motley compound of
your Southern population” were “towards the compound equally heterogeneous of the Mexican
population? Do not you, an Anglo-Saxon, […] hate the Mexican-Spaniard-Indian”? Adams
characterised the Mexican citizen as carrying “the torch of liberty in his hand”, seeking, among
other things, the “revenge to the native Indian”, and asserted that Mexico would, in the case of a
U.S.-Mexico war, look for help among Native Americans as well as African Americans, making
it a “Mexican, an Indian, and a negro war” for the United States. Such a war Adams referred to
as a “war of races – the Anglo-Saxon American pitted against the Moorish-Spanish-Mexican
American; a war between the Northern and Southern halves of North America”. As the statement
regarding Mexico’s “revenge to the native Indian” demonstrates, Adams failed to identify the
disdain that certain factions of Mexican society held against some Indian tribes, such as the
Comanches. Yet this speech nevertheless highlights that statesmen often saw the Mexican and
Indian populations as racially intertwined, a condition which Texians used to justify their
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independence and their hatred for Mexico.131 The same was also observed by a French
newspaper, the Journal des Débats, which stated that “the multitude of Anglo-Americans
despises the Mexicans who, in return, as said by M. Adams, detest the same wholeheartedly. The
North Americans have an awareness of their superiority with regard to their indolent neighbours,
and they have concluded that they are destined to dominate and invade them”132
Though Texians much more frequently engaged in discussions tying Mexico to Native
Americans raids in order to debase the mother republic from which Texas had seceded, the same
can also be observed among European observers. Saligny – possibly influenced by the opinions
of Texian newspapers – reported in March of 1839 that the recommencement of Indian raids in
West Texas had been “incited by Mexico”, and asserted a year later that Austin’s surroundings
were “exposed to the attacks of the Mexicans as well as the savages”.133 Victor Bracht, a German
author who moved to Texas, claimed that Mexican President-General Santa Anna was the “war
chief of the Comanches”, ignoring Mexico’s own significant problems with said tribe and
alleging instead that the Mexican government and Comanche tribe worked together.134 British
official Francis C. Sheridan identified that the Texian “contempt for the Mexicans and Indians”
was the driving factor “inconsequence of which [the Texians] consider themselves competent to
stand alone”, unveiling that the reasoning Hamilton had applied in his letter to Santa Anna was
not lost on the Europeans.135 Interestingly, Saligny also used the demotion of character by way of
comparing it to that of the ‘uncivilised Indian’ against the Texians on at least one occasion,
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writing that he was “tempted to believe [himself] in the midst of a Tribe of Savages rather than a
civilized and friendly nation, unless the Texian government shakes off its inconceivable lethargy
[…] and to make an honorable reparation to France for the wrong done her”. What this statement
shows is that the comparison or conflation with Native American tribes was perceived and used
by statesmen as an insult and used to dishonour one’s opponent or to spur them into action to
tidy their image by removing whatever condition gave them the semblance of an Indian tribe. In
the case of Saligny, this means that he sought to motivate the Texian government to make
reparations to France by alleging that its current action was akin to that of an uncivilised
nation.136
The perception of Mexicans as weak, cowardly, and racially tied to Indians with whom
they also shared a hatred for Texas that caused them to induce or participate in treacherous
Indian attacks on the young republic also constituted a component of the broader racial ideology
that some statesmen applied to the conflict between the Anglo-Saxon Americans and those of the
Spanish or Mexican race. Not all prejudice and dislike for Mexicans, Texians, or U.S.-Americans
was necessarily racially motivated, as the discussions of the Adelsverein demonstrate. In one of
his reports, for instance, Prince von Solms expressed distrust towards U.S-Americans and
Mexicans in Texas, claiming that the German settlers should not rely on either to transmit
messages and should instead establish their own network because “there is no one among the
Americans and Mexicans here in Texas that is trustworthy”.137 This suspicion regarding the
Mexicans and U.S-Americans stemmed more from socio-economic interest rather than racial
misgivings, as seen in a later report by von Solms, in which he noted that he aspired to provide a
“great future, a rich reward, and entirely new stimulus to everything in the beloved Germany”

136
137

Saligny to Mayfield, March 29, 1841, FLTx, 230-232.
Prince von Solms’ Second Report dated August 20, 1844, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.

260

rather than, as Fisher had asserted according to von Solms, remaining hostile to all Americans.138
Nevertheless, there are many accounts in the correspondence and newspapers of the time in
which the story of Texas is evaluated and analysed as a racial war.
Texian representative Hamilton cemented his idea that the Texians were, as AngloSaxons, more racially fit to settle Texas and the Americas than their Mexican counterparts in a
letter to the British government, where he stated that “the best resources of Texas are her moral
Resources – in the Anglo American and Anglo Saxon Race, who are in permanent and [illeg.]
occupation of the Southern portion of the American Continent, who belong essentially to a law
abiding and debt paying people”. This political effort to persuade the British government of
Texas’ stability and financial credibility found its backing in a racial argument of Anglo-Saxon
astuteness and uprighteousness. Hamilton continued that “if in spite of her natural resources if
[sic] Texas has not the forecast to provide for the payment of the comparatively insignificant
Loan she desires to negotiate, Great Britain will be entitled de jure under the ultima ratio to
foreclose the mortgage”, but emphasised thereafter that “Texas will make no default. Where has
the Anglo Saxon Race ever established a Colony in a propitious climate, and fertile soil that it
has not grown into a powerful State? Texas will form no exception to this invariable Law of
Anglo Saxon power”. It was, according to Hamilton, primarily the race of the Texians that
enabled them to prosper, an advantage that by inference Mexico had not. Moreover, Hamilton
pointed out the racial ties between British and Texian nationals, claiming that an independent
Texas “gives to Great Britain a friendly ally belonging to her own blood and race”. The
argument of Anglo-Saxon prosperity and power was one that Britain could hardly deny, and to
stress this, Hamilton paid tribute to the British as the Texians’ ancestors, praising that Texas,
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“speaking the language and worshipping at the altars of old England, she will bear the standard
of Religion, Literature and Laws over a Region more comprehensive than the dominion of the
Casars [sic] to the remote ages of a distant prosperity”. Due to the lack of positive arguments
regarding Texas’ finances, which were in shambles, Hamilton relied on notions of race to
achieve his goal of receiving a loan for his republic.139
Hamilton’s effort to convince the British government of the entitlement of Anglo-Saxon
Texians to possess Texas, previously part of Mexico, also incorporated a comparison of the
degenerate Mexican and the powerful Anglo-Saxon races: “It is quite obvious that the debased
and corrupt Race who hold in temporary occupation, the delightful Region comprehended within
the temporary Limits of Mexico cannot long continue permanently to possess it”, he wrote,
“more especially when the Anglo Saxon Race, through Texas begin to press closely upon them.”
He accused the Mexican government of “popular anarchy and governmental misrule” which
would only lead to Mexico’s “dissolution which must terminate in a feeble and disjointed
federative system”. Hamilton extended this Anglo-Saxon right to own Texas beyond the young
republic’s borders, declaring that “the Northern Provinces of Mexico are now ripe for Rebellion,
for which an Invasion by Texas of Mexico would be the first signal”, underlining the Texian
desire to expand into regions of Mexico which the debauched Mexicans were incapable of and
unqualified to rule, anyhow.140 According to Hämäläinen, Mexico’s inability to fend off
Comanche raids played a factor in Anglo-Americans’ dislike for the Mexicans even on a racial
basis, for they had yielded to “savage rule”.141
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Hamilton’s connections are interesting, because they underline the emerging racial
thought of the era. He compares the Anglo-American race’s ‘dominion’ to that of Caesar, thus
drawing a connection to the Roman Empire. As Liebersohn and Penny have argued, Germans
with sympathy for Native Americans often drew parallels between the indigenous of North
America and the Germanic tribal societies that resisted Roman rule and conquest. Hamilton is
alluding here to the opponent of these tribes as a model for the Texian state and Anglo-American
race. Nevertheless, as Horsman has shown, the same similarities that gave German travellers a
partiality towards Native Americans were also turned by German nationalists into the tenets of
emerging racial theories and thus contributed to the increased desire to highlight one’s own race
vis-à-vis those of others. Tacitus’ ideas were combined by German scholars in the 1840s with the
vision of the Aryans as “vigorous peoples sweeping westward”, which became, amalgamated
with the myth of the freedom-loving Anglo-Saxons, a cornerstone of U.S. racial ideology of the
nineteenth century and a justification for U.S. expansionism and imperialism.142 A message from
Anson Jones to the Texian Congress manifests this: Jones stated that “the history of their [AngloAmerican] migrations, and that of the noble race from which they sprung, clearly demonstrates,
that, neither in the climes of the farthest east, nor in the islands of Australia and the Pacific, nor
in the wilds and praries [sic] of the West, have they ever in a single instance as a people or a
cummunity [sic] degenerated from the distinguished virtues of their ancestrel [sic] stock, nor
become degraded by adopting in their intercourse with savages, any of the barbarous usages or
customs incident to savage life”.143 No matter where Anglo-Saxons went, they brought with
them a superior form of civilisation.
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The French, predominantly consul Saligny, likewise engaged in analyses of the AngloAmerican and Mexican races, regarding the former as the dominator of the latter. Like Hamilton,
a French memorandum on Texas portrayed the Texians as financially shrewd, stating that with
the “entrepreneurial and speculative genius of the American race, these miserable villages [of
Texas] and these humble dwellings can one day become remarkable towns and buildings”.144
The American race Saligny titled as “indomitable and creative” and he lauded it for taming the
“vast wilderness” that had existed only a few years prior during Spanish reign.145 In another
letter, he described the Anglo-American race as being known for their “restless temperament,
their insatiable avidity, their unbridled ambition, their adventurousness, their boldness, and their
tenacity”; a people who did not merely dream of the “conquest of the Indian, the bear, and the
buffalo”, but also all of Mexico. Saligny alleged that the entire North American Southwest was
“destined to be conquered by the Anglo-American race within a quarter of a century”, which did
not interest the people of Europe much because Mexico’s malfortune was there perceived as “a
just punishment inflicted by heaven on a people deplored by responsible and informed men of all
civilized nations”.146 Not only had Mexico brought its own misery upon itself, but Texians were,
according to the French memorandum, justified to take the land because they were a productive
and consumating people” venturing into a land “which would have remained deserted and
uncultivated in the hands of Mexico”.147 Together with his contemporary Gaillardet, Saligny did
not believe that the Mexicans would stand a chance against the brave race of Anglo-American
Texians.148 The “miserable Spanish race of Mexico, moronic, degraded, worn out in physique as
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in morale by corruption, is condemned to lose the magnificent country which God has placed in
their hands”, whereas the “modern civilisation” of Texas was destined to succeed in the North
American Southwest.149 Saligny reiterated this idea several times, writing in another letter that
Mexico was “condemned to perishing”, and that the Spanish race of Mexico would soon be
replaced by the Anglo-American race.150
Not all observers regarded the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American race through such a
positive lens as Saligny. British merchant Charles Power begrudgingly commented that the
secession of Texas from Mexico and possible annexation to the U.S. would lead to “the March of
the Anglo-Saxon race to the conquest of the South American Continent”, and that, given the
negative impact this would have on European commerce, European states “ought not to allow the
race to travel beyond its present limit, for travel they will with their energy”. Thus, he also
considered the Anglo-Saxon race as vigorous, bold, and restless, though he identified these
characteristics as potentially devastating to European trading interests.151 The members of the
Adelsverein feared the adventurous American race, for they dreaded that it would replace the
Germanness of their emigrants. Since the Society hoped to establish a German colony, and
possibly a German state, outside of Germany, its members did not desire that their German
settlers adopt American language and customs.152
The Native American tribes of Texas played a large role in the socio-economic and
political circumstances of the Texian borderlands, influencing statesmen, merchants,
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entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and settlers’ decisions, possibilities, and opinions. The individuals
of several trans-Atlantic states, including Britain, France, Mexico, Texas, the U.S., and the
German states, viewed Indians essentially unanimously as formidable and as a principal actor
controlling and shaping the events of the Texas region. Indian raids and plundering were feared
on both sides of the Atlantic, eliciting concerns for international commerce and prosperity as
well as the safety of one’s nationals. Because of this, Native Americans were often described in
negative terms in correspondence and newspapers, where they were labelled as savage,
barbarous, wanton, murderous, and uncivilised. Indian tribes, chiefly among them the
Comanches, sought to define power dynamics in the Texian borderlands according to their own
goals and interests, damaging and threatening the states of the region. Mexico’s northern states
were economically crippled and experienced a continued depopulation, which had been one of
the primary reasons for inducing Anglo-American settlement in the first place. Europeans’
opinion on Mexico changed for the worse in view of the inability of that republic’s government
to repel Indian attacks, and Mexico became less attractive for European merchants and states as a
result thereof. Texian observers were particularly brutal and ferocious in their assessment of
Indian tribes due to the destabilising effect that they had on the Texas republic.
Nevertheless, Texians also used Native Americans to define and categorise the world
around them. The language used to describe Indian raids was also used to debase any Mexican
action regarding Texas, and Mexicans, both due to their indigenous heritage and their state’s
inability to control Native Americans, were labelled as likewise savage and racially degenerate.
This conceptualisation of Mexicans reached the other side of the Atlantic, where observers
commented on the racial justification behind Texians’ claim to their republic and, in the case of
Saligny, reiterated the righteousness of Texas’ existence as an independent entity. Indians also
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played a role in how Europeans defined their own racial circumstances, for many statesmen and
entrepreneurs questioned whether their settlers would not adapt to the savage conditions existent
in Texas. For German backers of various emigration projects, the presence and characteristics of
the indigenous population formed a key component in deciding which project to support and how
to advertise it to the general populace. Moreover, the racial features of Native Americans were
used in the trans-Atlantic definition of civilisation and in particular the Anglo-Saxon and
Spanish-Mexican races, the former of which was seen as the exterminator of Indians and the
aggressive usurper of the Americas, whereas the latter was increasingly seen as debile and weak,
prey to the savage Indians on one hand and the stronger Anglo-Saxon race on the other.
Conceptualisations of race, which manifested themselves and were tested and shaped in Texas,
became another tool in the arsenal of informal empire, especially for Anglo-Americans.
Moreover, trans-Atlantic concepts on civilisation and law were shaped by Native American
action in the Texas region and by the emergence of racial thought at this same time period. Ideas
of law, civilisation, and nationality during the time of the Texas Republic and their significance
to informal imperialism will also constitute the subject matter of the next chapter.

267

Chapter Five – “A Protective Arm to Watch Over Them”: The Development, Discussions,
and Impact of International Law, Free Trade, and Nationalism in North America

The previous chapters have largely focussed on the imperial, commercial, and political
contestations extant in the Texian borderlands during the independence of the Republic of Texas.
Various areas of this contestation – such as slavery and abolitionism, trading barriers,
emigration, and diplomacy – and numerous actors – such as diplomats in the periphery, i.e.
Mexico and Texas; politicians in the core, i.e. Britain, France, and Prussia; merchants, the
Adelsverein, and journalists – have been discussed in this context. Overall, the past chapters have
analysed many of the drivers and motivators behind the economic, political, and imperial
connections outlined above, whether it be the Verein’s desire to foster German emigration to
Texas due to a perceived problem of overpopulation within Germany and the aspiration for a hub
for German commerce on the Gulf of Mexico, the British fervour for abolitionism and the
resulting debate on informal empire in Texas, or the significance of the textile industry in the
aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, leading to serious competition between Europe’s
economies and the scramble for new American markets, including those of Mexico and Texas.
This chapter seeks to analyse how this contestation that existed in independent Texas shaped
international law and human rights, perceptions and definitions of nationality and nationalism,
and the development of free trade.
Reclamations, a huge point of conflict between European states and Mexico, were more
than a merely financial affair. In fact, they shaped how nations perceived one another and their
international community as one made up of ‘nations among nations’, and influenced ideas of and
discussions on the laws that governed this community. One such example are the mediation
efforts between two states that were guided by a neutral party: When Mexico and the United
268

States encountered discrepancies and disagreement regarding reclamations that had arisen in the
aftermath of the Texas Revolution, the Prussian government was called upon to serve as umpire
in the matter, as Prussia was deemed a neutral party to the conflict. In his justifications
concerning the decisions he had made for each reclamation, von Rönne also referred to a blend
of thoughts on international law, philosophy, and nationality, highlighting the important interplay
of these factors with those of finance. Texas, where several U.S.-Americans had pressed for
reclamations against Mexico, became a state that von Rönne could use to apply concepts of
international law, and for questions on the interplay of national independence and the construct
of a nationality, as well as a nation’s rights – could a nation commit suicide, for example? –
Texas became a precedent that shaped international law. Mexico was also heavily involved in
shaping international law and ideas of nationalism via reclamations and legal disputes with
foreign states and their agents. For the Mexican government, this was a primary outlet for the
defining and cementing of a Mexican nationality at a time when the Mexican Republic was in the
process of falling apart: With so many of its states in revolt, Mexico needed to establish the
tenets of its nationality both internally as well as externally. Mexican responses to foreign
reclamations showcase that the Mexican government used reclamations to cement their
nationality and their nation’s place as one among other nations on the international stage, and to
strengthen patriotism within Mexico itself.
Lastly, this chapter will also analyse how trans-Atlantic trade, international law, treaties,
and the commercial-diplomatic currents discussed particularly in chapters one and two,
influenced and increased sentiments of and desires for a German national identity and unity. The
German states realised in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars that they were at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis France and Britain, which, though empires, had at the core transformed into nation-
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states.1 German politicians regarded the nation-state as a fundament of strength that would be
able to protect and defend German interests abroad, be they commercial, financial, military and
maritime, or political in nature. The premonition that trans-Atlantic states like Mexico, so crucial
to the new order of Europe’s economies after 1815, were not likely to privilege German interests
given that Germany lacked a central governing apparatus capable of defending its interests
abroad in the same manner that Britain or France could, led to aspirations for a German nationstate among several German officials, particularly Prussians. Moreover, several Germans also
bemoaned Germany’s lacking imperial strength in contested states such as Texas. This
intellectual process, which found Prussia and Austria as the main contenders to lead a possible
German unification or cementation, was augmented by politically and economically weaker
German states, who, realising that they did not hold enough weight to fruitfully negotiate with
trans-Atlantic states themselves, deferred to Prussian leadership and sought Prussian aid. These
international circumstances dovetailed with the establishment of the Zollverein on a national
basis; a customs union designed to unify and standardise the German economies to make the
larger German economy competitive globally vis-à-vis Britain. Overall, commercial competition
was a key driver behind desires for German unification in the 1830s and 1840s: even the Hanse
Towns, so vested in their independence, recognised that in this burgeoning age of economics,
German interests had largely moved beyond the German Bund’s individual member states.
As has been discussed previously, Bayly considers the timeframe immediately before the
1830s as an imperial meridian. Bayly regards the 1830s as the beginning of a shift where the
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subscribed to mercantilism to one conducted by nation-states in Michael Zeuske, „Preußen und Westindien. Die
vergessenen Anfänge der Handels- und Konsularbeziehungen Deutschlands mit der Karibik und Lateinamerika
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Carreras and Günther Maihold (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), 145-215. See particularly p. 146-147.
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stricter Second British Empire gives way to one that does focus more on informal, particularly
free trade, imperialism.2 This chapter seeks to underline this view by evaluating the various
treaties of amity and commerce that European states negotiated with American ones. Rather than
concentrating solely on British policies and agreements, this chapter will also analyse German
treaties as well. This chapter will argue that smaller states, such as the Hanse Towns, which did
not possess an imperial presence of their own and shaped imperial contests mostly through their
support, cooperation, or collaboration with an imperial power, such as Britain, were crucial to the
development of free trade in the nineteenth century, in part because they were seen by less
powerful American states as more equal trading partners with whom more liberal agreements
were less risky. Though their lesser political and military significance also hindered smaller
states such as the Hanse Towns in some ways – e.g. through pressures from larger powers or the
prioritisation that British or French trade experienced in Spanish America, sometimes at the
expence of the Hanseatic city-states – it was also an advantage in others, largely because they
were regarded as less threatening by both European and Spanish-American states.
GERMAN TRANS-ATLANTIC TRADE AND ITS ROLE IN GERMANY’S GROWING UNIFICATION IN
THE 1830S AND 1840S

Before delving into the chapter’s main foci of international law, free trade, and
nationalism, a quick outline of the German political landscape will be made. The series of wars
that had occurred in Europe between 1750 and 1815 – the Seven Years’ War and the Napoleonic
Wars in particular – changed the balance of power in Germany. States such as Saxony,
previously a Central-European great power, found themselves severely weakened by 1815.3 The
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3
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situation that emerged within Germany after the Viennese Congress was one that saw Austria
and Prussia as the dominant political weights. Commercially, Prussia emerged as the more active
party; it had escaped the Holy Alliance legitimist conservatism through the use of mercantile
agents in Spanish America and had commenced by the late 1820s and early 1830s to negotiate
treaties with trans-Atlantic states.4 For states like Saxony, whose trans-Atlantic commerce
predated Spanish-American independence and was not insignificant in volume, the Prussian
stance was more beneficial than that of Austria, which focussed more on restauration and
legitimacy within Europe.5 As has been discussed in previous chapters, the Hanse Towns, due to
their geographic location and mercantile history, formed the other commercial weight within the
German Bund. 6 As such, the German political and commercial landscape regarding Spanish
America was dominated by the Prussia and the Hanse Towns, respectively. Under this two-

annexed the Duchy of Warsaw). After this, Saxon officials recognised that their state, which had managed to remain
independent yet had lost half of its territory and over a third of its population to Prussia, had definitely left the
playing field of the European political stage; most of Saxony’s political ambitions and policies thereafter
concentrated on the German Bund as well as cooperation with Prussia. For more on Saxony’s political situation and
trans-Atlantic trade, see: Jörg Ludwig, Der Handel Sachsens nach Spanien und Lateinamerika 1760-1830:
Warenexport, Unternehmerinteressen und Staatliche Politik (Leipzig: Nouvelle Alliance, 1994), 65-71.
4 See: Walther L. Bernecker, „Preußisch-mexikanische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19.
Jahrhunderts“ in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 217-258.
5 Ludwig, Der Handel Sachsens nach Spanien und Lateinamerika, 150.
6 Neither the Hanseatic nor the Prussian central and pioneering roles to German trans-Atlantic commerce were
universally accepted in Germany during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, as historians Ludwig and
Zeuske have determined, the latter in his various works centring on the German ‘hinterlands’ and their efforts for
direct trans-Atlantic trade. Yet by the 1830s, the major projects on behalf of Saxon entrepreneurs to establish direct
connections with Spanish America had failed, leading to an acceptance on behalf of other German states and
merchants of the Hanseatic dominance in mercantile relations to America until the foundation of the Second German
Empire. See: Michael Zeuske, “Handels- und Konsularbeziehungen“ in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 148-149, and
„Deutsche ‚Hinterländer‘ und Amerika. Die Sächsischen Mitglieder der ‚Rheinisch-Westinidischen Compagnie‘
1820-1830“, in Sachsen und Lateinamerika. Begegnungen in vier Jahrhunderten, ed. Michael Zeuske, Bernd
Schröter and Jörg Ludwig (Frankfurt a.M.: Vervuert, 1995), 164-200, 186, and Jörg Ludwig, Der Handel Sachsens
nach Spanien und Lateinamerika. The necessity for the Hanseatic middleman was largely geographic in nature:
Given that the majority of German states was land-locked, Hanseatic harbours were by far the most important for the
export of German goods, especially those of Bremen and Hamburg. Much of the international trade that German
representatives sought during this time frame was trans-Atlantic in nature, and North Sea port-cities Hamburg and
Bremen were geographically better equipped for this than the Baltic Sea port city of Lübeck. See: Von Rönne to von
Bülow, March 1, 1845, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 73-76.
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pronged leadership, a common German policy in trans-Atlantic affairs emerged that other
German states largely followed, primarily for three reasons.
First, the political guideline set by the Holy Alliance, and the decimation of political
power of German counterweights to Prussia and Austria, such as Saxony, prevented many
German states from pursuing an independent course on Spanish-American matters.7 Many
German states waited on Prussian precedent before engaging in diplomatic or commercial
relations with Mexico in order to have the political safety provided by one of Germany’s great
powers legitimising this step through prior action.8 Second, German states’ interests could not be
seen in isolation from one another. The entire German economy was heavily linked despite the
presence of internal tariffs before the Customs’ Union did away with them, and as a result, many
states did not want to risk damaging the larger German, and consequently their own, economic
interests, particularly at a time when English commercial might pressured the German markets.9

7

Kossok quoted Georg Anton von Schäffer, a German pushing for the diplomatic recognition of Brazil on behalf of
German states, who said that “one cannot expect anything from the smaller states of Germany so long as Austria,
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8 This was the case for Bavaria, which waited until Prussia had finished its treaty of commerce and amity on
February 8, 1831. See: Von Cuxburg to Eichhorn, September 20, 1831, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5497: Acta
des MdaA betreffend die Handels-Verhältnisse zwischen Baiern und Mexico, l. 1. Saxony’s treaty also followed the
Prussian precedent and was signed in October of the same year, see: Treaty of Amity and Commerce between
Saxony and Mexico, ratified December 31, 1832, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5499: Acta des MdaA betreffend
die Handels-Verhältnisse zwischen Sachsen und Mexico, l. 4-10. Württemberg likewise waited until 1832 before a
treaty with Mexico was signed by the ministers plenipotentiary of both states in London, Karl August Franz Count
von Mandelsloh and Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza. The negotiations with Mexico that preceded the treaty had
actively been encouraged by Prussia, which believed it sensible that Württemberg respond to de Gorostiza’s desire
for a treaty. See: Freiherr von den Linden, Württembergian chargé d’affaires in Prussia, February 19, 1833, GSta
PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5498: Acta des MdaA betreffend die Handels-Verhältnisse zwischen Württemberg und
Mexico, l. 7-8.
9 The Bavarian example again showcases this. Bavarian officials in 1831 highlighted that the “interest of the
customs union between Bavaria and Württemberg were so closely tied to those of the Prussian” that they desired to
use the Prussian treaty of amity and commerce as a model for their own treaty, and even considered the possibility
of a simple ascension to the Prussian treaty because Bavaria’s interests were so closely connected to Prussia’s. See:
Von Cuxburg to Eichhorn, September 20, 1831, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5497, l. 1. Saxony, under their agent
Jacob Colquhoun, pushed for a separate article in its treaty with Mexico which enabled various duchies and
principalities to ascend to the treaty, see: Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Saxony and Mexico, ratified
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Thirdly, the political clout of the German states was too insignificant to attract the same attention
in Mexico that Prussia was able to garner.10 Bavarian representative Count von Cuxburg, for
instance, approached Prussian statesman Eichhorn, asking him whether the Prussian
representative in London, von Bülow, would be able to assist the Bavarian von Cetto in his
desire to forge a treaty between Mexico and Bavaria, indicating Prussia’s greater political
influence as well as experience with trans-Atlantic treaties.11 Notwithstanding that the Hanseatic
city-states had significant commercial influence, they also struggled in Mexico due to a lack of
political power.12

December 31, 1832, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5499, l. 4-10. The states included in this article were the Grand
Duchy of Saxony-Weimar, the so-called Ernestinian Duchies of Saxony-Altenburg, Coburg-Gotha, and Meiningen,
and the Principality of Schwarzburg and Reuß. Prussian observers assessed the inclusion of these smaller states as
interesting, and the rationale behind this article can be traced back to the fact that these smaller duchies and
principalities would not have had political and commercial weight and perhaps even interest to negotiate singular
treaties with Mexico on their own. The inclusion of these smaller states also stood to benefit Saxony, for it would
facilitate trade between the various Saxon territories and states on the one hand and Mexico on the other. See: Letter
to von Schuckmann and Maassen, February 12, 1833, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5499, l. 1.
10 Though Austria was also a dominant German power, its more dominant focus on legitimacy and restauration
made it a less significant trans-Atlantic commercial partner, and is hence not included in this summary of “the
German states”. German historians made the observation that Austria was not as involved in trans-Atlantic trade as
Prussia (or more generally, the Zollverein) as late as the 1860s, see: Julius Schadeberg, Der Zollverein, Oesterreich
und die Sonderbündler (Halle: G. Schwetschkescher Verlag, 1864), 41.
11 Von Cuxburg to Eichhorn, September 20, 1831, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5497, l. 1. Another such example
is given by an article in the Mexican Diario, wherein a writer lamented that the Mexican government had sought
Congress’ approval of the treaties with Bavaria, Württemberg, Switzerland, and the Hanse Towns, yet without
success. The writer identified a potential cause for the Mexican Congress’ lack of interest when he noted that
Mexico’s commercial connections with these German states – with the exception of the Hanse Towns – remained
minimal. See: Excerpt from the Diario del Gobierno de la República mexicana, May 20, 1840, GSta PK: III. HA
MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Acta Mexico, Vol. XI: December 1839-December 1841, l. 242-247.
12 Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located
in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342.
Though Hanseatic negotiations for a treaty with Mexico predated Prussian efforts, von Gerolt reported in January of
1841 that the ratification of the second attempt at a Hanseatic-Mexican treaty of commerce and amity had not yet
taken place, despite the fact that this draft had been ready to be ratified for six or seven years. Von Gerolt suspected
an “invisible hand intentioned to prevent the treaty” was behind this delay. Before ratification did finally occur in
London later that year, Hanseatic officials had to send another copy of the treaty to the Mexican authorities, for
unrest in the country had led to the displacement and ultimate loss of the treaty draft possessed by Mexico. The
Hanseatic experience in Mexico highlights that even the Hanse Towns, commercially crucial as they were, did not
possess significant political influence. Such difficulties encountered by the Hansa – the holders of a virtual
monopoly of German trans-Atlantic shipping – encouraged Hanseatic officials to seek out political support from
another German power in Mexico: Prussia.
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Though the Hanse Towns and the Prussia, the primus inter pares of the Customs Union,
had partially opposing interests on a political-national level, they often cooperated, out of
necessity, on the international stage in order to promote German products and trade and protect
German interests abroad. A letter from Prussia’s Consul in Hamburg, Wilhelm Oswald,
emphasised to his government that Hanseatic and broader German interests were deeply
intertwined in Mexico, because “Hamburg and Bremen are the sole agents of the commercial
relations between Germany and Mexico”.13 Another Prussian observer pointed out that “the
Hanseatic merchant class engaged in traffic with Mexico and in possession of establishments in
that country does not merely engage in Hanseatic trade with Hanseatic goods, rather, it engages
in German trade with products of the Zollverein, predominantly of Prussian origin”.14 This
relationship between the Hanseatic city-states, in possession of Germany’s most important
harbours yet only secondary participants in the production of German export goods, and the
other German Bund states, particularly those that later joined the Zollverein, which often did not
have direct access to maritime trade yet produced German manufactures for export, led to a
certain degree of symbiosis on behalf of the two parties. As a German observer noted: “It should
become clear then, that the German Zollverein, even with the help of a Prussian navigational act,
will not be able to do without the Hanse Towns, in much the same fashion as the Hanse Towns
will not, individually and torn from Germany, be able to establish any sort of commercial or

13

Oswald to von Rönne, February 4, 1845, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127: Acta betreffend der
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political meaning/power. For the Hanse Towns as well as the Zollverein, only reciprocity can
bring true benefits”.15
One particular report showcases that German diplomats aspired to productively combine
Prussian and Hanseatic interests in Mexico: The Hanseatic trade and the Hanseatic flag were
primarily responsible for the export of German goods, including those of Prussia and the
Customs Union, to Mexico, yet the Hanse Towns did not possess the necessary political
authority to press for a timely ratification of the treaty of commerce and amity between their
governments and that of Mexico. Such a ratification was deemed important not merely to
Hanseatic, but also to Prussian representatives. As von Gerolt noted, German trade as a whole
would profit if the Hanseatic flag were to be imbued with more legitimacy through an official
treaty, which is why he hoped that his government would allow him to support Hanseatic
interests in this matter. A Hanseatic consul in Mexico, Eduard Ferdinand Färber, likewise
approached von Gerolt to ask for his help, aware of the fact that von Gerolt, as the chargé
d’affaires of Prussia, the politically most eminent state of the German Confederation, could
possibly press the ratification with greater urgency and authority. Von Gerolt surmised that the
Hanseatic Consul Färber did not possess the necessary political and official weight needed in
order to effect the ratification by himself.16 Indeed, in 1844, von Gerolt wrote to his government
that the ratification of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty had finally occurred, and that it was he who
was responsible for this laborious achievement, as the Hanseates in Mexico acknowledged also.17
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Von Gerolt’s deeds and engagement on behalf of Hanseatic interests were recognised by
German merchants in Mexico, many of whom were Hanseates. In October 1844, when it became
evident that von Gerolt would leave Mexico to assume a diplomatic post in the United States,
many of these merchants wrote a letter to von Gerolt thanking him for his service to not only
Prussian, but also and “especially Hanseatic interests”.18 A subsequent letter by von Bülow sent
to the head of the Prussian Commercial Department, Friedrich Ludwig von Rönne, emphasised
that German merchants engaged in overseas trade had requested that von Gerolt’s replacement
visit Bremen and Hamburg to familiarise himself with the harbour cities that exported German
products, highlighting the importance of the Hanse Towns to German commerce.19 The man who
stepped into von Gerolt’s footsteps, Ferdinand Seiffart, did indeed approach a Hamburgian
merchant house in April 1845, shortly after his appointment, and engaged in contact with the
Prussian General-Consul in Hamburg, Wilhelm Oswald, and – indirectly – the Mexican Consul
Negrete in Hamburg.20 This was in part due to necessity: Seiffart wanted to bring assets and
financial instruments into Mexico, and in order to do so, he was dependent upon Hanseatic
maritime traffic.21
This type of cooperation and collaboration, and the realisation on behalf of many German
statesmen that their respective state’s economic interests overlapped strongly with those of other
German states formed an important component to ideas of German national unity. Many scholars
have analysed the unifying impact of the Zollverein on the German states, particularly under
Prussian leadership. Hans Blum illustrated how the Customs Union and its treaties with non-
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German states, especially the one with France, strengthened Prussia’s position as a political and
economic leader in the German Confederation whilst it weakened Austria’s. Blum argued that
this this treaty, spearheaded by Prussia, put an end to the “secret hopes of the Southern German
states for a permanent agreement [or Customs Union: Zolleinigung] with Austria”.22 Ernst
Rudolf Huber has also demonstrated that the Zollverein promoted the idea that Prussian
hegemony in the Bund and German unity and liberty were not mutually exclusive and could
instead “be united and develop into a reciprocally complementing and supporting system of
interests and power”.23 Hans-Werner Hahn has shown how the Zollverein became a union with
significant national meaning, and writes that “after 1834, an increasing number of voices of the
public opinion in Germany assessed that the Zollverein had a greater national meaning than the
German Bund”. Economic questions, Hahn determines, grew in importance as factors of nationbuilding. “Especially the Zollverein offered a clearly definable substrate for models of national
identity in comparison to the rather amorph surfaces of projection such as the common language
or culture”, Hahn manifests, and notes that the mere name of the Customs Union – called the
“Deutsche Zollverein” or German Customs Union, despite the fact that the initial treaties for this
union did not include the word ‘German’ – suggests that it was utilised by many as a national
term. According to Hahn, the Customs Union was seen by several voices of public opinion as
“not merely an important factor in Germany’s economic integration, but already they also often
considered it an important step towards increased political unity”.24 Hahn showcases many of the
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positive views German statesmen, journalists, poets, and economists had of the Zollverein as a
tool of national unity as well as power abroad.25
The importance of commerce to the formation of a German national identity in the
nineteenth century can also be witnessed among German statesmen in Mexico. Seiffart pointed
out that Prussia’s interests in Mexico were really German interests, for the actual number of
Prussian subjects was small – of those Prussians, many had lost “their characteristics of Prussian
subjects”, Seiffart argued, and even the Prussian consul in 1846 was not actually a Prussian and
affiliated instead with one of Hamburg’s merchant houses. Seiffart’s next statement highlights
beautifully the process of German nationalisation occurring in the periphery of Mexico: “But in a
distance of 2000 miles from their common [/shared] fatherland, the Germans have forgotten that
particularism, which unfortunately estranges them from one another so frequently in the
Heimath”.26 In another instance, Seiffart wrote that German merchants exhibited “in such a far
distance a more strongly prominent attachment to the fatherland” and aided German trade
“through the pride of asserting [Germany] and its achievements on foreign markets”. Germans in
Mexico were “true patriots” for defending German interests against English competition, Seiffart
noted, which showcases the importance of English commercial competition to ideas on German
unification and consolidation.27 Seiffart’s predecessor, von Gerolt, held similar views. “The band
of the Nationalgefühl, which has wrapped itself anew around the German states in the fatherland,
also unites the colourfully mixed Germans of all kinds in these distant zones, and one does not
see here, as formerly in foreign countries, that the Germans reject their origins, cowering under
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the protection and nationality of the English or French”.28 Von Gerolt juxtaposed a common
German identity with German competitiveness abroad, and viewed Mexico as a place where
German unity could be witnessed clearly.
In another report, Seiffart reiterated the desire of Germans in Mexico for and the
importance of a wholly German presence that could compete with its French and English
counterparts, behind which stood nation-states:
One cannot lament enough the evil that arises from the fact that German interests are
represented by a colourful mass of agents of large and small, well-known and unknown
governments here, where it is so imperative that the Germans are established/perceived as
a compact mass/unit next to the English and French, and that the particularities destroy
yet again the impression of a totality. There are Hanseatic, Bavarian, Prussian, Saxon,
and other German consuls, of which no one, neither here nor in Germany, believes that
they do anything besides using the small prerogatives of the consulate for their own
advantage and arrogance29
Seiffart’s statement indicates that the consuls of individual German states were judged by him
and others, both in Germany and Mexico, as ineffective and powerless. In order to defend
German interests, particularly against the constant pressure provided by English commerce, it
was crucial that German states unite behind one common German representative.
This commonality of German interests resulting in greater German unity and desires for
centralisation dovetailed with the difficulties that German agents faced in Mexico. What is
noteworthy about this is that Mexico’s periodic indifference to German demands and requests, as
well as the Mexican government’s disapproval of Germany’s means of diplomatic and
mercantile representation in Mexico, both contributed to a growing desire for more German unity

28

Nationalgefühl, literally, national sentiment. See: Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in
Mexico toward the Germans of all states located in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta
PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342.
29 General Depiction of the German-Mexican Trading Relations: Addition to the Trading Report of the Royal
General-Consulate in Mexico No. 3, by Ferdinand Seiffart, May 20, 1846, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA,
Handelsamt, Nr. 127. This report spans roughly a hundred pages, see pp. 101-102.

280

and political centralisation on behalf of Prussian officials. Frequently, developments in
peripheral regions as well as the influence of the periphery are neglected or downplayed when
discussing nationalism in the European core states, such as France, England, or Germany. In the
case of Germany, several works have shown that emigration and colonisation projects were used
to foster nationalism within Germany. Frederik Schulze, for example, has argued that
colonisation in southern Brazil was a national project used to define ‘Deutschtum’ or a German
national identity, whereas Nikolaus Barbian has shown, based in part on works by Bradley D.
Naranch and Sebastian Conrad, that the “Auslanddeutschen” played a significant role in both the
development of a German national identity and a a foreign Kulturpolitik.30 Barbian cites Patrick
Schreiner in stating that the Außenkulturpolitik (i.e. “foreign cultural politics”) is that type of
Politik, “in which the foreign-political and national-cultural aspects of the nation-state do not
merely dovetail, but rather mutually necessitate each other”, showcasing that nationality can in
part be developed in the periphery.31 Again others, including Hans Fenske and Wolfgang
Reinhard, have focussed on the Germans as imperial bystanders during the first half of the
nineteenth century. Fenske speaks of the Germans as “impatient spectators” to European
imperialism between 1815 and 1880, a timeframe where several Germans desired colonies but
were unable to obtain them. Fenske argues that this longing for an overseas empire combined

See: Frederik Schulze, Auswanderung als nationalistisches Projekt: ‚Deutschtum‘ und die Kolonialdiskurse im
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2005), 21-40.
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economic, scientific, and political concerns and was particularly present among the middle class,
which is why Fenske dubs it an “intellectual imperialism”.32
What von Gerolt’s and Seiffart’s comments on Mexico reveal however is that
negotiations with trans-Atlantic, Spanish-American states formed a component of this increasing
desire for a common national identity and a nation-state in Germany, particularly on the level of
politicians and statesmen. Moreover, Felix Becker’s work on the Hanse Towns and Mexico also
includes anecdotes of other German statesmen and agents who, like Gustav Schaedtler, note that
a strong diplomatic representation of Germans in “half-civilised countries like Mexico” would
provide ample protection and “promote unity and National-Gefühl [national sentiment]”, thus
preventing the German abroad from “renouncing his fatherland [and] turning himself into an
Englishman, a weakness which has only been excusable because of the lack of proper
representation”.33 Seiffart explicitly connected the issue of German representation in Mexico to
German unity, arguing that Germany needed a Gesammt-Vertretung, i.e. a representation “for
German interests which leads to the recognition of Germany as a whole”. It was essential that
such a representation “put an end to the recurring particularities and that it achieve, in its
standing vis-à-vis the [Mexican] government, the same consideration and significance as is
conceded to the representatives of other nations”. Seiffart continued: “The Germans perceive it
as painful that all this is denied to them, that in such a distance [from Germany], there is no
protective arm watching over them, that there is no representation possessing the dignity and
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importance/weight of the nation”. Seiffart actively tied this need for German national agents
abroad to the difficulties that German interests faced when represented by the individual states in
Mexico. The protectionist economic policies of the Mexican government and the resistance to
European reclamations were one of the main reasons for Seiffart’s belief that a common German
identity abroad was necessary.34
The standardisation of the German economy – through the elimination of tariffs extant
within the German Bund, for example – was also aided and spurred on by trans-Atlantic
developments. At the time, it was still common for the various regions of Germany to use
different versions of the unit Elle, a unit to measure length, particularly when assessing e.g. the
length of cloth.35 This unit varied widely in actual length depending on the region it was used in:
The various Ellen from the northern German states were often roughly 60 centimetres in length,
whereas they were longer in the South, where Ellen of around 75 centimetres were more
common. Overall, Ellen ranged between 40.2 centimetres and 81.1 centimetres, which meant that
some Ellen were twice as long as other Ellen. A report by Seiffart to his government, spanning
roughly 100 pages, emphasised that German merchants in Mexico criticised the broad variety of
German measurements, particularly among the unit Elle, because Mexican consumers were
reluctant to buy cloth or fabric (as well as other goods) when they were unfamiliar with the
measurement used to determine the amount that they were to receive of a certain good. The fear
among Mexican consumers was that the German merchants, as the only persons who knew how
to use the different types of Elle, would take advantage of buyers and charge them too much. If
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all German merchants used “one type of German measurement, [Mexican consumers] would
easily be able to get used to it and its proportion” to the Mexican Arancel. Seiffart also urged the
use of a standardised unit of measurement in the production of textiles, especially woven fabrics
and thread. England and France had already implemented the use of such a standard for all of
their overseas exports, enabling consumers to know exactly what they were buying and thus
increasing sales for English and French goods. The facilitations that the trade of Germany’s
competitors experienced because of this conformity to one standard among all French and British
producers led Seiffart to conclude that it was “incomprehensible why German producers are
unable to achieve the same consensus without the use of force and regulations”.36
In the same report, Seiffart asserted that German standardisation in trans-Atlantic
commerce could moreover facilitate trade and make the latter more independent from reliance on
England if a Verschwisterung between the Hanse Towns and the Zollverein could occur.37
Communication between Germany and German agents in Mexico was predominantly
orchestrated and maintained by the use of English packages transported via British vessels.
German vessels, primarily Hanseatic ones sailing from Hamburg or Bremen, only carried such
communication irregularly and sporadically. This defect in Germany’s connection to its overseas
officials could be remedied if the Zollverein and Hanse Towns created a maritime traffic union, a
Schiffahrtsbund, and if Germany had not several, but one national Handelsflagge, a merchant
flag. This would “confront foreign/distant nations with the nation [of Germany]”, enabling
Germany to finally receive similar advantages and concessions to those possessed by France or
Britain. Without centralisation, Seiffart believed, Germany would never be able to compete
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effectively and sustainably with nation-states in trans-Atlantic commerce; thus, an alliance
between Hanse Towns and Zollverein was “the most urgent and most essential” subject for
German regimes. Seiffart regarded German unification in regard to international trade as so
important to German interests that “no sacrifice is too big” to take the step toward a German
maritime union. Much like the Adelsverein, Seiffart also asserted that a united German maritime
traffic could maintain a common national identity among German emigrants, and increase
German influence worldwide.38
Seiffart, in emphasising the advantages that the structure of the nation-state had for
European interests in Mexico, also considered the nation-state as an imperial state, showcasing
that commerce between a growing community of nation-states and nations was not necessarily
non-imperial when contrasted with the previous mercantilist and colonial empires of the 17th and
18th centuries. Seiffart noted that England and France were able to defend their national and
commercial interests better in Mexico due to their maritime might, which made their demands on
Mexico regarding reclamations more imposing and pressing. The German route, maintained
Seiffart, was ineffective: German agents attempted to solve their disagreements and conflicts
with Mexico with profuse politeness, an imperative strategy in the eyes of many German
merchants who feared that a more aggressive stance would make Mexico hostile to their interests
at a time when Germany lacked the tools of power – maritime and military – to enforce their
interests in any other way. All the more important was thus a diplomatic representation in
Mexico more akin to that possessed by nation-states like France and Britain, Seiffart argued.39
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“A representative of the nation”, according to Seiffart, would be able to protect German interests
even without a war fleet such as those of France and England.40 Seiffart – as a Prussian agent –
emphasised the importance of a Prussian statesman in this role, and underlined that this Prussian
would protect, much like a Briton for Britain and a Frenchman for France, all German interests
rather than just those of Prussia, i.e. this Prussian official would occupy a position similar to that
of an agent of a nation-state. This would give the Prussian agent more prestige and influence and
benefit the commerce and interests of all Germans in Mexico and German states in general. 41 As
such, Prussia was able to establish itself as the primus inter pares in the German Bund using
trans-Atlantic trade, a measure which Austria did not adopt.
Other German states, and as Seiffart’s reports showcase, non-Prussian German
merchants, considered this Prussian representation as beneficial, despite resistance to the loss of
their independence in intra-German affairs.42 After the Prussian government intended to send
Seiffart to Mexico as a consul, an appointment of a Prussian chargé d’affaires or
Ministerresident was even seen by the Hanseates as an important step for German interests,
mainly for one reason: Mexico did not acknowledge consuls, including Consul-Generals, as
diplomats. Felix Becker outlines the history of consuls’ position after 1815, noting that
agreements of the Congress of Vienna and the Protocol of Aachen (1818) had determined the
exclusion of consuls from the ranks of diplomatic agents. Consuls in non-Christian countries
could have a certain diplomatic status during the first half of the nineteenth century, but Christian
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states could decide individually whether they wanted to award diplomatic status to another
country’s consuls or not. The United States, for example, allowed Austria to be diplomatically
represented by a consul until 1838.43 For Mexico, this was not the case.44
The Hanse Towns did not send an agent properly acknowledged by Mexico as a diplomat
either, for two primary reasons. The first was financial in nature, though the second was based on
the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty. This treaty stated the mutual agreement that consuls of either party
could and would be treated as diplomats in the other party. Though the Hanseates honoured this
stipulation and awarded diplomatic status to Mexican consuls in the Hanse Towns, Mexico
ignored this article. The Hansa, without political or military might and no means of imposing
pressure upon Mexico, had little choice but to accept the Mexican stance under protest. All the
more important then was the ability and possibility of Hanseatic agents and merchants in Mexico
to turn to more powerful European states, such as England or Prussia. Particularly the latter was
a crucial partner for the Hanseates given the mutual commercial interests both parties shared in
trans-Atlantic affairs.
The fact that Prussia did not plan on appointing a proper diplomat after von Gerolt’s
departure either, however, was problematic for the Hanse Towns and German interests at large.45
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A petition from Bremian merchants to the Prussian government called upon the latter to appoint
a diplomat to Mexico after von Gerolt’s departure from Mexico. The Hanseatic merchants
justified their plea for a Prussian diplomat who should support Hanseatic commerce by
underlining that Prussia stood to benefit from this appointment, because Hanseatic commercial
interests overlapped significantly with their Prussian counterpart. “The trade with German
products and manufactures is almost entirely in the hands of Hanseatic establishments in
Mexico”, the petition noted, “exclusively Prussian or Zollverein merchant houses do not exist.
Should the Prussian chargé d’affaires in Mexico thus choose to restrict his activities solely to
Prussian or Zollverein interests, this agent would hardly benefit German trade. The Hanseatic
houses in Mexico do not trade with Hanseatic products, however, rather, they do so with
Zollverein [products]; if their business is thus disrupted, the entire German or Zollverein trade
will suffer”.46 This letter showcases the interdependence of Prussian and Hanseatic officials,
merchants, and agents, which both Hanseatic and Prussian parties sought to use to their own
state’s advantage, and the Hanseatic willingness to be represented by a Prussian chargé d’affaires
demonstrates Prussia’s growing prestige and importance in Germany as a result of its transAtlantic engagement, something that Austria did not possess.
Seiffart was not the only Prussian agent to push for the idea of a national German agent
in Mexico. During von Gerolt’s times, this idea had also existed and found his support: Von
Gerolt argued that a German mission under Prussian leadership should be established in Mexico,
stating that the “intimate connection of all German and namely the Prussian and Hanseatic
interests regarding the commerce and trade with Mexico, and the necessity that these interests be,
given the constant disorganisation of this country and the imposing competition of the
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commercial interests of the other nations, protected and promoted through a watchful and active
representation in the capital” were the reason why he believed that other German, including the
Hanseatic, governments would surely be willing to contribute financially to the establishment of
such a representation in order to “secure the diplomatic protection” that had thus far been
awarded to Prussian subjects by the Royal Prussian Legislation. A German mission in Mexico
with the purpose of representing all German interests under Prussian leadership was seen by von
Gerolt as a good idea, for states like Saxony, Bavaria, or Hesse-Cassel would be able to better
promote their economic interests if represented by the stronger political entity Prussia, whereas
Prussia would be able to gather prestige as the representative of German interests at a
manageable cost through the financial contribution of those states that utilised the Prussian
mission to fight for their economic interests. All sides, he argued, stood to gain from a closer
German cooperation on the playing field of international trade.47
Despite this move towards German consolidation under Prussian leadership, which found
expression through the Zollverein or the desire for a Prussian agent representing Germany’s
national interests in Mexico, Hanseatic independence continued to pose as a special case in intraGerman relations. Part of the reason for this was the fact that Hanseatic independence enabled
German trade to pursue a dual policy. France and Britain, as nation-states, had to choose a course
of action in their commerce and diplomacy with American states. An example of this is the
Pastry War: France had chosen to intervene in Mexico via a blockade and maritime/military
pressure in order to push its reclamations. This had enabled France to receive 600,000 pesos’
worth of compensation, but Mexico’s policy toward foreign states had not markedly changed; in
fact, an increased hostility among Mexican authorities may have been the most noteworthy
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outcome. The French government had to assume the full consequences of its actions in Mexico,
and if ties between both states had been severed, for instance, this would have negatively
impacted French trade, incapable of permeating Mexico in a meaningful manner without its
merchant marine. Due to the existence of many German states, von Gerolt believed that Prussia
could circumvent such consequences should they occur if Prussia chose to support the
intervention of Europe’s great powers in Mexico: In the event that war between Mexico and
Europe’s great powers, joined by Prussia, broke out and Euro-Mexican trade was hindered
between the parties at war, or in the event that European intervention encouraged Mexican
authorities to apply penalties to the trade of those parties who had intervened or supported such
an intervention, Prussia could always use the “neutral Hanseatic flag in order to bring our
industrial products into Mexico”.48
Though some of the advantages of Hanseatic independence were acknowledged by
Prussian officials, the desire to bind the three city-states more closely to the Zollverein and into
Prussia’s zone of influence outweighed the consideration for such benefits. In another instance,
von Gerolt questioned whether his conclusion regarding the neutral Hanseatic flag and its ability
to bring German goods into Mexico was sound, for pressures from or an intervention on behalf
of a great power in Mexico would more than likely lead to hostility toward all foreign trade on
behalf of the latter, and stymy Hanseatic maritime trade, also.49 In the same report where von
Gerolt emphasised the advantages a common German diplomatic representation via a Prussian
statesman could have for the Hansa’s and other German states’ interests, he also pointed out that
his past willingness to promote Hanseatic reclamations was deeply dependent upon his personal
position and interconnectedness in Mexico. Surely, von Gerolt surmised, he did not actually
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possess the legal authority to protect non-Prussian Germans – the Mexican government could
thus reject von Gerolt’s intervention on behalf of Hanseatic reclamations. Only his good
relationship to several important persons among Mexico’s authorities enabled him to submit
Hanseatic reclamations without resistance from the Mexican government.50 Becker has also
illustrated that von Gerolt announced repeatedly that his successor in Mexico would not be able
to assist Hanseatic merchants with their reclamations unless a formal agreement were reached
between Prussia and Hanse Towns.51 Such remarks could be perceived as threatening to the
Hanseates, for they suggested that Prussian officials might not defend Hanseatic interests in the
future barring a deeper official connection between Prussia and the Hanse Towns.
Though Prussian officials aspired to form a stronger connection between the Hanse
Towns and the Zollverein – and predominantly Prussia – they also recognised that the Hansa
could not be pressured too intensely because their interests were so relevant to Prussian and
German ones. In 1841, von Gerolt wrote that half of Germans in Mexico were Hanseatic citizens,
which meant that “their protection and legal representation are incumbent upon me also, for, as
Your Excellency is aware, our commercial interests are related to and tied intimately to those of
the Hanse Towns”. As such, he aided the Hanseates in many reclamation efforts. Of all German
reclamations that von Gerolt received from German persons in Mexico, “there is not a single one
in which the Hanseatic interests did not have, and still have, an important share/role”, suggesting
that Hanseates were among the main effectors of German interests in Mexico.52
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Trans-Atlantic treaties incited discussions on German unity and centralisation through the
deference to and orientation toward Prussia on behalf of many German states, such as Bavaria,
Württemberg, or Saxony; the realisation that German interests often existed in unison with, and
not in opposition to, one another in the Americas; and the realisation that Germany lacked
strength vis-à-vis imperial nation-states France and Britain in Mexico. Yet as the above example
suggests, the Hansa formed to a certain extent a counterweight to this development toward a
centralisation of German interests and power under Prussian leadership. Though many Hanseatic
merchants, particularly those in Mexico or other American states, sought cooperation with and
support from Prussia, backing the idea of a Prussian agent to represent and defend common
German interests, the position of many Hanseatic officials located in the city-states themselves
had different views that focussed more on Hanseatic independence. This was also lamented by
von Gerolt, who stated that, whereas Hanseatic merchants in Mexico had been incredibly
thankful for his promotion of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty in front of Mexican authorities, he
had not heard “one word of thanks” from the Hanseatic, particularly the Hamburgian,
governments, who apparently regarded it as “not worth their while” to honour Prussia’s
engagement on their behalf.53 Though Syndic Sieveking stood in contact with Prussian
representatives, such as Johann Ludwig von Hänlein, and spoke in 1838 of ‘common German
interests’ in Mexico, most Hanseatic officials viewed their cities as a unique weight in the
German Bund and privileged independence over deference to Prussia.54
These contestations that existed between Prussia and the Hanse Towns and were shaped
by trans-Atlantic trade gained a new facet through the independence of Texas. Prussia did not
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engage in any correspondence with Texas beyond a few letters exchanged between Daingerfield
and von Rönne; thus, the Hanseatic correspondence with the young republic marks the only
official German engagement with Texas on a state level. This gave the Hanse Towns another
opportunity to establish themselves as the commercial pioneers and entrepreneurs of the German
Bund, who would also act independently from the Prussian policy line. As previous chapters
have showcased, the Hanseatic decision to enter or not enter into negotiations with Texas was
heavily influenced by the international political landscape – only after Texas’ recognition by
France, Britain, and other states such as the Netherlands did the Hanse Towns consider it wise or
plausible to become receptive to Texian envoys’ advances. The Hanseatic correspondence on the
treaty to be signed with Texas demonstrates that Hanseatic officials sought to use this experience
to bolster their own position within the German Bund, resist Prussian pre-eminence and the
criticism of other Zollverein states, and promote German economic interest in North America.
TEXAS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC TREATIES OF COMMERCE
Previous chapters have discussed the Hanseatic focus on their treaty with Venezuela in
shaping the Texian-Hanseatic treaty’s articles, stipulations, and concessions. Beyond its
liberalism, the treaty between the Hansa and Venezuela was also cited by Rumpff in his
negotiations with Daingerfield as one of the precedents which motivated the Hanseatic cities to
insist on one condition: the inclusion of products from the states of the German Bund in several
of the treaty’s stipulations. Article X in the Venezuela-Hansa treaty formed the basis of this
Hanseatic desire in negotiations with Texas.55 The prevalence Hanseatic representatives attached
to the extension of some of the treaty benefits to the entirety of the German Bund was an
innovative component of this treaty because it provided a potentially viable alternative to the
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Zollverein’s handling of trans-Atlantic treaties. The creation of the Zollverein, though it
facilitated intra-German trade and commerce, helped make the German economy more
competitive on an international basis, and fostered Prussian engagement in the trans-Atlantic
world on behalf of most other German Bund member states, did not lead to the termination of
treaties completed between individual German states and American ones. Treaties between
Mexico and states such as Prussia, the Hanse Towns, Saxony, or Württemberg remained intact
after the Zollverein’s foundation. Only a very small number of treaties of amity and commerce
were renegotiated with the Zollverein as a party to the treaty, including those with Great Britain,
Belgium, and Naples.56 One of the primary reasons why these treaties were rare is the fact that,
in order to negotiate such treaties, all Zollverein member-states’ governments had to engage in
correspondence with one another, for no Zollverein state – including Prussia – had the ability to
single-handedly complete a treaty on behalf of the entire Zollverein. The only way in which the
Customs Union could forge a treaty of amity and commerce with a foreign power was by
agreement and approval of each member-state; if even one constituent rejected a treaty, the treaty
could not be ratified.57
This problematic was one of the factors standing behind the failed treaty between the
Zollverein and the United States. An 1844 letter from the Prussian Foreign Ministry to the
Prussian envoy to Dresden, von Jordan highlighted the difficulties that the Zollverein faced in
completing this treaty of amity and commerce: the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed
von Jordan of the U.S.-American envoy Wheaton’s suggestions for mutual concessions to be
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incorporated in this treaty. Since the Prussian government judged the U.S.-American
Congressional stance as very favourable toward this treaty and Wheaton’s ideas, which promised
great benefits to German commercial interests, it wanted to pursue this opportunity
expeditiously, particularly because Wheaton had various time constraints of his own. Von Jordan
was thus instructed to receive Saxony’s commentary on and approval of Wheaton’s suggestions
as soon as possible. Prussian representatives in other Zollverein member-states were asked to do
the same for those respective governments. Though Prussia still hoped for a timely completion of
the treaty, the fact that the Prussian government had to receive approval from each Zollverein
government stymied the Custom’s Union’s ability to pursue this treaty effectively: though it was
completed, the treaty between the United States and the Zollverein was not ratified.58
The Hanse’s desire to incorporate, in some fashion, all German Bund states in their treaty
with Texas would have presented an important precedent for Germany’s international trade, for
this treaty could have been used as a basis for future negotiations between German parties and
American ones. The way in which German Bund states were supposed to find inclusion in this
treaty and its benefits was the possibility for them to easily ascend to the treaty. This preference
was initially ill-received by Daingerfield, because he feared that this would both reduce the
interest of other German states to engage in their own treaty negotiations with his state and
trouble the young republic’s Senate, which might lead the ratification of the treaty ad calendas
graecas.59 Smidt emphasised that Daingerfield’s concerns regarding the lessened interest of other
German states concentrated particularly on Prussia, showcasing the Texian awareness of
Prussia’s growing pre-eminence in the Bund.60 Rumpff, however, indicated to Daingerfield that
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the incorporation of German Bund states in the treaty was a sine qua non on behalf of the Hansa,
and that an exclusion of the German states would lead to the termination of negotiations, which
caused the latter to acquiesce to his counterpart’s demand so long as the other German states
were not listed by name and merely addressed by the blanket term “states of the German
Bund.”61
The Hanseatic efforts to incorporate the other German Bund states into the treaty with
Texas were orchestrated in such a way as to strengthen the Hanse Towns’ prestige and
economic-political importance within the German Bund. Though all German products
originating from the German Bund were included in the treaty benefits – such as the elimination
of differential duties and low tariffs –, this was only the case if they were shipped under a
Hanseatic flag. Initially, Rumpff had hoped to effect a limitation of navigational and commercial
benefits to the Hanseatic and Texian flag only, a desire that fell on fruitless grounds with
Daingerfield, who argued that Texian commerce was dependent on their prioritisation of the
U.S.-American flag in light of the near inexistence of a Texan fleet. Nevertheless, Rumpff
insisted on the limitation to Hanseatic flags.62 This latter point stood to benefit Hanseatic
maritime trade – as Smidt summarised, in order to be able to export non-Hanseatic goods from a
non-Hanseatic port, e.g. Hannover or Oldenburg, to Texas, Prussia would either be exposed to
differential duties or be forced to rely on Hanseatic vessels instead, which would only change if
Prussia also furnished a treaty with Texas.63 By April of 1844, Hanseatic officials decided to aim
for the removal of all references to merchant flags in article III of the Hanseatic-Texian treaty: A
note from Bremen emphasised that the Hanseatic-Texian treaty would, in such a form, enable the
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maintenance of treaty benefits should the German Bund create a common merchant flag, as had
already been suggested by some Prussian officials.64 The Hanseatic-Texian treaty was seen as
advantageous because it gave the Hansa the ability to extend its commercial benefits to the entire
German Bund, regardless of future developments within the Bund.65
The extension of treaty benefits to the entirety of the Bund reaffirmed the Hansa’s
preeminent position as traders in the German Bund, for it would motivate German states to
ascend to a Hanseatic treaty. As Rumpff stated in his correspondence, the German states’ ability
to join the treaty by use of a special convention would “put our trading politics into a liberal
light, without there being the possibility that the slightest disadvantage for us could emerge of
this situation.”66 In a notice from Bremen to Rumpff, more than likely authored by Senator
Johann Gildemeister, several suggestions for improvement of the treaty draft were made in order
to maximise the profit that the Hansa were to obtain within the German Bund as a result of their
negotiations with Texas. Gildemeister, Rumpff, and other Hanseatic politicians such as Syndicus
Banks and Kirchenpaner sought to make each article as clear as possible, and deliberated
profusely over the placement of commas in articles such as Article III, where Banks feared that a
comma between “which may be imported from the Hanseatic Republics, into the Republic of
Texas” could limit the applicability of the treaty to Hanseatic ships departing from the Hanse
Towns only.67 Gildemeister’s remarks to Rumpff highlighted the importance of the Hansa’s
freedom on this matter: Using stipulations from improved versions of Articles XVIII, IV, II, and
XIV, Gildemeister argued that the Hanseatic-Texan treaty would give Hamburg, Lübeck, and

64

Rumpff to Smidt, April 8, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
Zusatzartikel, einzuschalten zwischen XIV und XV oder Separatartikel, sent to Rumpff March 16, 1844, StA HB:
Acta C. 26.
66 Rumpff to Syndicus Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24.
67 Syndicus Banks to Rumpff, date unknown (April 1844), StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
65

297

Bremen the ability to ship their – or generally, German goods – from the ports of any German
state who had acceded to the treaty:
In Article IV it is written that a, e.g. Bremian ship, if it sails from Hamburg to Texas,
ought to, same as its cargo, be treated according to the treaty as if it were coming from
Bremen itself. Through Article II, the cargo of the same Bremian ship departing from
Hamburg, if it consists of products of the German Bund, is protected from differential
duties privileging similar products of other states…according to Article XIV, these rights
of the Bremian flag would remain even on such a voyage even if Hamburg terminated its
contract with Texas…this…will also now be the case for each acceding state of the
German Bund, so that, e.g., Hannoveranian ships can sail from Hanseatic ports, or
Hanseatic [ships] from Hannoveranian ports as if they were their own,…68
The two-fold advantage bestowed upon the three city-states through these stipulations –
that German states would have an incentive to accede to the treaty in order to avoid differential
duties and that Hanseatic ships could sail for Texas from any acceded German Bund port to do
the same – was considered significant for the Hanseatic representatives who regarded this as an
opportunity to improve their image in the Bund and pronounce their importance. Sieveking spoke
rather dismissively of Prussia’s aspirations for German economical centralisation and
standardisation as Zollvereinsfanatismus, and doubted disgruntledly that the other German Bund
states would pay the Hanseates the respect and thanks due to them for their pioneering work.69
Rumpff sneeringly voiced his disdain for the Zollverein, and asserted that the Texian-Hanseatic
treaty would help establish the Hansa’s influence in the Bund vis-à-vis the Prussian-dominated
Customs Union: using the biblical reference “therefore, if thine enemy hunger, feed him, if he
thirst, give him drink; for in so doing, thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head”, he stated that
article XVIII of the treaty – the one enabling German Confederative accession – “heaped coals
of fire on the head of the Zollverein, without the need for us to burn our fingers”.70 Bremen’s
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mayor, Johann Smidt, wrote that unlike Southern German states, which often looked to Prussia
for guidance – Smidt called them “Southern German leaves” in order to showcase their debility
and lack of tenacity in the face of Prussia’s leadership, much like leaves in the wind – the Hanse
Towns enacted their own policies for the benefit of not just themselves, but the German Bund as
a whole: “The Hanse Towns […] do not, in the way in which Southern German leaves often
accuse them of, focus entirely on their particular interests in their relations to the trans-Atlantic
foreign states, […] unlike the Zollverein, which, in similar negotiations, seeks only to pave the
way for its member states, […] we assume our position as the outpost and avant-garde of the
German states vis-à-vis the trans-Atlantic world, which was factually assigned to us due to our
location.”71
Though the Hanseates sought to use their treaty with Texas and other trans-Atlantic
treaties, as well as trans-Atlantic trade more broadly, to establish and legitimise their
independence and importance in the German Bund, treaties of amity and commerce also had the
potential of confronting German officials, economists, philosophers, and historians with more
difficulties that stemmed from Germany’s status as a loose confederation in the process of
standardising and centralising parts of its political and economic landscape. These were also
conflicts that intersected with arguments of free trade. Germany’s unique position vis-à-vis
consolidated nation-states caused some German officials to fear that trade agreements between
German states and Mexico would be disadvantageous to Germany, mainly because the 1830s and
1840s constituted a time when, though free trade was on the rise, certain trading restrictions and
protectionist barriers still existed, particularly in Europe. The treaty between Württemberg and
Mexico was criticised by statesmen from Bavaria, with which Württemberg was in a special
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customs union at the time of the treaty in 1833. Article V of the Württemberg -Mexico treaty of
amity and commerce needed modification according to Bavarian officials, because the clause on
the most favoured nation was too unspecific for the special Württembergian circumstances:
Article 5 determined that both states, Württemberg and Mexico, would be placed on the footing
of the most favoured nation regarding exportation and importation of goods in the respectively
opposite country. The Bavarian ministry feared that Mexican authorities would try to use this
clause in order to receive the same concessions that other German states had in their relations
with Württemberg: At a time when Germany strove for the eradication of internal barriers in the
form of taxes, tariffs, and duties, Bavaria raised the concern that Württemberg’s treaties and
agreement to this effect with Prussia, Hohenzollern, Hesse, Coburg, Weimar, and Bavaria itself
would be interpreted by Mexico as those conditions given to the “most favoured nations”,
potentially giving Mexico the opportunity to take advantage of commercial and trading
regulations that were supposed to benefit the standardisation, strengthening, and centralisation of
the German economy.72
Similar concerns existed regarding the Hanseatic-Texian treaty. Gildemeister analysed
the draft of this treaty and pointed out that article III, focussing on duties to be imposed on
exportations made from one party to the other – which should not be higher than those imposed
on other foreign states and most favourable nations – made the Hanseates susceptible to the
inability to enforce differential duties on vessels of foreign nations which had sailed to the
Hanseatic ports via Texas, i.e., this article, Gildemeister noted, might enable a third party to use
Texas as an entrepôt over which goods could be shipped to the Hanse Towns in order to avoid
duties and Hanseatic trading barriers. This thought, manifested Gildemeister, had already existed
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in prior treaties, though Hanseatic statesmen had concluded in these cases that their concern
about third parties’ circumvention of duties via an American state with which the Hanse Towns
had a treaty was not well-founded enough to justify change to this stipulation or the termination
of negotiations, because the formulations of the treaty made such an abuse of the treaty unlikely.
In the Texian case, however, the situation was more difficult due to the inexistence of a Texian
merchant marine.
As a result, Daingerfield had desired the elimination of the words “by vessels of the
republic of Texas” in article III in reference to vessels included in the treaty benefits. This,
according to Gildemeister, would expose the Hanse Towns to third parties’ indirect voyages to
the Hanse Towns via Texas, and would lastingly prevent the city-states from imposing duties or
other restrictions to protect their own trade. The Hansa should therefore incorporate a separate
article or clause in their treaty with Texas that outlined that the benefits of an indirect passage
over Texas to the Hanse Towns would only apply to those foreign states which permitted the
same for Hanseatic vessels’ voyages to their ports.73 Rumpff later reiterated Gildemeister’s
arguments in his communications with Gildemeister.74 In another instance, Rumpff also noted
that he had insisted on the words “in vessels of the contracting parties” in order to “restrict the
liberality of article I”, which would have otherwise removed almost all restrictions regarding the
unloading of cargo in both parties’ ports.75 This highlights that protectionism was still very much
a factor in 1830s and 1840s Europe, even at a time of rising free trade sentiments. Nevertheless,
Smidt referred to the Hanseatic treaties with Texas, Venezuela, and the United States as treaties
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of “the most liberal fashion”, demonstrating that the Hansa prided themselves in the perpetration
of free trade in the first half of the 19th century.76
Other trade agreements between Texas and the Hanse Towns preceding the treaty of 1844
also raised concerns among intellectuals and statesmen. C. F. Wurm, when he was consulted by
Sieveking in 1841, combined international law, economics, and philosophy (in which he
obtained a Ph.D. in 1825) in order to assess the new republic.77 Using his background in these
fields, Wurm expressed his concerns about the ‘Memorandum on a Convention between Texas
and Hamburgh.’ In Article IX, Wurm questioned the exclusion of cargo in seizing an enemy
vessel, largely due to the impracticality of this limitation. “The ship is confiscated,” Wurm
wrote, “what happens to the cargo? It ought not to be confiscated. But how should it be returned?
[...] Not to the owner, for he cannot reclaim it; as the enemy, he does not have personem standi
in judicio…”78 One of the chief publicists cited by Wurm in his critique of Article IX and its de
facto applicability is enlightenment-era politician and writer August Adolph von Hennings. A
statesman from Danish Schleswig-Holstein, Hennings is known for publishing the book Ueber
die wahren Quellen des Nationalwohlstandes, Freiheit, Volksmenge, Fleiß, im Zusammenhange
mit der moralischen Bestimmung der Menschen und der Natur der Sachen, a rebuttal to Adam
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in which Hennings argued that morality and religion are and have
been responsible for generating national wealth in Western countries, not merely self-interest.79
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The Hanseatic-Texian treaty, though it promised to be liberal and facilitate German trade,
ultimately failed in part because of Texas’ annexation to the United States, but also Hanseatic
discord on the Texas matter. As soon as Rumpff engaged in negotiations with Daingerfield, he
highlighted the difficulties he had encountered in acquiring the permission from Hamburg and
Lübeck to sign a treaty on behalf of all Hanse Towns.80 Though the Senates of Hamburg and
Lübeck eventually took steps towards authorising Rumpff’s negotiations in March 1844,
Hamburg’s and especially Lübeck’s involvement remained sparse – in the archives of Hamburg
and Bremen, one can only find a total of roughly five letters from Lübeck’s officials on the
Texas matter.81 Despite this, the fact that Rumpff had to negotiate for three city-states meant that
he had to address concerns and complaints from three sides – not to mention Daingerfield as the
representative of Texian interests – which slowed down negotiations. Though Sieveking
estimated that the Hamburgian Senate would not refrain from empowering Rumpff to sign the
treaty on Hamburg’s behalf, he did ask for several improvements to be made to article I, as well
as those stipulations based on article IV in the U.S.-Hanseatic and article II in the VenezuelanHanseatic treaties.82 Despite such desires, he did not stand in frequent communication with
Rumpff, for the latter lamented in a letter to Bremen that “Sieveking strings me along in truly the
most gruesome way regarding the Texian treaty”, and that he no longer knew what to tell
Daingerfield regarding negotiations and Hamburg’s stance.
Rumpff also highlighted that “it might not be the poor, possibly plagued (in the matter)
Sieveking’s fault, for his influence in Hamburg is not as great as one believes, at least abroad”.
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This demonstrates that various interest groups existed within each Hanse Town, also. Though
Rumpff included this caveat in his letter, he did conclude that Sieveking held little interest in the
Texas matter, writing that “of course, if the issue at hand is not relevant to the harness of his pro
temporé hobbyhorse, he is much more inclined to study Turkish or Chinese or whichever sundry
destitute/breadless arts, rather than Texian”.83 Rumpff’s letter as well as Kossok’s analysis do
showcase that Sieveking was not the main obstacle in the negotiations with Texas; rather, these
were Hamburg’s merchants, who did not wish to endanger Hanseatic-Mexican relations so
shortly after the treaty of amity and commerce between the Hansa and Mexico was finally
completed and ratified. Out of the three Hanse Towns, Hamburg and Bremen were the most
engaged in trans-Atlantic trade. Yet between the two of them, Hamburg’s role was more
significant than Bremen’s, particularly in Mexico. This also provides an explanation for
Bremen’s greater willingness and Hamburg’s greater reticence to receive Texian representatives
and form a Hanseatic-Texian treaty, for Bremen, whose interests in Texas were stronger than
Hamburg’s stood to gain more than Hamburg, whose interests in Mexico were greater, from such
a treaty.84 The fact that Rumpff had to serve three masters, all with similar though slightly
differing interests and priorities made negotiations more confounded and complex – when one
realises that the three Hanse Towns struggled to come to a consensus on the Texas matter, it
becomes evident why the Zollverein, with over a dozen members by the early 1840s, found itself
unable to forge a significant number of international treaties of amity and commerce.
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International trade with the trans-Atlantic world, including Mexico and Texas, influenced
German definitions of and justifications for German unity and a common German identity.
Whereas movements like the 1848 political revolution were heavily dominated by intellectuals
and students, and ultimately crushed by states like Prussia and Austria, which did not desire a
German nation under such a liberal guise, the commercial and diplomatic connections between
Germany and North American states Texas and Mexico showcase the perceived necessity for
German centralisation on a state level, particularly in Prussia. Germany in the 1830s and 1840s
was thus in a state of consolidation – a confederation of states within which there were rising
sentiments of and calls for nationalism and unity. This can be contrasted by the example of
Mexico in North America: though a nation-state, Mexico found itself in a state of dissolution in
this era. Many states sought to secede from the Mexican Republic, and some even succeeded.
Next to Texas, there was Yucatan, which gained its independence in 1841 and was not
reintegrated into the Mexican Union until 1843, as well as the effort of the Republic of the Rio
Grande, which was an effort of several northern Mexican states to form their own independent
state. Given its disorganised state and the lack of a binding sense of unity among many local
elites, finding ways of consolidating Mexican patriotism was important for Mexico’s central
government. Just as issues of international law and commerce impacted and influenced the
development of a common German identity, Mexican intellectuals and statesmen used the same
two fields to justify and underline their nationality, patriotism, and their nation’s validity and
equality among other nations. The following pages will outline and analyse these Mexican
arguments and underpinnings of nationality based on international law and interactions with
foreign states.
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PRUSSIA’S MEDIATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO IN 1839: TEXAS AND
EUROPEAN CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
An interesting episode in the history of Prussian-Mexican relations is the assumption of
the role as an umpire by Prussia in 1839 in an effort to mediate between Mexico and the United
States regarding reclamations made in Texas. The United States, as a Prussian report authored by
von Rönne noted, had only requested the mediation of a neutral third party in two prior
instances: These were the disputes with Great Britain regarding the first article of the Treaty of
Ghent (December 24, 1814), mediated by the Tsar of Russia, and the north-eastern boundary
between Canada and the United States, which was mediated by the King of the Netherlands
beginning in 1827.85 Beyond this, the United States had only utilised mixed board of
commissioners for the purpose of deciding various reclamations.86 The Prussian report
emphasised that only the Russian mediation was comparable to the Schiedsrichteramt to be
assumed by Prussia regarding the reclamations of U.S.-Americans against Mexico, for the
mediations decided by commissions only relied on an independent arbitrator possibly from a
third-party state, not on the evaluation and verdict entirely determined by a third party.87 The
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Russian umpireship, the only precedent that Prussia could fall back on in this matter, had never
been called upon in the dispute between Britain and the United States, which left von Rönne –
not just a diplomat and statesman, but also a lawyer – with the option of looking to the more
distantly related commissions in order to familiarise himself with “the basic tenets which were
decisive for these commissions in their decisions regarding the reclamations”.88
The number of reclamations submitted by U.S. subjects was 65, of which 29 were listed
without and 36 with the sum being demanded. In the latter case, this sum amounted to a total of
1,395,343.87 dollars. Some of these reclamations summarised the wrongdoing that the Mexican
government was being held responsible for by the U.S.-Americans, whereas others did not.
Overall, von Rönne concluded, the justifications for and reasonings behind each reclamation
listed were very vague and insufficient for the determination of awards to be made, yet he
attached them to his report nonetheless for they enabled Prussian officials to view the types of
reclamations that had been brought forth. “In all of these cases there are claims for
indemnification for damages which the [U.S.] American citizens have unlawfully been forced to
suffer as regards their fortune, person, freedom, and honour”, von Rönne wrote. He elaborated
on the latter point: “There are among the points of grievances listed in the two documents
grievances regarding insults, which have not only been inflicted upon [U.S.] American citizens,
but rather upon the [U.S.] American Government”. Interestingly, the United States decided not to
leave these reclamations to the Prussian umpireship. U.S. Secretary of State John Forsyth wrote
to Mexican representative Martinez in September of 1838 that he wanted to address “the causes
of complaint which directly affect the national character” separately from the other reclamations
because they involved “points not supposed to admit of arbitration or compromise”.89 As von
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Rönne stated, these cases affecting the national character were insults to the U.S.-American flag
(cases 36 and 46), consuls (cases 44 and 49), and Lieutenant Osborn (case 51). Since neither
person nor property had been damaged through these insults and were not borne from such
reclamations brought forth by U.S. citizens, von Rönne likewise concluded that these cases were
not fit for Prussia’s umpireship.
Von Rönne furthermore determined that international law, the tenets of fairness, the
treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and Mexico, and “the spirit of
democratic-republican institutions of both countries” ought to be used as the foundation for
Prussia’s mediation.90 As such, von Rönne referred to and cited works on international law,
including those authored by German diplomat and scholar on international law Georg Friedrich
von Martens, Saxon historian, professor of law, and economist Friedrich von Bülau, and
Portuguese statesman Silvestre Pinheiro-Ferreira. The latter also worked with Emer de Vattel, a
Prussian subject of Swiss heritage who authored The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural
Law, one of the most important works on international law of the eighteenth century. De Vattel
links the political economy to international justice, writing that it had been commerce which had
transformed Europe from a “confused heap of detached pieces” into a community in which the
members were united “for the maintenance of order and liberty”.91 This trend can be identified in
Europe’s relations to Mexico, where commerce and international law in the form of
reclamations, treaties, and other agreements went hand in hand, and where European states often
strove for a certain degree of unity in order to imbue their reclamations and pressures on Mexico
with more legitimacy. As the first part of this chapter showcases, this sense of unification also
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occurred on a national basis for Germans in Mexico. De Vattel and one of his predecessors,
Christian Wolff, both argued that the society of nations ought to “cultivate human society”, for
which trade was of a primary importance. De Vattel did not confine the definition of the law of
nations to a series of “maxims and customs”, and instead advocated for a natural law of nations
akin to the natural laws and rights attributed to individuals in Enlightenment thought.92 De
Vattel’s idea that nations should restrict trade as little as possible and only in the effort for selfpreservation; and aim for the breaking down of internal barriers hindering their citizens from
engaging in trade.93 Ultimately, de Vattel concluded that Britain was the nation whose
international conduct was most worthy of emulation, and that a balance of power according to
British example would quell France’s desire to engineer its hegemony on the European
continent.94 In some ways, de Vattel’s work can be linked to 19th-century trends, including the
eradication of internal trading barriers in the German Zollverein as well as Britain’s decisive role
in international affairs, including those related to international law and rights in e.g. the instance
of slavery.
Using the ideas of the above-mentioned international and public law figures, von Rönne
addressed the legitimacy of some of the reclamations made, for they had occurred in the
politically fluid Texas. Based on the tenets of international law, Mexico should be held
responsible for any financial damages inflicted upon U.S. citizens by Mexican authorities.
Officials and government employees were “the organs of the state”, von Rönne highlighted, a
view shared by Pinheiro-Ferreira, de Vattel, and Bülau. The responsibility that the state assumed

De Vattel, Preface, 1. See also: De Vattel, Preface, 11: “Nations, it is true, can only be considered as so many
individual persons living together in the state of nature; and, for that reason, we must apply to them all the duties and
rights which nature prescribes and attributes to men in general”.
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for its employees – von Rönne speaks here of Vertretungsverbindlichkeit – extended to actions
that officials had executed without authorisation, as a precedent, a U.S.-American and French
reclamation dispute, had already determined.95 Though the state’s liability for its officials was
acknowledged by von Rönne, he noted that Mexico’s frequent political changes made applying
this concept to some of the reclamation efforts difficult: In 1817, two individuals saw their
property confiscated by the authorities of Santa Fe, and in 1818, the Brig Cossak was confiscated
by authorities of Mazatlán. Both cases led to reclamations, for which Mexico could not be held
accountable, von Rönne argued. “The authorities accused of inflicting these damages were
Spanish and not Mexican officials; the Spanish authorities still existed in Mexico at that time,
and the alleged damage was inflicted by them”. Consequently, such reclamations should not be
brought forth against the Mexican government, which had not existed in 1817 and 1818:
“Mexico was not yet a nation at the time, there did not exist a Mexican sovereign Volk; the
originator of this damage – in whose name the [damage] was inflicted – the sovereign
government of Spain – still exists today; thus, both claimants should have approached [that
government]”.96
Precedents had also established that the Vertretungsverbindlichkeit, the liability assumed
by a government for its officials, was not something that could be transferred to a new state like
other burdens, such as state debt.97 Hamburg and the Netherlands had, for example, not been
held accountable for the damages inflicted upon U.S. merchants during the French occupation,
for the officials who had been responsible for the customs barriers had been French. What is
more, U.S.-American reclamations in response to this commercial loss had demonstrably been
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satisfied by French monetary compensation and indemnities for damages.98 Von Rönne thus
concluded that Mexico could not be held responsible for reclamations prior to its independence,
because officials at that time had not been Mexican, but Spanish officials. Though this seems to
be, on the surface, an advantage for Mexico, von Rönne tied this string of arguments to Texas in
the subsequent pages. Several U.S. reclamations accused Mexican authorities in Texas of
wrongdoing, but von Rönne argued that claimants had to address the Texian government in order
to receive compensation, for Texas was no longer part of Mexico.99 What, though, could be
made of the fact that Texas had just seceded from Mexico, that Mexican authorities were blamed
for the damages inflicted upon U.S. citizens in Texas, and that Mexico did not recognise Texas
as independent? Von Rönne’s subsequent arguments to address reclamations that had occurred
during Spanish rule or in Texas led him down a rabbit hole that could only have displeased the
Mexican government.
On the U.S.-American side, Mexico’s acknowledgement that it would accept the
reclamation in the case of the Brig Louisa, which dated back to Spanish rule, was evaluated as a
concession that should apply to other reclamations that had occurred before 1821, yet von Rönne
argued that the Brig Louisa represented a different issue altogether: Though Spain had still held
political authority in Mexico in February and March of 1821 – the times of the incidents – the
damages had not been caused by Spanish authorities, but by the head of a political party, namely
Agustín de Iturbide, who had “represented a part of the sovereign Mexican Volk which had risen
up against Spanish rule”. As such, only the Mexican people could be held accountable,
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“represented by their current government”. Von Rönne wrote subsequently of the importance of
defining terms such as “political party”, as well as rebellion, revolution, civil war, and
insurgents, and determined that these definitions would be different for a democratic-republican
rather than a monarchical government. These terms were particularly important “when there is,
in actual fact, a lack of stability, and as long as a nation has not yet engaged in the continuous
process of forming its own types of government”.100 Von Rönne continued: “The question here
always must be whether a resistance to the Nationalwillen can be assumed or not”.101 Such a
resistance was – von Rönne cited Pinheiro-Ferreira – a rebellion, for “the rebellion consists of
putting up a resistance to the national will”. If there was more than a resistance to the national
will, however – if the nation split into several factions of which one could no longer determine
who was in the majority and who in the minority – “one can no longer speak of a rebellion, it is
instead a civil war”, von Rönne wrote. The rebels could, during a civil war, no longer be labelled
as such, and were instead ‘political parties/factions’. Especially in Mexico, under a democraticrepublican government, having a majority party was regarded as crucial by von Rönne. Since this
did not exist, and since Santa Anna engaged in frequent disputes and battles for power with
opposing factions and the government of Mexico in 1839, “there is no question that” Mexico’s
situation “deserves the label of a civil war”, von Rönne stated. Given this definition of a political
party in relation to the national will, von Rönne determined that Mexico could be held
responsible for the Brig Louisa reclamation, which complained about damages inflicted by a
Mexican political party, not a Spanish authority.102
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This line of reasoning became disadvantageous to Mexico on the international stage when
tied to the Texas Republic. As von Rönne had argued, Mexico could not be held accountable for
the U.S. reclamations regarding Texas, because the latter had established its own state. Von
Rönne thus believed that Texas was no longer a territory in rebellion, as Mexico’s government
viewed it – even if Texas’ international and foreign recognition was still shaky in 1839, it was at
the very least a political faction representing a part of the national will, a conclusion that would
mean Mexico was engaged in civil war, or in fact an entirely independent nation with its own
national will. Either way, von Rönne’s arguments weakened Mexico’s claim to Texas. If Texas
was acknowledged as a party engaged in warfare – a kriegsführende Parthei – this would
moreover, according to von Rönne’s definitions, enable Texas to “assume the rights that parties
at war are allowed to claim vis-à-vis third parties”, a concession that was not in Mexico’s best
interests.103 Only upon reunification and the return of peace in a country engaged in civil war,
could the nation be held accountable for the damages inflicted by one of the parties at war, a
circumstance that could not be applied to Spain (for Mexico was lost by Spain for good and the
political party responsible for the damages of the Brig Louisa had been representatives of the
Mexican, not the Spanish national will) or Texas (which had not been reintegrated into Mexico).
To add insult to Mexico’s injury, von Rönne also wrote that von Bülau’s works led one to
conclude that foreign recognition was not the primary factor that defined an independent state;
instead, it was “traffic [Verkehr] of states as such or through individual citizens, regulated by
international law […] individual states as such can only engage in peaceful traffic with those
states, which they have recognised as independent states. Of course, they do not obtain these
characteristics through foreign recognition; they must possess them because of their own
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strength, and can also possess them without recognition”, von Bülau wrote. Even though Texas
could only become an equal member of the society of nations through foreign recognition, it
could be independent without it nonetheless.104
Next to these conclusions, which questioned seriously the existence of a united Mexican
national will and rejected Texas’s status as a Mexican territory in rebellion, von Rönne made
further claims that troubled Mexico’s authorities. The Prussian minister argued that it did not
matter whether the political party responsible for damages came out of the civil war victorious;
the government would have to accept reclamations from foreigners from the losing party, also.
That is, von Rönne emphasised that some reclamations listed by U.S. citizens had been brought
forth because of damages inflicted by a political party at war, which existed in many parts of
Mexico during the 1830s and 1840s due to the efforts for independence on behalf of Yucatan,
Zacatecas, the Republic of the Rio Grande (an 1840 insurgency in modern-day Nuevo Leon,
Tamaulipas, and Coahuila), and others. The central government was also subject to frequent
attacks, coups d’état, and the existence of several regimes that claimed authority for themselves.
Even though many of these political parties at war were ultimately crushed by the Mexican army
or faced instability themselves (such as Santa Anna’s regimes), von Rönne believed that the
Mexican government was responsible for damages inflicted by any of these political parties,
even if they had been unable to come to power. In connection to this argument, the Prussian
representative also rejected Forsyth’s note on U.S. reclamations: This note, sent to the Mexican
government, emphasised that the U.S. sought indemnity for those damages inflicted by the
legitimate Mexican government (von der herrschenden Parthhei, the governing party). Though
von Rönne surmised that it was unclear whether Forsyth included in this definition also those
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ruling parties that had reigned fleetingly on a regional level, he ultimately concluded that
Forsyth’s claim was not in accordance with the tenets laid out by the international law of de
Vattel, Pinheiro-Ferreira, or Martens, and should hence not be taken into consideration for the
decisions to be made regarding the U.S. reclamations.105
Prussia’s umpireship was not well-received in Mexico, as Kossok has highlighted.
Because von Rönne’s reasoning denied Mexico the “legal proof” necessary to denounce U.S.
involvement in the Texas matter as “an intervention in the internal affairs” of Mexico, and
because Prussia’s decision was moreover perceived as too generous toward the U.S.-Americans
and hence financially unfortunate for Mexico, the Mexican government’s view on Prussia was
negatively impacted for years to come. Prussia’s initial choice to send Seiffart to Mexico as
merely a General-Consul, not a chargé d’affaires as von Gerolt had been, was also perceived as
an affront by the Mexican government. Seiffart wrote in 1846, the year marking the beginning of
the U.S.-Mexico War, that anti-U.S. sentiments had grown drastically in Mexico and become a
Nationalhass, a national hatred, in relation to which Prussia was also occasionally mentioned
“because public opinion had never been able to get accustomed to not seeing a favouring of the
extravagant North American demands in the arbitrated decision [of Prussia]”.106 Prussia’s
umpireship changed how Mexico was able to use international law and its tenets in an effort to
reconquer Texas. But this Texian episode is just one way in which international law defined the
relationship between Europe and Mexico, and indeed, Europe and the trans-Atlantic world. What
becomes noticeable is that international law, defined by Europeans, became increasingly applied
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to the new American states, the latter of which had little say in shaping international law or
determining how it should be applied.
Discussions on and philosophies of international law were shaped by two currents, that of
natural and that of positive law. Whereas de Vattel had focussed on natural law as the basis of
the law of nations, Martens is regarded as the first thinker of international law to establish a
detailed system of positive law based on empiricism. Particularly treaties – of amity, commerce,
trade, neutrality, peace, alliance, et cetera – were of interest to Martens. Not only did von Rönne
cite Martens, but Hanseatic representatives did so as well in their correspondence on Texas:
Vincent Rumpff, commenting on the in-depth analyses occurring among the Hanseates regarding
the Hanseatic-Texian treaty, noted that “Martens would shake his head, smiling”, if he could see
that the current draft of the treaty would only oblige the Hanseates to treat Texian vessels as they
would those of any other country, without imposing differential duties – something that “we
could never think of, anyway”, Rumpff noted.107 Martens’ works focussed on international law
from an exclusively European standpoint: Some of his works include Précis du droit des gens
modernes de l'Europe, Einleitung in das positive Europäische Völkerrecht auf Verträge und
Herkommen gegründet, Erzählungen merkwürdiger Fälle des neuern europäischen Völkerrechts,
and Grundriß einer diplomatischen Geschichte der europäischen Staatshändel und
Friedensschlüsse seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts.
This focus on Europe extant among key figures of international law extended to de
Vattel, who used international legal tenets to justify that Europeans had settled the “uncultivated
land” of the Americas.108 De Vattel wrote that “every nation is then obliged by the law of nature
to cultivate the land that has fallen to its share”, and that a nation did not possess the “right to
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enlarge its boundaries, or have recourse to the assistance of other nations, but in proportion as
the land in its possession is incapable of furnishing it with necessaries”. This is a significant
remark, for it justifies not only European settlement of the Americas, but could also be used in
theory to justify the United States’ expansion into Mexico, if one counts the cultivation of
Southern cotton as a “necessary”, particularly since Mexicans did not engage in much cotton
cultivation in Texas prior to Anglo settlement there. “Those nations”, wrote de Vattel,
who inhabit fertile countries, but disdain to cultivate their lands, and chuse [sic] rather to
live by plunder, are wanting to themselves, are injurious to all their neighbours, and deserve to be extirpated as savage and pernicious beasts. There are others, who, to avoid
labour, chuse [sic] to live only by hunting, and their flocks. […] Those who still pursue
this idle mode of life, usurp more extensive territories than, with a reasonable share of
labour, they would have occasion for, and have therefore no reason to complain, if other
nations, more industrious, and too closely confined, come to take possession of a part of
those lands. Thus, though the conquest of the civilised empires of Peru and Mexico was a
notorious usurpation, the establishment of many colonies on the continent of North
America might, on their confining themselves within just bounds, be extremely lawful.
The people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than inhabited them.109
De Vattel’s analysis denied the status of civilisation to Native Americans such as the
Comanches, whose importance to power relations, influence on culture, and exertion of
imperialism in the Texian borderlands have been discussed in chapter four.110 Though de Vattel
himself, noting that the empires of Peru and Mexico had been civilised even prior to Spanish
arrival, would not have viewed the U.S. War with Mexico as lawful, his conclusion that an
industrious nation could lawfully take possession of land held idly by another certainly sounds
similar to U.S. justifications for expansion into Mexico and Native American territory.111
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Though de Vattel argued in another passage that the civilising of nations in need thereof ought
not to occur by force, and that a nation could decide what to do with its vacated lands, his
perspective that the American nations prior to European arrival needed such civilising indicates
that debates on international law centred on European ideas of law, civilisation, justice, progress,
cultivation, and right.112
Though many of these individuals were Germans, hence not politically and
diplomatically powerful like the British, they nevertheless impacted international law profoundly
and perhaps even most heavily. Martti Koskenniemi writes that “The way we theorise about
international law has grown out of German public law […] the theoretical articulation of the
nature and problems of modern international law comes from the tradition of German public
law”.113 De Vattel was also a major inspiration for the fathers of the American Revolution, which
subsequently impacted many political revolutions and shaped ideas of liberalism and liberty,
human rights, and democracy. De Vattel was also cited by political conservatives during the
Congress of Vienna, such as Cardinal Ercole Consalvi of the Papal States.114 Thus, these
individuals had a global outreach. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, their
definitions of international law as being centred on Europe began to incorporate the American
states. Mexico’s response to this development is particularly interesting, because Mexican
authorities resisted arguments of international law brought forth by European agents and held

suggests that the displacement of many Tejanos in Texas or Mexicans who had been crossed by the border after
1848 would not have been seen as lawful or just by de Vattel.
112 De Vattel, 265.
113 Martti Koskenniemi, “Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756-1821) and the Origins of Modern International Law”,
IILJ Working Paper 2006/1, History and Theory of International Law Series, 1-24, see: http://iilj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/Koskenniemi-Georg-Friedrich-Von-Martens-1756-1821-and-the-Origins-of-ModernInternational-Law-2006-2.pdf. Accessed April 16, 2020.
114 Béla Kapossy, and Richard Whatmore, “Introduction” in de Vattel, The Law of Nations, xix.

318

against them their own interpretations of and arguments based on international law. By doing so,
Mexican statesmen also continuously reemphasised and shaped Mexican nationalism.
MEXICO AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Mexican officials used international law to condemn the independence of Texas. Texians,
however, used international law in order to accomplish the opposite. One note highlighted that
Texians were not intruders or usurpers, having been called into Mexico, and that they had, after
independence, established enlightened and free institutions under the banners of peace and
security. Texas had been, the excerpt asserted, accepted into the family of nations, and because
of Texas’ recognition by the United States in particular, the former had the “unquestionable
rights of being considered and treated, under all aspects, as an independent power”. Any efforts
by Mexico to conquer Texas were unlawful.115 On the other hand, Mexican officials saw it as a
matter of fairness and law/right that Texas not become independent. A pamphlet from 1837
argued that the Texian Congress was not one that honoured these two principles, stating that
anyone who “dared to raise their voice in defence of the most obvious principles of fairness and
law was charged [by all of Congress]” and labelled as a bad citizen who had sold himself to
Mexico.116
Another Mexican observer accused U.S.-Americans and Texians, who engaged in
contraband trade and were generally hostile toward Mexico, of “depriving the nation of its
rights”. Urréa asked whether Mexico ought not to finally implement laws that would save it from
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the ruinous influence of the “usurpers”, who were taking advantage of the fact that Mexico had
not yet made a serious enough effort to stop them. Was this not Mexico’s right?117 This question
is one of international law, which de Vattel also considered in his Law of Nations – for Mexico,
international legal tenets were of particular importance after the rebellion of the Texians.118 What
Mexican authorities found out, however, is that international law was not often used by
Europeans and others in their support, at least not effectively (as previous chapters have
discussed, Europeans did recognise Texas to Mexico’s chagrin, and did not condemn seriously
the U.S. breaches of neutrality in the Texas Question).
Another instance showcases that Mexican representatives often felt abandoned by
international law when they needed it. J. Álvarez linked the Texas matter to the United States
and the Pastry War, stating that U.S. support for Texas and a violation of its proclaimed
neutrality in the matter was a sign of the “disdain with which [the U.S.-Americans] see us”,
which made him believe that the United States would not be a country that would intervene in
France’s blockade of Mexico in 1838-39. Álvarez labelled France’s blockade an ‘injustice’ with
which the rest of Europe, though at other times so concerned with international law, would not
occupy itself: Though Deffaudis had announced that France’s action was not an offence against
the Mexican nation, but solely against its government, Álvarez argued that the French
intervention was really an attack on Mexico’s independence, and thus a violation of Mexico’s
rights. France, he believed, did not care whether Mexico was centralist or federalist, free or
enslaved; for France, it was much more useful to turn Mexico into a colony or to form another
royal dynasty there, for this would promote French interests in Mexico. England, on the other
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hand, did not care about justice or international law either, for it only cared about its commerce
and that “its capitals enjoyed the sufficient guaranties”. “The question is nothing more but ours
and exclusively ours”, Álvarez said of the Pastry War, highlighting that he did not expect support
from the world’s great powers.119 Anastasio Bustamante was also sceptical regarding the French
blockade, and wrote that Mexican troops that had just quelled internal insurgencies ought to be
used against the French in case the latter exceed the limits of a simple blockade.120
In many of Mexico’s international struggles, Mexican representatives felt as though
international law had disappointed them or left them in the state of a second-tier nation –
European international law seemed to take hold when it suited Europe’s commercial or political
interests. Vargas Garcia views aspects of international law, particularly treaties of amity and
commerce as well as slave-trade treaties, as inherently unequal, arguing that Britain in particular
pushed for agreements that were nominally fair but favoured it in practice: “only one of the
contracting parties was in the position to demand that the other observe the clauses in case of
divergence”, Vargas Garcia states. In most cases, this was the European power.121 In the case of
new reclamations brought forth by the United States, Álvarez even argued that these represented
an effort in which Mexico was not even recognised as a proper nation, highlighting his
discontentment with international legal standards.122 Because of this, Álvarez challenged
European definitions of international law. Deffaudis’ justification of French intervention and his
remark that France sought solely to intervene against the Mexican government, not the Mexican
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nation, was rejected by Álvarez, who wrote that “only we, as Mexican citizens, can distinguish
that point at which the government is different/separate from the nation, because we examine the
issue with the eyes of our own interest and measure the extent of the dispute with the dimension
of our laws: the foreigner and us have different modes of viewing the aspects of the difficulties
that we are occupied with”. Álvarez explicitly rejected the legal tenets laid out by Europeans, for
they did not adequately reflect the state of Mexico’s affairs and had not been shaped by Mexico
as Mexico’s laws had. Much like Álvarez, who believed that Europeans only acted in their best
interest, Valentín Gómez Farías labelled “the Texas Question as a question of life or death for
the Mexicans. I, who have lived a bit abroad, know the importance and politics of the nations
(the United States, England, and France) which contend, albeit by very different means, to
appropriate/seize [Texas]”.
U.S.-American influence in Texas had to be prevented, this was certain for Gómez
Farías, but he also criticised English and French intervention: “it is said that we are running a
huge risk if the annexation [of Texas to the United States] turns out to be true, and in this fact, I
have no doubt, but we will not have [the risk] any less […] if the English stay in/keep Texas”.
This scenario, manifested Gómez Farías, would lead to the establishment of a foreign monarchy
at the feet of Mexico. He emphasised subsequently that Mexico did “desire peace with all
nations”, but that it could not maintain peace – i.e., keeping by international legal tenets which
foresaw that laws regulate international relations – if this came at the expense of the Mexican
nation.123 In another letter, Gómez Farías reiterated this, lamenting that the “English dominate
the Mexican government” and sought the latter’s recognition of Texas because they did not want
Texas to be annexed to the United States. Gómez Farías rejected England’s policy, arguing that
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Mexico would not let “our soil be dominated by the Yankees or the English, we want and must
be solely Mexicans, and so we will be, and we will reconquer Texas”.124 Another observer also
noted that Mexico could not expect help in the Texas matter, and had rather ruined its
relationship with Europe over the issue: “We have destroyed ourselves, discredited ourselves in
Europe, and prepared two foreign powers for setting a trap in our path by which they can
conquer, subjugate, and humiliate us”.125
As the above cases have shown, Mexico’s statesmen’s views on Texas were accompanied
by a certain resignation that appealing to England or France would not help Mexico in solving
the Texas Question. With the Hanse Towns, however, Consul Negrete hoped to have better luck:
These small towns, not politically or militarily powerful, might respond better to a Mexican
protest regarding Hanseatic-Texian relations and negotiations of a treaty. In October of 1844, A.
Negrete, the General-Consul of Mexico in the Hanse Towns, wrote a letter to the Hanseatic
Senates, submitting a protest concerning the appearance of Texian representative (the “so-called
Colonel Dangerfield [sic]”) William Henry Daingerfield in the Hanseatic Cities, “with the goal
of negotiation the recognition of the Venerable Senates of the independence of this territory
violently removed from the legal authority of the Mexican Republic”. A Hanseatic recognition of
Texas would be “not merely against the rights of my government, but also the interests of the
subjects of our two respective countries”, Negrete wrote, and referred subsequently to the
Texians as “usurpers”. Hanseatic negotiations with Texas would be contrary to “the rights and
the sovereignty of the Mexican Republic”, which showcases that Negrete sought to use legal
foundations in order to cement his position.
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Though he tried to use Hanseatic commercial interests to persuade the Hansa’s Senates to
reject Daingerfield’s status, the Hanseatic response also used legal, particularly international,
principles to justify their reception of the Texian: “Far from prejudging on a question of public or
international law, the Senate limits itself strictly, as it has done in the past, to cultivating the
rapports of navigation and commerce which have naturally formed themselves between the
entrepôts of Germany and a country such as Texas”. Rather than rejecting Negrete’s claim to
international law, the Senate’s response was rather diplomatic – though it did not disregard
Negrete’s comment, it steered clear of making a telling or partial remark by emphasising that the
Hanse Towns cultivated commercial relations where they formed ‘naturally’. Moreover, the
letter pointed out that Mexico had profited from this Hanseatic stance not long ago: In the 1820s,
when restorationist and legitimist policy advocated for Spain and the non-recognition of SpanishAmerican independence, Mexico had aspired to receive the same recognition from Europe that it
was now denying to Texas. This weakened Negrete’s legal arguments.
The Hanseatic response reemphasised once more that it followed the commercial lead of
the great maritime powers, but sought to refrain from voicing any views regarding international
law, particularly because of Mexico’s importance to and friendship with the German city-states.
This Mexican appeal to international law thus fell on deaf ears, because of the precedent that
Mexico’s own independence had set in this regard.126 Nevertheless, Negrete sent another
response to the Hanseatic Senates, using international legal principles to establish why Mexico’s
case had been different from Texas’: Mexico had, indisputably, declared Negrete, been its own
nation by the time the Hanseates engaged in official relations with that country, and Mexicans
had not demanded that a neighbouring country hand over part of its territory to enlarge their
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own. Mexicans had already established a nationality by the time they became independent;
Mexicans shared a language, religion, and had won a “glorious battle in order to found a
nationality and enjoy the rights” of their ancestors and other nations. Texas, according to
Negrete, had none of these characteristics. Thus, Negrete took this opportunity to cement and
legitimise his country’s nationality and independence at the same time as he tried to degrade
Texas’.
Contestations arose between Europeans and Mexico in response to these differing views
and usages of international law. Mexicans tried to resist European recognitions of commerce
through other means, also. One newspaper excerpt highlighted that Mexico would no longer treat
those nations who had recognised Texas and those which had not the same, and that it would
view those treaties with Texas as hostile to Mexico. “We do not possess vessels of war with
which we can make war, but we have our appetizing commerce”, the writer noted. With the
latter, Mexico could try to influence foreign nations.127
European responses to this Mexican resistance likewise referred to legal tenets in order to
reaffirm their point of view. Mexico’s young history inspired one Prussian observer to argue that
the Germans in Mexico had all experienced an exquisite political education, whereas Mexicans
generally had not.128 This could be used as a justification for discrediting Mexicans’ political
thinking. In one instance, von Gerolt rejected Bocanegra’s argument regarding a particular law
that had given rise to reclamations, stating that foreigners’ civil rights in Mexico had not been
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taken into account by Bocanegra.129 Moreover, von Gerolt underlined the European focus of
international law when he stated that international and public law had been accepted by the
United States and Europe, which gave it enough credibility and legitimacy to be applied to the
remainder of the globe – Spanish-American views of international law were not of essential
importance.130 Vargas Garcia notes that European perceptions of international law contributed to
Spanish American states’ relegation to peripheral areas, where the “dilemmas of political
influence, economic expansion, and strategic relevance did not manifest themselves in the
classical colonial sense, but in a deterritorialised frame with certain international rules, many of
which were not written […] and without legal restrictions to the discretional unilateralism of the
powers at the peak of the hierarchy of global power”.131 Mexicans contested the monopoly that
Europeans sought to claim for the interpretation of internation legal standards: Bocanegra, in
another reclamation matter, referred to international law in order to justify his government’s
decisions. In one instance, Mexico’s authorities had determined that, “owing to the tenets of
equality and justice, which form the foundation of [Bocanegra’s] actions, the Prussian subjects’
forced bonds ought to have the same fate as those of the French, English, and North Americans”,
which meant that these reclamations would be sent to the ministry of finance for evaluation.
Regarding reclamations submitted because of plundering, however, Bocanegra emphasised that
his government could not respond or accept these efforts, because Mexico had never
acknowledged that it was obliged to extend the right to indemnities to such a scenario. The
French case, where compensation had occurred in the aftermath of the Pastry War, could not be
used as precedent, Bocanegra argued, for Mexico had not acknowledged that France’s demands
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had been lawful or righteous. In his response to von Gerolt, Bocanegra appealed to principles
such as peace, equality, justice, and humanity between nations.132
In internal affairs, Mexican representatives used international law, also. When another
rebellion broke out in Mexico City in 1841, a message to the Mexican nation was issued by
President Bustamante, in which he appealed to international legal tenets in order to unite the
Mexican people behind his cause. Bustamante highlighted that the Mexican nation was exposed
to great suffering, unable to assume a flourishing era for which it was destined and incapable of
enforcing important reforms to its institutions and agencies. The President blamed the various
military chiefs, who frequently engaged in resurrections and insurgencies, for Mexico’s dire
state, and stated that they were the primary reason why Mexico had not yet been accepted as an
equal among the civilised nations of the globe. These military men kept Mexico from
implementing the ideals of the Enlightenment, as well as proper liberty and patriotism, and it was
his goal, Bustamante claimed, to foster “steady principles and foundations” for the Mexican
nation, so that it might grow prosperous and receive credibility in front of other nations, who
regarded Mexico’s name “even more contemptuously” in the aftermath of rebellions such as the
one of September 1841. Whereas von Rönne had rejected a common national will in Mexico,
Bustamante appealed directly to it: Mexico could, like other civilised and educated countries,
solve its problems through empirical means.133 Another message by a Mexican official argued
the same, emphasising that a liberal and constitutional government was important in elevating
Mexico in the community of nations.134 In 1839, Rocafuerte had also sought to unite the country
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using international legal arguments, writing that Mexico was in need of eradicating the resistance
to “the progress of enlightenment and the march of civilisation. The mental emancipation and the
cause of civil and commercial liberty encounter […] obstacles, which appear in this moment to
be insurmountable”. Mexico could overcome these obstacles through patriotism, Rocafuerte
argued.135
International law and the contestation thereof, as well as its applicability to America,
shaped definitions of and sentiments of nationalism in both Mexico and Germany. For German
officials, Mexico, a country where German interests were weakened by Germany’s political
fragmentation, became a place where German national unity became more visible and more
necessary. This inspired Prussian officials such as von Gerolt and Seiffart to engage with the idea
of a German national representative under Prussian leadership in Mexico. This type of German
nationalism, which existed not among liberals – students, professors, and other intellectuals who
fought for German unity and democracy in 1848 – but conservatives and particularly Prussians
interested in a Prussian-led, monarchical Germany, was shaped by events and currents in
peripheral Mexico. International legal struggles stood behind many of the discussions that
German officials had regarding German centralisation, from the standardisation of
measurements, to customs unions, to national agents, and Germany’s position in Europe and visà-vis England and France. Trans-Atlantic trade was also imperative to the conflict between both
Prussia and Austria and Prussia and the Hanse Towns: Austria was not a trans-Atlantic power
and lacked the economic-commercial incentive for centralisation and unification that Prussia
could offer via the Zollverein internally and a German-Prussian agent representing all German
interests abroad externally. This gave Prussia an importance in a facet of the development of a
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national German identity that Austria, at times dismissive of the trans-Atlantic world, did not
possess. In Hanseatic-Prussian relations, trans-Atlantic trade became a subject of constant
contestation: Prussian agents sought to bind the Hansa more closely to Prussia by emphasising
that Hanseates were heavily dependent upon Prussian representation. On the other hand,
Hanseatic independence also benefitted the German Bund’s trade because the Hansa were not
part of the Holy Alliance. Moreover, their significance as port cities and merchants abroad, as
well as as pioneers in trans-Atlantic affairs and international legal agreements, such as the
Texian-Hanseatic treaty, made it difficult for Prussia to pressure the Hanse Towns in the same
way as it did with other German states.
Mexico’s relationship to international law is equally interesting. Mexicans often felt like
international legal principles did not apply to them in the same manner in which they did to
Europeans; rather, they felt disadvantaged by a growing system of international law that was
predominantly shaped by European thinkers with European perspectives. Mexicans believed that
those who enforced international law – the great powers, and predominantly England – often did
so in ways that suited their commercial interests rather than focussing on an objective ‘right’ or
justice. This could be seen in Mexican responses to European reclamations, as well as views on
Europe’s reaction to France’s blockade in 1838-39 or the independence of Texas. As a result,
Mexican observers responded to Europeans using international legal principles in order to
highlight that their country should be perceived as an equal in the community of nations.
International law was also used by Mexicans to define their nationality. Officials such as
Bustamante appealed to his nation using international-legal language, seeking to unify his nation
and thus establish Mexico more firmly and favourably on the international stage.
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Chapter Six – Under the Wing of the American Eagle or in the Jaws of the British Lion: An
Analysis of Anglophobia and Anti-British Sentiment on Both Sides of the Atlantic, and Its
Role in the Annexation of Texas to the United States1

Economic rivalry was a primary factor in the European recognition of Spanish America
and Texas, and economic incentive and the fear of commercial competition became dominant
factors in the efforts of restorationist regimes to circumvent legitimist policies. France, Prussia,
and the Hanse Towns were all eager to re-establish commercial ties with the Spanish-American
states after their breakaway from Spain, fearful of losing crucial and valuable trading advantages
to Britain, which emerged as the era’s hegemon. Chapter one has outlined Britain’s economic
prowess after the Congress of Vienna and showcased that many European regimes enforced
protectionist measures after 1815 in order to save their markets from the flooding of English
goods. In Mexico, English-German commercial rivalry had elements of cutthroat competition,
and France hoped that its earlier recognition of Texas would give it the economic advantages that
England had accrued in some parts of the Americas through their early involvement in and
recognition of independent Spanish America. Few conversations regarding competition were
held among continental European agents in North America that did not mention England, for the
English economy was the one to beat and the most threatening in trans-Atlantic trade. As chapter
three has shown moreover, Britain was also the dominant power in the abolitionist movement,
and the political, legal, extra-legal and imperial power of British slave trade treaties was

Terrell questioned annexationists’ fervent belief that Texas “must be taken under the protecting wing of the
American Eagle or […] inevitably fall into the jaws of the British Lion!”. See: “Speech of Hon. G. W. Terrell, Late
Texian Minister to France and England. Delivered at the public dinner, given to him at Galveston on the 2 nd October
1845”, Newspaper Excerpt, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 14: Consuls Elliot and Kennedy, Foreign Various &
Consular Domestic, January to December 1845, l. 164-166.
1

330

recognised by Europeans and Americans alike. Immanuel Wallerstein emphasises Britain’s
unique degree of power in his works on world-system analysis, stating that only at most three
powers had achieved hegemony over the current world-system centred on capitalism: the
Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The nineteenth century was the era of British
hegemony.
That British power was capable of striking fear in the hearts of American and European
statesmen seems clear, as does the fact that English commercial competition vexed both
European and American states. What though can be said of outright Anglophobia? The
historiography on U.S.-American views on Texas has revealed that U.S. statesmen had been
motivated to annex Texas sooner rather than later in part due to intense fears of English influence
and interference in Texas. Historians like Sam W. Haynes, William Freehling, Frederick Merk,
David Pletcher, and Paul Varg have considered U.S. Anglophobia to varying degrees, and argued
that it was one of the arguments used by Southern and Texian pro-annexationists and indeed, one
of the reasons for Texas’ annexation.2 What this chapter seeks to evaluate, however, is the extent
to which Anglophobia on the subject of Texas went beyond that of the United States and Texas:
French agents in particular also expressed anti-English views, as did some Germans. As the last
chapter has already outlined briefly, some Mexican observers likewise branded Anglo interest in
Texas as a mere effort to subjugate that country, even if not necessarily by turning the young
republic into a British colony. As a result, Mexicans often viewed England as self-servient and at
times expressed contempt for the latter on that account. This chapter will evaluate the degrees of
anti-British sentiment among Texians, Mexicans, Germans, and the French regarding Texas and
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will also analyse European perceptions of the U.S. hatred for Britain, which amounted to outright
Anglophobia. This chapter will also showcase one important aspect of informal imperialism:
Even if informal-imperial measures are not actually fruitful, the mere perception of English
informal empire in Texas on behalf of other agents was enough to shape lastingly the political
landscape and power relations extant in the Texian borderlands. Moreover, the chapter will also
analyse British perceptions of U.S. Anglophobia.
Though several works have been done on U.S. Anglophobia, with Haynes’ works
representing some of the most thorough efforts, a brief outline of this sentiment will be given
regardless, for it serves as context for European perception of U.S. Anglophobia. Haynes has
showcased that Anglophobia existed in most parts of and among most political factions in the
United States, though predominantly as a tool to advance regional interests. Whereas Northerners
acknowledged British power as dangerous to U.S. interests in the North via Canada, Southerners
focussed on British abolitionism and British influence in Texas and Mexico.3 Pro-annexationists
attributed grand designs and dark schemes to Britain, claiming that the British had used their
influence in Mexico to mediate between Texas and that country solely with the intent of
advancing British interests and power; that Lord Aberdeen had offered a loan to Texas in
exchange for abolition of slavery – an idea that was advanced by some Britons, including
Charles Elliot – and that Britain would use its presence in Texas to surround the United States,
ultimately leading the latter country to perish commercially. An example of an argument borne
of this fear is a pro-annexationist editorial published in The Evening Star in August of 1837,
which cited English interest as a reason for the necessity of immediate U.S. action on the matter
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of Texas. The editorial showcases how English informal imperialism – be it real or perceived by
U.S.-Americans and others – and commerce intertwined in Texas:
If Texas continued to be an independent republic […] we unavoidably throw her into the
arms and under the protection of England. Texas says to England, “Bring in your
Woollens at a duty of ten per cent. ad valorum, and all your other articles of manufacture
at the lowest possible rate: Mexico and the United States have both prohibitory duties;
send your manufactures here, and they will soon find their way through Mexico and
through the Southern and Western States. Take our Cotton in payment at lower rates than
you can obtain it on the Mississippi.” What would become of our Tariff and our
manufactures and our revenue laws under this influence? The whole West would be
flooded with cheap British goods: England would hold a most commanding and
influential position, controlling the mines of Mexico – the trade and commerce of Texas
– together with an influence over the Indians on our frontier. That our Eastern
manufacturers should take measures to avoid this state of things cannot be doubted, and it
only can be avoided by bringing Texas fairly and tranquilly into the Union at once.4
This excerpt has been given here in almost its full length, because it discusses the benefits of
lower trading barriers in Texas, the fear of British power, and the establishment of British
influence via informal-imperialist measures centring on commerce. In another instance in Spring
of 1837, U.S. representatives were scared that Mexico might try to sell Texas to Britain. In a
letter from William D. Jones to John Forsyth, the former announced that Mexican general José
Marino Michelena had made a proposal to the Mexican Congress that Texas might be sold to
Britain “at the rate of twenty five cents per acre, in order to pay off the British debt”.5
In another interesting episode of anti-British sentiment, a U.S.-American observer
blamed England for the international law violations committed by U.S.-Americans, in this
instance, a violation of neutrality. After discussing the disarmament of Texians by U.S. troops,
and the refusal to defend them against an oncoming Mexican force, the writer lamented: “but so
it goes. England tramples upon Americans with impunity, and we follow its laudable example
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and trample upon other (weaker) nations”.6 This highlights both the use of Anglophobia as an
excuse, explanation, or justification for U.S. expansion and aggression, as well as the deep
pervasiveness that Anglophobia had for U.S.-Americans’ identity of self. In his book, Haynes
analyses the influence of Anglophobia on U.S. society, culture, politics, expansion, slavery,
commerce, and diplomacy in the first half of the nineteenth century, showcasing the deep
pervasiveness of anti-English sentiment and its importance to the formation of a U.S.-American
identity. One of the key Anglophobes mentioned by scholars who have evaluated this aspect of
U.S. history is Andrew Jackson, who highlighted incessantly that the United States needed to
annex Texas or fall prey to England. In March 1844, Jackson believed that “the present golden
moment to obtain Texas must not be lost, or Texas must, from necessity, be thrown into the arms
of England, and be forever lost to the United States!” He feared British interference not merely
in Texas, but also in California, which would “cost us oceans of blood, and millions of money, to
free us from the evils that may be brought upon us” by the British. Texas would be a “strong iron
hoop around our Union, and a bulwark against all foreign invasion and aggression”.7 Jackson’s
dislike for Britain bordered on hysteria, for he believed that there was no act too treacherous or
sinister that England would not try to imperil the United States and possibly lead the Union to
perish.
One of Mirabeau Lamar’s associates, William Jefferson Jones, lamented that U.S.
statesmen “fear another contest with Great Britain” – U.S. interference in Canadian affairs,
paired with strong British interests in the Southern part of North America, made W. J. Jones
believe that “our [U.S.] government will hardly be able to steer between Sylla [sic] and
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Charybdis”. Nevertheless, W. J. Jones identified some possible benefits for Texas: “A war
between Great Britain & America would be worth millions to Texas by judicious management
on the part of your [Texian] government”. He advised Lamar with the words in medio tutissimus
ibis, suggesting that Texas pursue a middle course between English and U.S. influence and
interest.8 In another letter, Jefferson Jones asserted that “the public mind both here [in the U.S.]
& in England is prepared for war”. He emphasised the contribution of slavery as an explosive
issue, noting that “the slavery question is a mania in England and the attempt to unite Texas with
a view to strengthen that institution will arouse he [sic] English Naion [sic]”.9
Among Texians, anti-English sentiment existed as well, particularly among proannexationists. Texian Anglophobia was deeply connected to its U.S. cousin, for both the Texian
and the Southern-U.S.-American Anglophobias centred on the preservation of slavery. After
independence, Texian statesmen pushing for annexation tried to use U.S. Anglophobia to their
advantage in negotiations with the United States. After immediate annexation failed, supporters
of a Texian accession to the North American Union emphasised the weight that English interest
and influence in Texas could potentially hold for the political, commercial, and imperial relations
in the North American Southwest. James Pinckney Henderson, Texas’ Acting Secretary of State
at the time and a Texian representative who travelled to Europe shortly after independence to
acquire a loan for his country, wrote to Memucan Hunt in December of 1836. The latter had just
been commissioned as Minister Extraordinary of Texas to the United States, and was supposed
to effect the recognition of Texian independence on behalf of Texas’ northern neighbour.
Moreover, he was to push for the annexation of Texas to the United States. Henderson focussed
particularly on the second point, and told Hunt to emphasise to the U.S. statesmen that the
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United States “would forever and entirely” be precluded “from enjoying any of the benefits
resulting in Texas from the richness of her soil, commerce &c &c.” if it did not annex Texas.
This disadvantage to the United States would arise because a lack of annexation would force
Texas to seek treaties with Europe, especially England. Henderson knew about the heated
debates on the imperial and geopolitical contestation between England and the United States, and
stated that such a treaty with England would cause “all advantages of commerce wealth and
strength” to be “forever lost to the United States and important advantages given to a Power on
her Southern border which already confines her on the North”. Henderson labelled Texas’
annexation to the United States as a “national defensive point of view”: “take from the United
States these advantages and add them to England or any other power and it would hang like an
Incubus upon her prosperity”.10
In an 1844 letter to Andrew Jackson, Sam Houston suggested that he would be in favour
of Texas’ annexation to the United States, though he underlined that Texas, if it could establish
peaceful relations with its neighbours, was not in need of annexation. Rather, Houston argued, it
was the United States that needed Texas, for “the United States cannot, without great hazard to
the security of her institutions, exist without Texas. The United States are one of the rival powers
of the earth; and from their importance, as well as the peculiarity of their institutions and the
extent of their commercial relations, they must expect at no distant day, wars, the object of which
will be to prevent their continuance, if possible, as a nation”. With this statement, Houston could
only have promoted Jackson’s already-rampant Anglophobia, for he questioned the very
existence of the United States after future wars to come. Possessing Texas would be crucial to
the United States’ geopolitical success, Houston asserted, but Texas, “has nothing to apprehend

10

James Pinckney Henderson to Memucan Hunt, December 31, 1836, TLP, 89-95.

336

for years to come. Other nations would not dread her rivalry; but rather court her friendship for
commercial advantage”. Like Henderson had in the 1830s, Houston alleged that Texian
independence would lead that republic to become a European commercial hub in North America.
With its low tariffs, Texas would become the main place from which Europeans would conquer
the commerce of northern Mexico, and U.S.-American manufactures would no longer be
competitive. Annexation to the U.S., however, would integrate Texas into the U.S. economy, and
thus secure the advantages outlined above “to the American Merchant to the exclusion of the
Europeans”.11 U.S.-American and Texian arguments for Texas’ annexation to the United States
showcase that commerce, slavery, and imperial rivalry were deeply interrelated in North
America, and statesmen used Anglophobia as a means of manipulating this connection in the
United States’ favour.12
Beyond fanning U.S. fears of Anglophobia in order to speed up or encourage annexation
in the years after independence, Texians’ conviction that annexation was necessary in order to
save their state from English interference also grew in the 1840s. Slavery arose here as a primary
cause of anti-English hysteria. As early as 1838, Henderson pointed out to Lamar that one of the
main reasons for Britain’s delay on the decision whether to recognise Texas or not came from the
widespread British opposition to slavery.13 In an 1843 letter, a Texian observer expressed fears
regarding British abolitionist influence in Texas, writing that “if captain Elliott [sic] and the
British Abolitionists succeed in making Texas an anti-slavery country, and are allowed to open
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rendezvous for runaways […] it will be a difficult matter for our planters to keep any slaves”.
The writer identified British interference in Texas as a “danger to our internal tranquillity”, and
pointed to “the increased temptation to insurrection, with the probably immense pecuniary
losses” as consequences of British abolitionist fervour.14 An 1843 article from the Civilian and
Galveston Gazette detailed the grim future Texas would face if it remained unannexed and fell to
British informal empire. “The Duke of Wellington tells us that the consumption of British
manufactures depends upon the legislative control of Great Britain – or in other words, that the
prosperity of England depends upon the ability of British Parliament to compel other nations to
consume her manufactures”; the writer quoted General Duff Green, showcasing the link between
U.S. and Texian Anglophobia and observers’ linking of British commerce to British politics and
empire. This particular article argued that the English were limited by the low consumption of
their manufactures in their colonies. As a result, they would establish themselves in Texas in
order to influence that country’s politics, particularly regarding slavery. An abolition of slavery
in Texas, the writer asserted, would lead to the abolition of it in the United States, and hence
destroy U.S. competitiveness to Britain, which was itself limited by the cessation of slavery in its
colonial empire. “England will again through her monopoly of the East India market, be enabled
to levy contributions on all other civilized nations”. For U.S. Southerners and Texians, slavery
was the predominant issue regarding British interests in Texas, and they connected it to most
other issues of the era: commerce, expansion, and liberty.15
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In both the United States and in Texas, Anglophobia regarding British interference in
Texas was linked strongly to annexationism. Smith of the Texian Congress, for instance, who
was in favour of annexation, believed that independence would mean that “in less than three
months from this period, we may be annexed to England or any other European power”.16 Those
in favour of Texian independence may have held suspicions against Britain because of its power,
but were often ultimately of the impression that Texas could prove itself in a British world. This
makes sense, given that Anglophobia and the belief that Britain would subjugate small and weak
Texas and abolish slavery there would easily lead to the conclusion that an accession to the
United States would protect Texian interests, and hence also worked well even if the concern
about British interference was not always authentic but rather a political tool. A proindependence article from 1843, published in The Citizen, argued that “the reasons advanced by
the press of the United States for annexation, are forcible truths”, and suggested that Texas
should remain independent because of her valuable assets. In order to avoid becoming “the bone
of contention”, Texas could turn to England, for “she only is the great medium through which we
can look for obtaining by diplomacy possession of the soil we occupy”. Relations with England
would legitimise Texian independence from both the United States and Mexico, and though the
writers acknowledged that England “has her motives”, they also believed that these were “in this
case reciprocal in their relations, (she wants our staple products, we need her commodities”.17
Though a fear of British influence was a reality for many Texians, particularly due to the concern
that Britain would interfere with slavery in Texas, the fact that Texian nationalists were generally
less scared of England and its power suggests that Texian Anglophobia was heavily used as a
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political tool. Given the strong pro-annexationist sentiments of 1836-1837, and again after 1843,
Texian Anglophobia also seems to have been most present in the few years following
independence and those approaching 1845.
Next to pro-independence newspaper articles and publications, there were also statesmen
with positive views on the Republic of Texas and consequently more optimistic views on
England. Though Robert Anderson Irion, Texas’ Secretary of State in 1837, did acknowledge
that Texas, if not annexed by the United States, would become “an immense cotton and sugar
growing nation in intimate connection with England”, he also argued that, in the future, Texas’
relations with the “commercial and manufacturing countries of Europe […] shall have been
permanently adjusted on the equitable principles of reciprocal interests”. He did not fear
economic dependence on Europe’s industrial powers, writing that they “may have to deplore the
loss of that ascendancy in manufacturing and the carrying trade that they now so triumphantly
enjoy”.18 Overall, Irion promoted Euro-Texian relations, noting in late 1838 that Texas’
proposition for annexation to the United States should be withdrawn; this “will have a most
favorable effect on our negotiations in Europe”, he argued.19 Another observer downplayed
Europe’s potency, also: Tejano O. de A. Santangelo labelled John Quincy Adams’ ideas that a
war of the races could break out in Texas and incite Anglo-French intervention as “chimeras”,
suggesting that he did not believe that European influence could impact Texas’ political or
commercial independence. As a result, he also believed that U.S. annexation of Texas would not
be necessary.20 Another opponent of annexation, George Whitfield Terrell, asserted that the
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Anglophobic fear that Texas would be annexed by or at the least dependent on England was “an
insult to every independent man in Texas”. The “intrigues of the British Cabinet” and the
“unwarrantable interference” inflicted by “that insidious British Cabinet, within the dark recesses
of whose secret councils are engendered more than half the evils that afflict mankind” were
evaluated by Terrell as a boogieman: “suppose that, in truth, all the sin of this management,
intrigue, bribery, falsehood […] should lie at the door of the United States”, Terrell stated in a
speech.21 Those opposed to annexation were more likely to view England in a favourable light,
and some, such as Terrell, held suspicion regarding U.S. policy in Texas.
What the correspondence and opinions of U.S.-Americans and Texians such as Irion and
Houston highlight is that sentiments of fear were not solely limited to the British, though
Anglophobia was by far the most pervasive and potent fear toward another country in both the
United States and Texas. At times, Anglophobia was connected to the anxiety that Britain might
be joined by other European powers in its designs, or that Europe, even if not immediately
connected to Britain, might interfere in Texian affairs to U.S. detriment. Andrew Jackson argued
that “the whole European world could not, in combination against us, make an impression on our
Union” if Texas be annexed, and the “probabilities of future collusion with foreign powers”
would be lessened as a result.22 One Texian observer explained that the United States’ preferred
course in the Texas matter, i.e. annexation, was singularly beneficial to that country, whilst
Texian independence “was most desirable for all parties, except the United States”. The article
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emphasised in particular France’s and England’s gain from Texas’ independence.23 Britain’s
policy line was also seen as the guiding principle for the remainder of Europe by some. Another
article criticised “the astute diplomacy and active intrigue of Europe” and identified those two
factors as “the only weak points in our national position – points which, it seems to me, none but
enemies can contemplate with satisfaction”. At the same time, this observer seemed to have
conflated Britain with Europe, for his subsequent comments concerned themselves solely with
the dangers of British influence, writing that there had already been “evidence of a design on the
part of Great Britain to interfere directly in the relations of Texas”.24
Though Anglophobia, together with anti-Mexican sentiment, was the primary U.S.American concern regarding foreign intrusion in Texas, there are instances of U.S. jealousies
specifically toward a perceived interference of other European states. Laurent’s article on
Belgium’s interests in Texas showcases that the United States pressured Belgium to terminate
negotiations with the Texians regarding a loan-colonisation deal, demonstrating that U.S.Americans saw any European immigration to Texas as an undue influence exercised over what
they regarded as their backyard.25 Among Texians, a different stance was taken regarding
emigration, largely due to the necessity of peopling the country. As Daingerfield’s
correspondence with Rumpff, discussed in prior chapters, has outlined, Texian statesmen
believed that they were in dire need of emigration. Texian observers had confidence that most of
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the emigrants arriving were “not the viscious [sic] and idle, or foreign speculators, but mostly
men who wish to settle permanently in the country; and while they seek their own, add to the
general prosperity”. Barnard E. Bee also suggested optimistically that, shall Texas be met with
war with Mexico, “volunteers from all nations will flock to you, Ten thousand Germans, ten
thousand French, - give moderate bounties in land, have a good Commissariat, and you need not
give a dollar pay during the time they are in service,” demonstrating his confidence in the power
Texas held via its land.26 Unlike the U.S. perception – which even encouraged U.S. officials to
pressure Belgium into rejecting the loan-colonisation deal – Texian views of European
immigrants were more favourable.27
EUROPEAN AGENTS’ AWARENESS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN ANGLOPHOBIA AND JEALOUSIES
TOWARD CONTINENTAL EUROPE
Nevertheless, U.S. imperialism and the anxiety toward not just English, but any European
influence, were recognised by European observers. As previous chapters have showcased,
Prussian minister Christian Rother rejected the Adelsverein’s plea for official support for
colonisation schemes in Texas, citing the strength of British and U.S. imperialisms in the region
as a primary reason. As soon as Germany would seek to establish its own influence in Texas,
Rother argued, Britain and the United States would take steps to push Germany out of the young
republic, making it impossible for Germans to establish even the most rudimentary trading
connection to Texas.28 This demonstrates that Prussia was well-aware of U.S. jealousies
regarding foreign influence – even if not British – in North America. The Adelsverein, on the
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other hand, believed that it was worthwhile for German states and the Society to resist U.S.
expansionism motivated in part by U.S. jealousy of Europe. The politics of the United States
were referred to by Prince von Solms as “rapacious”, and he dismissively labelled U.S.Americans and the United States as “Yankees, the big ‘go ahead nation’” which sought to export
their “adventurers and villains” to Texas.29 In another report, von Solms expressed awareness of
Anglo-American perspectives designed to spur sentiments against him and his German-national
project in Texas: Von Solms wrote that Fisher had apparently hired a lawyer and told the latter
that von Solms was hostile to U.S.-Americans and that he did not permit Anglo-Americans in his
colonies, primarily because von Solms sought to protect German interests only. Fisher identified
von Solms as a threat to Anglo-American interests because he was opposed to annexation.30
This instance demonstrates once more that Germans were cognisant of U.S. jealousies regarding
foreign interference. It also shows that U.S. hostility toward Europeans extended beyond the
British, even if the British case is perhaps the only one severe enough to be labelled a phobia.
The Hanseates were also aware of U.S. Anglophobia, and considered it as a factor in their
negotiations with Texas. Rumpff stated of Daingerfield that “he had told me that his instructions
indicate that he should seek to connect [also affiliate or associate, anzuschließen] with the Hanse
Towns, for which the people of Texas held a special sympathy as the ancient representatives of
true free trade, and that Texas had a more vested interest in an intimate relationship to the Hanse
Towns than in the protecting relationships [protegierenden Verbindungen, also: sponsoring
relations with Texas as a protégé of] with the greatest monarchies of Europe”.31 Moreover, as has
previously been discussed in Chapter Five, Rumpff was aware of the animosity between England
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and the United States, and believed that a recognition of Texas on behalf of the Hansa would be
beneficial for the latter in case a war between the United States and Britain broke out.32 To a
certain extent, Rumpff thus regarded the recognition of Texas as an advantageous way in which
the Hansa could avoid commercial repercussions in response to a U.S.-British War and U.S.
Anglophobia, because an independent and neutral Texas would continue posing as a haven for
German goods. At the same time, Rumpff also knew that Texas’ annexation to the United States
was made all the more likely because of Anglophobia: „The ratification on behalf of the Senate“
of a treaty for Texas’ annexation to the Union, wrote Rumpff, “which seemed so impossible to
the Colonel Daingerfield, could now perhaps be facilitated through the skillfully [/ingeniously]
aroused and hence desperate anti-English national sentiment”.33
Moreover, the British themselves were aware of the strong presence of Anglophobia
among U.S.-Americans. Henry Fox, the English minister to the United States, analysed President
John Tyler’s Message to Congress from December 5, 1843, which included excerpts revealing
anti-British sentiment. Fox paid particular attention to the passage that discussed “interference on
the part of stronger and more powerful nations, which, intent only on advancing their own
peculiar views, may sooner or later attempt to bring about a compliance with terms, as the
condition of their interposition, alike derogatory to the nations granting them, and detrimental to
the interests of the United States”. These ‘peculiar views’ on behalf of foreign powers –
predominantly Britain – included those on slavery, yet Fox rejected U.S. accusations of undue
interference. “Considering the character of the institution of slavery”, a British abstract on the
issue of Texas annexation summarised Fox’ view, “it was a monstrous assumption on the part of
the United States that third parties, wholly independent countries, should not be permitted to treat
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with one another for the abolition of slavery within their own territories, for fear that by so doing
they might render it more difficult for the people of the United States themselves to maintain in
security that inhuman and hateful institution”. Though Fox did not deny that the British sought to
use their influence to limit slavery in North America, including in Texas and Mexico (where
slavery had already been abolished), he did not see this as a justification for U.S.-American antiEnglish sentiment.34
At the same time, British policy as instructed by statesmen from London emphasised
neutrality and the publication of letters and statements that would show U.S.-American and
Texian sceptics of Britain that that country would not intervene unduly in Texas, and that it
respected fully the sovereignty of Texas. Aberdeen wrote to Richard Pakenham – by then
minister to the United States of America, no longer to the United Mexican States – in 1843,
that as much agitation appeared to have prevailed of late in the United States relative to
the designs which Great Britain was supposed to entertain with regard to the Republic of
Texas, Her Majesty’s Government deemed it expedient to take measures for stopping at
once the misrepresentations which had been circulated, and the errors into which the
Government of the United States seemed to have fallen, on the subject of the policy of
Great Britain with respect to Texas.
Aberdeen continued that Britain was indeed hoping for an abolition of slavery in and aiming for
Mexico’s recognition of Texas, but not to slight the United States. Rather, “the British
Government was convinced that the recognition of Texas by Mexico must conduce to the benefit
of both of those countries”, Aberdeen argued. As regarded abolitionism, Britain “would do
nothing secretly or underhand”.35 Aberdeen fully rejected the idea that Britain desired to
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establish “any dominant influence” in Texas. “She only desired to share her influence equally
with all other nations”, he wrote of England; “her objects were purely commercial”.
Despite this emphasis, U.S.-Americans would not have felt relieved by Aberdeen’s letter:
given the English focus on commerce and abolitionism, and given the significance of slavery to
the cotton-growing South, pro-annexationist Southerners regarded the combination of the British
economy and abolitionism as threatening. Though Aberdeen denied that Her Majesty’s
Government had any intention to cement a dominant influence in Texas, his note that England
would “share her influence equally with other nations” seems to suggest that Britain did hope for
a certain degree of influence, though one that was similar to those of other states. In
consideration of Britain’s strong naval and maritime might, economic and commercial prowess,
and political weight, it is unlikely though that such an equal influence – on par with, say, a minor
political player such as the Hanse Towns – would have been a reality in Texas. Moreover, as
previous chapters and the historiography on the imperialism of free trade and informal empire
suggest, Britain’s commercial objects were often connected to her global power. Ultimately,
Aberdeen concluded that Pakenham should emphasise that Britain’s efforts for its commerce,
and particular for the abolition of slavery, would not “disturb the internal tranquillity” and
“prosperity” of the United States.36 At a later date, however, he also instructed Pakenham to
make Britain’s dissatisfaction with the prospect of Texas’ annexation “privately known in
influential quarters” in the United States.37
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Indeed, Pakenham lamented in April of 1844 that Southern slaveholder and Secretary of
State, John C. Calhoun, had misinterpreted Aberdeen’s despatches: “far from being interpreted
by Mr. Calhoun in a spirit of fairness and good faith”, Pakenham observed, the British note “had
been received in a sense quite contrary to either obvious and literal meaning, and that it was even
attempted to assign to England, on the ground of her avowed desire for the abolition of slavery,
the principal share in the responsibility of the proposed arrangement” of Texas’ annexation.38
Calhoun wrote to Pakenham that the aim for world-wide abolition on behalf of Britain would be
achieved in Texas through British influence, particularly diplomacy, and that Texas, even if one
supposed that “the influence and exertions of Great Britain” would not be “extended beyond the
limits assigned by Lord Aberdeen”, would not be able to resist British desires. Once rid of
slavery, Texas would be placed “under the influence and control of Great Britain”, and “from the
geographical position of Texas” Britain would have “the most efficient means of effecting in the
neighbouring States of this Union, what she [Britain] avows it to be her desire to do in all
countries where slavery exists”.39 U.S.-Americans were unwilling to recognise England’s
ambition for the abolition of slavery as an issue separate from England’s imperial influence.
In subsequent letters to Pakenham, Elliot, and other statesmen, Aberdeen sought not only
to alleviate U.S. concerns regarding British influence: he also defined Anglophobia as a
homemade problem of the United States, for the politicians of that country actively spurred antiBritish attitudes and spread misinformation. Aberdeen criticised the U.S. policy line in Texas as
unnecessarily suspicious of Britain, thus putting the blame for the tense Anglo-U.S. relationship
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in Texas partially on the United States. “Her Majesty’s Government must attribute the manner in
which the President, when adverting to the relations between Texas and Mexico, had thought
proper to speak of the probable interference of stronger and more powerful nations intent upon
advancing their own peculiar views, by forcing them upon the weaker of the two parties, as the
condition of their interposition”. It was clear to Aberdeen that the ‘foreign power’ alluded to was
Britain, and that Tyler would voice such unfounded, provoking, and inflaming suspicions had
“caused Her Majesty’s Government much surprise and regret”, the Briton wrote.40 Abel P.
Upshur, Secretary of the Navy and Calhoun’s predecessor as Secretary of State during Tyler’s
administration, alleged that the British government had misinterpreted Tyler’s message, and that
his statement applied as much to France and other powerful European states as it did to Britain.
The British were not convinced, and commented rather dismissively that “Mr. Upshur spoke like
a man who knew that he was defending a bad cause, his defence was accordingly a lame one”.41
Officially, the British decided to drop the matter in order to prevent an endless series of
arguments, and received furthermore a note from Texian President Anson Jones, who
acknowledged the British statements regarding England’s intent as “satisfactory”.42 Pakenham’s
dispute with Calhoun, however, dragged on for longer, though after Calhoun persisted on his
point of view, “declaring that he did not consider the remarks contained by Mr. Pakenham’s
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answer to his first note, as a denial of its correctness”, Pakenham decided to terminate
correspondence with the Southerner.43
British discontent with the United States focussed on the Southern slaveholding states,
which were accurately regarded as the fervent supporters of annexation. Pakenham felt it hardly
necessary to explain to Aberdeen that the advocates for Texas’ annexation were Southerners and
members of the democratic party, which formed a large share of “that class of persons, and a
very numerous class [Pakenham] feared it must be considered in that country, who were always
in favour of acquiring or retaining anything worth having, careless of the rightfulness or legality
of the title”.44 In his conversations with Calhoun on the matter of Texas’ annexation, Pakenham
reiterated emphatically that “neither within the compass of his imagination, nor from aught that
he had ever heard of the feelings and wishes of Her Majesty’s Government upon the subject,
could he discover any process or mode of arrangement by which the annexation of Texas […]
could be made agreeable” to Britain. This “important alteration in the territorial distribution of
the American Continent” would have political and commercial consequences to England, and
thus not permit him to respond to Calhoun’s desire – that England, Mexico, and all other parties
with an interest in the Texas Question could be rendered agreeable with the U.S. annexation of
Texas – affirmatively. Though Britain had not protested formally yet, Pakenham stated, U.S.
proponents of the measure should not mistake this for Britain’s indifference on the matter. In
fact, Pakenham emphasised that his government reserved the right “to take […] whatever steps
might upon consideration be deemed advisable”, and that he would even be willing to deviate
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from London’s official course should such a protest seem promising, for success would justify
this deviation in front of Aberdeen.45 The overall conduct of the U.S. government was described
as being to a certain degree “without regard to fairness or propriety of the proceedings”, and
Pakenham acknowledged that a Southern fear of British abolitionism was behind the conduct of
men such as Calhoun.46
Because the supporters of annexation were Southern, pro-expansionist slaveholders and
consequently opponents of abolition, and because their dislike for England was known to English
statesmen, a certain degree of anti-U.S. sentiment was also present among Britons. Pakenham
stands out here; as a British minister to the United States, familiar with U.S. views on Texas’
annexation and the ways by which the United States hoped to attain it, Pakenham believed that
“the progress of the mischief” practiced by the latter country ought to be stopped, for the U.S.
government’s intentions were “evil”, as he labelled them. He lamented that Britain would not be
able to stand its ground on the matter through formal protest unless supported “by an intimation
of more decisive measures of resistance”. What added insult to injury, he argued, was that the
most recent effort for the annexation of Texas, brought forth in Spring of 1844 – a “mischievous
affair” – had not even arisen “from an honest and deliberate conviction of the expediency and
propriety of such an arrangement”. Rather, it had been “an electioneering manoeuvre of Mr.
President Tyler”. 47 Calhoun’s conduct left a bad impression on British statesmen, particularly
Pakenham, not merely due to his insistence upon British imperial and undue influence, but also
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due to his justification of slavery based on what he asserted was statistical data: Calhoun argued
that the large number of mentally and physically ill free black men was caused by the simple fact
that blacks were not designed for freedom; rather, slavery protected them from themselves and
their low state of civilisation. Though Pakenham’s superficial and disengaged response was met
with a clarification on behalf of Calhoun that his statistical information had not had the intention
to “expound the subject of slavery” and to defend it, no further correspondence between
Pakenham and Calhoun took place thereafter.48 Pakenham concluded that the U.S.-American
conduct on Texas as a whole had been subject to “instances of bad faith and flaring perversion of
facts which were to be found so repeatedly in the correspondence” on the matter, and he hoped
that the United States government “would receive from public opinion in England and elsewhere,
the condemnation which it deserved”.49
Though some British statesmen had a measure of disdain for Southerners and
slaveholders like Calhoun, they hoped that the upcoming U.S. election would end in Henry
Clay’s favour. Clay, an opponent of Texas’ annexation and more favourable towards a gradual
abolition of slavery (despite owning slaves himself), was a member of the Whig party, a party
with more strongholds in the North than the South. Both Pakenham and his French counterpart
Pageot believed that “the Governments of England and France had every thing to gain by the
success of Mr. Clay; and accordingly whatever might in any way unfavourably affect his
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prospects, ought by all means to be avoided”. Because of this, Pakenham suggested that Britain
refrain from any interference in the Texas matter or U.S. affairs prior to the election, for he
credited non-interference on behalf of France and England as one of the reasons for the rejection
of the last treaty on annexation. “Any resistance” to Texas’ accession to the Union “on the part
of [England and France], would, Mr. Pakenham thought, have had the very opposite effect to that
intended, and would probably have led to the ratification of the Treaty instead of its rejection”.50
This showcases that the British walked a fine line in 1844 Texas: their official policy line
advocated for non-interference and no establishment of dominant influence, and the English
government did not regard their desire for abolitionism as invasive in either Texian or U.S.
affairs, for the abolition of slavery was not pressed upon Texas as a prerequisite for foreign
recognition or mediation with Mexico. Nevertheless, British non-interference was politically
motivated shortly before a U.S. election with potentially tremendous consequences, and
ultimately, the British wanted Texian independence.
Though the British government emphasised continuously that it would not interfere
unduly in Texas, it did hope to sway the Texas Question in its favour by encouraging
independence. After Tyler’s effort for annexation seemed to have been shot down, Aberdeen
suggested in late May of 1844 to Cowley that, since the annexation project “might be hereafter
resumed, […] it therefore became desirable that those Governments who were most deeply
interested in the independence of Texas, should concert together for the adoption of such
measures as might appear to them best suited to defeat any future scheme of annexation, and to
secure the permanence of that independence”. What becomes noticeable in Aberdeen’s letter
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(and the correspondence by others, such as Elliot or Pakenham) is the vague language used.
Though the official British policy emphasised that Britain would not exert a “dominant
influence”, it is unclear whether the measures to be adopted to encourage Texian independence
would have been informally imperial in nature – the ‘measures’ spoken of were often left in
generic terms.51 The only measure that was outlined in detail was that of a joint Franco-British
venture to persuade Mexico to recognise Texas as independent, in order to make annexation to
the United States less attractive to the latter state. “In case Mexico should agree to take this
step”, Aberdeen wrote to Cowley, “an assurance would, as above described, be in that case given
to the Mexican Government that Great Britain and France would, on their parts, formally bind
themselves to guarantee Texas against falling into the hands of any Foreign Power, and also to
secure the boundary of Mexico […] against all future encroachment on the side of Texas”. In
order to avoid U.S. accusations of undue British involvement, Britain should invite the U.S.
government to follow the Franco-British example.52 Moreover, though concessions would be
made to Mexico by Britain and France, Mr. Bankhead, British minister in Mexico, made it clear
to the Mexican government that England would provide no support should Mexico attempt a
reconquest of Texas.53
France, as one of Britain’s most prominent commercial, political, and imperial rivals, was
also sometimes eyed with suspicion by Texians and U.S.-Americans. Though German
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emigration was generally well-received by Texian statesmen, one observer expressed concern
about the Franco-Texienne Bill, which he viewed as a tool that France could use to pry open the
gateway to Texian politics and “afford a pretext for a foreign government to interfere with our
domestic institutions”.54 James S. Mayfield also disliked the Franco-Texienne Bill for the same
reasons, highlighting the dangers that it posed to Texas, a circumstance that Saligny scoffed at
for Mayfield had participated in drawing up the bill.55 Saligny quoted Mayfield as having
denounced the bill as “the result of a plot contrived by His Majesty the King of the French and
General Houston through the intermediacy of the French chargé d’affaires designed to deliver up
Texas to France, which would make it into a kingdom for one of the King’s sons”.56 General
Hamilton also believed that the abolition of duties on French wines in early 1840 had been
conceded too prematurely; rather, Lamar should have waited with taking this step until Hamilton
had completed negotiating for a loan in France. Now that France had a commercial advantage
and concession in Texas, Hamilton feared that France would no longer be interested in providing
support for Texas. This suggests that Hamilton regarded France, much like England, as a country
concerned predominantly with its own benefit, though Texian sentiments toward France did not
reach a degree of phobia as they did toward England.57 Vice-President Burnet was also criticised
several times by Saligny as possessing “secret antipathy for France”, unlike President Lamar,
whom Saligny identified as a friend of France and an apt man of French heritage.58 Overall,
Daingerfield concluded in a letter to Rumpff that the treaty with France had, surprisingly, not
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been very well received in Texas, despite – or perhaps because of – the fact that France had been
the first European power to recognise Texas, and its action had thus been “a show of mercy”.59
French-Texian relations were also marked by a measure of disagreement and antipathy,
most noteworthily an episode oftentimes called the “Pig War”. Hostilities in 1840 and 1841 were
dominated by the disdain for France expressed by Mayfield and his associates, such as Moseley
Baker and Mr. Chalmers, and the debate regarding the Franco-Texienne bill.60 In mid-1841
however, another outlandish affair stood in the foreground of Franco-Texian relations. The pigs
of a hotelkeeper, Richard Bullock, had not been properly fenced in and hence roamed around
freely. Problems arose when the pigs penetrated Saligny’s stables and his house, including his
bedroom. As the pigs started eating his papers, Saligny ordered his servant to shoot them, which
motivated an irate Bullock to beat the servant and threaten to do the same to Saligny. This matter
became a diplomatic affair for Saligny, who left the country after Bullock did not go punished
immediately (the Lamar administration would not punish him without due process of law).61
Before his departure, the Texian government also called for Saligny’s recall, and listed several
accusations by Texian ministers against Saligny as reasons for this desire for his removal from
Texas. Besides killing Bullock’s pigs and threatening him, Saligny was also accused of having
passed counterfeit money and having refused to pay his hotel bill. Interestingly, some of the
other claims brought forth were of undue foreign interference: Saligny was accused of “having
insulted the [Texian] government in his correspondence, of having attempted to arouse the
citizens against their government, of having tried to have passed in Congress a bill from which
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he would have derived enormous benefit, of having incited meetings against the government
[…]”62 Though Guizot hoped that the removal of a few of the key anti-French Texians in the
administration would aid in bettering Franco-Texian relations, Saligny wrote a few months later
that Guizot’s note had not been well received in Texas, and the French diplomat did leave the
country.63 Nevertheless, French relations with Texas did persist: in 1843, Saligny was
temporarily replaced by Viscount Jules de Cramayel.
Texian and U.S.-American views regarding the French, slightly suspicious yet much
more subtle and less substantial than Anglophobia, were also picked up upon by the British, who
pursued a policy of both alleviating U.S. concerns regarding a joint Franco-British imperial
influence in Texas and using their French counterparts to reject U.S. Anglophobia. British
officials knew that their country’s influence was the main concern of U.S.-Americans, yet they
were also aware that France was at times mentioned as a secondary power and junior partner to
Britain’s supposed ploys in Texas. Thus, Aberdeen wrote to Lord Cowley, stating “that it was
probable that the late message of the President of the United States to Congress had not failed to
attract the attention of the French Government, especially the part […] speaking of the foreign
relations of the Republic”. Cowley was supposed to convene with Guizot regarding the matter to
ascertain that France’s views on U.S. phobia concerning foreign influence were similar to
Britain’s. At the same time, Aberdeen also believed that U.S.-Americans’ fear of French
influence, which was significantly less substantial, could also be used to highlight that U.S.
Anglophobia was unfounded. If Britain and France pursued such similar policies in Texas, and
given that France “would not, any more than […] Britain, look with indifference upon any
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measure by which Texas would cease to exist as a separate and independent State”, the United
States’ xenophobia could hardly be justified in concentrating on the British, Aberdeen implied.64
Much like their British counterparts, the French rejected U.S. claims of undue foreign
influence, though they did stand by their interests in Texas. The French King highlighted that it
was “for the advantage of all maritime States, for France and Great Britain in particular, that the
independence of Texas should be maintained and that a barrier should thus be opposed to the
encroachments of the United States”. The King feared that U.S. expansionism would not halt
with Texas, it would also extend into Mexico, which would seriously harm French interest.65
Guizot was also of the opinion that the annexation of Texas to the United States ought to be
prevented in the interest of his government. Thus, he contacted M. Pageot, the French minister in
Washington, to instruct him in “the same sense in which Lord Aberdeen had written to Mr.
Pakenham”. “It would not suit the French Government”, the British abstract summarised
Guizot’s stance, “to accept such a change without opposition”, particularly given that the Texian
population was split on the issue and that the U.S. interest in annexation was primarily that of
slaveholders’.66 After James K. Polk’s election and Clay’s loss, Guizot moreover reiterated the
importance of the Texas Question to Franco-British interests, and recommended that Britain and
France “ought to be strenuously exerted in order to prevent” the planned invasion of Texas by
Mexico, “since nothing would be so likely to induce the Texians to throw themselves for
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protection into the arms of the United States”.67 As late as December 1844, French and British
statesmen still hoped that Texian annexation could be prevented.
The Franco-British rapprochement on the Texas Question bolstered U.S. concerns about
France in response to France’s association with Britain. In summer of 1844, the British and
French became aware of an article published in the Richmond Enquirer, which outlined that
France had decided to join Britain in an effort to prevent the U.S. annexation of Texas. The
relationship between England and France was described as having “an unusual intimacy, and
active intercourse of communication” on the matter, and the article also betrayed knowledge of
the protest of the French King and excerpts of Aberdeen’s despatches, which the French and
British representatives had agreed they should keep secret so as to avoid rousing U.S. fears of
foreign intervention. The writers outlined their disappointment with France. That Britain did not
desire annexation was clear, but “we had been under the impression” the article stated of France,
“that she would rejoice in our prosperity and growth, and would like to see a Power on this
continent, fully equal to Great Britain. But it now seems that France, too, thinks we are growing
too strong, and would like to cut a pinion of the young eagle’s wing”.68 Despite this disapproval
of France’s actions, the writers did have more positive words for France than for England:
whereas the latter was just the disliked former colonial master, the former was described as
having extended “the hand of brotherhood” to the United States in its hour of need.
Overall, France’s aid for the thirteen colonies in their struggle against England was
mentioned by U.S.-American, Texian, and French statesmen as a demonstration of France’s
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support for newly independent republics in the Americas and opposition to and distinctiveness
from England. In conversation with Saligny, Bee stated that “it seems, in truth, that France has
been destined by Providence to be the Protectress of the republics of North America. It was
France who sustained […] the infant United States in its battle against England and assured the
independence of that glorious republic”.69 Colonel James Love, a confidante of Lamar, also
expressed a toast to France and her alliance with Texas.70 Texian statesmen Isaac Van Zandt,
William N. Porter, and Lindsay S. Hagler expressed a similar sentiment, referring to France as
the “the great and generous nation which, the first in Europe, had offered her hand to Texas in
friendship”.71 Granted, men like Love, Van Zandt, and Bee of course tried to flatter the
representative from “chivalrous and generous France” given Texas’ need for European
recognition and its desire for European loans, but the fact that he and several other Texian
statesmen referred to France’s support of the United States against England shows that France
occupied a position different from England’s in the minds of Texians. Dalmatia also believed
that France’s aid in the American Revolution should elevate his country’s standing within Texas:
“They will never forget, I hope, that France was the first nation in Europe to recognise their
independence, just as, sixty years ago, she had been the first to salute and recognise that of the
United States”, he wrote to Saligny.72
A few months after the publication of the Richmond Enquirer, Calhoun responded to
notes from U.S.-American minister at Paris, Mr. King, highlighting his satisfaction with King’s
impression that the prior information regarding a Franco-British opposition to annexation was
“in all probability, without foundation”. “You were right in making a distinction between the
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interests of France and England”, wrote Calhoun, “in reference to Texas […] France cannot
possibly have any other than commercial interests […] while it is certain that England looks
beyond, to political interests”. France, Calhoun asserted, actually had interests “directly and
deeply opposed” to the British scheme, for Britain’s designs in Texas focussed on the abolition
of slavery and the establishment of a dominant English influence over Texas.73 France, not
heavily engaged in international abolitionism, was not a thorn in the eyes of Southern
slaveholders like Britain was.
FRANCE AND U.S. ANGLOPHOBIA
England’s desire for a collaboration with France on the matter of Texas raises the
question of how U.S. Anglophobia was perceived in France. Before annexation became a
threatening issue to European diplomacy in 1844, the French, and Saligny in particular,
considered how U.S. Anglophobia could be used to their advantage. Just as Calhoun expressed
little concern about French influence in Texas, in part because France did not pursue an
abolitionist policy worldwide, Saligny also tried to incentivise Texian relations with France
rather than England by emphasising that English politics and diplomacy were dominated by the
abolition of slavery, whereas France’s were not. During Lamar’s Presidency of Texas in 1839,
Saligny wrote to his government that Lamar’s “antipathy toward England is well known to me”,
and that he had outlined the benefits of a Texian relationship with France to both the President
and General Hamilton. “I alluded to the attacks of the Tories and the radicals on Texas, the
intrigues of the abolitionists, and the opposition of O’Connell, to whom several articles in the
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radical press against Texas are attributed”, Saligny summarised.74 Only a few weeks later,
Saligny reiterated Lamar’s dislike for England and his sympathy toward France, which gave the
French agent confidence that the preferential treatment toward France in the Texian timber trade
would be put into practice.75 In another instance, Saligny argued that U.S.-American and Texian
suspicions of England and the latter’s possible support of Mexico in the event of war should
encourage France to cement its relationship with Texas, for this Anglo-American distrust for
England – even if unfounded – would elevate France as the most important European power in
Texas.76 Dalmatia held the same view in October of 1839, instructing Saligny to follow the
policy of England toward Texas. He believed that British anti-slavery politics might defer an
English recognition of the young republic, enabling France to get a head start in that country.
England, Dalmatia claimed, “is already jealous of our recently formed relations with the Texian
republic”.77 In late 1840, Saligny wrote that Abner Lipscomb, Secretary of State in 1840, had
“prejudices and hatred for England”, which he expressed “with a frankness bordering on
imprudence”. Given such attitudes in the Texian government, Saligny even asserted that he
might be able to prevent the ratification of an Anglo-Texian treaty should it serve “too
exclusively the interests of England at the expense of France”.78
The French were also aware of several episodes of tension within the Texian-English
relationship, including the Little Penn Affair, Taylor’s introduction of slaves into Texas, and a
land dispute. When discussing these events with his government, Saligny often emphasised that
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Texian officials, particularly Lamar, viewed the British with disfavour.79 Saligny concluded that
these tensions between Texas and Britain would elevate France’s status, writing that “the
unsatisfactory relationship existing between the cabinets of London and Austin increases the
desire of Texas to be on friendly terms with France. She never misses an opportunity to manifest
her sympathy and respect for the Government of the King”. Only a few days later, Saligny stated
that the Franco-Texian friendship had already born fruit, for Lamar, “employing the authority
vested in him by Congress, has abolished all duties on French wines imported directly from
France […] it proves, better than all the truly extraordinary marks of respect and gratification
constantly extended to me as the chargé d’affaires of the King, the genuineness of their
friendship and gratitude toward France”.80 Saligny furthermore expressed his desire that the
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French government take action to cement its influence in Texas and “put down deep roots in this
country” whilst the affections of the people of Texas were in favour of France vis-à-vis
England.81
THE ROLE OF U.S. ANGLOPHOBIA AND FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF BRITAIN’S COMMERCIAL
PROWESS IN THE 1844 FRANCO-BRITISH MEDIATION EFFORT BETWEEN MEXICO AND TEXAS
The fact that France sought to exploit Anglophobia to achieve a better standing in Texas
raises the question how the Anglo-French relationship in Texas was impacted by French
suspicions of England. Though anti-British sentiments on behalf of statesmen involved in the
Texas Question were not comparable to the level of Anglophobia extant among AngloAmericans, concerns regarding British competition did influence how the French ultimately
perceived their joint mediation with England in Mexico. From the beginning of French interest in
Texas, English rivalry and the perception that England often acted either predominantly or
exclusively for its benefit were important factors in France’s relationship with Britain in Texas,
which also motivated the French agents to analyse what advantages France might draw from
U.S. and Texian Anglophobia. In Texas, Saligny believed, “England will […] establish her
political and commercial predominance”, and a Mr. Cosmao, Commanding Officer of the Sloop
the Sabine, wrote to the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies in 1841 that “England also has her
partisans” in Texas, and that it had been “their influence, probably, that lay behind” the recent
anti-French sentiment expressed in the Texian government via individuals such as Mayfield.82
Saligny’s more level-headed replacement, de Cramayel, regarded England’s interests in Texas as
more pronounced than France’s, and reported that the British were sure to attribute the mediation
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of an armistice between Mexico and Texas “to [their] influence alone”. De Cramayel, though he
believed French involvement in the Texas Question worthwhile, continued that England would
“not fail to seek using her good offices in behalf of some selfish financial or political interest” in
Texas, signifying a degree of suspicion on his part.83 Ultimately, French peripheral agents’ fear
of England as a commercial rival was augmented by the realisation that England was frequently
mentioned by U.S. and Texian presses as the primary European power in Texas: Saligny
lamented that France was seldom mentioned by the Texian presses and statesmen, suggesting
that the French were considered secondary to the British in Texas. In August of 1844, for
example, Saligny summarised an article from the National Vindicator, regretting that France had
only found one incidental mention whereas Britain occupied centre stage. The Frenchman
continued that “a complete change has taken place in the dispositions of this [Texian]
government”, highlighting that France had lost its favourable position to England and the United
States.84
The opinion of the peripheral French agent was shared by Guizot, who believed that
Britain already had the upper hand in Mexico vis-à-vis France, in part due to the latter country’s
numerous grievances with Mexico and French intervention during the Pastry War. England,
Guizot told Lord Cowley, had large possessions in America whereas France had lost control of
her American territories. Consequently, England’s interest in the Texas Question and the
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independence of the young republic was greater than that of France. Though Cowley emphasised
that Britain and France held interest in Texas, to which Guizot conceded that “Undoubtedly, we
will use our best efforts for that purpose (of obtaining from the Mexican Government the
acknowledgement of Texas’ independence), and will even refuse to recognize the annexation of
Texas to the United States”, Guizot ultimately concluded that “as a question of peace or war, I
am not prepared to say that its junction with the American States is of sufficient importance to us
to justify our having recourse to arms in order to prevent it”.85 Count von Armin, Prussian
diplomat at Paris, reported the same back to his government, writing that Guizot “did not see in
this affair [the annexation of Texas] a casus belli, neither vis-à-vis the United States nor vis-à-vis
Mexico. He added that France was not an American power like England”, which was the reason
why France would not go to the same lengths as England to prevent annexation.86 Guizot was
willing to join Britain in the endeavour of obtaining Mexico’s recognition of Texas, but only if
this did not involve France in war. France’s unwillingness to go to war over the issue dovetailed
with Texians’ perception of England as a paper tiger: Consul Kennedy wrote that the Texian
annexationists boasted that Britain, “in their prudential anxiety for peace” would not intervene if
the annexation of Texas to the United States were to take place.87 By December of 1844,
Guizot’s policy became even more reticent, and he told the British that “France had not agreed to
unite with England in a protest against Annexation”.88
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France was not the only power reluctant to commit to a joint mission that went beyond a
mediation with Mexico: Many Englishmen likewise believed that their country should only
engage in a mediation, an interesting observation given U.S.-Americans’ fear of the
omnipresence and omnipotence of their former parent country. Though Guizot believed
England’s interests in Mexico to be greater, even England began to consider in late 1844 whether
sustaining Texas’ independence partially to maintain Mexico’s integrity from U.S. encroachment
was worth it, given that Aberdeen argued that “there was unfortunately but little in the general
conduct of the Mexican Government which could induce Great Britain to risk such a collision for
the sake of Mexico alone. In Mexico British subjects had been oppressed, harassed, and
maltreated without redress”.89 Should France withdraw from the effort to maintain Texian
independence, the British government did not know whether it would be capable of preventing
annexation alone, particularly because U.S. and Texian Anglophobia made a unilateral English
action suspicious – it could potentially have an effect opposite of the intent and thus encourage
Texas’ annexation to the United States. Aberdeen believed that “any doubt as to the unanimity
existing between England and France, with respect to Texas, might have a most injurious
influence upon the course of events in that country”, which made it all the more vexing for
England that Mr. King had been told by Guizot that France would not interfere in Texas’
annexation should it indeed occur. Pakenham, for one, asserted that King must have
misunderstood Guizot, for Pakenham had heard from the Frenchman that France would protest
the measure.90 Though Guizot denied ever having made a claim so absolutely opposed to French
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interference in the Texas Question, he was nevertheless uncertain of whether a Franco-British
mediation could bear fruit, in part because he shared the British belief in Mexico’s incompetence
and corruption. In response, Paris was reluctant to join a British declaration on the Texas
Question intended to include Texas and France.91 This declaration spoke of French and British
involvement in Texian-Mexican relations and the endeavour to persuade Mexico into
recognising Texas as independent.92 Though Aberdeen stated as late as January of 1845 that
France and England were of a unanimous opinion in the Texas Question, Guizot seemed a bit
more reluctant, writing to Comte Saint Aulaire that the French insisted that the Franco-British
mediation offer should not include the word ‘guarantor’ because “we […] have feared that its
usage might result in consequences of too indefinite a nature”.93
Though the French were at times suspicious of British designs in Texas, considered
England a commercial rival, and saw begrudgingly that England was considered the primus inter
pares among European states in Texas, the 1830s and 1840s were nevertheless a period of
entente between the two powers. Shawcross has shown that the French were either supported by
the British or at the very least not confronted with British opposition in Spanish-American affairs
between 1830 and 1867. Though he concedes that there existed an Anglo-French rivalry and “the
habitual upsurge in anti-British public opinion” in those years, French foreign policy between
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1840 and 1870 “was generally directed by Anglophile statesmen”, and Guizot hoped for an
amicable relationship with England. The mediation in Texas does show that Guizot and
Aberdeen, despite the former’s reluctance to get his country involved in this project to a point
where France could face dire consequences, largely sought unanimity on the issue and aimed to
prevent annexation jointly. Shawcross summarises that England and France did not go to war
against each other after 1815; any war efforts happened with the other, such as in the Crimea or
the Second Opium War. In Spanish America, many interventions were also executed
cooperatively, such as the blockade of Buenos Aires, 1845-1847. Shawcross manifests that “this
partnership was based on a commonality of interests” even when Britain did not intervene with
France and instead merely allowed it: “The position of the British government over French
intervention throughout the period was that if France could secure these terms for Britain, then so
much the better”.94 This echoes Prussian attitudes in Mexico and showcases the web of empire
extant among Europeans in the nineteenth century. Todd also discusses that the French Empire
could, during the nineteenth century, even act as an agent of British Empire by furthering the
interests of both empires.95 Thus, French attitudes regarding the British in Texas, though
sometimes sceptical, cannot be compared to the Anglophobic hysteria raging in the United
States.
GERMANY AND ANGLOPHOBIA
The German states and actors were even less prone to sentiments of Anglophobia in
Texas. The Adelsverein, as previous chapters have showcased, was linked to England via its
nobles, and von Solms had actively sought out British support for the Society, demonstrating that
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the Verein was more Anglophilic than Anglophobic, despite its desires to elevate German
commerce vis-à-vis its British counterpart. Von Solms, rather than favouring an independent
German policy in Texas, suggested that the Verein look to England and France, the European
great powers who could, in his opinion, not allow for Texas’ annexation due to their interests in
that state’s independence.96 Particularly after Prussia’s rejection of official support for the
Adelsverein, the Society needed to use the international current and resistance to U.S. expansion
represented and brought forth by England: Unlike Mexico, the United States, and France, with
serious imperial ambitions in Texas, the Verein, without official German support, slim financial
resources, a disorganised colonisation effort, problems with fraudulent or worthless grants, a
small base of members and an even smaller base of people at least somewhat competent enough
to put any emigration plans into action, had no basis for Anglophobia. The Verein’s limited
degree of power also meant that it could never have stood up to England, unlike France and the
United States, nation-states that were noteworthy competitors for English interest in Texas.
The same can be said for the Hanse Towns. Though the Hanseatic city-states engaged in
correspondence and negotiations with Texas with the goal of elevating their position in the
German Bund and for German commerce, they nevertheless kept treaty negotiations secret from
the press and from Prussia, which pursued a policy of non-recognition of Texas (and hence also
had no viable reason to be Anglophobic in Texas). In 1844, Rumpff wrote that “to my elation
[relief], the local newspapers have not yet gotten wind of our negotiations with Texas.
Nevertheless, on the 26th [of this month], the Quotidienne has published the copied [written off]
article under the section “Hambourg”:
Quotidienne, Sunday, May 26 1844
Hamburg. There is a lot of talk on the conclusion of a treaty of commerce between Texas
and the Hanse Towns of Hamburg and Bremen. In this moment, where the Zollverein has
96
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just united for a treaty of the same nature with the United States, and where Texas will
perhaps enter the territory of the latter state, this new pact in question will not for certain
remain without influence in the international affairs of the German states.97
The fact that this French newspaper article was enough to rouse Hanseatic anxieties regarding
the publicity of their treaty showcases why Anglophobia was not a dominant factor for the
Hanseates in Texas: Though the Hanse Towns were not as powerless as the Verein, they were
nevertheless a political and commercial power that played in a rank far inferior to that of
England, France, or the United States. Consequently, Anglophobia with the intent of rivalling
British power, as was the case for U.S.-American observers, was not a Hanseatic preoccupation.
Though Anglophobia did not have to come from a position of power, of course, one can
nevertheless argue that Hanseatic officials were not dominated by anti-English sentiment: after
all, Hanseatic independence in the Congress of Vienna had been supported by Britain, which
meant that Anglophobia was not in the best interest of the Hanse Towns.
Ultimately, a French lack of confidence in their own interests in Texas if those came at
the expense of a war, as well as the concern that England might stand to benefit more than
France from this engagement, made the French more reluctant to get deeply involved in the
British-French mediation effort.98 But French scepticism was also roused by U.S. Anglophobia.
Whereas Saligny had initially hoped that Anglophobia could improve France’s chances of
becoming the preferred power in Texas, this opinion had changed by 1843. Because anti-British
sentiment played a large role in U.S. plans for Texas’ annexation, U.S. Anglophobia became a
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risk rather than an opportunity for the French. De Cramayel explained in October of 1843 that
Texian hysteria regarding a supposed English abolitionist ploy had only been kept alive by
newspapers, “on the pretext of accusing the government of connivance with abolitionist schemes
or of blaming England as the originator of these intrigues”. Both Texian and U.S.-American
newspapers thus advocated for Texas’ incorporation into the Union based on fears of British
influence.99 In the next weeks, de Cramayel reported frequently of the fact that Anglophobia was
utilised to strengthen Texian and U.S.-American interest in annexation, an act that would finally
“evict[ing] England from Texas”.100 Saligny emphasised that rumours of British interference
were highly exaggerated by the Anglophobic presses in Texas and the United States, noting that
Britain “is far from harbouring the ambitious designs in Texas attributed to it by certain
individuals”.101 In another letter, Saligny voiced his frustration with U.S. politicians’ conduct,
asserting that the rumours about England were “exploited by President Tyler” and were, “as
dishonestly as […] successfully”, used “in trumping up a make-believe scare in the United States
and arousing all of the prejudices and hatreds of the Americans in regard to Great Britain”.102
Since U.S. Anglophobia drove the project of annexation, hopes that France might benefit from it
were gone by 1843.
A fear of the power of U.S. Anglophobia also tampered British efforts to prevent the
annexation of Texas. Rumpff, as a Hanseatic observer on the matter, likewise recognised that
U.S. Anglophobia, and the general fear of foreign influence, stymied the British and French in
their endeavours to maintain Texian independence. Kennedy lamented that British-French
mediation, or indeed any project on behalf of European powers to encourage Texian
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independence, would “be dilated into a Scheme of alarming magnitude, calculated to awaken
fresh Jealousies in the United States respecting British interference, and to serve as a pretext for
those who wish to precipitate a war. Among the excitable population of the North American
Confederacy, a small spark may kindle a great flame”.103 Shortly thereafter, Kennedy reiterated
his complaints of U.S. Anglophobia. After Clay had declared that the United States would,
“prevent, if necessary by an appeal to arms, the Colonizing of Texas by any European Nation”,
Kennedy expressed his disdain with the fact that “an excitable people might be brought to
believe that the private enterprize of a foreign Agent had originated in the ‘Ambitious designs’ of
the Country to which he belonged” through “a very slight exercise of perverted ingenuity”.104
Aberdeen likewise underlined the critical role that Anglophobia played in the question of
annexation, manifesting that partisans of Texas’ incorporation showed jealousy at “any sign of
interference, or even of interest expressed by a Foreign State against the cause in which they are
engaged”. If this jealousy led to hostilities between Mexico and the United States, Texas could
not “hope to escape [these hostilities] with her Independence”, Aberdeen argued.105 The
Hanseates were aware of the negative influence of Anglophobia on Texian affairs, as well: After
another attempt at a U.S. treaty for annexation failed, Rumpff wrote in June of 1844 that this
“obviated an Anglo-French protest, which is important insofar as that such protest would, it is
my firm belief, lead to the opposite of the desired effect in the United States” and encourage U.S.
desires for annexation rather than quelling them.106
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European reactions to U.S. Anglophobia offer revealing perspectives on imperialism in
North America at the end of the first half of the nineteenth century. Whilst Britain was perceived
and portrayed by U.S.-Americans and Texians as a leviathan that threatened the existence of the
United States and desired to dominate the entire North American continent, thus suggesting that
the United States faced Britain in a David versus Goliath struggle, the fact that Britain and
France, the most formidable imperial powers of Europe, were discouraged from taking decisive
action to prevent Texas’ annexation by their fear of inciting U.S. expansionism illustrates that
U.S. imperial power in North America was already present and competitive vis-à-vis its French
and British counterparts. Though the United States lacked the means to enforce the Monroe
Doctrine that had been proclaimed in 1823 in South America, it was more effective in Texas.
Given that many Texians were open and favourable to annexation, British and French agents
were concerned that too much interference in Texian affairs would encourage the republic’s
incorporation into the Union rather than preventing it. As a result, U.S. rejections of European
involvement in North America were taken more seriously in Texas. De Cramayel believed it
imperative that France contest the Monroe Doctrine in Texas, questioning “should we not make
[the Americans] understand that the European powers have not only the right to settle their own
affairs among themselves, that the United States consents to let them be without getting
involved, but also that at any time that their material or political interests are compromised in
affairs in the new world, [they have the right] to get involved with or without the approbation of
a nation that has absolutely no right to exercise a monopoly of influence [in the Western
hemisphere]?”.107 Texas could serve as an important precedent in this matter and either imbue
U.S. claims with legitimacy or discredit them as hollow. Though Cramayel asserted that the U.S.
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“claim to regulate the destiny of the two American continents and their challenge to the overseas
empire of Great Britain, can be viewed as nothing more than idle bluster”, he did note that these
ideas “constantly crop up everywhere” in response to the topic of Texas’ annexation.108 The
Texas Question thus also popularised U.S. support for the Monroe Doctrine, which was restated
in one of Tyler’s speeches.
U.S. Anglophobia and the associated fear of British imperialism, commercial rivalry, and
influence in Texas proved to be an effective tool in cementing U.S. imperialism and expansion in
North America through the annexation of Texas. Neither the British nor the French were willing
to risk war with the United States over the Texas Question, but feared that the latter country
would not have the same inhibitions: Kennedy wrote in December of 1844 that he had heard
from a reliable source in the United States that Calhoun and his party “would prefer war with
England to the non-acquisition of Texas”, and surmised in a subsequent letter that the United
States had gotten so invested in the Texas Question that it would not be willing to “bear what
might be deemed the humiliation of retreat”.109 Given Texians’ fickleness regarding annexation,
Mexico’s military weakness and instability, the hesitation for unilateral action, and the overall
desire to avoid war, the British and French did not seriously challenge Texas’ annexation when it
did finally occur. This was a victory for the United States, which found its imperial status
strengthened and legitimised in North America. Nevertheless, supporting Texas would have been
significantly easier for Britain and France had the former country rejected U.S. proposals of
annexation. The issue of Texian nationalism and Europeans’ perceptions thereof will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Seven – Lone Star Suicide: European Perceptions of Texian Nationalism and the
Search for a Texian Identity

On February 19, 1846, the Republic of Texas was no more. It was integrated into the
United States of America, without the declaration of war on behalf of any European power.
Peace then, was more important to Europeans than the maintenance of an independent Texas. For
the Adelsverein, business continued much as usual; in fact, it was able to settle more Germans in
the new U.S. state than had been the case in the independent Republic of Texas.1 Hanseatic
correspondence on Texas effectively ceased between 1845 and 1846, and the entire matter was
laid to rest. Prussians, who had rejected displaying interest in Texas early on, were not surprised
by the annexation of Texas, and even French and British agents, earlier so keen on preventing
Texas’ incorporation into the North American Union, adapted to the new situation without much
protest. The power most roused by the accession of Texas to the United States was Mexico,
which had itself insisted so furiously and feverishly on the reconquest of the territory. Fuelled by
anti-U.S. sentiment, by U.S. provocations, and by a northern neighbour whose hunger for war
finally got the better of it as Southern, pro-slavery and pro-expansion factions gained power in
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the form of a new President, James K. Polk, Mexico headed towards war. The U.S.-Mexico War,
1846-1848, would leave Mexico bereft of roughly half its territory.2
Thus, the nine-year old Republic of Texas did not fall into the depths of historical
meaninglessness, leaving neither traces nor impact. Rather, its existence had tremendous
consequences on the imperial relations of the North American continent, and indeed, the world.
What, however, can be said of a nation marked by such comparative ephemerality – in fact, can
the Republic of Texas lay claim to the term ‘nation’ at all? Tenets and principles of international
law would suggest so. But was the Texian nationality anything more than nominal in nature?
Were there truly differences between the identities of Texians and U.S.-Americans? This chapter
will analyse this question by evaluating the opinions of European observers in order to determine
how important the existence – or absence of – a Texian nationality was to Euro-Texian
diplomacy. Though this chapter does engage with Texians’ own views on Texian nationalism,
proving or disproving the presence of a uniquely Texian nationality is not its main purpose.
Rather, the chapters aims to showcase that Europeans increasingly expected to encounter nationstates abroad and defined their relations with foreign states in terms of the nation, nation-state,
and a distinct nationality assigned to this state. The uncertainty surrounding Texian nationalism
confronted Europeans with new challenges to their informal imperial aspirations because of
Texians’ identification with the United States, and it brought rise to new international legal
questions.
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Questions surrounding Texian nationalism – when it existed, who its adherents were, how
commonplace it was, and whether it even existed at all – have already been analysed in the
scholarship on the Republic of Texas. One of the most-explored epochs in regard to Texian
nationalism has been the Lamar administration. It is well-established that Lamar aspired to build
up an independent Texas that would possibly expand westward and rival U.S. expansion towards
the Pacific.3 Dorman H. Winfrey has written on Lamar’s Texian nationalism in depth, arguing
that the Texian statesman sought to lay “the foundations of a great empire” and expressed his
nationalism most presently through his statements “concerning one’s devotion to and the
supremacy of the state, the question of annexation, races and nationalities, military policies, a
national bank, and national education”.4 Winfrey also points out that Lamar consistently used the
term “Texian” in order to instil national sentiments in his people. Lamar supported the sustained
independence of Texas and was opposed to annexation, claiming that Texas was better off if it
could control its own Indian affairs, commerce, trade, and treaties. 5 Because of Winfrey’s
detailed discussion of Lamar’ nationalism, Lamar will not find significant mention in this
chapter. Mark E. Nackman wrote a monograph on Texian nationalism, outlining what he
believes to be the tenets and characteristics of Texian nationalism, whereas Andrew F. Lang has
focussed on the nationalist legacy of the Republic of Texas, showing that Texans of the 1860s

See: Herbert Gambrell, “Lamar, Mirabeau Buonaparte”, Handbook of Texas Online, accessed April 20, 2020,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fla15. See also: M. Baptista Roach, “The Last ‘Crusade’ of
Mirabeau B. Lamar”, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 2 (October 1941), 147-163, and Stanley E.
Siegel, The Poet President of Texas: The Life of Mirabeau B. Lamar, President of the Republic of Texas (Austin:
Jenkins, 1977), and Winders, Crisis, 41.
4 Dorman H. Winfrey, “Mirabeau H. Lamar and Texas Nationalism”, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol.
59, No. 2 (Oct., 1955), 184-205, 186.
5 Winfrey, 188-191.
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used their state’s recent independence to justify the secession from the Union.6 Both of these
works will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter.
Thus, several scholars have evaluated Texian correspondence with other Texians and
U.S.-Americans to answer whether Texian nationalism existed and how it was expressed from
the independence period through the Civil War. However, given that Texas laid claim to being a
nation on the international playing field, analysing the perceptions that Europeans had of Texas’
nationalism and their responses to Texian statesmen seeking recognition of or treaties for their
republic can be useful: Evaluating Texian nationalism from this perspective can offer new
insights on how it manifested itself, how it was defined, and how it ultimately impacted the
state’s diplomacy with Europe.
“BARELY OUTGROWN ITS DIAPERS”: TEXAS AS A NATION IN A STATE OF INFANCY
Europeans recognised early on that the Republic of Texas was a state in the early stages
of development. A French report from 1838 commented that “the country, the society, the state
here are in their infancy”, and that “this republic [Texas] had just been born”. As a result, it was
faced with all of the “uncertainties which are bound to the destiny of a new people like [they had
been] to the weak beginnings of the life of man”.7 Hanseatic official Vincent Rumpff referred to
Texas as a republic that “had barely outgrown its diapers”, illustrating the country’s youth.8
Texas’ youth was highlighted by Rumpff on several other occasions, albeit with less flowery
language.9 Wurm, whose opinion on Texas is only represented in the Hanseatic correspondence
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through one letter sent to Syndic Karl Sieveking, likewise regarded Texas’ youth as one of the
key characteristics of the republic.10 These anecdotes are not surprising since Texas was indeed a
very young state. Given that Anglo-American migration to Texas had also been a fairly recent
development, it only seemed natural that Texas’ nationality found itself in its infancy as well.
But how did this perception influence European observers?
Though Texas had seceded from Mexico, Europeans were, as previous chapters have
shown, not primarily concerned with a Mexican reconquest of the new state, but rather with its
incorporation into the United States. This also led them to view Texas, though formerly part of
Spanish America, as much more closely affiliated with the United States than with Mexico.
Rumpff noted that Texas was “considerably more inclined to follow in the footsteps of the
United States rather than those of the South-American states” and that Texians generally “hold
some mistrust regarding the treaties that have been negotiated between the South-American
republics” and European states.11 In another instance, he wrote to Sieveking that the Texian
government was sure to swallow any treaty stipulations that were also included in the HanseaticU.S.-American treaty, referring to the United States as the country “which serves as the sole role
model for this young republic”. According to Rumpff, Texas wanted “to follow [the American
example] as closely as possible”.12 Daingerfield encouraged the Hanseatic Ministerresident to
perceive Texas as such, for the former had communicated to the latter that it was “the institutions
and commerce of the United States of America, with which those of Texas are almost indentical
[sic]”.13 Englishman Kennedy called Texas a country that had been “recently settled”,
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demonstrating that he did not consider the number of Mexicans (or Native Americans, for that
matter) sufficient to refer to Texas as a Mexican settlement – rather, he regarded Texas as a
territory that had recently been settled by Anglo-Americans.14
De Cramayel also identified Texas as a successor state of the United States rather than
Mexico due to its cultural and national similarities to the likewise Anglo-American United
States. De Cramayel travelled to Texas via the United States, and claimed that this journey had
permitted him to acquaint himself with the U.S.-American opinion on Texas. U.S.-Americans,
reported de Cramayel, saw “the formation of the new republic as the first offspring of a people
who, up to the present time, have been generally regarded as in a state of infancy, but that now
has donned the toga of virility and in its turn procreates new nations in imitation of their fathers
in the Old Country, as Europe is called here”. Rather than viewing Texas as an offspring of
Mexico, de Cramayel was first confronted with Texas through the lens of an Anglo-American
perspective that highlighted Texians’ national affiliation with the United States.15 Guizot also
identified a close bond between the Texian and U.S.-American nations, surmising that the latter
would always come to the aid of the former should Mexico seek to invade or threaten it.16
Bourgeois d’Orvanne had similar views, arguing that the U.S. influence in Texas was strong, not
due to U.S.-American diplomatic representatives but rather because the “emigrant [to Texas]
himself was American […] his parents and friends around him were fellow Americans. The
language, the political and social ideas of their native land endured”. American ideas, said
d’Orvanne, were predominant in Texas.17
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This inclination towards the United States caused Europeans to question whether there
were indeed differences between the emerging Texian nationality and its U.S.-American
counterpart. In his 1842 letter to the French minister of commerce, d’Orvanne expressed doubt,
arguing that only the U.S.-American divide on slavery had prevented an annexation of Texas to
the United States.18 One of the largest sceptics was de Cramayel, Saligny’s temporary
replacement in 1842 and 1843. In one of his initial impressions of Texas and U.S.-American
opinions on the state, de Cramayel reflected that some U.S.-Americans he had met on his way to
Texas rejected the idea that Texas had already established a nationality separate from that of the
United States by 1842, though they did not exclude – and indeed feared – the possibility that a
uniquely Texian nationality might emerge over the years.19 Several months later, de Cramayel
echoed this impression, arguing that Texians continued to hold a deep attachment to their initial
homeland: the United States. He went even further, stating that “The expression ‘Texian people’
is pure fiction. There are no ‘Texians’”.20 In another letter, the Frenchman asserted that even
Sam Houston had admitted that Texas’ revolution and independence had come too early, i.e. at a
time when the Texian people were still an “undisciplined rabble” and “incapable of governing
themselves”. De Cramayel continued that the Texian population was essentially made up of
citizens from the United States, which meant that Texians, “the citizens of the United States
which now compose the population of Texas, can not be considered as a separate and distinct
people. In colonising Texas and in rising against Mexico they have always had one and only one
goal in view, which is that of seizing a province of their neighbours, the Mexicans, and adding it
to their fatherland”.21 In subsequent letters, he repeated this view, writing that the population of
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Texas was “made up entirely of Anglo-Americans who have been in this region ten years at most
and who exercise their rights of citizenship in both countries, it is difficult to determine to which
they belong”.22 In addition to seeing Texians as U.S.-Americans, de Cramayel thus also rejected
that either the Mexican population of Texas – the Tejanos – or the Native population could lay
claim to a distinct Texian nationality.
TEXIAN NATIONALISM AND THE PROSPECT OF ANNEXATION
Because of this absence of a Texian nationality, de Cramayel manifested that
independence had come against the Texians’ wishes, making independence a state that the
diplomat labelled “unnatural” for this country.23 As a result, the diplomat lamented, the Texians
always turned to one theme in “moments of distress – annexation to the United States”.24 Texas’
independence the Frenchman identified as being in the interest of Europe alone.25 Several
Texians were moreover “willing to be used as instruments” in the intrigues of Murphy, the
American chargé d’affaires in Texas, who was strongly in favour of annexation. This de
Cramayel attributed to Texians’ “national sympathies” for the United States.26 This was despite
the fact that Murphy was, according to the Viscount, a catastrophe: the French agent had so
much contempt for Murphy that he referred to the U.S.-American as “mentally deranged”, not
least due to his boastful claims that the United States would send troops to Texas to effect a
military occupation of the country.27 The entire conduct of the United States de Cramayel
reduced to “an intrigue” based on false principles, and the stance of Mexico was not much better:
the Frenchman had very little faith in Anglo-French efforts to attain a Mexican recognition of
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Texas.28 One of the only people the Viscount was willing to mention in a light that was more
positive for France was Houston, whom he described in early 1844 as silent on the matter of
annexation and overall reserved towards the United States. Unfortunately for Europe, this
attitude was limited to Houston according to the diplomat: “the opinion of the immense majority
of the population of Texas, to which one can only give the name Texians with great difficulty, is
American by heart and birth and aspires only to be reunited with their fatherland”, de Cramayel
wrote to Guizot.29 Shortly after this letter, de Cramayel left Texas.
De Cramayel was thus rather pessimistic about Texas’ future as an independent state. Did
the views of Saligny, the predominant French agent in Texas and considerably more flamboyant
and optimistic than Cramayel, differ significantly from his counterpart’s? Indeed, in March of
1839, Saligny was more confident in the independence of Texas, claiming that Houston had
become unpopular in Texas in part because he pursued the project of annexation so stubbornly,
“a project opposed by a majority of the people” of Texas. Saligny’s impression of Texas was
coloured by the subsequent election of Lamar, whose Texian nationalism – and indeed,
imperialism given his hopes for westward expansion – are well-known in the literature on the
Republic of Texas.30 In the same months, Saligny moreover expressed his confidence that the
Texian people had realised that an accession to the United States was contrary to their interests,
and that Hamilton, despite his earlier advocacy for annexation, had changed his mind and
become supportive of Texian independence.31 Nevertheless, Saligny’s correspondence gave few
examples of what a Texian nationalism might entail beyond Texians’ economic interests: Saligny
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acknowledged that many Texians were recent U.S.-American arrivals and wrote on another
occasion in 1839 that the question of Texas’ annexation to the United States was “irrevocably
resolved” in favour of Texian independence due to the strength of U.S. abolitionism.32 This,
however, is not a sign of Texian nationalism either, but rather an external factor. Nevertheless,
based on Saligny’s early reports, the Duc de Dalmatie concluded that Texian independence
seemed fairly assured.33
After his physical recovery from the illness that had forced him to return to France in
1842, Saligny returned to Texas in early 1844. Immediately, he was confronted with a situation
different from the one he had left behind. Though the Pig War affair had caused Saligny to lock
horns with parts of the Texian government, causing him to claim at one point that “Texas could
not presume to consider itself an independent state and establish friendly relations with other
nations if it did not have both the desire and the means to fulfill the obligations” of a nation, he
continued to label Texas as a “nation” nonetheless.34 But by 1844, annexation overwhelmingly
dominated Texian politics. “The newspapers in Texas”, reported Saligny, “continue to be
preoccupied exclusively by annexation”. Optimistically, the Frenchman asserted that “the
repugnance of General Houston for annexation has not diminished”, and he thus hoped that the
project of annexation would fail as it had before.35 Yet less than two months later, the diplomat
acknowledged that his confidence might have been misplaced: “On my arrival here I was at first
little moved by the host of rumours making the rounds in the United States and Texas of the
impending incorporation of Texas in the American confederation”, stated Saligny, “however, the
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organs of Mr. Tyler have dwelled incessantly on this theme and with a tone of assurance have
represented the treaty of annexation as already signed by Messrs. Upshur and Van Zandt”.
According to the Frenchman’s sources, Houston had also begun to consider an incorporation of
Texas into the United States more seriously. Though Saligny continued to hope that annexation
would not take place, his hope was not based on his faith in any sort of Texian nationality but
rather U.S. abolitionism. In the same letter, Saligny spoke of a “planter from Alabama” who
owned property in Texas and who was a proponent of annexation.36 Such anecdotes, together
with other accounts of the large number of settlers in Texas who had only arrived from the
United States less than a decade ago, showcase that many Texians held fairly little patriotic
sentiment for Texas, viewing themselves rather as U.S.-Americans in a country that would soon
join the Union.
In subsequent months, Saligny shared with his government summaries and newspaper
excerpts on the annexation affair, though he was unable to provide much conclusive analysis of
the situation, admitting that there circulated many rumours on the issue and that he was not quite
sure what was going on. He assumed that Houston was in disfavour of annexation, though he
knew little that was concrete.37 On April 30, 1844, the French diplomat manifested that General
Terrell, Attorney General of Texas, was a staunch opponent of the scheme of annexation, and
that, “in spite of what certain individuals would have us believe”, many Texians were likewise
opposed to the measure.38 Saligny’s optimism notwithstanding, one of his subsequent letters tells
a different story: in a meeting in Galveston, Houston was exposed to a storm of slurs and insults
directed against his person, and when he made an effort to leave, men barred his passage with
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pistols and knives.39 Besides Houston, whom Saligny identified again and again as a proponent
of an independent Texas, the Frenchman also pointed to Anson Jones, a candidate for the Texian
presidency of whom it was said in Texas that he was likewise in favour of independence.40 Just
shortly thereafter however, Saligny questioned Jones’ sincerity, having heard of rumours that
attributed to him a “two-faced policy” and that he was secretly making deals with
annexationists.41 Saligny’s return to a confidence in Jones’ interest in the maintenance of Texian
independence just another few weeks later shows that the French representative had little
conclusive evidence on the matter of Texas’ annexation.42 His hopes that Texas could remain
independent stemmed largely from his desire to promulgate French interests, and concentrated
predominantly on Texian political actors: In early 1845, he disclosed to his government that,
although he spoke again of a “Texian nationality” and noted that a party in favour of annexation
was growing among the Texian populace, he did not have “explicit confidence in the dispositions
of the population” of Texas on the matter of Texian independence.43
British officials’ views on Texas were not much more optimistic regarding the
development of a Texian nationality than their French counterparts’. Kennedy also commented
on the fact that most settlers were U.S.-Americans, particularly Southerners, and told Elliot that
many Texian settlers did not desire European immigration.44 “The inhabitants of Texas wanted
emigrants like themselves – and no others – Men speaking their own language, and subject to
their own Customs and laws”, Kennedy reported, showcasing that most Texian settlers still
identified strongly with a U.S. (Southern) nationality, a circumstance that they were unwilling to
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see changed through the influx of Europeans.45 Kennedy thus also viewed the Europeans of
Texas as separate from the majority of Anglo-American Texian settlers, referring to them as “the
European residents” rather than seeing them as Texian nationals. These Europeans were heavily
opposed to annexation, located in Galveston, and held mercantile interest in the Republic.46
Much like de Cramayel, Elliot pointed out that the United States was likely to fear the emergence
of a confident and independent Texas, for this new country could challenge U.S. access to
westward expansion.47 In another similarity to his French counterpart, Elliot found it difficult to
distinguish between Texian and U.S.-American nationals, struggling in one instance to determine
whether General Green, who spoke boastfully of a protection of “Our Western and North
Western frontier” from British interference, regarded Texas as already a part of the United States
or whether he had become a Texian citizen.48
Elliot and Kennedy struggled in much the same way as Saligny in determining which
information on the annexation project was reliable and true. Unlike Saligny, Kennedy spoke in
June of 1844 that Houston was now in favour of annexation, though much like Saligny, Kennedy
was unsure of how to process the information for it was based on a rumour and the professions of
Houston’s close friends.49 Kennedy acknowledged that it was difficult to discern both the
accuracy of certain statements as well as the reasons for their publication at a given time.
Frustrated, Kennedy established that “political finesse is as well understood and as
unscrupulously practised in this unfledged Republic, as in the hoary despotisms of remotest
Asia”.50 Elliot was possibly the more optimistic of the two British agents, for he hoped until
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early 1846 that the will of the Texian people was actually one for independence rather than
annexation. In February of 1845, he wrote to Aberdeen that the pro-independence movement in
Texas was growing, and a week later, he sent to Aberdeen excerpts of Texian newspapers to
support his claim that the press of that country was “leaning against Annexation”.51 In April of
that year, Kennedy shared less positive news, summarising the statements of several proannexationist newspapers in Texas.52 Nevertheless, in December of 1845, Elliot reported once
more that the number of Texian anti-annexationists was growing, leading him to hope that they
might gain in influence in Texas.53 Even after the resolution to annex Texas passed both Houses
and was approved by the President, Elliot continued to believe that opposition to annexation was
growing in Texas, alleging that Texians had not had a “freedom of choice” on the matter, and
that “two thirds of the people abstained from voting at all, or voted against Annexation”.54
Though the two Britons wished to see Texas remain independent, neither one offered any
evidence of an emerging Texian nationality. Elliot, his claim that Texian anti-annexationists
were becoming more powerful notwithstanding, could not determine on what grounds a Texian
nationalism might be taking shape in pro-independence circles. Aberdeen engaged with the idea
of Texian nationalism more firmly, however, and concluded, despite the fact that he referred to
Texas as a “Texian Nation” in some of his instructions, that a real Texian national identity did
not exist.55 Opposition to annexation, Aberdeen told Cowley, was tied more to the
disadvantageous terms of Texas’ incorporation outlined by the U.S. Congress rather than an
earnest desire for independence due to national differences. “Little dependance [sic] could be
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placed on the steadiness of the disposition on the part of the Texian people to maintain their
independance [sic] against the United States”, wrote Aberdeen, “it is in fact pretty obvious that
the present disgust evinced by that people arises more from the disadvantageous nature of the
terms offered to them by the United States than from any high national feeling”.56
The Germans involved with Texas were likewise conflicted on the question of a Texian
nationality. Von Rönne’s analysis of the U.S. reclamations against Mexico that concerned Texas
is one interesting aspect of this debate, for it opened up the possibility for perceiving Texians as
either representatives of a faction of the Mexican national will or of an entirely new national
will, i.e. that of a new nation.57 Many German statesmen had differing views. Von Gerolt, being
the Prussian chargé in Mexico, often adopted language more agreeable to the Mexican
authorities in his correspondence with them, referring to the Texians as “insurgent colonists in
the Department of Texas” as late as 1841.58 In accounts to his government, however, von Gerolt
sometimes labelled the Texians “North Americans”, a name often used in German
correspondence to designate U.S.-Americans.59 T. Bahre, Prussian merchant, regarded Texas as a
U.S. expansionary scheme as early as 1839, and thus surmised that the United States would try to
resist English colonisation efforts in Texas.60
Though Daingerfield claimed that von Rönne had told him that Prussia would recognise
Texas at once if the latter’s independence were guaranteed, the Prussian correspondence of von
Humboldt, Schmitz, von Rother, and Bremian merchant Delius shows that the outcome of
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independence was overall not perceived as likely enough to make official relations with Texas
worthwhile.61 This suggests that if the Prussians recognised the existence of a Texian ‘nation’ or
national identity, they were skeptical that it would survive. Indeed, most reports from Prussian
diplomats in London and Paris – this correspondence forms the bulk of the Acta concernant les
affaires du Texas located in the Prussian Privy Archives – deal with Texas as a prospective new
state of the North American Union, a project that England and France were seeking to prevent.
Within these letters, Prussian representative at London, von Bunsen, declared that “Lord
Aberdeen had for a long time now foreseen the case of a suicide of the Texian government of
slavers and vagabonds [du gouvernement négrier et vagabond du Texas]. Last year, he had
offered to me the discussion on the admissibility of such a suicide according to the principles of
international law”. Von Bunsen reported that it had been said that there had been erected in
Texas a government opposed to annexation, which had elicited much noise from the Texian
chargé d’affaires in London, who declared to Aberdeen that Texas “was determined [fut résolu]
to maintain its independence […] this noise”, decided von Bunsen, “is entirely a falsehood”.62 In
another letter, von Bunsen pondered the question whether a nation was permitted to commit
suicide, concluding that Texas must be a country incapable of governing itself if it was willing to
take such a step.63 These impressions by von Bunsen illustrate a Prussian scepticism toward
Texian independence.
The Hanseatic perspective on Texian nationalism as the foundation of Texas’
independence was not much more optimistic than that of Prussian statesmen, as Delius’
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testimony already suggests. Much like his fellow diplomat Rumpff, Bremian Consul Klaener,
though he had appealed for a Hanseatic consular post at Galveston, guessed that a U.S.American jealousy of England would increase the likelihood of a U.S. offer of annexation, which
Texas, “following the wish of its population” would probably agree to.64 In another letter, the
Bremian consul underlined the clear ties between Texas and the United States, stating that the
latter country assumed a relationship of a Bürgschaft (pledge, sponsorship, guarantee) for the
former.65 The Hanseatic representative also drew attention to Houston’s postulation that the
Texian Congress had thus far not prioritised the Hanseatic-Texian treaty due to the assumption of
that Congress that Texas was to be annexed soon and that negotiations with the Hanse Towns
were thus moot.66 Klaener, being situated in Texas unlike other Hanseatic representatives, had
more knowledge on the disposition of the Texian population, and his opinion on this matter is
thus likely to have caused further hesitation among Hanseatic officials seeking to furnish a treaty
with Texas. Even the Adelsverein, according to consul Fehrmann, approached the governments
of France and Britain to ascertain that Texas’ independence was likely a permanent one.67
Overall, Rumpff may have summarised Hanseatic interests in Texas best when he said that, even
if Texas became incorporated into the United States eventually, having completed a HanseaticTexian treaty prior to that event would benefit the Hanseates because they could use this treaty as
advantageous precedent for future trans-Atlantic negotiations. As Rumpff said: “fiat
experimentum in corpore vili” – let the experiment be performed on a worthless body.68
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Thus, Europeans were largely uncertain whether Texas did indeed have a nationality
distinct from that of the United States, particularly the U.S. South. This overwhelming similarity
between Texians and U.S. Southerners heightened Europeans’ fears of Texas’ annexation to the
Union. Texian statesmen sought to alleviate this European anxiety by confirming emphatically
their desire for maintaining their independent nation. Daingerfield told Rumpff in 1844 that he
viewed the incorporation of Texas into the United States as “entirely impossible”, a stance that
Rumpff evaluated as “natural” for a representative of such a young nation. Nevertheless, he
surmised that Daingerfield’s assurance “seems indeed to be his innermost conviction”.69
Nevertheless, Rumpff commented only shortly thereafter that annexation, despite the fact “that it
had seemed unlikely to Colonel Daingerfield” now appeared quite likely, in part due to antiEnglish sentiment in the United States.70 De Cramayel’s observations also raise doubts regarding
the sincerity of Daingerfield’s Texian nationalism: before the Colonel had gone to Europe in
1844, he had also gone to the United States in 1843. Though his official business was to secure a
loan, de Cramayel concluded after a lengthy conversation with Daingerfield that the latter was
“actually going to the United States to seek once more the active protection of the North
Americans and, as a last resort, to join the Union by means of annexation if they would
consent”.71
TEXIAN DIPLOMATS’ FORMULATIONS OF TEXIAN NATIONALISM
Though Daingerfield had already received his appointment to Europe at that time and the
predominant reason for his travel via the United States was not the pursuance of annexation but
rather the delivery of the commercial treaty between Texas and its northern neighbour to Van
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Zandt, de Cramayel’s statement does highlight that Daingerfield’s claim to Rumpff of the
“impossibility of annexation” was exaggerated.72 Daingerfield knew of the political currents
extant on the matter in Texas as well as the European awareness thereof, as evidenced by his
letter to Anson Jones in September of 1843, where he noted that the United States was the
country “with which […] we are closely identified in the European mind”.73 In Spring of 1844,
the Texian chargé in Europe penned once more that the Hanseatic-Texian treaty “encountered
ma[n]y delays, and latterly, the doubt which existed as to the annexation of Texas to the United
States occasioned great hesitation and at one period threatened to su[s]pend the negotiation
altogether”.74 As a result, he highlighted to Rumpff that, though Texas was indeed culturally and
politically affiliated with the United States, his country was strongly in favour of independence.
Nevertheless, in correspondence with Jones, Daingerfield implied that Texians were of an
“American character”, which meant that Rumpff’s knowledge of the United States (and the
character of its people) facilitated his understanding of Texas.75
Daingerfield’s views on a Texian nationality are summarised best in a letter to Jones
dated July 28, 1844, in which he concluded in response to the pending application for
annexation, to which several Texians had raised objections, that
we must treat affairs as we find them actualy [sic] existing, that diplomatists must deal
with facts and not with probabilities much less possibilities. That in this light the
nationality of Texas must be viewed, and consequently its actual and existing capacity to
enter into negotiations must be considered. That annexation can only be considered as a
possibility or if you please, a probability of greater or less intensity, or more or less
remote. But still only a probability. That there is not a Government in Europe which may
not possibly or even probably change its form – and that within a space of time more
brief than that required for annexation. And yet that no one would think of raising this
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possibility or probability as an objection to the formation of merely commerciall [sic]
treaties, on the footing of perfect reciprocity.76
Daingerfield defended the existence of a Texian nationality by emphasising that many
nationalities of the nineteenth century were transient. At a time when many Spanish American
states were barely a quarter century old, when Belgium had barely received the recognition of its
independence from the Netherlands through the Treaty of London five years prior, and when
many German states feared for their independence in the German Confederation, Daingerfield’s
point of view seems reasonable. Though he did express profound interest in the maintenance of
Texian independence in his letters from the Hague, he did strive to serve his country, Texas, by
seeking earnestly the ratification of the Hanseatic-Texian treaty. In early 1845, Daingerfield had
been informed by Ashbel Smith that General Terrell was refused his nomination as Texian
representative in Europe, and that it would be best if he likewise returned to Texas in the event of
annexation.77 In response, Daingerfield wrote to Smith in July of 1845 that, even as annexation
seemed likely, he “was guided by the opinion that with me it was a paramount duty to maintain
unqualifiedly the separate nationality of our country up to the moment when I was informed
officially that that nationality had ceased to exist; of the correctness of this determination I am
fully satisfied”.78
Much like the Colonel, General Terrell was cognisant of the suspicion among Europeans
that Texas was merely an extension of the United States waiting for its official consummation, a
circumstance that Terrell much disdained. In a letter to George Villiers, 4th Earl of and Lord
Clarendon, the General complained about the way in which the House of Lords had discussed
Texas as merely an appendage of the United States. Terrell quoted the reference that he had
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found most objectionable; a parliamentary representative had announced “which may at no
distant time endanger the peaceful relations of the U States with our country, by affording to the
restless and encroaching people of Texas an opportunity of gratifying their tastes for
establishing a boundary quarrel, and thus creating a cause of war with Mexico which must be
viewed with interest in this country”. In response, the Texian commented that “this statement
does so much injustice to the people of Texas that, as the representative of that Republic […] I
feel myself called upon to vindicate them from an imputation so unjust and injurious; and to
place your Lordship in possession of facts which will enable you to appreciate more correctly the
true character of the people of that country”. Terrell continued that Texas “has been so much the
subject of misrepresentation, and is consequently so much misunderstood abroad”, underlining
his awareness that Texians were often perceived by European sceptics as U.S.-Americans in-themaking.79
Less impartial and practical than Daingerfield, Terrell was one of the Texian statesmen
most staunchly in favour of his country’s independence. Even as annexation seemed likely in
1845, Terrell expressed confidence in the existence of a Texian nationality, arguing that Texas
could “still be saved” because it was not up to the United States whether Texas be annexed or
not: “to the people alone, and to no one else, belongs the right to abdicate its nationality and to
dispose of its territory in favour of another nation”, Terrell told Saligny. If the Texian nation did
indeed disappear, it would not have been a result of the wish of the people, Terrell claimed, but
rather a result of the ambitions of a handful of “mercenaries and corrupt speculators”.80 On
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another occasion, Terrell referred to speculators’ yearning for annexation, in hopes that their land
would increase tremendously in value, as “a mere chimera of the wild brain; a mere ignis fatuous
of the disordered immaginations [sic]”. In the same letter to Daingerfield, Terrell wrote that he
hoped “that a better fate awaits [Texas], and pray to that God who controls the destinies of
Nations in his infinite mercy to avert such a calamity, for I should look upon its consummation
as the death knell of the prosperity of Texas”. Terrell argued that Texas had established its own
nationality, and surmised pessimistically what was to come if annexation took place:
I[t] would prove a very poor encouragement to you and myself and the few others who
with us have borne the burthen and heat of the day, who have laboured and toiled for
Texas, without any prospect or hope of reward other than the good of the country, to
know that this beautiful country now of such high promise was shortly to be merged
within the national limits of another – and that all the sacrifices of her Patriotic Sons, all
the glories of her revolution, all the achievements of her gallant Sons on the battle field
yea the splendid hallo [sic] which encircles the heights of San Jacinto itself were doomed
so soon to droop and wither and fade and that Texas itself was destined to fill about half a
Page in the work of some future Gibbon of America, and in a few more ages to be
entirely lost in the mouldering ruins of extinguished nations and swept from the
recollections of mankind forever.81
Events such as the Texian Revolution and the events at San Jacinto made Texas unique
and distinguished the republic from the United States. Terrell assumed that Texas would not play
a large role on the international stage once it ceased to be independent, and hence rejected
incorporation into the United States. In another letter to Smith, Terrell compared the U.S. offer
of annexation to the Stamp Act, which had symbolised the thirteen colonies’ patriotism and
desire for independence, asserting that Texians would see annexation, once it was offered by the
United States, as similarly objectionable and that they would fight for their independence and for
principle.82 For Terrell, the sacrifices he and others had made defined Texas’ nationality and the
Texian nation, which became meaningful for him. In another letter to Daingerfield, he declared
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that he “shall go to the stake with as much resignation as old Polycarp did for his religion”, and
would accept “political martyrdom for [his] opposition to the doctrine of national annihilation”.83
Nevertheless, as Terrell unfortunately highlighted, only a select few had made such sacrifices –
many settlers in Texas retained a U.S. Southern identity, having taken part neither in the Texian
Revolution nor in any of the republic’s other initial struggles. Terrell admitted again in another
letter that “there were few” Texians that clearly rejected annexation.84 Even many statesmen
were sceptical towards Terrell precisely due to his strong feelings for independence: In early
1845, Smith told Terrell that the Texian Senate had refused his nomination as chargé to England
because of his opposition to annexation.85
Ashbel Smith, one of the predominant Texian representatives in Europe, sought to
convey in Europe an image of a stable and gladly-independent Texas, writing to Aberdeen and
Guizot that “Texas enjoying stable institutions at home, has been and continues to be rapidly
increasing in population and all the elements of strength […] The policy and the wishes of Texas
are for peace. She expects and desires to become an important Nation”.86 Shortly thereafter,
Smith reported that he had “the satisfaction to state that frequent evidences are presented that our
country and institutions are rapidly becoming more highly and more justly appreciated both in
England and on the Continent”.87 In early 1843, Smith moreover emphasised to Jones that he had
persuaded the British government that Texas’ annexation to the United States was “extremely
improbable”, surmising that the incorporation of Texas would “endanger the existence of [the
U.S.-American] Union” and thus prevented this measure from taking place.88
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Like Daingerfield, Terrell, and other Texian diplomats, Smith knew that Texas’
reputation abroad could be improved if the annexation matter were taken off the table. “Our
national character it must be confessed does not stand high in Europe”, the Texian wrote.
Because of events such as the failed Santa Fe mission and negative press in Texas, Europeans’
confidence “in our ample ability to maintain independence” had been diminished.89 Because
Europeans were sceptical, Smith regarded it as imperative that Texas be represented abroad by
very able diplomats, asserting that “the credit of Texas abroad is greatly influenced by the
personal character and local consideration of persons exercising its consular functions”.90
Initially, Smith received the news of renewed annexation proposals in early 1844 negatively,
lamenting that “the resolutions [sic] in favor of annexation produces rather an unfavorable
impression relative to our country; they are regarded as an expression of our inability to take care
of ourselves”.91 Smith surmised that Texians’ desire for annexation came almost exclusively
from their fear of renewed hostilities with Mexico, not an earnest longing to join the U.S.American Union.92 Nevertheless, when the resolution for annexation was approved in 1845,
Smith did not resist this step as Terrell, viewing things rather pragmatically in much the same
way as Daingerfield had done.
Houston, as one of the republic’s key statesmen, communicated to both British and
French agents that Texians would prefer independence if Texas could only achieve security. In a
letter to Elliot, Houston asserted that 90 percent of Texians were in favour of annexation solely
for the reason that it would finally give Texas peace and protection from Mexican attacks.
Annexationist sentiment could easily be curbed if England mediated between Texas and Mexico
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and thus brought peace to Texas through that measure, Houston argued, writing to Elliot that
“upon this point of our National existence I feel well satisfied that England has the power to
rule!” Houston combined English desires for Texian independence with a Texian desire for
foreign recognition and support by suggesting that England could effectively decide over Texas’
fate and maintain the latter’s independence through an intervention in Texian-Mexican affairs.93
In response, Elliot told Pakenham that he believed that Houston was indeed “anxious to secure
the Independence of the Country”.94 In another letter, Houston assured Elliot that Texas had,
despite proclamations of U.S.-Americans to the contrary, a separate nationality, founded on “her
enterprise, daring, sufferings and privations. The blood of her martyrs has been sufficient to give
cement to the foundation of a great nation”. Thus, Houston started to outline on what grounds
Texas had a separate identity from that of the United States, but suggested once more to Elliot
that this nationality could only be maintained if England mediated between Texas and Mexico.95
Several Europeans noticed that Texian affirmations of sustained independence were not
always reliable. Rumpff’s views on Daingerfield’s optimism have already been outlined, but
there were other European agents who were unsure of how to receive and evaluate Texian
pronunciations of reassurance. Cramayel expressed his doubts on several occasions, believing
that several Texian statesmen promoted the incorporation of their state into the United States
behind the scenes: In March of 1843, Cramayel suspected that an intrigue was taking shape in
Washington D.C., where Texians Isaac Van Zandt and James Hamilton, together with U.S.
statesmen, were searching for a legal means of Texas’ annexation to its northern neighbour that
would circumvent the U.S. Senate, whose consent for this endeavour pro-annexationists had
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already been refused several times before. By claiming that Texas had been a part of the
Louisiana Purchase, the Senate’s approval would not be necessary, for it could be argued that
Texas had been part of the United States all along and that its status as a state of Mexico (and
previously, a territory of New Spain) had been faulty for over four decades. Cramayel viewed
this complot with disdain, and given his belief that Hamilton and Van Zandt were involved in
this scheme, one can infer that he doubted their sincere interest in an independent Texas.96
Saligny moreover stressed that he perceived Smith to be inclined towards annexation
despite the latter’s insistence that annexation seemed unlikely, writing that Smith “does not
conceal his preferences for annexation were it probable or even possible”.97 Saligny also outlined
a discussion he had had with Houston that left the Frenchman with the impression that the
Texian had characteristics that were not quite trustworthy: When Houston manifested that he was
largely in favour of independence and believed in the Texian people’s choice, arguing that
“neither the executive power nor Congress had the right to alienate our nationality. That right
belongs to the people alone”, Saligny expressed doubt, informing Houston of the U.S.-American
press’ claims that Houston was in favour of annexation and had done everything that the Texian
executive could do to encourage that measure. Houston emphatically rejected this allegation,
going as far as to say that even those of his friends that spoke of his commitment to the U.S.
government were mistaken. In response, Saligny described the president as “extremely
circumspect” and as exhibiting both a “feline prudence and a shrewdness that sometimes
amounts to wiliness and trickery”.98 Klaener shared to a certain extent Saligny’s impression,
writing to the Hanse Towns that Houston’s strategy was one of trickery, for “it seems to have
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been the policy [Politik] of Houston to seemingly deliver the fate of Texas into the hands of
England in order to achieve the influence of the United States, that is why the relationship [of
Texas] with that country [England] is such a friendly one”.99
Overall, Texian officials spoke fairly little of their countrymen’s nationality, and many
believed that they could work towards annexation whilst using European diplomatic relations for
their benefit. Secretary of State Ebenezer Allen, for instance, was a supporter of annexation,
showing himself pleased with the Texian people’s decision to accede to the United States. In a
letter to Smith, he spoke of the people’s “unanimity and cordiality” on the issue, “adopted in
accordance with plain and satisfactory indications of the national desire – measures presenting an
unobjectionable mode for the free and effectual expression of the People”.100 Writing to
Kaufman, Allen asserted that Texas’ diplomatic ventures had never been in opposition to the
project of annexation; rather, they had been an endeavour to obtain peace with Mexico and that
country’s recognition that it had lost Texas.101 Prior to his election as president, Jones likewise
announced that Texas should pursue a speedy peace settlement with Mexico, for annexation, a
“desirable” event, could still take place afterwards.102 Van Zandt’s replacement as chargé in the
United States, Charles H. Raymond, was instructed in February of 1845 to “use [his] most
strenuous exertions in every proper manner to accomplish the annexation of Texas to the
American Union – a measure earnestly desired by this [Texian] Government”.103 In March of
1845, Raymond consequently wrote that he had regarded it as one of his primary duties to
achieve Texas’ incorporation into the United States, showcasing that the Texian diplomatic effort
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in the United States was seen by several statesmen in the light of Texas’ accession to the Union
rather than as a means by which Texas could build its international credibility.104
What much of the correspondence between Texians and Europeans showcases is that
Texians strove to use European diplomats as political tools to improve Texas’ position, be it to
achieve peace with Mexico, improve Texas’ financial stability, garner immigration, or incite
U.S. jealousies. But the correspondence also unveils another important aspect of Texian
nationalism: both European and Texian statesmen believed that it was up to Europeans to take
action to sustain Texian independence. This makes Texian independence different from Spanish
American or U.S.-American independence: whereas the latter maintained their independence on
their own, Texas seemed to need incentives in order to be convinced to remain its own nation.105
Whereas Europeans struggled to implement informal-imperial strategies in Mexico in part due to
patriotism on behalf of Mexico’s citizens and officials, both of which resisted European
commercial penetration and maintained suspicion toward foreign influence, Europeans faced the
opposite problem in Texas: there, they encountered a population that identified so strongly with a
foreign party that it considered surrendering its country’s independence in favour of annexation
to the other party – in Texas’ case, the United States. Kennedy asserted that “the tendency of
Texas is towards annexation with the […] [U.S.-American] Union, unless she is sustained by the
friendly offices of England”.106 This belief can be seen among many of the statesmen under
consideration: Prussian von Bunsen and Count Armin reported repeatedly on the uncertain state
of Texian independence, which could only be saved through Franco-British action.
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Elliot manifested that U.S.-Americans believed that “the influx of foreign Capital and
principles to this Republic from other parts of the world, particularly from England, would pretty
rapidly modify present sympathies. Men, they think, would soon begin to feel Texian, as well as
to call themselves, Texians”.107 Aberdeen outlined Britain’s official policy as one designed to
improve the chances of Texian independence as much as possible through British mediation with
Mexico without raising U.S. fears of British interference.108 De Cramayel had recognised early
on during his stay in Texas that Texians acted as if they had only two options, either an
independence bolstered through European mediation with Mexico and loans to stabilise Texas’
dire financial situation, or annexation.109 Saligny reported the same several months later, citing
Terrell as having asserted that Texas could stay independent only if Britain and France united to
form a counterweight to the intrigues of the U.S. and Texian governments.110 Texians like
Houston strove to encourage the perception that European action was needed to sustain Texas’
independence; Houston wrote to Elliot that annexation to the United States could never take
place if Texian independence were recognised by Mexico through the influence of England.111
Nevertheless, Britons and Frenchmen, as last chapter has shown, were hesitant to fully engage in
such tremendous interference in Texas due to fears that doing so would only spur U.S.
xenophobia in regard to Texas.112
Neither the majority of Texians nor Europeans were thus confident in the maintenance of
Texian independence through a Texian nationalism. Rather, most statesmen believed that
European interference was essential to encourage Texians to remain independent. This sets
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Texas apart from Spanish American states, which did not need European assistance to remain
independent. What is more, several European agents considered countries like Mexico as
difficult to control, because Mexico was intent on exercising its sovereignty and disinclined to
bow to a foreign power, wheras Texas proved resistant to informal-imperial ambitions because of
its readiness to surrender its sovereignty to the United States. Given the European resignation
that Mexico could not reconquer the territory, preventing U.S. aggrandisement became a primary
concern for Europeans in the Texas Question. Even Prussian diplomats, though they did not view
Texas as vital to their state’s interests, regarded the annexation of Texas to the United States as
one of the less favourable outcomes of this issue. Ultimately, European agents were torn between
stabilising the Republic of Texas through immigration, loans, and commerce on the one hand,
and fearing that their efforts would be for naught due to Texas’ annexation to the United States
on the other. This struggle stymied European action. At the centre of this struggle was thus a lack
of confidence in the maintenance of Texas’ own nationality.
Lang and Nackman have both discussed a uniquely Texian – or Texan – nationalism.
Interestingly, both tie this nationalism to the Confederacy of the 1860s, arguing that Texans were
inspired by their state’s earlier history in the decision to secede from the Union at the beginning
of the Civil War. Nackman in particular asserts that a Texian nationalism emerged through the
independence years and cites several factors as having shaped this national identity: the attacks,
plundering, and raids of Native Americans and the defence against them; the fear of Mexican
reconquest and redefinition of a Mexican territory as Anglo-American; an attachment to land; the
martyrdom of several of their leaders; a romantic sense of adventure; and the feeling that Texas
was an escape for those who had hit rock-bottom; all shaped Texians’ nationalism. Much like
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Winfrey, Nackman also focusses heavily on the Lamar administration.113 As several critics,
including Stanley E. Siegel, Alwyn Barr, or Billy D. Ledbetter have pointed out, however,
Nackman does not adequately show how these factors were unique to Texas or indeed applied to
all Texians in a significant measure. Barr suggests that Nackman’s characteristics of a Texian
seem much like those of many U.S. frontiersmen, whereas Siegel notes that Nackman
exaggerates some of his conclusions.114
THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS AND THE DIVISION OF THE U.S.-AMERICAN NATIONALITY
Rather than seeing the Texian identity that developed in the Lone Star Republic as
uniquely Texian, one could identify the Republic of Texas as an engine that sped up the
divisiveness between a Northern and Southern U.S.-American nationalism. European observers
identified in Texas a culture defined by expansionism and a desire for land; a feeling of racial
superiority vis-à-vis Africans, Native Americans, and Mexicans; an adventurer cult; and the
presence of slavery. These are many of the aspects Nackman regards as fundamental to Texians’
identity. Rather than viewing these characteristics as solely Texian, Europeans instead regarded
them as Anglo-American in general and sometimes as found in the South in particular. In his
letters, Elliot spoke of the Anglo-American “races” and their tendency to “fight with any people
for profits sake”.115 Kennedy also wrote the U.S.-Americans were “a people so shrewd, so landloving and so anticipatory”. The Briton saw these characteristics as transcending party lines and
regional differences, stating that “whatever professions may be put forth by American Statesmen
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of the East, or the West, the North, or the South, it ought not to be forgotten that, for forty years,
the heads of each party have laboured in turn to extend the South-Western flank of the Republic
towards the Rio Grande”.116 Aberdeen likewise viewed U.S.-Americans’ land-grabbing nature
and their subsequent desire for Texas’ annexation as partly national, yet also borne from party
differences and being used for party purposes. Though the “National vanity of all the States” of
the Union would be satisfied by Texas’ annexation, Aberdeen saw this as an issue related to the
“peculiar interests of the South”.117
Kennedy also reported that U.S. newspapers had proposed the replacement of U.S. chargé
d’affaires to Texas, Howard, with a Barton of Lousiana, a man opposed to English abolitionism
and a representative of Southern interests. This shows that Kennedy was not unaware of the fact
that Southerners in particular pushed for annexation.118 Elliot moreover seems to have viewed
the Anglo-Americans living in slave states in the South as much more objectionable than their
counterparts from free states: the latter he viewed as “orderly people that come to work for their
bread in peace”, whereas the former “idle[d] away their time in the hope of profitable adventure
in Mexico” and brought slavery with them to Texas. Elliot hoped that Texas would finally make
a determined stance towards sustained independence and “place Itself in a really independent
attitude, as respected the S. W. [South-Western] States of America, instead of one advanced post
of aggression against Mexico, which it will continue to be till Mexico has the sound wisdom to
sever the tie that connects Texas with those States”. The British chargé also expressed his hope
that the U.S. government would reject “any attempt of the S. W. States to force on a War with
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Mexico”, and that the U.S. would recognise that the expansion of slavery “in a S. W. direction”
would not be beneficial to the interests of the Union.119
Sometimes, correspondence with Texians increased these perceptions. Houston spoke to
Elliot of a division between the “Yankees” of the North, supplying the Union with manufactures,
and the South, which supplied raw materials and was home to slavery, and the West, interested
in increased trading routes. Houston also identified a party divide on the matter.120 In another
letter to Elliot, Houston asserted that “the Continent of North America is regarded by the people
of the U. States as their birth-right”, and that Texas would threaten this U.S. scheme of
expanding across the entire continent. The related fear of British interference in Texas Houston
believed to be a Southern one.121 Kennedy reported that General Hamilton, a Texian who had
also travelled to Europe to obtain recognition of Texas as an independent republic, was “a
follower of Mr Calhoun’s” and staunchly in favour of annexation. General Hamilton identified
himself with Southern interests, and sought, in a letter to Webster, to showcase why even the
North would benefit from an annexation of Texas. In another display of ties between U.S. South
and the Texians, Kennedy summarised that the “Polk party, or rather the Jackson party, are in the
ascendant here [in Texas], as well as in the United States”.122 The divisiveness of U.S.
Northerners and Southerners on the matter of Texas, and many Texians’ allegiance to the South
caused Elliot to surmise that in “this strange Scheme”, i.e. the entire Texas affair in U.S. politics,
there may have been “some speculation of preparing for the disruption of the South from the
North in the United States, and ultimately for the Establishment of a great Confederacy
extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with the possession of the Californias”. This scheme
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Elliot associated with anti-Mexican and anti-Indian sentiment, both characteristics that defined
Anglo-Texians’ identity.123 Aberdeen also underlined that Texas independence would benefit the
national unity of the United States and prevent the excitation of “discord in the bosom of that
great Country”. British interests, he argued, “require that the United States should remain
peaceful and united amongst themselves”, but expansionism jeopardised this national unity.124
Elliot, indeed, said that he feared what was becoming of the United States, manifesting
that negative attributes were beginning to dominate that country’s identity. Slavery was one such
subject, and one that was related to annexation. Moreover, the Texas Question was “founded on
mixed feelings of ill will and envy against Great Britain, and a rapacious spirit against Mexico”.
Such sentiment he identified as “a dangerous purpose against the integrity of the present Union”,
and contrasted it with the U.S. nationality of the Founding Fathers:
The Fathers of the United States when they imagined, and shaped the Scheme of society
under which that people live, and might live so flourishing and respected, knew that it
could only subsist by the maintenance and improvement of the great and good qualities of
the race from which they sprung. There was no hatred, no malice, or uncharitableness in
their hearts towards Great Britain, or any Country […] They knew well, indeed, what
would follow from the prevalence of envy, and aggression, and cupidity, and dishonest
fulfilment of engagements, and political intrigue, and the vulgar devices of
Electioneering knavery, and the postponement of the claims of the great and the good to
the clamour of demagogues […] Watchful observers in the United States and elsewhere,
must remark with anxiety that the race of their great Statesman [sic] is rapidly passing
away, and their influence is almost gone, that men of incomparably meaner dimensions
are taking their places, and that there are other painful evidences of the grave truth that
whilst elements of durable power and happiness are of slow growth in Nations […] the
decay of lights, and virtue, and the spirit of compromise is fearfully rapid.125
Elliot saw that the spirit of expansionism and the support of slavery led to a formation of a less
agreeable nationality in the United States, and the annexation of Texas was central to this
development. The British chargé reiterated this belief after annexation had been decided,
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proclaiming that this consummation strengthened the negative aspects of the U.S.-American
nation and its nationality: the territory claimed by the U.S. was larger than that actually settled by
Texians, showcasing an excessively aggrandising nature, and Elliot spoke dismayed of “Texas’
“prospective influence on America, that is in fact, the prospective influence on America of
continued violation of compact, and increasing spoliation by the Government of this Country on
feeble Powers”. He criticised “the means by which [annexation] has been accomplished; that is
means which cannot bear light”.126
Saligny frequently spoke of the Texians’ characteristics in terms of their overarching
racial identity, which he labelled as “Anglo-American” and used in reference to both U.S.Americans and Texians. Saligny’s racial views have already found discussion in chapter four,
but it is relevant for this chapter to recall that the attributes of the “Anglo-American race”
included a desire for land, a thirst for conquest, particularly of Mexican and Native-American
lands, industriousness, adventurism, and vanity. From Saligny’s accounts, one can thus see that
the episode of the Texas Republic, rather than solely influencing Texians’ identity, had an impact
on U.S.-American nationalism overall. De Cramayel had called the Anglo-Americans a “Go ahead” nation, calling them an “active, industrious, restless people”.127 Whereas de Cramayel
believed that Texians as such did not exist – rather, they were U.S.-Americans – he noted that the
Texas Republic shaped this nationalism, particularly in regard to Mexico. De Cramayel surmised
that the vigour with which U.S.-Americans pursued the incorporation of Texas, and the
arguments – of which the French diplomat said he understood not the logic – used to justify it
revealed “the real way of thinking [façon de penser] of the United States on Texas” and “the new
policy of the Anglo-American people”. As a result, de Cramayel feared that if Mexico tried to
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reconquer Texas, the former would encounter “an entire untameable race, animated by national
hatred, greed, and ambition”.128 This sentiment de Cramayel saw concentrated in the South and
in Texas, “formed as it was from the dregs of the southern states which themselves contain all
that is worst in the United States”.129 Like his diplomatic counterparts, Saligny concluded in
early 1846 that “the annexation of Texas is inciting and encouraging still more the insatiable
avidity and spirit of conquest of the American democracy”.130
The racialised references to Texians as Anglo-Americans, voiced particularly by Saligny
and de Cramayel but also by other Frenchmen, Germans and Britons, offer another perspective
for analysis. The racial attributes of U.S.-Americans and Texians – identical, given that they
were those of an ‘Anglo-American’ people or race – further cemented the idea of and European
scepticism of a Texian nationality that was, in reality, a mere extension of its U.S.-American
counterpart. Many of the components of the Texian nationality described by Nackman centred on
westward expansion and frontier life; these factors were discussed by Europeans in a racialised
way and applied overarchingly to Texians and U.S.-Americans, whose national differences were
already ambiguous but diminished further through the reference of both parties as “AngloAmerican”. Thus, the independence of the Republic of Texas caused Europeans to rethink the
meaning of nationality and cast it in a racial way, i.e., the low faith in Texas’ unique nationality
was in part motivated by Europeans’ conclusion that Texians were racially identical to U.S.Americans. The Mexican nationality, too, was seen increasingly through a racial lens as
Mexico’s integrity became threatened by the expansionism of an Anglo-American race. The
conflict of Anglo-Americans and Mexicans in Texas encouraged Europeans to view their own
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nation-states and nationalities as racially uniform identities: At times, for example, the French
got involved in Spanish America as a racially ‘Latin’ nation opposed to Anglo-Saxon or AngloAmerican expansion, as Maike Thier has outlined.131
The question of a Texian nationality and the existence of a ‘Texian nation’ also reveals
another aspect of European imperialism and international relations in the nineteenth century:
Europeans increasingly came to expect the existence of nations overseas. The emergence of a
large volume of works on the ‘law of nations’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
showcases that expectations for the existence of nations became popular among Europe’s
philosophers and statesmen. De Vattel’s and von Martens’ works demonstrate that some thinkers
sought to apply the concept of the nation to all societies, including also the tribal societies of
North America or the dominions of Indian kings.132 As de Vattel’s discrediting of North
America’s tribal societies has shown, however, these nations were not considered the full equal
of those of Europe.133 Rather, ‘civilised’ nations were expected to meet certain European criteria,
such as the presence of Christianity. Christianity occupied in the perception of many statesmen
and thinkers an elevated position vis-à-vis other religions, thus elevating Christian nations vis-àvis non-Christian nations. Von Martens emphasised that “the powers of Europe look upon
themselves as having a more general right to espouse the cause of the members of their religion,
and even to lend them military aid”, illustrating the importance of Christianity to the
development of the Law of Nations.134 Another excerpt from von Martens’ works likewise
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showcases the criteria Europeans used to assess other nations: von Martens considered the idea
of precedence or rank among nations, i.e., “the right of occupying the place of honour, when
several powers assemble, either personally, by themselves, or their representatives, or when their
names or titles meet in the body and signature of public acts”. In order to determine this place of
honour, to which “all powers have put in their claim” the nations of Europe have resorted to
“pleading the antiquity of their independence, the antiquity of the reigning family, their prior
profession of Christianity, their power, their form of government, the number of their crowns,
their dignities, titles”.135 North American tribal societies, thus, were not considered proper
nations by von Martens, who referred to the “discovery of America” and the acquisition of
colonies by European nations as positive events in European commerce.136
The field of nations was thus an unequal one, despite the fact that thinkers like de Vattel
and Marten aspired to create just and fair codices that would protect weaker nations from being
brutalised or conquered by others. By the nineteenth century, these ideas of the nation changed
through the idea of the nation-state. Though European statesmen expected to find their states in a
community of other nations, many regions of the world did not fit the idea of the nation-state.
Empires in Asia and societies in Africa did not fulfil the criteria of a common language, culture,
and religion, and consequently no longer fit into earlier treatises of international law. Just as
German statesmen and thinkers increasingly considered the foundation of a German nation-state
a necessity if Germany wanted to prove itself on the international stage next to powers like
France and Britain; just as German diplomats lamented that their fragmented political
confederation was not taken as seriously as nation-states Britain and France by states like
Mexico; Europeans begun to see it as beneficial that commerce abroad was conducted with
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nation-states. States that were generally not regarded as nation-states – many states in Asia and
Africa – became subject to formal imperialism rather than the informal methods used in Spanish
America, i.e. a region constituted by entities regarded as nation-states. Several historians have
analysed the modern nation-state of the past 200 years as a capitalist construct designed to
facilitate and promote commercial processes, production, and exchange.137 Meyer’s World Polity
Theory argues that a new world culture that emerged in the nineteenth century has forced various
groups – both colonisers and colonised, state elites and political challengers, liberals and
conservatives – to adopt nationalism and the nation-state as the most legitimate and effective
form of statehood.138 It is noteworthy that European imperialists left behind a landscape of
nation-states after decolonisation in the twentieth century – this phenomenon started with the
United States in the 1770s and the Spanish American states in the 1810s-20s. When Texas joined
the world increasingly defined by nation-states in 1836, Europeans classified it as a nation-state
despite the existence of doubts about the Texian nationality.
Ultimately, many Europeans did not see the Texas Question as leading to the rise of a
uniquely Texian nationality. Rather, they regarded it as a factor that both shaped the U.S.American nationality and led to its continued division between Southern and Northern interests
and identities. The annexation of Texas thus, as has been established by scholars, set up the
United States more firmly on the road to disunion and the Civil War. Many of the attributes
Nackman regards as uniquely Texian were discussed by European observers as U.S.-American
or Southern in nature. Nevertheless, as Lang has shown, Texians – by the 1860s, Texans – did
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use their state’s period of independence to justify secession, making them unique from their
Confederate counterparts. Indeed, the Republic-era did therefore shape how Texans perceived
themselves, but it did so in large part after independence had been surrendered in 1846. Even
today, one can identify among Texans a pride in their state’s nine years of independence: the
Texas Nationalist Movement continues to push for renewed Texan independence, and on the side
of the state’s highways, there are billboards (erroneously) reminding Texans that their state still
has the power to secede from the Union or split into several smaller states. In Europe, too, Texas
is identified as one of the most iconic U.S. states: Next to New York and California, many
Europeans seem to have the most illustrious image of Texas, often picturing the state as the
“Wild West” of horses, outlaws, and the Texas Rangers. The appeal of Texas dates back in part
to the plethora of travel literature on Texas authored by Europeans such as Scherpf, Kennedy,
Sheridan, and others.
Though Texian independence has shaped Texans’ patriotism today, the analysis of
Europeans’ perception of Texian nationalism showcases that most European agents and
observers saw little that made Texians distinct from their U.S. counterparts – instead, Texians
seemed to represent many of the U.S. Southern attributes that many Europeans detested, such as
the perpetration of slavery and a thirst for conquest, as well as U.S.-American characteristics in
general, such as vanity, expansionism, political unreliability and dishonesty, and antiEuropeanism. It was ultimately in large part this lack of faith in Texas’ sustained independence
and unique nationality that broke the back of Europeans’ dreams and ambitions in Texas,
because it prevented vigorous European action. As much as Europeans hoped that Texians would
choose independence and their nationality over annexation, they were confronted with the
resignation that this hope was rather a European rather than a Texian vision.
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Epilogue – Texas: A Vision of Empire

Texas’ independence falls into an interesting time period that confronted the young
Republic with a new and continuously changing form of imperialism practiced by Europeans,
one that centred on new ideas of commerce, liberal thought and international law, and
diplomacy. The emergence of new states like Texas in the Americas led European states to apply
new strategies in their imperial projects across the Atlantic. Philanthropic thought encouraging
the abolition of slavery garnered tremendous attention on both sides of the Atlantic, as did the
theory of free trade as propagated by Adam Smith. Trade, which itself had been changed by and
continued to change because of industrialisation, formed a crucial component of informal
empire. The fact that Europeans operated using a double-standard – or, in other words, the fact
that Europeans did not always practice what they preached – formed a key component of the
informal type of empire that emerged, in theory and in practice, in the Americas in the 1830s and
1840s. Europeans found themselves at the junction between protectionism and free trade,
outwardly pushing for low trading barriers whilst maintaining many of their own up to the
middle of the century; they desired the abolition of slavery, yet continued to purchase cotton
from one of the last countries in the Americas to grow its cash crops on the backs of slaves.
European officials and legal minds used the emerging codex of the law of nations to define their
countries’ relationship to states in the Americas but frequently rejected Mexican officials’ use of
or efforts to shape international law. Texas likewise became a place where European agents
applied their new understandings of international law, slavery, free trade, nationalism, and race
in order to create an informal-imperialist presence.
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Many of the agents hoping to establish such a presence were agents in the periphery. At
times, their ideas seemed to conflict with the instructions they were receiving from the European
centres of power and the leading state officials therein: Aberdeen emphasised continuously that
Elliot’s position was more that of the observer rather than that of the sweeping actor, and the
Prussian government distanced itself from the overtly imperial project of the Adelsverein. In
Mexico, also, many European diplomats and consuls were instructed to maintain their country’s
neutrality. Core state officials’ reticence on active involvement in American states’ affairs does
not mean that informal empire was rejected by core entities. From the Hamburg Commercial
Deputation’s astute observation that the outflow of silver from Mexico disempowered the latter
country whilst enriching Europe’s, to the rejection of protectionist barriers imposed by American
states, and finally, the support that European governments extended to their merchants, who
themselves, as peripheral agents, sometimes harboured informal-imperial aspirations, one can
identify contradictions in European centres’ official declarations of their countries’ neutralities
and some of their actions that defined European relations to American states.
Though Europeans were moving towards free trade in the nineteenth century, this shift
did not happen fully until the middle of the century. Britain was a pioneer in this pursuit of free
trade, repealing all major tariffs on foreign agricultural products in 1842 and repealing the Corn
Laws in 1846. Nevertheless, most scholars agree that Britain was quite protectionist prior to the
1840s, as were Continental Europeans. At the same time, Europeans pushed for low trading
barriers on behalf of the new Spanish American states, seeking to extend foreign recognition in
exchange for trade. This European double-standard was met with resistance on the part of states
such as Mexico, which sought to protect its own fledgling industries and prevent the outflow of
precious metals to Europe. Though many European diplomats saw Mexico as a state of
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significant commercial interest, in part due to its comparatively large population in Spanish
America and its metal wealth, they were vexed by Mexican protectionism and their inability to
overcome it. As the literature on informal empire has shown, European peripheral agents’
informal-imperialist ambitions were generally greater than those of their counterparts in
Europe’s centres of power. The former were the ones who exerted pressure on the Mexican
authorities, threatening state intervention and sanctions from their respective governments if
Mexico did not acquiesce to their demands. Here, diplomats and consuls worked closely together
with merchants, who had a vested interest in accumulating as much wealth from their
transactions in Mexico as possible. Though Europe’s core officials, such as foreign ministers,
rejected the idea that their diplomats in Mexico and Texas unduly influence the latter’s
governments, they did desire strongly that commercial connections be kept as open and liberal as
possible, and they supported reclamation efforts based on principles of international law. This, in
combination with diplomats’ and consuls’ actions and merchants’ pleas, led to the establishment
of a new type of imperialism in the nineteenth century, one dominated by informal tools.
Rather than seeing informal empire as a system enforced or envisioned by just one entity,
it is helpful to analyse it in the same way in which Wallerstein constructed the world-system
centred on capitalism: this world-system manages to maintain core, semi-peripheral, and
peripheral states as well as unequally distributed measures of power because it is a system
upheld by capitalism with caveats. There is no absolute capitalist competition in the worldsystem; rather, core states manipulate capitalism by the use of laws and other regulations. The
use of free trade, abolitionism, international law, and diplomacy to establish an informal-imperial
presence is no different: Europeans pushed for lower trading barriers in the Americas than they
themselves possessed, international law was an outgrowth of European legal thought and
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dominated by strictly European ideas on the concept of the nation and its rights, and politically
weaker countries were pressured much more intensely by England to sign slave trade treaties,
even if their vessels no longer or had never engaged in the slave trade. Another conclusion by
Wallerstein can also be applied to informal empire: whilst a world-empire is prevented by the
incomplete power on behalf of even the most powerful core states, such as hegemons Holland,
Britain, and the United States, scholar David MacLean also points out that informal imperialism
was utilised by Europeans because of the limits to their imperial power and ultimately,
possibilities: MacLean argues that Britain initially sought to intervene beyond the scope of
informal empire in South America by use of naval strength and military might, and that the
primary reason for Britain’s use of informal imperial strategies was the fact that Britain found
itself unable to implement more formal measures of imperialism or enact the political
circumstances which its officials had ideally desired. MacLean thus raises the question whether
informal empire was indeed a government strategy based on the communication between politics
and commerce, or rather a strategy that emerged as a result of a network of decisions,
interactions, and choices made by merchants and politicians. Much like the capitalist worldsystem, informal empire did not have to be borne from conscious choice on behalf of key state
officials in Europe. Rather, it was the network of actors and various tools of empire – including
commerce, diplomacy, international law, and abolitionism – that made informal imperialism
possible.
Informal-imperial aspirations on behalf of European states were not always successful, of
course. Mexico in the first half of the nineteenth century confronted Europeans with many
challenges. The country continued to uphold high trading barriers, frequently rejected
reclamations, and did not provide for the security of foreigners, which caused peripheral agents
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to exert pressure. Many of their labours did not earn them copious fruit: Mexico was insulated
from European influence by its high level of instability, including the frequent changes in
government, the insurgencies, rebellions and secessions in many parts of the country, and the
dire financial situation; as well as a degree of xenophobia among the Mexican population.
European diplomats in Mexico often felt unable to wrestle Mexico’s officials into concessions
for their countries, and direct interference in the form of the Pastry War were ineffective in
subjugating Mexico on an informal-imperialist level during the 1830s and 1840s. European – and
U.S.-American – attempts to incorporate Mexico into their imperial spheres became more
successful in the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly during the Porfiriato.
When Texas became independent, it quickly became an imperial vision for many
Europeans, particularly those who were engaged in the periphery. Travellers to Texas, such as
Scherpf, Kennedy, Sheridan, and de Baradère, spoke positively of the new republic, as did
merchants, such as Power, and peripheral diplomats, such as Mexican consul Crawford. Many of
them approached their respective governments to encourage them to extend recognition to Texas
with the expectation that trade with the young country would serve their own; in other cases, the
literature written by these individuals served as a source of information for Texas enthusiasts
such the Adelsverein. Once recognition was extended and diplomats sent to Texas, these agents
also had high hopes in Texas. People like Elliot, Saligny, or Klaener, wanted to form ties to
Texas in the most advantageous manner possible in order to enhance their own state’s interests
and power. Unlike Mexico, whose trade was dominated by Hamburg, Texas’ trade with
Germany was conducted via Bremen, giving the latter Hanse Town an opportunity to further its
wealth within the Hanseatic League as well as the German Confederation. Even officials of the
Hansa closer to home, located in Hamburg, Bremen, or Paris, aspired to use Hanseatic relations
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with Texas to augment the Hanse Towns’ position in the German Bund and to resist Prussian
extensions of power. The Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas even had the
vision that Texas could become a Germany outside of Germany, a stronghold of German power
in the Americas and hence a source for German power vis-à-vis the great maritime traders,
France and Britain.
Elliot, Kennedy, and Saligny highlighted the possibilities of an informal-imperialist
influence in Texas on behalf of Britain or France, respectively: Elliot was a staunch advocate of
abolitionism and aspired to utilise British influence to promote the eradication of slavery in
Texas, whereas most British agents in Texas foresaw the establishment of a firm British
commercial hold on that country. Texas could serve as a cotton supplier, a market for British
manufactured goods, and a buffer between Mexico and the United States, thereby curbing U.S.
expansionism. The agent of France – Britain’s commercial and imperial runner-up during the
nineteenth century –, Saligny, had similar goals for his own country, and advocated for one of
the most debated informal-imperialist measures, the Franco-Texienne Bill. Though an
independent Texas damaged European interests in Mexico, as particularly the diplomatic
correspondence of Europeans in the latter country showcases, European recognitions of and
interest in Texas grew in the late 1830s and early 1840s for primarily three reasons. The first and
second were the lack of faith in Mexico’s ability to reconquer Texas and the desire to prevent the
young state’s annexation to the United States. The third was founded on what Europeans
believed Texas could become if placed under their influence: Under English, French, or German
influence, Texas could shape power relations both in North America and globally. Texas thus
became a vision of empire for several European actors, a place where international relations –
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including diplomacy, commerce, the law of nations, nationalities, philanthropy, and racial
identities – could be redefined.
Unfortunately for Europeans, these ideas remained mere visions for Texas. Though hopes for
informal empire in that republic were present among most peripheral agents and even some
statesmen in Europe, the official dictum of non-intervention, the fear of U.S. influence, and the
lack of Texian nationalism in favour of an identification with the United States prevented the
realisation of informal imperialist endeavours in Texas. Scepticism regarding Texas’
independence and a suspicion that Texas could be annexed to the United States were present
among Prussians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Hanseates, who also dreaded that European
influence in Texas, no matter how small, would urge the United States to incorporate Texas. This
made Texas a difficult candidate for informal empire, for any diplomatic negotiations with that
state were overshadowed constantly by the looming prospect of annexation. Exerting too much
pressure on Texas could have led to its ‘suicide’, as von Bunsen referred to it, and Texians
continuously reminded European diplomats that Texas would choose incorporation into the
United States if Europeans did not mediate between Mexico and Texas. Annexation was thus
Texians’ primary power tool in their interactions with Europe. This tool was particularly potent
for a uniquely Texian nationalism was absent among many Texian citizens. Though some
officials, including Terrell, were fiercely in favour of independence and began to build a Texian
nationality built on founding myths and commonalities, most of Texas’ population and many of
its politicians desired annexation. Europeans, though they hoped that most Texians were
ambivalent on the issue and could be convinced to remain independent through more favourable
conditions – predominantly, peace with Mexico –, were adamant to stay largely uninvolved in
Texas’ internal politics so as not to drive Texians into the arms of the United States, where
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statesmen, particularly Southerners, raised their voices against and stoked fears of foreign,
especially British, interference.
It was partially because of these fears that European informal-imperial ambitions in Texas
remained without much success. Elliot’s dream of ridding the Republic of Texas of slavery never
came to fruition; Saligny was disappointed by the intense rejection Texians expressed regarding
the Franco-Texienne Bill; and the Adelsverein’s demand for commercial advantages for it and
the German states in exchange for the Society’s provision of immigrants to Texas remained
unanswered. On many occasions, European agents lamented that there arrived only seldomly a
European vessel in Texas, whereas most commerce – particularly contraband trade – continued
to be dominated by the U.S.-Americans. The Hanse Towns, who operated in the imperial web
without being its primary players, likewise encountered difficulties in their negotiations with
Texas. Though they, with Bremen at the forefront, desired to conclude a treaty with Texas in
order to attain the same trading benefits as the most favoured nation, the debates on the
Hanseatic-Texian treaty dragged on both in Texas and in the Hanse Towns. Thus, Bremian
vessels were never afforded the advantages of the most favoured nation and had to pay additional
duties. Politically, the Hanseates remained stymied in their relationship with Texas due to their
comparative powerlessness vis-à-vis states like Britain, France, the United States, and even
Mexico, which did not honour all stipulations of the Mexican-Hanseatic treaty. The Prussian
government’s resignation that an exertion of German influence in Texas exceeded Prussia’s
maritime, political, and military possibilities caused it to reject any imperial projects in Texas
from the start. Ultimately, Texas’ commerce and trade, its customs and culture, its legal
frameworks, its racial and national affiliation, and its politics, were dominated by the United
States throughout much of the independence years.
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Despite the fact that European trade with Texas was not very substantial, and despite the
country’s annexation in 1846, Texas is significant to the histories of empire, nationalism, and
international law for several reasons. First, it confronted Europeans with international legal and
commercial challenges. Treaties with American states raised fears among German politicians
that the “most favoured nations” clause could give the contracting American states the same
advantages given to other German states in customs unions designed to stabilise and strengthen
the German economy vis-à-vis other states’, especially England’s. If American states with whom
treaties using the ‘most favoured nation’ clause were furnished had these same advantages, the
purpose of these intra-German customs unions would be defeated. Thus, trans-Atlantic trade
confronted German officials with the question of how much free trade they really desired. The
Hanseatic-Texian treaty was revised several times in part to prevent the eradication of protective
Hanseatic trading barriers; yet next to this restrictive component, the Hanseates pushed for a very
liberal treaty that could set precedence for other Hanseatic treaties with foreign countries. An
international legal challenge for the Prussian government was the umpireship it assumed in 1839
to mediate between the United States and Mexico, a thankless task through which Prussia risked
offending either or perhaps both of the contesting parties. But the Prussian decision also posed a
challenge for Mexico: von Rönne engaged with ideas of de Vattel, Bülau, and Pinheiro-Ferreira
to determine the status of Mexico’s nationality and the resulting culpability of the Mexican
regime for damages and loss of property incurred by foreigners, and ultimately concluded that
there did not exist within Mexico a national will and that Texas was an independent nation
whose government needed to be consulted in regard to any U.S.-American claims in Texas.
These decisions angered Mexico’s authorities, for they questioned Mexico’s nationality,
suggested the country was in the midst of a civil war, and that it had irrevocably lost Texas, now
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its own nation with its own ‘national will’. But such analysis, based on, and illustrative of the
growing importance of, the law of nations, gave rise to new questions. How could Texas be
acknowledged as a nation when it lacked a nationality? Could a nation simply elect to commit
suicide, as Aberdeen questioned? Would it be forced to uphold its agreements with foreign
nations even after it had been absorbed by another? For these questions, Texas was a case of
precedence.
The Republic of Texas also had a lasting impact on U.S.-American nationalism. Texian
settlers based their identity on negative sentiment toward Native Americans, which was quite
common among U.S.-American frontiersmen. But many Anglo-Texians were also fiercely antiMexican, and became increasingly so as the republic headed toward annexation. At the same
time, and largely in response to the Texas Revolution and secession from Mexico, many U.S.Americans became more dismissive of and antipathic towards Mexicans as well. This
development was especially noticeable among those in favour of expansion as well as
Southerners – often, these two aspects dovetailed. In Texas, racial hierarchies were also created
and redefined: European observers saw a racial conflict brewing in the new country, one that
pitted the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American race against the Spanish, Mexican, or SpanishMexican race. Whereas the Anglo-American race was increasingly defined as expansionist,
aggressive, pioneering, successful, vigorous, industrious, and vain in regard to other racial
groups, the Mexican race was seen more and more as weak, debilitated, unproductive, and prone
to conquest at the hands of the Anglo-American race.
As such views of the Anglo-American race became more popular among European
statesmen, they also began – or were encouraged to continue – to redefine their own racial
identities vis-à-vis the other races of the North American continent. The French saw in Spanish
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America a race of Latins who had a natural affiliation with European states using Romance
languages, such as Spain, the Italian states, or France. Given that France considered itself the
predominant Latin power in the world, several French philanthropists, philosophers, and officials
began to believe that it was France’s rightful privilege and its duty to elevate these Latin races of
Spanish America and establish a bulwark to Anglo-American expansion. Germans identified in
Texas an opportunity to establish a Germanic element insulated from Anglo-American influence.
German officials argued that the German race was very susceptible to its Anglo-American
counterpart, pointing out that thousands of Germans emigrated to the United States each year,
cutting their ties to their homeland, which meant a loss of wealth and influence for Germany and
the Germanic race. In Texas, with its smaller population, several German entrepreneurs and
nobles considered it possible to build a German presence which maintained its connections to the
fatherland, thus promoting the industrious, reliable, and honest Germanic race in the Americas.
Moreover, Europeans’ impressions of Native Americans were changed in Texas: whereas many
German (and also French) travellers spoke rather positively of Indians, those Europeans who
visited Texas were confronted with the formidable Comanches, a tribe that many called savage
and barbaric.
Beyond shaping racial hierarchies, Texas – and North America more broadly – became a
place for European nation-building, especially for Germans. German merchants found unity in
the periphery, where intra-German differences gave way to an overarching national identity. To a
certain extent, this was born of necessity, as German diplomats emphasised: Prussian and
Hanseatic agents were met in Mexico with a plethora of difficulties associated with the lack of a
German nation-state, including the absence of maritime power, diminished political might and
financial resources, and the complexity of diplomatic undertakings as not all German states had
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representatives who were classified as diplomats and/or capable of handling reclamations. This
often led to Prussian officials’ assumption of duties to which they could not lay legal claim, e.g.
when they presented reclamations of non-Prussian merchants. These challenges in Mexico
informed how the concept of the nation-state was perceived by many Germans situated in that
country. This development dovetailed with the new type of imperialism centred around trade,
which emerged around the same time as England assumed a hegemonic position and threatened
the German economy. These new types of commercial relationships likewise encouraged
Germans, particularly merchants and officials, to see the nation-state as important. In a world
dominated by industrialisation and the power of maritime commerce, free trade, the law of
nations, and diplomacy, German politicians, philosophers, merchants, and economists realised
that a German nation-state was crucial if Germany wanted to compete internationally with
Britain and France.
On the other hand, Texas was also a place where Hanseates resisted Prussian designs for
a Germany consolidated under Prussian leadership: A Hanseatic-Texian treaty was supposed to
elevate the Hanse Towns’ prestige in the German Confederation and cement their position as
primary traders and windows to the trans-Atlantic world. The periphery, in this case, Mexico and
Texas, was thus used by various German states to shape intra-German developments and contest
the power of other German states, at the same time as German diplomats and merchants became
increasingly aware of the need for cooperation and collaboration abroad in order to augment
Germany’s competitiveness with England, the United States, and France. The Americas are also
interesting for they are evidence of an early disparity between Austria and Prussia. Whereas
Austria waited a long time to extend recognition and send representatives to Spanish America,
Prussia was involved in trans-Atlantic trade much earlier on and thus became the political leader
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of German commerce with the Americas. Texas is also an episode in the history of German
imperialism and colonisation: There had been, prior to the Adelsverein’s efforts in Texas, several
projects to colonise a region of America in order to elevate Germany into the ranks of powers
like Britain and France. Gernot Lennert describes the desire of the ruler of Brandenburg to see
his state participate in overseas trade and colonialism in the seventeenth century, hoping that
such endeavours would boost his country’s international status and power. Two colonial projects,
however, in West Africa and the Caribbean, remained unsuccessful. Even through its union with
Prussia, the new Prussia-Brandenburg had very little sea access, and that which it did possess
was frequently controlled by other smaller imperial powers, such as Sweden. Lennert regards
these seventeenth-century ambitions as stepping stones to the German Empire’s colonial desires
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.1 Indeed, much like these former missions, the
Adelsverein’s Texas project failed to establish a German colony that continued to hold
significant political, economic, or imperial relevance to Germany. This desire for colonies
becomes a recurring theme in German history, culminating in the Scramble for Africa of the late
nineteenth century, where Germany, finally united as the Second German Empire, acquires a few
colonies and ‘a place under the sun’ of its own.
The independence of Texas from Mexico and its annexation to the United States accelerated
the course that the North American continent was on. Shortly after Texas’ incorporation into the
Union, the U.S.-Mexico War commenced, and by 1848, Mexico had lost roughly half its territory
to its northern neighbour. This event had a large impact on Mexicans’ identity, which developed
in part in opposition to the U.S.-Americans. The United States, on the other hand, found itself
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heading closer towards disunion. The annexation of Texas was hotly debated between
abolitionists and slaveholders, Northerners and Southerners, manufacturers and raw material
producers, and those opposed to and in favour of expansion. Slavery indeed was once more at the
forefront of U.S.-American politics. Southerners sought to make this institution a domestic
policy issue rather than an international one, thus rejecting English abolitionism as undue
interference of a foreign empire. English designs for abolition in Texas were perceived by
Southern statesmen as a threat to their rights and their country’s integrity; this Anglophobia was
used by Southerners to define themselves and slavery became an increasingly integral part of
their identity. Though Northerners were not as concerned about undue British interference in
regards to slavery in Texas, they likewise engaged with ideas of Anglophobia, fearing the
expansion of British industry and commerce in North America.
The annexation of Texas was a success for U.S.-Americans who feared British, or any
European, influence in the Americas. Indeed, European conduct in Texas was shaped heavily by
the knowledge that the U.S. government followed the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, a declaration
that rejected European involvement in the Western hemisphere. Though the United States was
not in any position to enforce this doctrine in the entirety of the Americas or even just North
America, the policy did have teeth in Texas. Due to Texians’ inclination toward annexation, the
United States had the upper hand in Texas vis-à-vis Europeans, and the latter were thus stymied
in taking vigorous action in Texas for fear that the new republic would accede to the Union. The
Republic of Texas was thus one of the first episodes in which European states were confronted
with an effective Monroe Doctrine, one that limited their possibilities of exerting imperial,
commercial, or diplomatic influence in North America. When Tyler echoed the Monroe
Doctrine’s tenets in late 1842, Elliot expressed his disdain, commenting that “this pretension of
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United States policy may not be equally acceptable to all ‘the States of the American
Continent’”, for many Spanish American states probably lacked confidence in the purposes of
Washington. Surely, Spanish America would not wish “to cast off all other friendships in peace,
or alliances in War”. Elliot critiqued Tyler’s declared “Bon Soir” of European influence in the
Americas by highlighting that “there is no objection to as much of United States influence on the
Continent of Europe […] but Great Britain must pretend to no influence on the Continent of
America”. The English agent in Texas had little understanding for U.S. pronouncements
“drumming us all off this Continent”, but Europeans’ fear of Texas’ annexation proves that this
episode was one where the United States could repel European interference in a region of the
Americas.2
But this was only the beginning: The United States desired to become the primary imperial
power on the North American continent, and Britons were aware of this sentiment. What is more,
the U.S.-American imperialism applied to Texas and the other territories in northern Mexico was
a formal type of imperialism; the United States sought territorial conquest and annexation rather
than an informal control through commerce or diplomacy. Its imperial vision was also built on
older strategies of empire that many European powers had largely discarded, such as the reliance
on plantation slavery, the aggressive subjugation of Native peoples in the regions they
conquered, and, as British correspondence and President Tyler’s use of Monroe Doctrine
principles reveal, the rejection of foreign commerce. After hearing that General Hamilton had
coaxed Webster to view Texas’ annexation positively because this would enable the United
States to exclude British commercial competition in Texas, Kennedy told Aberdeen that “the
American imagination eagerly anticipates the day, predicted by Humboldt, when the products of
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European industry should be excluded from this Continent. – It takes at times even a more selfexalting range, and, by means of Settlements on the North Western Shores of the Pacific, dreams
of creating a commercial dominion in India and China”.3
Texas is symbolic of the changes that occurred on the North American continent. Not only is
it prophetic for the power that the Monroe Doctrine would gain by the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, not least due to the addition of the Roosevelt Corollary, but the historic
episode of the Republic of Texas showcases the rise of the United States as a global imperial
power. Europeans wanted to maintain an independent Texas not merely for their own economic
benefit, but also to curb U.S. expansionism, commercial growth, and imperial strength. Though
the United States was only a little over a half-century old, it was already identified by European
states as a major rival. De Cramayel observed that it was “England especially, who daily watches
her former colonies burgeon into a rival nation endowed with the same qualities and made of the
same stuff that have constituted her own strength” who anxiously hoped to prevent annexation,
knowing that this would strengthen the United States.4 Saligny’s admiration for and critiques of
the Anglo-American race, German agents’ misgivings regarding the quick assimilation of the
‘Germanic element’ into the Anglo-American mainstream, and the overall awareness of the
United States’ growing industrial output and commercial successes demonstrate that the United
States was perceived as a formidable rival by Europeans as early as the 1830s.
Rafe Blaufarb has shown that as early as the French Revolutionary Wars, internal European
strife enabled U.S. expansionism by forcing Spain and Britain to abandon their restrictive
policies. Samuel Flagg Bemis’ book on the matter is aptly named America’s Advantage from
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Europe’s Distress.5 Blaufarb concludes that the disengagement of Europeans on the North
American continent during and after the French Revolutionary Wars “led to the emergence of the
United States as a respected actor on the international stage and was one of the factors that led to
its eventual rise to superpower status”.6 Another such factor was the annexation of Texas, for to a
certain extent, the same mechanics that were at work during the French Revolutionary Wars
were also at work during the era of the Republic of Texas. Though France and England were not
at war with each other between 1836 and 1846 – which consequently means that war between
these two parties was not the reason why Texas’ annexation came to pass –, the two powers were
unable to prevent the incorporation of Texas into the Union in part because their alliance to
mediate between Texas and Mexico was incredibly fickle and marked by a measure of mutual
distrust. The correspondence of the two Prussian representatives in London and Paris, von
Bunsen and Count Armin, respectively, illustrates this. Armin wrote to his government that
France ultimately did not see within the Texian affair a casus belli, largely because French
officials did not perceive France as an American power in the same manner as Britain was.7
Thus, French statesmen feared that their engagement in the Texas Question would lead their rival
England to accrue the fruits of French labour, or as Kossok summarised: “Guizot did not have
the inclination to rescue the English chestnuts from the American fire with French pliers”.8 This
European disunion was thus to the United States’ advantage; Texas was annexed without
European resistance, and the historic episode of the Republic of Texas ended up joining a line of
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factors that promoted the U.S.-American global ascent. The annexation of Texas was also a
major victory for the United States vis-à-vis Britain, the hegemon of the nineteenth century.
The nineteenth-century North American continent was thus a space for heated imperial
contestation, commercial rivalry, and competition over diplomatic-political pre-eminence and
influence. Many states had interest in Texas, aware of the fact that this territory had the potential
of reshaping power relations in North America and indeed, globally. Countries like the
Netherlands, Belgium, the Hanse Towns, Prussia, England, France, the United States, and
Mexico, all sought to use the existence of the new state of Texas in order to obtain personal
benefit and enhance their position on the international stage. Be it through emigration,
discussions of philanthropy in the form of abolitionism, commerce and trade, or diplomacy, all
of these states, in addition to some non-state actors, such as the Adelsverein, aspired to exert their
influence in Texas. The looming prospects of Mexican reconquest or U.S. annexation as
perceived by Europeans, or European intervention or interference as feared by the United States,
meant that the Texas Question was also a race against time. Though European powers had
initially been so reluctant to recognise Texas, the latter years of Texian independence turned into
a scramble for influence: Britain and France, eager to maintain Texas’ independence, scrambled
to obtain Mexico’s recognition of Texas before U.S. annexation could take place, whereas the
members of the Adelsverein scrambled to commence German colonisation as quickly as possible
despite the Society’s unpreparedness. The Hanse Towns, eager to use the Texian treaty as
precedent for their other trans-Atlantic treaties, receive the commercial benefits of the ‘most
favoured nation’ clause, and forge an additional agreement combining trade and emigration,
scrambled to determine a common course at a time when Lübeck’s and Hamburg’s reluctance
was opposed with Bremen’s greater enthusiasm on the Texas matter. What informal-imperialist
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ambitions in Texas illustrate is that an imperial scramble was not just characteristic of the latenineteenth-century colonialism, an outgrowth of formal empire. Rather, informal empire was
characterised by a scramble as well: the power to come first in recognising a new state could
potentially achieve the most commercial benefits and diplomatic influence, inciting other states
to take similar steps, et cetera.
Overall, the Republic of Texas was, for many European actors, particularly those in the
periphery, a large ‘what could have been’. Europeans had high hopes in an independent Texas, a
new state that would have suited European designs for North America very well. What then,
could have happened if Texas had remained independent? Though nobody can answer this
question, one can surmise that the United States’ continental and global ascent could possibly
have been delayed. It is dubious whether this could have entirely been prevented – as Blaufarb
has shown, the road to U.S. power had already been paved by events such as the French
Revolutionary Wars. Moreover, the United States’ great proximity to Texas may have made it
impossible to maintain an independent republic between Mexico and the United States even if
Texians had chosen against accession. However, the Republic of Texas is significant to the
history of international relations and imperialism: For a period of almost a decade, several
Europeans envisioned a North America not dominated by the United States. They saw in Texas a
state that could elevate their own state’s prestige and status in a world-system centred on
capitalism and commerce. Thus, the history of the Texas Republic and Europeans’ engagement
therewith demonstrates that a discussion of informal empire can be fruitful even where such
designs ultimately failed, for the visions of empire offer tremendous insight on developments of
international law, nation-building and nationalism, commerce and trade, diplomacy, racial
hierarchies, and the history of slavery.
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